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Abstract 
In the context of international agendas to transform African States from a state of corruption 
to good governance, Oyo State’s transformation in 2011 provides an apparent fairy tale case 
study. For eight years, the state was synonymous with violence and ‘godfatherism’, but 
Governor Abiola Ajimobi’s election in 2011 brought the promise of transformation, in line 
with the Lagos Model, based on the highly celebrated example of nearby Lagos State. This 
thesis draws on six months of in-depth qualitative fieldwork in Ibadan, the capital of Oyo 
State, to show how the Lagos Model in Oyo State leveraged international conceptions of 
good governance to pursue a political strategy of autonomy from central government, whilst 
building on long-held progressive political ideas in Yorubaland. However, the Lagos Model 
faced competition from populist opposition, who drew on the failings of the Lagos Model to 
meet popular conceptions of good governance. Key themes in popular conceptions of good 
governance are: progress, legitimate leadership and economic benefits. This thesis analyses 
the tensions within the Lagos Model’s response to these themes and uses empirical material 
to reveal how these tensions play out in practice. The ways in which Ajimobi was required to 
respond to numerous competing conceptions of good governance complicates the initial 
theoretical framing of a binary between corruption and good governance.   
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Chapter 1 - Introduction: Oyo State’s Transformation and the 
Standard Story of Corruption to Good Governance in Nigeria 
1. Nigeria: From Corruption to ‘Good Governance’ 
Dr Kayode Fayemi, a poster-boy for the Action Congress of Nigeria took office as Governor 
of Ekiti State in October 2010, after a court ruled that he was the true winner of the 2007 
election (PM News 2010; Eribake 2010; Premium Times Nigeria 2013a).  In office he 
rejected the corruption and embezzling of state funds that had characterised previous 
administrations. He committed to the policies advocated by the international conception of 
good governance: reducing the budget deficit, reducing reliance on oil revenues and 
increasing government effectiveness (Premium Times Nigeria 2013b; Premium Times 
Nigeria 2013c). At a time when federal engagement with international institutions was 
stalling, Ekiti entered a new era of close collaboration with the World Bank, who lauded 
Fayemi’s achievements in education, fiscal responsibility and his track record of 
implementing donor programmes. He assembled a team who had track records of working 
with various international agencies including DFID, UNDP and the World Bank (Channels 
TV 2013b; Premium Times Nigeria 2013d; 2013e; Channels TV 2013a).  
Four years later, in the 2014 gubernatorial election, Fayemi was beaten by Ayo Fayose of the 
PDP. Fayose represented the money-driven politics that had so characterised Nigeria. He 
was impeached in 2006 and was placed under investigation for corruption by the Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission, who mounted a case against him for stealing at least 
N416m whilst in office, including buying a Mercedes Benz for his mother (Premium Times 
Nigeria 2013f; Premium Times Nigeria 2014a). Coming into the election campaign, Fayose 
faced outstanding allegations of both corruption and murder and following the election there 
were reports of extreme electoral misconduct (Gbadebo 2014; Premium Times Nigeria 
2014b; 2014a; 2015a; Sahara Reporters 2015). Months after his election, thug-rule had 
returned, with men linked to the Governor invading a court room where a case against 
Fayose was being heard and violently attacking judges and litigants (Premium Times Nigeria 
2014c). 
The 2014 election campaign was marred with violence and some elite supporters of Dr 
Fayemi were intimidated into silence (Premium Times Nigeria 2014d). Whilst the election 
suffered from misconduct, there were grounds to believe that Fayose nonetheless had 
significant support among the population. This opened the possibility that the conception of 
good governance offered by the likes of Fayemi was not necessarily what the majority of 
people on the ground wanted or considered to be good governance.  
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The New York Times described the situation surrounding the 2007 election in the following 
Manichean terms: “Mr. Fayemi’s campaign treads the treacherous middle ground between 
the high road, on which pro-democracy advocates have traditionally marched directly to 
defeat, and the bruising, money-driven politics that dominate Nigeria’s electoral contests.” 
The mainstream interpretation was that there were a virtuous minority of politicians, like 
Ekiti’s Dr Fayemi, who knew what good governance looked like: “the high road”. Yet, they 
were forced to make concessions to “money-driven politics” despite it making them 
‘uncomfortable’, because, as Fayemi said, “this is what we live with” (Polgreen 2006)  
The story of Ekiti State raises major questions about what sort of politics is best able to meet 
popular needs and demands. It calls into question the assumption that a certain broad model 
of politics, that which has been promoted by the donor community in developing countries 
for at least the last 25 years, is best suited to providing development and legitimate 
government. The international conception of good governance promoted by the World Bank, 
the UN and OECD bilateral donors has been supported by innumerable loans and reform 
programmes. The Ekiti case serves as an example of how, when these programmes 
eventually take effect and developing countries replicate the ‘good governance’ model, they 
may be rejected in favour of their polar opposite. This raises the possibility that certain core 
values or needs are overlooked by international conception of good governance.  
Nigeria typically fits into broader discussions about corruption and good governance as a 
prime example of the worst kind politics (Gore and Pratten 2003, 212; Apter 2005; Nolte 
2006, 484; Albin-Lackey 2012, 132; Hill 2015, 669). Adebanwi and Obadare (2013, 6) quote 
from Joseph’s seminal work on prebendalism (1983) to describe the Nigerian state: “systems 
of formal authority … that function as camouflages and operate according to recondite forms 
of ‘rational irrationality’— legal, paralegal, or even outright illegal.” This understanding of 
two systems, the formal and the informal operating simultaneously and parasitically, with the 
formal state as a mere façade, is expressed in the African Politics literature as 
‘neopatrimonialism’ (Eisenstadt 1973; Bratton and van de Walle 1994; Erdmann and Engel 
2007; Bach and Gazibo 2012). Through Nigeria’s history multiple processes - colonisation, 
oil politics, military rule, and economic structural adjustment - have resulted in the 
“alienation of the ruled from the rulers” and an ongoing “crisis of governance” in the 
country (Awe 1999, 1; Akinwale and Aderinto 2012). 
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2. Oyo State: The Fairy Tale Transformation  
Against this background of corruption and disaster, this thesis is about an apparent fairy tale 
exception which was unfolding in the south-west of the country. Noting that good 
governance is “not a concept normally associated with Nigeria”, the Financial Times 
commented in 2012 that in Lagos State, “things have started to turn around” (Financial 
Times 2012) An academic commentator writing in the New York Times in 2014 agreed that 
Lagos “seems to have turned a corner” and is “well governed and thriving” despite being a 
“slum-ridden and largely impoverished metropolis” (Kaplan 2014). Over 12 years, between 
1999 and 2011, the Lagos State government had undertaken wide-ranging reforms to create 
order and cleanliness in the state and jump-start private sector-led development, with the 
help of sustained input from donors like DFID and the World Bank (DFID 2007; House of 
Commons 2009; DFID 2014).   
In Oyo State, a state of 6million people a few hours drive from Lagos, the transformation 
was even more rapid (NPC 2006). In 2007 Oyo State was among four states highlighted by 
Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch 2007) as exhibiting some of the worst 
‘Godfather politics’ in the country. Godfathers are powerful men who position themselves as 
political patrons, mobilising both state and personal resources to build up a network of 
‘protégés’ under their control (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007; Albin-Lackey 2012; 
Animasawun 2013; Hoffman and Nolte 2013). Human Rights Watch reported on Rashidi 
Ladoja, the former state Governor’s, attempt to escape the yoke of Oyo’s most powerful 
godfather, Lamidi Adedibu, which resulted in violence, a dubious impeachment and the 
installation of a new Governor more compliant with Adedibu’s demands for access to the 
state treasury (Human Rights Watch 2007). The new, Adedibu-approved, Governor was 
subsequently re-elected in elections marred with irregularities later exposed in court (O. 
Ajayi 2007).  
Yet in 2011, the PDP lost the Oyo gubernatorial election to a candidate from the Action 
Congress of Nigeria, a progressive party that had, for over a decade, won international 
acclaim for their achievements transforming nearby Lagos. Abiola Ajimobi won the election 
with around 40% of the vote and proceeded to make radical changes to the state, in line with 
the technocratic Lagos Model (Sahara Reporters 2011). Ajimobi’s track record matched the 
prescriptions of the international good governance agenda: governance reforms to make the 
civil service more efficient, the reduction of state involvement in the economy and the use of 
public-private partnerships (PPPs) to deliver public goods.  
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Oyo State is a key example for studying how the Lagos Model plays out in a new terrain. 
Lagos, where the state and the city are broadly coterminous, is the modern business capital 
of Nigeria, with a huge economy estimated at $90bn in 2014 and host to the headquarters of 
major international and regional corporations. It hovers between the 10th and 5th biggest 
economies in Africa, bigger than whole countries such as Cote D’Ivoire and Kenya (Oni and 
Nwagwu 2015; Kazeem 2016; Vanguard News 2016). Oyo State, and its capital, Ibadan, in 
particular, is the traditional heart of Yorubaland. The state is home to the seats of the Old 
Oyo Empire, Oyo Town, and has been the regional hegemon since the nineteenth century 
Yoruba wars. By the middle of the twentieth century, Ibadan was the political and 
administrative centre of the whole of what was then Western Region. 
 Whilst Ibadan lacks the international commercial importance of Lagos, it is still the second 
biggest city in the South West Zone, and has one of the highest population densities in 
Nigeria. Ibadan’s GDP in 2011 was US$9.5bn, making it bigger than the neighbouring Benin 
Republic (NPC 2006; FrontierStrategyGroup 2011). This means that whilst Oyo State is 
home to only 10% of the population of the South West zone, it enjoys a much greater hold 
on the Yoruba imagination than its current size would suggest (NBS 2013). It is the next 
natural step to investigate how the Lagos Model plays out in Oyo State with a focus on 
Ibadan. 
Moreover, Oyo State is a pertinent case with regards engagement with the international 
conception of good governance via donor programmes. Most developing countries which 
adopted good governance reforms did so as a result of conditionality, for example as part of 
the eligibility requirements for debt relief under the heavily indebted poor countries 
initiative (Stewart and Wang 2003). However, there are a number of states who have 
undertaken good governance reforms, and entered into partnerships with major donors, 
namely the World Bank, via a very different route. Some states approached the World Bank 
seeking partnerships (World Bank 2010a). Oyo State presents a case study of such a ‘self-
selecting’ good governance state. It had almost no donor involvement between 2003 and 
2011. The securing of $200m from the World Bank for a major flood defences project later 
that year was celebrated by the administration as vindication of their good governance 
credentials (The Guardian Nigeria 2015).  
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3. Aims of the Thesis: Political Values in the Study of African Politics 
Alex de Waal’s 2015 study of the Horn of Africa promised to go beyond the naivety and 
bluster of the development industry and shine a light on the “real politics” of Africa. Rather 
than building towards the lofty goals of state-building, real politics is a “political 
marketplace” where everything is up for sale. Supply and demand – of money, loyalty, arms 
and natural resources – interweaves with violence as a value-signalling mechanism (Waal 
2015). On this view, to understand politics we must see it as essentially practical and 
instrumental. Driven by self-interest, politics in Africa is a means to an end.  
This thesis seeks to make a contribution to the understanding of politics in Nigeria from the 
opposing direction. If politics is a means to an end, then what are the ends? Despite the 
widely noted failure of successive governments to fulfil citizens’ expectations, it does not 
mean that there are not rich conceptions of good governance against which political figures 
and the state are being evaluated.  
Traditional themes of ideological debate, like class and the role of the state, were fiercely 
debated by Nigerian and foreign intellectuals in the 1970s and 1980s (Ayoade 1985; 
Williams 1974). Surrounded by neighbours that had formally declared allegiance to 
Scientific Socialism, and caught between rival Cold War powers, the ideological orientation 
of the country appeared to be a genuine and pressing choice to make. After the military coup 
of 1984 there were intense discussions of the need to draw on ideology to foment social and 
economic change (Yusif 1984). The ensuing decade and a half of military rule, combined 
with disastrous Structural Adjustment Policies, effectively shut down such debates (Agbaje 
and Guyer 2002).     
From the 1990s Nigeria came to be seen as a country without politics or ideology; any 
political disagreements between constituencies were cast as the result of competition for 
resources between ethnic or regional blocks (Osaghae 1994; Osaghae 1992). Nigerian 
commentators tend to see the “poverty of ideology” as a weakness in politics (Aleyomi 
2013, 289; Omotola 2009). Nigerian parties promote neopatrimonial ethnic politics, rather 
than programmatic appeals (Cheeseman 2014, 17–18; Ikeanyibe 2008). Political 
commentators in the domestic press identified a lack of ideology as one of the factors in 
Nigeria’s failure to mature politically, and linked this to corruption and self-aggrandisement 
(Odebode 2013). 
Rather, what mattered for development was governance, which could be measured against a 
number of indices (Cleen Foundation 2010; Amundsen 2010).  This gave rise to the 
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conception of Nigerian politics that dominated academic and policy discussions from 1999 
onwards: ideologically undifferentiated parties competing to control venality and patronage, 
occasionally punctuated by virtuous, but unsuccessful, interjections from civil society and a 
tragic but high-minded progressive opposition.  
Broadly, the binary between corruption and good governance, is reproduced in the 
mainstream understanding of Nigeria as a country caught between the failures of the formal 
system and the insidious venality of an informal system. The ongoing popularity of analysis 
of Nigerian politics as prebendal or neo-patrimonial is part of this mainstream interpretation 
(Albin-Lackey 2012; Adebanwi and Obadare 2013).  However, this dual systems 
interpretation is reductive and constructs an idea of Nigerian politics as being vacant of any 
normative political values. This sense of Nigeria being a vacuum, leads to the claim that 
once corruption is washed away then good governance must be built up from scratch. JNC 
Hill writes that “few places in the world today are more synonymous with corruption. 
Checks, balances, political offices and layers of government, therefore, all need to be 
designed and empowered with this in mind” (Hill 2015, 669) According to this view, the 
entire toolbox of government needs to be 'designed', summoned out of thin air and donor 
policy papers, as if there were no existing institutions that are worth building upon.    
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4. Research Question 
The question this thesis seeks to answer is: what were the politics of good governance in 
Oyo State between 2011 and 2015 and how did different conceptions of good governance 
play out in political competition?  
This is broken down into three sub-topics. The first sub-topic addresses the interface 
between international conceptions of good governance, as represented by the good 
governance agenda of the World Bank and the donor community, and the Lagos Model. Is 
the Lagos Model a direct replication of international models or is it simply a way of paying 
lip service to international standards whilst maintaining existing models of governance? 
Alternatively, does the Lagos Model represent a genuine moment of African innovation and 
agency? 
The second sub-topic is the different conceptions of good governance that form the 
normative environment into which good governance reforms are received. What are the 
popular conceptions of good governance that challenge Ajimobi’s agenda and how are they 
mediated through the day-to-day realities of political competition?  What are the 
mechanisms by which people in Oyo State hold their leaders to account and ensure 
transparency of government, and how do leaders show themselves to be accountable and 
transparent? 
The final sub-topic focuses on the way that those leaders who are committed to a reformist 
good governance programme navigate between different conceptions of good governance 
and popular demands. How does the Oyo State government under Abiola Ajimobi respond to 
efforts to hold it accountable to differing conceptions of good governance? What are the 
contradictions and tensions involved in making a break with existing models of governance 
and how does this play out politically?  
Chapter Overview:  
The thesis is made up of nine chapters. This introduction is the first chapter. Chapter two 
reviews the literature on governance, looking both at conceptions of good governance that 
have been developed ‘from above’, among international institutions, political science 
scholars and donors, and ‘from below’, that is, how grassroots systems of governance and 
conceptions of good governance have been studied. It also considers the intersection of the 
two, how donors have at times sought to replace grassroots governance, and at others sought 
to harness it. 
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Chapter three presents the historical background to the case and the methodology and 
methods. It considers how the research question can best be answered through certain sorts 
of data collection, and how data can and should be used to produce knowledge. Within this 
chapter there are also reflections on how my identity as a scholar, and my position in global 
systems of power, influenced the data I was able to collect and my interpretations thereof.  
The remaining chapters form the substantive argument of the thesis. Together they seek to 
answer the main research question about the competing conceptions of good governance in 
Oyo State between 2011 and 2015. The sub-topics are woven through the chapters.   
Chapter four lays out indigenous notions of good governance, and shows how they oppose 
the corrupt and venal politics of Oyo’s recent past. It highlights enduring themes and 
reference points in politics in Oyo State and Yorubaland more generally. These are a desire 
for long-term progress, for immediate economic benefits for the poor majority, and that 
leaders are legitimate. The broad lines of political thought in Oyo State are set out, 
emphasising the historical roots of progressive and populist politics. It draws on a variety of 
key moments in the history of Oyo State, drawing out the interactions between these lines 
and how each responded to popular needs left unmet by the other. It explains the 
contemporary politics of Oyo State leading up to 2011. The chapter shows how, in the years 
before 2011, the elite preferences of ‘kingmakers’ in Oyo state were starting to shift. 
Increasingly the ostentatiously corrupt serving Governor became a liability for Oyo State 
elites in a broader national and international environment that was gradually cracking down 
on corrupt practices.  
Chapter five introduces the Lagos Model, a set of governance principles, reforms and 
policies first pioneered by Lagos State governors between 1999-2015. Through the political 
patronage of Bola Tinubu, the Lagos Model has been exported to other neighbouring states 
in the Southwest Yoruba region of Nigeria. Oyo is one of the states where the model has 
been replicated closely since 2011. The Lagos Model draws not only on international 
conceptions of good governance, but is heavily based on older Yoruba progressive ideas and 
groups. These ideas combine with new aspects of international good governance, such as the 
enthusiasm for the international private sector, to form a new and distinctive conception of 
good governance. The Lagos Model leverages the idea of good governance as part of a long-
running political strategy to achieve independence from central government, which for 
decades was controlled by hostile rival factions. The chapter first sets out the Lagos Model 
in its original form in Lagos State before rendering its implementation in Oyo. Whilst the 
Lagos Model has been effective at radically expanding the provision of public goods, the 
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associated policies have problematic implications favouring elites and legitimising 
inequality.    
Chapters six, seven and eight take the framework of the three key themes of popular 
demands in Yoruba politics and uses each to explore the tensions within the Lagos Model, 
and between the Lagos Model and popular conceptions of good governance. In-depth 
qualitative examples are used to explore the political and economic consequences of these 
tensions in Oyo State between 2011 and 2015. 
Chapter six looks at the tensions inherent in building a political programme around 
‘progress’ and the responses to it on the ground. It presents an in-depth case study of traders 
who were cleared from the roadside as part of urban renewal and were eventually relocated 
to a newly-built, government-sponsored neighbourhood market. It takes as its starting point 
the puzzle of why some traders have remained in the market despite making almost no sales. 
It explores the experiences and hopes of the traders who remained, and compares them with 
those of traders who went back to the roadside. The Lagos Model discursively constructs an 
enlightened public, who will understand its transformative policies and to whom it can be 
accountable.  Whilst the traders who remain, many at great economic cost, construct 
themselves as members of the ‘enlightened public’ a major factor in their ability to remain is 
participation in party patronage networks linked to the Governor. Therefore, a flagship 
policy of the Lagos Model, with its transformative technocratic aspirations, is made possible 
through the Governor’s engagement with contrasting forms of governance.  
Chapter seven explores the tensions within the theme of legitimate leadership, exploring 
conflicting conceptions of accountability and transparency, and how they played out in 
political competition. In the pursuit of the Lagos Model’s conception of accountability as 
performance, Ajimobi centralised decision-making and government spending within key 
agencies in the executive branch of the state government. Whilst centralisation increased the 
government’s capacity to deliver certain public goods, it reduced accountability downwards 
to various democratic and political actors. This reflects the tensions within the international 
conception of good governance between effectiveness and accountability. The chapter then 
draws on a variety of in-depth interviews to reconstruct the values that define legitimate 
leadership within popular conceptions of good governance: transparency in people and 
accountability as accessibility. It then considers two case studies of how these popular 
notions came into tension with the tendency, supported by both the Lagos Model and 
international good governance agenda, towards the ‘politics of insulation’ and the increasing 
internationalisation and regionalisation of Ajimobi’s economic strategy.    
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Chapter eight focuses on the tensions surrounding Ajimobi’s response to popular demands 
for short-term economic benefits. During elections, demands couched in the popular 
conceptions of good governance become much more powerful. Democratic accountability 
mechanisms give the electorate the ability to sanction the government by voting them out of 
office. Ajimobi’s team believed that they risked losing the 2015 election if they continued 
with the unpopular elements of urban renewal and did not show themselves to be sensitive to 
alternative conceptions of good governance. How do governments navigate the tensions 
between three conflicting conceptions of good governance: the international, the Lagos 
Model and popular conceptions? What policies do they enact to meet the demands of one 
conception, and how are those policies constrained by the demands of other conceptions? Is 
it possible to simultaneously meet the demands of all three?  
The final chapter, chapter nine, concludes the thesis, summarising the main findings on 
each of the sub-topics and drawing out the overall implications for answering the primary 
research question. It considers the overall logics of the politics of good governance in Oyo 
State.  
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Chapter 2 - Governance from Above and Below 
Introduction 
The chapter starts with debates over good governance, as advanced by the World Bank and 
other donors from the late 1980s onwards. It sets out how the good governance model aimed 
to create a strong, lean state to facilitate market-led development. Criticism focused on the 
way that good governance reforms were imposed on developing countries, strengthening 
top-down accountability to donors, and impeding the implementation of bottom-up models 
of good governance. It considers four key debates: whether good governance should be 
accurately seen as technical or political, whether claims to the universal nature of good 
governance are justified, the debate between choiceless democracies and national ownership, 
and finally whether the evolution of good governance beyond conditionality provides 
opportunities for agency or replicates coercive relationships.   
Section 2 turns to the literature on the relationship between patrimonialism and good 
governance. After considering the way that neopatrimonialism came to be seen as the 
opposite of good governance, and an obstacle to development, it turns to the possibility of 
developmental patrimonialism providing good governance. The developmental 
patrimonialism literature argues that strong states with centralised control can draw on 
informal, patrimonial institutions to deliver developmental governance. This literature offers 
a view of bottom-up governance insofar as elites at the national level can control and 
leverage existing informal institutions, the same institutions that are seen as obstacles to 
good governance by the mainstream good governance school, and harness them in the 
interests of private-sector led development.  
The chapter proceeds by considering debates over what bottom-up governance means. 
Section 3 covers two literatures that seek to highlight actually existing bottom-up 
governance structures: practical norms and hybrid governance. Authors writing from these 
perspectives argue that, regardless of modernist ‘state ideas’, governance in African states is 
piece-meal, improvised and involves a plethora of state and non-state actors. “Good enough 
governance” can be achieved through hybrids of formal and informal institutions delivering 
public goods. Bottom-up for these literatures means studying governance in areas of weak 
statehood and peripheries (Reyntjens 2016, 362).   
The fourth section shifts the focus from elites in developing countries to the masses or the 
“grassroots”, and asks how the governed evaluate the institutions they are subject to and how 
they conceive of good governance. It looks at debates over how principles and concepts 
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from the good governance framework are enacted and interpreted by voters, constituents and 
clients, and considers what alternative concepts furnish popular ideas of good governance in 
different contexts.  
Section five concludes by drawing out the broad themes of how each core literature 
conceives of the relationship between good governance and politics. 
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1. The Good Governance Debate 
In the 1980s World Bank and IMF policy was largely focussed on rolling back the state and 
freeing markets to drive ‘accelerated development’ in Africa and other developing countries, 
motivated by neo-classical understandings of economics (World Bank 1981). This came to 
be known as the Washington Consensus and included policies aimed at deregulation of the 
economy, financial liberalization (McKinnon 1973), privatization, abolitions of trade and 
investment barriers, and more careful and restricted public expenditure (Williamson 2004, 
197). The record, both in terms of policy implementation and of the effects of such policies 
were patchy (World Bank 1990; Nelson 1990; Leftwich 1993, 363; Mosley and Weeks 
1993). The implementation problems of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) showed that 
government capacity was vital to whether reforms were actually implemented; SAPs were 
implemented most fully where the state was strongest, rather than where it had been 
radically rolled back (Leftwich 1994, 366–68). Whereas some scholars credited the failure of 
SAPs to the political and distributional consequences of economic reforms (Herbst 1990; 
Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye 1995; Williams 1994), the World Bank and IMF located the 
source of failure in the corruption, lack of capacity and incompetence of many state 
bureaucracies (World Bank 1989; 1991; 1994, 8; Lancaster 1993, 9). 
Good governance represented a step away from the Washington Consensus. With Western 
governments increasingly interested in democratisation and human rights abroad (Leftwich 
1994, 363), market reforms were no longer sufficient. Good governance emerged from a 
recognition of some of the excesses of radical pro-market reforms (Toye 1987) and paid 
attention instead to the institutional environment that ‘makes markets work well’ (Stiglitz 
2005; Ahrens 1999; Serra and Stiglitz 2008). At a time when there were calls to ‘bring the 
state back in’ (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985), proponents of good governance 
argued that strong and effective, but pared down, state institutions were needed to build 
‘market-friendly’ economies (Aoki, Murdock, and Okuno-Fujiwara 1995; Streeten 1996). 
The role of the state should be one of ‘steering, not rowing’, also summarised as ‘governing 
without government' (Rhodes,1996). Thus governance, defined by the World Bank as “the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common 
good” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010, 3), emerged as a way of understanding 
public authority as exercised by a range of state and non-state actors (Resnick and Birner 
2006, 8). The good governance agenda was developed and refined primarily by the World 
Bank but it was adopted ubiquitously across the donor community and international 
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institutions including agencies within the OECD, the UN, bilateral donors like USAID, 
AUSAID and DFID (Akhmouch 2012; UN 2009; DFID 2007).   
Good governance drew on three intellectual traditions. Neo-classical economics, which had 
also provided the intellectual justification for Structural Adjustment, emphasised the role of 
markets and the private sector in development. It would not be the “direct provider of 
growth but as a partner, catalyst, and facilitator” (World Bank 1997, 1) New Institutional 
Economics, and Douglas North’s work in particular, developed the models of neo-classical 
economics to include a central focus on institutions (North 1990b; 1990a; 2003; North et al. 
2007; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). New institutional economists argued that ‘getting 
the institutions right’ was the most important factor in development (Rodrik 2004). The final 
influence, was New Public Management, a philosophy of public management reform that 
was influential in Western governments reforms in the 1970s and 1980s. It was New Public 
Management (NPM) that provided the groundwork for conceptualising accountability in the 
public sector and the role of the private sector in government (Barberis 1998; E. Chang, 
Golden, and Hill 2010; Choup 2010; Fombad 2013; Hood 1991, 3–4). NPM was based on 
the belief that ‘proven’ private sector management techniques should be applied to state and 
public sector bodies (Hood 1991, 6; Pierre 2009, 596). 
A core set of principles for good governance was effectiveness, the ability to achieve a 
defined result or implement a desired policy, and efficiency, the ability to achieve a defined 
output with minimal inputs of time and resources (World Bank 1992; 1994; 1995; Dollar 
1998; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2007). These in turn shaped conceptions of 
normative values such as accountability and transparency. Writers within the ‘Post-
Washington Consensus’ that developed around good governance, argued that the role of 
accountability was as an instrument to effective public administration.  Ahrens describes 
accountability as one of handful of qualities that are “required for the sound management of 
public resources, an enabling environment for the private sector and a productive partnership 
between the public and private sectors” (Ahrens 1999, 18). Bureaucrats were to be 
accountable to performance goals, that could be measured typically with quantitative 
metrics, with an increase in value for monetary audits (Day and Klein 1987; World Bank 
1992, 19). As the World Development Report from 1997 explained: “Even the best-
intentioned government is unlikely to meet collective needs efficiently if it does not know 
what many of those needs are” (World Bank 1997, 10) Accountability was about keeping 
governments on track to meet service delivery goals. The contracting out of government 
services to private firms through competitive bids and auctions was seen as a way of 
enhancing effectiveness and accountability, just as competition in the market makes firms 
accountable to consumer demand. Framed in a conception of the state where its primary role 
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is to facilitate the delivery of services via ‘agents’, accountability came to be seen as a 
principal-agent problem such that the primary function of accountability mechanisms is to 
ensure that there is minimal delegation costs when agents carry out these tasks on behalf of 
states (World Bank 1992, 6, 13).  
Overall the push for ‘economic accountability’ was to reduce spending and reduce the 
expanse of the state, with the focus on “wages issues”, “white elephants” and “ghost 
workers”. In this context, the secondary component of “monitoring and evaluation” of 
government performance meant the monitoring of spending cuts and the evaluation of how 
far the government was reducing inefficiencies. Policy-making was to be insulated from 
representative institutions which might derail technocratic policies with “distributive claims 
of pressure groups”, which needed to be ‘locked in’ to provide “stabilized expectations 
regarding a new set of incentive structures and the confidence that these cannot be arbitrarily 
altered” (Ahrens 1999, 27; World Bank 1995). Good governance gave the public a role in 
facilitating accountability and efficiency at the “micro-level”, not as citizens but “as 
recipients of public services” who could monitor service delivery through their interactions 
with services and give feedback (World Bank 1992, 14; 2004).  
The World Bank defines transparency as “the citizenry’s right to know and access to 
information” (Kaufmann and Bellver 2005, 1). It has been conceived of in a variety of ways 
by the Bank, reflecting shifting agendas, but is consistently understood as an instrument, 
alongside accountability, for increased efficiency. In the economic realm, transparency 
replaces market competition as a constraint on the state’s position as a monopoly provider of 
certain goods. Moreover, a transparent state gives the private sector more predictability to 
make good business decisions (World Bank 1992, 3). Making the state more accountable to 
citizens and society was seen as a means of enhancing efficiency of public good provision. 
Transparency opens government activities to public scrutiny, resulting in public pressure on 
governments to perform better and reduce corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1996; Stiglitz 1998; 
Stiglitz 1999). Ordinary people needed “easy access to information on the workings of 
public programs intended for their benefit” to empower them to demand better services and 
monitor officials (Reinikka and Svensson 2003, 2; Independent Commission for Aid Impact 
2013).  
The World Bank is constrained by its Articles of Agreement from interfering in the “political 
affairs of its members” (World Bank 2012, IV.10). However, the World Bank espoused 
increasingly expansive visions of its capacity to change institutions (Grindle 2007, 571), 
with one influential report remarking that donors “need to get beyond projects and spur 
systemic change in whole sectors and countries” [italics added] (Dollar 1998, 103). Indeed, 
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at times the World Bank has noted the tendency for issues designated as ‘technical’ to merge 
with broader political issues. A 1995 World Bank report noted “it is not really possible to 
separate out macroeconomic policy reforms and other items of the reform agenda” as all 
areas of structural and institutional reform are “complementary, and it is not possible to 
advance very far in one without advances in other areas.” (World Bank 1995, iii, v; 
Sandbrook 1995, 286)  
Leftwich argues that the good governance focus on “apparently politically-neutral” 
recommendations was a “sleight of hand” as such changes would inevitably have profound 
political effects. The shift to a focus on governance represented neoliberal trends in 
economic and public policy in the World Bank and IMF, and its most influential member 
states, consisting of “not just an economic vision but a political one” (Leftwich 1994, 368). 
This connected good governance to long-running debates about unequal relations between 
donors and recipient countries (Hayter 1971; Lonsdale 1986), pitching the idea of 
‘choiceless democracies’ (Mkandawire 1998, 1999) against a belief that reforms could be an 
expression of ‘national ownership’ (Lawson 2004).  
Critics of good governance questioned both the appropriateness of the donor community’s 
technical approach to development, and pointed towards its nonetheless political 
consequences. The good governance paradigm was seen as “managerial” and guilty of the 
technicist fallacy: the belief that human affairs are susceptible to an administrative ‘fix’ 
(Leftwich 1994, 363). Critics challenged how the technicist conception of governance gave a 
falsely consensual and uncontroversial impression of what governments should do; as if 
choices and trade-offs were unnecessary in the face of universally applicable ‘technical 
fixes’ (Polzer 2001, 7; Newell and Bellour 2002, 9). The creation of central banks 
independent from ministries of finance was a prime example of this, allowing economic 
expertise to determine interest rates, rather than political or policy goals (Mas 1995; 
Maxfield 1997). However, the division between political and technical aspects of state action 
was contested. One major critique was that good governance reforms incorrectly cast 
important and controversial aspects of government actions as technical, and therefore 
outside of democratic control (Sousa 2002). Critics argued that questions of economics and 
distribution, such as government spending, taxes and how government structures access 
economic opportunities and rents, were all key questions of politics and should not be 
“screened off” from the pressures of civil society and elected representatives1 (Mkandawire 
                                                          
1 Moreover, the evidence on whether ‘technicisation’ leads to better outcomes even on 
traditional economic criteria is mixed (Bruni and Masciandaro 1991; Beck, Cull, and Jerome 2005). 
  
32 
 
1998; Bangura 1999, 9). Mkandawire called this the “politics of insulation” and questioned 
whether such drives to enhance effectiveness at the cost of accountability would be seen in a 
positive light were they to be undertaken in authoritarian settings (Mkandawire 1999, 338).  
This debate echoed wider concerns within public administration about the effects of New 
Public Management in developed countries. There were fears that the profound changes in 
public service delivery including “devolution, privatisation, agencification, management 
reform, new forms of collaborative strategies and contracting out” (Pierre 2009, 592) had 
outstripped equivalent innovations in political accountability (Hood 1991; Mulgan 2000). As 
the state was remodelled according to market mechanisms, citizens came to play the role of 
customers, concerned primarily with their own individualised experience of the state, 
foregoing a capacity for collective consciousness or debates about distribution (Bozeman 
2007; Pierre 2009, 593).  
Whilst the World Bank was forced to maintain that good governance was not political, 
Western governments were more forceful and explicit in their equating political liberalism 
with economic liberalism (Leftwich 1994, 368). Bilateral donor institutions, like USAID, 
explicitly linked good governance to democracy (Sandbrook 1995, 280).  
To describe a mode of governance as ‘good’ is to make a normative claim about values in 
politics and what governments should do. There are marked differences between scholars as 
to the status of that normative claim. Universalists argue that the normative claims in 
asserting what is ‘good' governance and what is not, are essentially universal, and thus 
global comparisons and rankings can be devised using universal criteria (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi 2010; Dollar 1998; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2007). Others have 
argued that such universalism is misplaced because what is considered ‘good' governance 
varies from context to context, reflecting the power and interests of those defining it (Kurtz 
and Schrank 2007, 564).  
Scholars writing from a critical or postcolonial perspective have argued that a normative 
universalism leads to agendas being imposed on developing countries by rich developed 
nations, not to further good governance but to replicate a set of unequal economic and social 
relations (Mkandawire 2005; Mkandawire 2007; Wai 2012). Good governance “narrowed 
the policy agenda in most African countries, and the influence of citizens have been severely 
curtailed by the power of donors and creditors” (Abrahamsen 2000, xiv) The nature of the 
macro-economic reforms required by donors throughout the good governance era foreclosed 
many of the demands that governments faced from their populations (Moncrieffe 1998: 
400), and cast the opposition of elites and the urban working class to reform as illegitimate 
and rent-seeking (Bangura 1994, 300). Mkandawire notes that conditionalities associated 
33 
 
with good governance “severely limit the choices of new democracies” creating “societies 
which can vote but cannot chose” (Przeworski et al. 1999:84) or “choiceless democracies” 
(Mkandawire 1998).  
Another major criticism of good governance was that the policies and reforms were actually 
harmful to development. Scholars argued that they imposed a neoliberal economic agenda 
very similar to the earlier Structural Adjustment Policies, which increased poverty and 
inequality (Barya 1993, 16–17; Mkandawire 2005, 13; Gills and Rocamora 1992; Di Puppo 
2014, 113). This included demands for financial liberalization, bringing interest rates into 
line with the market, and dissolving or privatisating national development banks (World 
Bank 1994; Lewis and Stein 1997). The debt servicing obligations of African countries 
continued to grow over the late 1980s and early 1990s as good governance reforms were 
introduced (Helleiner 1992). Monetary policy that targeted low inflation, rather than growth, 
and the forced shrinkage of the state and the limits on public sector employment meant that 
governments had to resist many demands that emerged from democratic and political 
institutions such as unions and civil society (Mkandawire 2005, 1). One report labelled 
Structural Adjustment Policies as “ the largest single cause of increased poverty, inequality and 
hunger in developing countries” (SAPRI Network 2013).   
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) tried to address concerns about the top-down 
character of good governance prescriptions. Developed first in 1999, PRSPs promised a shift 
away from the imposition of economic policies by IFIs  towards ‘national ownership’ of 
reforms, putting recipient countries “in the driving seat” (Levy and Kpundeh 2004; Booth 
2004; Cheru 2006, 355). Later iterations of PRSPs aimed at increasing downwards 
accountability for “pro-poor growth”. Donors stipulated that governments must consult with 
civil society groups to formulate PRSPs (Driscoll and Evans 2005; World Bank 2005a).  
Assessments of whether this worked in practice vary. Some argued that PRSPs did indeed 
represent a real but tentative step towards improving national ownership of poverty 
reduction programmes and inclusion of the poor (Booth 2005; Cheru 2006; World Bank 
2005a), albeit on highly circumscribed ‘liberal’ terms (Craig and Porter 2005).  
Critics argued that PRSPs reproduced the same power relations just in a new form, and were 
skewed in favour of donors rather than beneficiaries. Some case studies suggested that civil 
society engagement was superficial, and often with unrepresentative NGOs lacking 
“disciplinary bite” (Hickey and Mohan 2008, 234; Brown 2004). They point to how donors 
retained final sign off on the PRSPs and that they were, like SAPs, imposed on recipient 
states as part of the conditions for eligibility for debt-cancellation under the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) (Stewart and Wang 2003; Brett 2003; Lawson 
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2004). The most forceful critiques argued that the supposed innovations of poverty reduction 
and participation included in PRSPs were simply superficial ‘illusions’ (Dijkstra 2011) 
obscuring the harmful neoliberal policies that remained unchanged since SAPs (Hellinger, 
Hansen-Kuhn, and Fehling 2001; Gould and Ojanen 2003; Warnock and Gaag 2002; Saasa 
and Carlsson 2002; Abrahamsen 2004a). 
The choiceless democracies argument focuses on the way that good governance reforms are 
imposed on countries, leaving them with no option but to comply, and in so doing reducing 
their chances of development. However, since the early 2000s, donors including the World 
Bank and DFID have argued that innovations in good governance programmes increased 
national control and ownership over development. They moved away from conditionality to 
a model of selectivity, where funds are allocated to countries that have already proven their 
willingness and ability to implement reform (World Bank 2005c; Nanda 2006).  
There are four main interpretations of how these moves to partnership and selectivity have 
affected the relationships of power and accountability between national governments and 
donors. Some see good governance reforms as always coercive, despite the ideas of 
partnership. Others see space for African states to assert agency, though in different ways.  
The first line of argument is that the power of donors to push their agenda on governance is 
no less strong for being more diffuse. Governance indices, such as the World Governance 
Indicators (WGI)2, have broadened the scope of the scrutiny to cover all countries, not just 
those who are subject to conditionalities, and has opened the way to governance being used 
as an eligibility criterion for donor programmes (thought not at the World Bank itself) (D. 
Thomas 2013, 33; Arndt 2008, 278; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2007, 1; Millennium 
Challenge Corporation 2015). From a positivist standpoint this can be understood as 
showing governance indices having reputational effects (Arndt 2008, 283). Whilst the direct 
sanctioning power of conditionality is reduced, Abrahamsen’s quote from the Chairman of 
the African Union on the NEPAD Peer Review Mechanism in Ghana in 2004 suggests that 
compliance still has clear material implications in terms of resource distribution. He explains 
                                                          
2 Most widely used is Kaufman et al.’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), which uses 
over 30 data sources to give yearly assessments of governance perceptions in over 200 countries 
(Arndt 2008).  The WGI measures six dimensions of governance: Voice and Accountability, Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and 
Control of Corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009). These have been extensively critiqued 
on statistical, data quality grounds and conceptual grounds (Arndt and Oman 2006; Kurtz and 
Schrank 2006; Langbein and Knack 2010; Knack 2006; M. A. Thomas 2010). 
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that “Punishment will come by itself because investors will shy away” (Abrahamsen 2004b, 
1461). From this perspective national governments are still coerced into implementing good 
governance reforms, but the sequence has changed: funding is now being used as a carrot 
rather than its withdrawal threatened as a stick. Moreover, the funding comes from markets 
rather than aid donors. 
Others have pointed out the ways that relationships between aid-dependent national 
governments and donors become arenas for agency in different ways. In some cases, African 
national governments are adept at retaining sufficient power to still do what they want to do. 
By investing resources and reputation in the future success of certain regimes, donors are in 
a “symbiotic relationship” with countries and face huge costs if they withdraw (Hanlon 
2004, 747–48; Arndt 2008, 283–84). Donors in Kenya and Mozambique in the 1990s were 
incentivised to overlook and forgive repeated infringements of conditionality by key 
members of the national ruling classes, to maintain the appearance of aid success (Brown 
2001; Hanlon 2004). In other cases, national elites have skilfully instrumentalized their 
relationship with donors to advance their political and private interests whilst evading 
sanction, as with the southern bias in the implementation of Ghana’s PRSP (Abdulai and 
Hulme 2014). The thrust of this line of argument is that national government elites have 
interests and motives that diverge from what donors require for good governance, and they 
retain the power to pursue their own interests despite donor involvement.  
By contrast, there is some empirical literature that explores cases where the interests and 
motives of national governments in fact align with good governance. By enacting elements 
of good governance policies, and invoking its discursive aspects, national governments 
demonstrate agency. Case studies suggest that good governance reforms can empower 
certain groups over others. The new government of Georgia enthusiastically embraced good 
governance in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution in 2003, and took steps towards 
establishing a ‘Good Governance Strategy’ in 2005. This helped the new regime to ‘rebrand’ 
and distinguish itself from its predecessor, whilst ensuring external validation and 
international support for the members of the new government (Di Puppo 2014, 113–17). 
Within the civil service in Malawi and Ghana, reforms associated with the small-government 
imperatives of good governance can be useful for younger more cosmopolitan staff to assert 
themselves over the ‘old guard’ (Anders 2014; Lentz 2014). Where the World Bank and 
donors are keen to work with “champions of reform” in otherwise hostile environments 
(Dollar 1998, 116), there needs to be more work on how local actors appropriate such a role 
and use it to create new opportunities. 
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Abrahamsen offers a less optimistic interpretation of what it means for local actors to 
identify themselves with ‘good governance’. She argues that aid-conditionality is a form of 
Lukes’ first dimension of power as coercion. That is, where donors make states do that 
which they would not do otherwise. its second dimension is controlling what is and is not 
permitted on the political agenda (Crawford 2003; Abrahamsen 2004b, 1458–59; Lukes 
2004, 23–24). Selectivity and the rise of development partnerships should be understood as 
Lukes’ third dimension of power, the “ability to form the very interests and values that 
determine action in the first place”. Lukes describes this as more insidious “as it makes 
people accept their own domination” (Lukes 2004, 23-4). Sections of the elite governing 
class have internalised the neoliberal values of global governance, obscuring their real 
interests (Craig and Porter 2003; Pender 2001), as Harrison suggests has happened in 
Uganda and Tanzania (G. Harrison 2001).  This is the ‘false consciousness’ argument, and 
scholars have built on it with Foucault’s idea of ‘governmentality’. This emphasises the role 
of consent and ‘self-discipline’ in subject formation of the ideal state, via “freedom as a 
formula of rule”. Death’s study of the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable 
Development shows how power works through shaping new forms of legitimate and 
illegitimate action (Death 2010). Developing country states ‘responsibilise’ themselves 
(Löwenheim 2008, 255) as “the onus is on them to prove that they are committed, 
responsible and willing to govern themselves wisely” (Abrahamsen 2004b, 1459–61)  
Distinguishing between which of these four accounts best explains any one case is difficult, 
as it requires studying both what governments are doing and how their actions relate to their 
reasons, motives and interests. The final two accounts are especially hard to unpick in 
practice, because from Abrahamsen’s neoliberal governmentality perspective, what looks 
like agency is actually a more pernicious form of domination and control. However, this 
tension over whether third world agency is possible at all within the parameters of neoliberal 
development goes to the heart of debates within development over epistemology and 
knowledge. Post-Development saw development not as a natural fact but a cultural 
discourse, whereby ‘the West’ produces the ‘third world’ in need of development (Marglin 
and Marglin 1990; Escobar 1992; J. Ferguson 1990; Escobar 2001). Seen from this 
perspective, the problem with good governance was not simply that it reproduced economic 
policies favourable to the West and international capital, but that it reproduced forms of 
knowledge and domination which constructed the third world as inherently inferior “under 
western eyes” (Mohanty 1984) and in need of intervention (Shiva 1993; Rahnema and 
Bawtree 1997; Esteva and Prakash 1998; D. B. Moore and Schmitz 1995).  
Post-development has been highly influential in changing the terms of debate within 
development studies, and its insights have been taken in a number of directions. Most share 
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Escobar’s conviction that “the conventional development of the kind offered by 
neoliberalism is not an option” and that they must “end the dominance of expert knowledge 
over the terms of debate” (Escobar 2006, 450). But, what if the two pull in opposite 
directions. Arce and Long argue that development and modernity, even in their most harsh 
neoliberal forms, are not done to the third world. Rather, local groups engage in 'counter-
work' appropriating and re-embedding ‘mutant modernities’ in local life worlds (Arce and 
Long 1999). This raises the possibility that non-expert developing country actors may be the 
ones pushing at the frontiers of what conventional neoliberal development means, inverting 
Escobar’s trajectory.   
From the extensive literature analysing and critiquing good governance, some questions 
emerge. Self-selecting good governance states, which enter into partnerships with the World 
Bank despite not being aid-dependent nor having a history of donor involvement, need more 
study. Why do states voluntarily accept or even actively appropriate good governance? Are 
they superficially attempting to rebrand or are there deep changes to the political landscape? 
If so, in the context of criticisms of good governance as representing the outside interests of 
donors and constraining local choices, who do these reforms benefit? 
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2. Debates about Patrimonial Governance 
This section looks at debates about how informal institutions are destructive of rational 
governance, leading to a dysfunctional hybrid form of governance called neopatrimonialism. 
The first major debate about (neo-)patrimonial governance occurred in tandem with the rise 
of good governance in the 1990s and early 2000s. The concept of neopatrimonialism was 
understood by political scientists and donors as the opposite to good governance, whereby 
neopatrimonialism compromised and weakened states’ ability to perform proper governance 
functions.  
Neopatrimonialism is an elaboration of Weber’s typology of legitimate authority. 
Patrimonial states are run as if they were private households (Weber 1922) and can be 
contrasted with legal-rational authority where state authority is exercised according to rules 
(Eisenstadt 1973).  The addition of ‘neo’ recognised the way that patrimonialism elements 
were intertwined with state-like elements of a public service, sometimes bringing 
meaningful elements of bureaucratic authority (Erdmann and Engel 2007) and sometimes 
simply as a façade (Bach and Gazibo 2012). In the 1990s the neopatrimonialism literature 
was vibrant, and used the concept to explain Africa’s challenges in terms of democracy, the 
economy and engagement with donors (Bayart et al. 1999, Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, 
Chabal and Daloz 1999, Van de Walle 2001).  
Neopatrimonialism located the lack of good governance in African states both in Krueger’s 
ideas of rent-seeking bureaucracies  (Krueger 1974; Gallagher 1991) and social norms and 
behaviours that corrupted the state (Bayart 1993, 238; Martinussen 1998, 67,71). Van de 
Walle (2003) brought these two strands together in a conceptualisation of the African state as 
peopled by civil servants whose ‘primordial’ identities, linking them to ethnic or familial 
constituencies, ‘outweighed’ public loyalties. On this view, the rational-bureaucratic 
Weberian state of Western democracies was out of step with social norms in African 
countries, and neopatrimonial governance was, as such, legitimate in societies which 
naturally submitted to ‘Big Man’ politics (Médard 1992; McCauley 2013). 
Neopatrimonialism was seen as incompatible with good governance. Van de Walle argued 
that even when clientelistic elites publicly committed themselves to reforms, they were 
manipulated and distorted resulting in ’permanent crisis’ (Walle 2001).  
The neopatrimonialism thesis has been extensively critiqued on the basis of its conceptual 
weakness, empirical thinness and for the ways in which it re-animated negative colonial 
stereotypes of Africa. Mkandawire has compellingly demonstrated that the empirical 
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predictions of Neopatrimonialism do not hold in African countries (Mkandawire 2013). 
Neopatrimonialism was also critiqued on methodological and conceptual grounds. It was 
rarely tested empirically, rather theories were built from selective anecdotes from a limited 
number of countries, used as empirical data to expand to assertions about generalised 
systems across Africa3 (Therkildsen 2005; deGrassi 2008, 109). Whilst neopatrimonialism 
was generalised across Africa, it was rarely applied to other regions and when such practices 
were observed elsewhere they were not pathologized in the same way (De Sardan 1999; 
Qizilbash 2001, 271–72; Mkandawire 2007). Eventually, even those scholars who were 
decisive in defining the concept, like Gero Erdmann, started to lose faith in its analytic 
ability (Kneuer, Mehler, and Sell 2015, 116). Scholars highlighted the way that 
Neopatrimonialism drew on deeply held tropes from modernization theory and 
“misrepresents complex historical processes.” (Sumich 2008, 112) Moreover the 
oppositional binary of modern and traditional has been widely problematized (Piot 2010, 
113). The binary of good governance and neopatrimonialism fits into a wider Euro-centric 
world-view that Martin (2001, 181) calls “unilinear evolutionism”, where history is 
understood teleologically, with all societies moving towards a single goal, in the image of 
Western liberal democracies (Mamdani 1996; Wai 2012). From this critical perspective, 
neopatrimonialism was simply another construct used to normalise “certain patterns of 
authority, resources and expertise” by which Africa is exploited by the West (Aaron deGrassi 
2008, 111).  
Developmental Patrimonialism 
The neopatrimonialism school saw patrimonial elements of government as uniformly 
harmful to development. Where development did take place in neopatrimonial regimes, 
scholars like Bach and Gazibo argued that it was in spite of, and not because of, political 
structures, “just as bad politics can produce good policies” (Bach 2012, 221–24). However, 
other scholars have explored the ways in which patrimonial relationships within 
government, and between government and business, can be in some ways developmental 
(M. Moore and Unsworth 2010).  
                                                          
3 DeGrassi’s footnote five has a good discussion of the vacillation between insisting on the 
specificity of application of the term and references to ‘Africa’ in the abstract (2008: 09).  
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This literature comes out of the work on the developmental state in East Asia (Leftwich 
1994, 377–80). The historical experience of countries like Korea and Singapore4 suggests 
that in those states that have managed to achieve sustained development improvements the 
state has played a much greater role in the economy than the good governance model 
prescribes (H.-J. Chang 2002, 2003b, 2003a; Kohli 2004). This literature stands in explicit 
opposition to the good governance agenda which prescribed small states, transparent 
bureaucracies and development driven by private sector actors (Khan 2007; Khan and 
Sundaram 2000; Kiely 1998). Yet developmental states have “delivered the goods” in terms 
of the socio-economic indicators that make up the Human Development Index (Leftwich 
1994, 380) suggesting that the type of accountability that matters is as accountability to 
long-term government performance.  
Kelsall links the Asia-focused developmental state literature to the concept of 
neopatrimonialism that is mostly associated with African states. He argues that almost all 
countries exhibit neopatrimonial business-politics interactions that blend bureaucratic norms 
with more clientelistic or personalistic features. He uses Khan’s theorisation of growth-
enhancing and growth-retarding rents to distinguish between developmental and predatory 
forms of neopatrimonialism (Khan 2000a;  2000b; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Kelsall 
2013). Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012, 8) define developmental patrimonialism as when 
“the ruling elite acquires an interest in, and a capability for, managing economic rents in a 
centralized way with a view to enhancing their own and others’ incomes in the long run 
rather than maximizing them in the short run.” In East Asian states this was done by 
establishing “organisational complexes in which expert and coherent, bureaucratic agencies 
collaborate with organised private sectors” in order to achieve a vision of comprehensive 
national economic transition (Doner, Ritchie, and Slater 2005, 327).  
Coming from a perspective where the function of institutions is more important than their 
form (Rodrik 2007) or regime type (Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston 2009), Dawson and 
Kelsall emphasise that neopatrimonialism can co-exist with a variety of ‘growth coalitions’. 
However, developmental patrimonial states nonetheless tend to share certain political 
characteristics: “a strong dominant party, a visionary leader, and a competent and confident 
economic technocracy” (Dawson and Kelsall 2012, 50), Crook and Booth (2011) describe 
the ability to centralise rents as ‘vertical discipline’, whereby the risks of corruption and 
clientelism are supposedly controlled by a central power holder.  
                                                          
4  Leftwich’s argument is based on 8 countries that had achieved average rates of growth of 4% 
p.a. between 1965 and 1990: Malaysia, Botswana, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, Indonesia, China and 
Thailand. 
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The only African states which are considered to be examples of developmental 
patrimonialism are Rwanda under Paul Kagame and Ethiopia. Rwanda has been able to 
centralise rents through a number of party-owned businesses and built successful elite 
coalitions (Kelsall and Booth 2010; Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012; Behuria and 
Goodfellow 2016; Golooba-Mutebi 2013).  
Scholars have argued that it is not the precise institutions that matter for developmental 
governance but that states have “visionary leaders” (Dawson and Kelsall 2012, 50) and 'elite 
commitment' to ‘inclusive development’ (Pritchett and Werker 2012). Some scholars have 
explored what sorts of ideological convictions tend to accompany the ‘long-term economic 
horizon’ that is said to enable developmental governance. Gore describes this as a “maximal 
future horizon” where development means substantially improving living standards over the 
medium to long term. He contrasts it with what he sees as a “minimalist conception of 
development”, represented by the Millennium Developmental Goals, which aim to achieve 
minimum standards of decent living in a set amount of time (Gore 2010, 71)5. The 
significance of this ‘maximal development horizon’ is that it can take account of national 
objectives and motivations that the good governance paradigm, with its minimal conception 
of the state as simply facilitating private-sector development, cannot. In his analysis of 
Japan’s industrial transformation, Johnson emphasises the role of a grand nationalist vision: 
“a desire to assume full human status by taking part in an industrial civilization, participation 
in which alone enables a nation or an individual to compel others to treat it as an equal” 
(Johnson, 1982: 25).  
There remain questions about the developmental patrimonialism model. The main criticisms 
relate to the possibility for channelling patrimonialism to specific ends, and the role of 
democracy in development. Firstly, it is not clear that patrimonial regimes can be channelled 
towards developmental purposes at will, nor whether temporarily developmental 
incarnations of patrimonial regimes are stable. The Africa Power and Politics Programme 
(APPP) case study on Malawi suggested that whilst the first term of President Mutharika’s 
presidency was developmental, by the second term there was a shift to short-term creation 
and distribution of rents in unproductive ways. This turn-around happened under the same 
leader over an eight year period, suggesting that the distinction between developmental and 
predatory might be better applied to political moments or specific policies, rather than as an 
all-encompassing system (Kelsall and Booth 2010; Booth 2011b; Kelsall 2013). Gabay 
                                                          
5 i.e. “reducing the proportion of people living on less that $1-a-day by half by 2015”.  
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highlights the difficulties facing reform-minded Joyce Banda on her inauguration as 
president, who had no choice but to participate in unproductive forms of clientelism (Gabay 
2014). This suggests that the hope that patrimonial institutions can be straightforwardly 
commandeered for certain ends is too optimistic, and that ‘vertical discipline’ may be 
fleeting.    
Developmental patrimonialism scholars have been accused of having “dismissive” attitudes 
towards democracy (Joseph 2015, 216). Indeed, the focus on autocratic African states such 
as Rwanda and Ethiopia, and the valorisation of East Asian examples such as South Korea 
and Singapore, suggest that developmental patrimonialism may only be an option in highly 
repressive regimes (Joseph 2015). Whilst descriptive analyses in the 1980s and 1990s were 
open about the lack of civil liberties or political competition in developmental states, the 
more prescriptive arguments coming from the APPP set a worrying precedent in endorsing 
undemocratic practices. These analyses normalise corruption and despotism in Africa, which 
leaves developmental patrimonialism open to a similar line of critique as the original 
neopatrimonialism argument. Joseph argues instead for a democratic developmental state, 
noting that democracy in Africa is strongly correlated with high human development (Joseph 
2015, 219). Joseph also questions whether the idea of accountability as “delivering the 
goods” is legitimate among African voters. He draws on Bratton and Logan’s work 
analysing Afrobarometer data, which suggests that contrary to the developmental state’s 
accountability in “delivering the goods”, many African voters are in favour of procedural 
accountability even if it slows the pace of development (Bratton and Logan 2009; Joseph 
2015, 223).  
Both sides of the debate between the APPP and Joseph, about the role of democracy in 
developmental patrimonial states, would benefit from a return to Pitcher Moran and 
Johnston’s (2009) careful distinction between forms of authority and regime type. 
Patrimonialism describes one of the ways that “rulers may establish legitimate authority by 
securing consent (compliance) from their subjects”, whereas regime type is the “means by 
which positions of power are filled in a state and the degree to which citizens are allowed to 
participate in that process”(Diamond 2002). As such there is no inherent, nor empirical, 
incompatibility between patrimonialism and democracy, indeed they cite Botswana as an 
example of the two combined. Yet, APPP works focus heavily on highly centralised states. 
The politically closed nature of these states means that there has been less debate about how 
developmental models are received and made sense of in terms of local ideas of what counts 
as good governance, nor how contemporary ideas of governance interact with historically 
grounded reference points. The lack of open dissent and political contestation, or at least the 
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difficulties researchers face in accessing spaces of dissent, has foreclosed options for 
investigating the politics of how developmental models are pursued.  
A final debate about patrimonialism and good governance concerns how developmental 
patrimonial states persuade their citizens that they are ‘good governments’ and generate 
legitimacy and consent for their rule. Whilst the APPP agenda is highly elite focussed (Gray 
2014; Joseph 2015), how developmental states maintain popular legitimacy is an interesting 
question, because their transformative economic agendas involve overriding the immediate 
demands of special interest groups in favour of the national interest (Leftwich 1994, 378–
80). Doner, Ritchie and Slater argue that such states emerged in response to political-
economic constraints in situations of “systemic vulnerability” (Doner, Ritchie, and Slater 
2005, 355). This illuminates the political and economic context that often forces patrimonial 
states to be developmental, but it does not answer questions about the normative basis of 
these state’s authority among the population. There is little work interrogating whether the 
ideas of ‘visionary leaders’ pursuing ‘industrial civilisation’, as discussed by Dawson and 
Kelsall and Johnson above, resonate at the level of ordinary citizens. 
However, a fuller picture of patrimonialism would also look at how reciprocities and “multi-
stranded sets of ties and obligations” potentially facilitate developmental coalitions among 
elites (Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston 2009, 126–27). Essentially this is asking what ‘going 
with the grain’ would look like if scholars had a more nuanced and rich conception of what 
‘the grain’ actually was. Joseph’s work starts to extend the APPP agenda of 'working with 
the grain' in a more nuanced direction. He points to elements of Ghana’s ‘political culture’ 
beyond patrimonialism that have nonetheless been instrumental in maintaining Ghana’s 
respectable growth trajectory, namely Ghanaian politicians' tendency to reject violence and 
maintain calm during political transitions (Joseph 2014).  This leads us to questions of what 
conceptions of good governance already exist in states, and how do they frame popular 
reactions to top-down models such as good governance or developmental patrimonialism. In 
the next section on the hybridity literature we can ask how elites seeking to deliver their own 
model of governance integrate it with alternative mechanisms and models.  
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3. Bottom-Up Governance 
In response to a growing acceptance of the inadequacies of the good governance approach 
there has been an interest in ‘bottom-up’ governance in Africa. Many have argued that new 
forms of African agency are nonetheless being asserted. From the point of view of donors, 
there were strong voices that argued that, regardless of policy or orientation, efforts to 
impose development strategies and models upon developing countries had failed. Instead, 
Unsworth argued, aid should start from a deep understanding of the need and opportunities 
for development within countries (Unsworth 2001; Unsworth 2002; Hyden 2008; Carothers 
and de Gramont 2013). Good governance and other agendas for reform which took donor 
ideas and Western experience as their starting point gave an ‘upside down view of 
governance’ (IDS 2010). Donors should drop the ‘governance overload’ (Grindle 2004) and 
focus on what governance qualities actually work for development (Kelsall 2013; Khan 
2007) to achieve “good enough governance” with limited resources (Grindle 2007). These 
scholars argue donors should ‘go with the grain’ and build on ‘what works’ in Africa and 
other developing countries (Booth 2011a, 510; Kelsall 2011; Levy 2014), learning from 
successful case studies (Yanguas 2014).  
Blundo highlights how scholars have traditionally studied the state in the developing world 
through it’s “visible structures”, those that fit comfortably into Western theoretical models of 
the state and its historical development (Blundo 2006a, 800). In so doing the less easily 
visible elements which do not match mainstream theoretical assumptions are overlooked. 
Famously, James C Scott argued that a central task of the modern state is to render messy 
and complex social realities ‘legible’ to state agencies, so that the state can ‘read’ society, 
create new forms of knowledge about it, and then act upon it in a coherent fashion (Scott 
1998, chap. 1,5). As scepticism of top-down good governance reforms was growing, there 
were a number of attempts to make bottom-up governance institutions legible. A variety of 
literatures have sought to shed light on grassroots and alternative institutional arrangements 
that provided governance in local settings, which were not intelligible to the existing ways of 
seeing ‘from above’. This new debate focuses first on descriptive analytic questions in order 
to reconceptualise the state: what are actually existing forms of governance in developing 
countries? How do states and state agents behave in contexts of institutional plurality? There 
have also been debates about the normative elements of governance: how do those enmeshed 
in webs of plural institutions normatively evaluate governance? And how do various actors 
seek to enact elements of what they understand as good governance into complex 
institutional contexts?  
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Innovations within the New Institutional Economics (NIE) brought a new focus to studies of 
“rules of the game” of politics, by broadening its methodological and conceptual 
frameworks to include those institutions that are not “openly codified”. Guillermo 
O’Donnell and others argued that there were unwritten rules of the game that were actually 
being followed, which influenced formal institutional outcomes (O’Donnell 1996). Helmke 
and Levitsky define these informal institutions as “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, 
that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” 
(Helmke and Levitsky 2003, 8–9) whilst Leach et al. differentiate them from formal 
institutions according to their enforcement mechanisms (Leach, Mearns, and Scoones 1997). 
This theoretical innovation promised to make institutions and practices that were important 
for understanding actually existing forms of governance legible to new segments of the 
academic development studies literature. In her study of local government accountability in 
China, Tsai shows how consideration of informal institutions can provide a richer 
understanding of how social groups hold the state to account using both legal and illicit 
means (Tsai 2007).  
Scholars disagreed on what exactly needed to be seen in order to make the state legible; 
post-structural scholars in the Anthropology of the State and the States of Imagination 
literatures focused on the ethereal and discursive aspects of the state as an idea (Hansen and 
Stepputat 2001; Das 2004; Sharma and Gupta 2006), whereas the Practical Norms literature 
seeks to “render the state legible through the concrete practices of its employees” (Blundo 
2014, 70). 
Three similar literatures have engaged in debates over the local institutional realities of 
developing country states. The practical norms, hybrid governance and legal pluralism 
literatures reject the ideal of the state-based post-colonial order, with the centralist 
assumption that “the state has a monopoly on norm production” (Reyntjens 2016, 362). All 
three take a non-normative approach to mixed arrangements for public goods provision 
already on the ground. They suspend judgement of potentially coercive or corrupt 
institutions to see what can deliver the goods in difficult environments, often post-conflict or 
on the margins of the state. In absence of the strong, efficient and effective state, scholars 
and practitioners working on hybrid governance aimed to build second-best solutions that 
‘deliver the goods’ are seen as better than nothing.  
The States at Work framework, led by the work of Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, Thomas 
Bierschenk and Giorgio Blundo highlights the improvised, incomplete and cobbled together 
(bricolé) nature of the state. Discrepancies between the “official model, which states are 
supposed to follow and actual behaviour” exists everywhere, but are more noticeable in 
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resource-poor African governments (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014, 5,7,18).6 
Theoretically, they frame this as the difference between the blueprint of the state, or the 
“state idea” in Migdal and Schlichte’s terms, and the practical norms and social logics (De 
Sardan 1999) which govern actual behaviour (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014, 14). 
In fact, governance reforms related to decentralisation and democratisation have increased 
the ‘polycephalous’ nature of the African state, via the “proliferation of agencies exercising 
authority” (Bierschenk and de Sardan 2003) and ‘sedimentation’ of numerous partial reforms 
over decades of intervention (Bierschenk 2010).  
Scholars from the Legal Pluralism school offer a similar analysis, where state spaces are 
only one of many ‘social fields’ (S. F. Moore 1978) where plural normative and regulatory 
orders operate in sometimes conflicting ways (Nuijten and Anders 2009, 13–14; Anders 
2002). Cousins uses a legal pluralist framework to explore how legal reforms in South Africa 
translate into action on the ground via a ‘messy matrix’ of institutions (Cousins 1997, 61), 
whilst Gore shows how legal entitlements are constrained and enabled by socially enforced 
moral rules (Gore 1993). In the context of informal resource-use arrangements, Cleaver 
argues that institutions don’t so much overlap, but are put together in a patchwork of 
traditional or existing institutions put to new purposes, a process she calls ‘bricolage’ 
(Cleaver 2001; 2002; 2012). Whilst these studies consider the structural outcomes of plural 
forms of governance, others have looked at the role of agency within them. Taking as its 
premise Ostrom’s observation that rules do not determine action, they simply define actors’ 
room for manoeuvre (Ostrom 1986), scholars have focused on the agency of actors to 
leverage that room for manoeuvre either to claim rights (Hunt 1993), as resources (Galanter 
1981), to position themselves advantageously (E. Harrison 2004, 136, 148) or achieve status 
(Anders 2002, 6). 
The hybrid governance literature focuses on how state and non-state actors come together to 
exercise political authority in settings of extreme state weakness.7 It both offers an 
alternative analysis of states that are typically seen as “fragile”, and prescriptions for more 
successful state building interventions (Boege et al. 2008). Lund argues that in African 
states, public authority, the ability to make and enforce collectively binding decisions, is 
                                                          
6 Indeed, Cris Shore finds that in the European Commission, one of the most well-resourced 
governing bodies in the world, informal practices were justified on the grounds that the formal system 
didn’t work and staff had to “bend the rules” just to get things done (Shore 2005). 
7 For a comprehensive comparison of Hyrbid Governance and Legal Pluralism see (Reyntjens 
2016).  
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exercised by a variety of state and non-state actors who mobilise a language of “stateness” 
resulting in “twilight institutions” (Lund 2006, 685–99). Security, justice and the use of 
violence have played a central role in these conceptions of the state and its hybrid forms 
(Buur 2005; Pratten 2011; Gore and Pratten 2003).  Many scholars have looked at how 
institutional plurality has led to changes in state power and sovereignty (Jessop 1990; 
Roitman 2004; Hibou 1999) resulting in a blurring of the boundaries of state and non-state 
(Colona and Jaffe 2016). 
Meagher, Titeca and de Herdt bring together a growing literature which challenges the 
hybrid governance and practical norms literature on the grounds that they are insufficiently 
attentive to the ‘dark side’ of hybridity (Meagher, De Herdt, and Titeca 2014, 5). Firstly, they 
question whether these norms and hybrid solutions have legitimacy with the local 
population, and warn of the long-term risks to stability of arrangements that erode local 
consent. Just because hybrid arrangements exercise authority and maintain order, does not 
mean they are legitimate (Meagher, De Herdt, and Titeca 2014, 8). Here it is useful to return 
to Helmke and Levitsky’s definition of informal institutions in terms of “shared expectations 
rather than shared values.” They argue that institutions are both expected and enforced, but 
they may not be endorsed (Helmke and Levitsky 2003, 10). 
On the one hand, one of the strengths of hybrid governance is that it rejects the outright 
condemnation of informal practices that came with the valorisation of the Weberian state.  
The anthropological literature on governance broadly agrees on the relationship between 
informal institutions and ethical evaluations, resulting in a relativism. Following Olivier de 
Sardan, Anders argues that “what is considered to be corruption from the perspective of 
official norms is not, or seldom, viewed in the same light from the perspectives of practical 
norms and actual practices” (Anders 2002, 6) This is broadly the position of an anthology on 
the anthropology of corruption (Haller and Shore 2005), as well as the body of work on 
everyday corruption led by Giorgio Blundo (Haller and Shore 2005; Blundo 2006a; Blundo 
2006b; Blundo and Meur 2009).  
On the other hand, obviously not all informal practices are legitimate. The anthropology of 
corruption literature shows this in a variety of settings. Drawing on case studies of Russian 
hospitals and Chinese local government, Rivkin-Fish and Hsu and Smart argue that ethical 
and moral norms govern how informal practices can and cannot be enacted (Rivkin-Fish 
2005; Smart and Hsu 2009)8. Even for those elites who can navigate both formal and 
                                                          
8 Consequently, anthropological engagements with anti-corruption have been highly critical of 
the anti-corruption industry’s lack of sensitivity to context, and stigmatisation of low level practices 
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informal institutions to their advantage, they may still be ambivalent towards the hybridity 
they encounter (Ledeneva 2014). Civil servants in Malawi both see the obligations that come 
with informal kinship relations as an asset or insurance for lean times, and as a burden that 
they struggle to meet (Anders 2002, 12). In Willott’s study of a Nigerian university, he 
shows that powerful actors limit their use of informality to a level such that the formal 
system, which is seen as ultimately more desirable, can endure, even if in a dysfunctional 
form (Willott 2009, 2014). Such insights from anthropology complement the framework set 
out in the hybrid governance literature, adding nuances from in-depth case studies.  
If institutions are justified on the basis that they 'work', the question is who they work for 
and who pays the price (Meagher, De Herdt, and Titeca 2014, 2, 5–7). Informal institutions 
may entrench inequality. Whilst some actors may find that hybridity enhances their room for 
manoeuvre, and opens up space for negotiation, the ability to instrumentalise gaps in formal 
rules is highly differentiated. The less well-connected staff in Senegal’s forestry service are 
unable to draw on personal networks that others use to ‘get things done’ and have no choice 
but to follow the onerous formal rules, seeing as the channels for unofficial action are closed 
to them (Blundo 2014, 75). The ability to influence informal frameworks, and set the limits 
on legitimate regulation, depends on the relative power of competing groups. A move 
towards greater sensitivity to power relations in hybrid governance is important (Cleaver 
2012; Titeca and Flynn 2014).  
In addition to examining the power relations embedded within informal institutions, scholars 
have drawn attention to the ways that a shift from formal to informal institutions 
redistributes costs, and responsibilities of governance from official balance books to 
communities and popular organisations. Frontline bureaucrats at times push against 
informalisation, employing what resources and authority they have to shore up formal 
systems in the face of austerity and public sector cuts. For instance, officials may collect 
funds to buy fuel for government vehicles, when they would rather that the formal state 
simply be better funded (Blundo 2014, 81–82). Poorly resourced, dysfunctional states may 
lead to collective action that resists any moral classification whatsoever. In contrast to the 
view of hybridity institutions as resourceful local solutions, Obadare describes improvised 
popular solutions to the question of public goods provision as a form of resignation, “trying 
everything in the hope that something will work” (Obadare 2016, 121) 
                                                                                                                                                                    
whilst ignoring highly unequal prevailing economic systems (E. Harrison 2006; E. Harrison 2004; 
Sampson 2005; Webb 2012). 
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Meagher et al. urge caution with regards to assuming that all informal institutions are 
automatically ‘bottom-up’. What appears to be a local informal institution may in fact be 
influenced or enforced by powerful external actors such as mining companies, aid donors or 
foreign governments (Meagher, De Herdt, and Titeca 2014). Particularly in the field of 
peace-keeping and post-conflict reconciliation, local traditional institutions have been 
mobilised by donors resulting in ‘prescriptive’ (Wallis, Jeffrey, and Kent Forthcoming) 
‘administered’ (Millar 2014) or ‘artificial’ (Ginty and Richmond 2016) hybridity, where 
traditional practices are appropriated for purposes they were never intended (Finnstrom 
2010).  
Meagher et al. also warn that donor enthusiasm for systems that appear to ‘work’ and 
provide public goods at low-cost risks entrenching coercive, violent or socially divisive 
arrangements, such as relying on militias in the Democratic Republic of Congo for local 
taxation and services (Raemaekers 2013; Meagher, De Herdt, and Titeca 2014, 2). Relying 
on these second-best arrangements may heighten insecurity and social and economic 
dislocation in the long run (Meagher 2012; 2013; Nkemnyi et al. 2016). Scholars have 
shown, in studies from Russia, Nigeria and Senegal, that hybrid governance can corrode or 
reinforce state structures, or do both in a parasitic relationship between the formal and 
informal. In these final cases informal institutions facilitate the state’s daily functioning, 
whilst eroding and circumventing its authority (Ledeneva 1998; Routley 2010; Blundo 
2006a).   
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4. Grassroots Evaluations of Good Governance 
The previous two sections on local institutions and developmental patrimonialism looked at 
how developing country elites seek to achieve good governance, variously defined as 
‘developmental’ (Khan 2007), ‘sustained inclusive growth’ (Pritchett and Werker 2012) or 
‘what works’ (Booth 2011b). This section looks at debates over how non-elites in developing 
countries, people ‘at the grassroots’, conceive of good governance. It considers how scholars 
have sought to uncover conceptions of good governance which are indigenous to different 
political contexts, and how they can reflect popular concerns. Through studying grassroots 
perspectives on governance, scholars have revealed alternative perspectives on the concepts 
that are at the core of good governance agenda: transparency and accountability. In response, 
the World Bank has sought to incorporate some of these perspectives into its programmes.   
Transparency  
Transparency is a contested concept, and there are two broad schools of thought on 
understanding it. The mainstream side of the debate is the representational school that sees 
transparency as the disclosure of ‘neutral’ information, which includes the World Bank 
(Reinikka and Svensson 2004). This approach is representational in the sense that 
information represents a reality that cannot be perceived directly. From this view 
information is judged on the basis of accuracy and objectivity; it is accurate when it 
represents reality as it really is. Information can be acted upon, say by private firms making 
decisions or citizens demanding better, but it does not do anything by itself, and the process 
of creating information about reality does not change the reality it represents (Hetherington 
2011, 156). On the other side, constructivist scholars problematize the idea of information as 
a neutral representation, raising questions about the unintended and differential effects of 
transparency practices (Hetherington 2011, 156). Constructivists argue that while “pure 
information” is constructed as “neutral and uncontaminated” without unintended effects, it 
should be understood as a site of interpretation (Christensen and Cheney 2015, 74; Fenster 
2006).  
These two sides of the debate can be seen in different approaches to improving poor people’s 
access to information, and different models of how transparency can empower the poor. 
Representational approaches are concerned with the availability of documentary forms of 
information, recommending public information campaigns where government budgets are 
published in newspapers (Reinikka and Svensson 2007) and reducing the fees charged for 
obtaining documents from the government (Reinikka and Svensson 2003). Long distances to 
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a newspaper outlet may for instance act as an obstacle to transparency (Reinikka and 
Svensson 2007). The internet can enhance transparency by allowing electronic access to 
documents that would otherwise take a long time, or be expensive to track down in hard 
copy (Ronan McIvor, Marie McHugh, and Christine Cadden 2002; Bertot, Jaeger, and 
Grimes 2010). All of these relate to ways of placing information in the public sphere. 
However, there are some obstacles to transparency that relate not to the availability of 
information but the capacity of citizens to read that information. Writing itself is inaccessible 
in a context of widespread illiteracy, as in north India (Gupta 2012, chap. 5+6).  
Constructivists argue that the extreme case of illiteracy is not the only situation where 
citizens may struggle to ‘read’ and make sense of official disclosures. Similar to the earlier 
discussion about making local institutions legible (Scott 1998), constructivists see 
transparency as the process of making information legible so that various audiences can 
comprehend the message (Fenster 2006). Alternatively, information has an intended 
audience and ‘message’, and these ‘official’ interpretations are susceptible to unpredictable 
derailment, opening up new terrains for contestation (T. M. Li 1999; Garsten and Jacobsson 
2011, 379). Documents contain very different information depending on who is reading 
them and how (M. S. Hull 2003, 288–89; Hetherington 2011, 148). This raises the question 
if ordinary people cannot make sense of official documents, then how can they come to an 
opinion on whether what the government is doing is ‘good’? 
The rise of transparency practices – forms of monitoring and evaluation, disclosure, 
standardisation and record-keeping – based on quantitative performance metrics has been 
described as creating a new ‘audit culture’ (Power 1999). The use of principles and 
techniques of accountancy and financial management have been expanded to cover 
management of a wide range of heterogeneous people and organisations (Shore and Wright 
2015, 24; Gore 2010, 71). This cultural shift has worked in favour of certain groups but 
against others (Strathern 2000).  Transparency practices which are initially imposed on 
multinational companies or governments can be captured and re-appropriated for different 
ends, for example where performing transparency becomes a form of corporate branding 
(Garsten and Jacobsson 2011; F. Li 2009). Alternatively, transparency initiatives that are 
intended to reduce corruption may create new opportunities for illicit practices (Tidey 2013; 
Sharma 2013). The representationalist approach would see this as evidence of the need to 
refine anti-corruption programmes and push for greater transparency. The constructivist 
approach argues instead that transparency is inherently unattainable: there can be no 
communication that is “devoid of mystery, inaccuracy and (mis)representation”, it will 
always create “new opacities” (Christensen and Cheney 2015, 70). This raises the question, 
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when information is made transparent, who is it transparent for (Lodge 2014, 125; Fox 2007, 
663)? 
This leads to the question of what transparency does, rather than simply what it can 
passively reveal. The representational approach casts transparency as empowering the poor 
because it gives them tools to challenge government. Roberts highlights the “performativity 
of transparency”, how it places demands on the ‘citizen consumer’ of information when it 
calls on them to cultivate “information literacy” (2009, 958).  
Looking even more deeply at what transparency does, some scholars have pointed to 
situations where transparency is used to create new identities and relationships. The ability 
to impose these identities and relationships reflects the relative power of groups. New 
institutions based on audit and self-assessment seek to standardise and homogenise 
behaviour, replacing ethics grounded in staff’s engagement with their patients with an ethics 
that privileges conformity to standardised norms and performance criteria. Hull shows how 
South African hospital staff respond to the new imposed norms, trying to conform whilst 
experiencing “moral uncertainty” and discomfort (E. Hull 2012; McKay 2012). In terms of 
broader relationships and group identities, participatory processes aimed at building multi-
stakeholder relationships may end up enforcing falsely consensual modes of operation, 
where space for dissent is minimised (F. Li 2009). Identities and relationships come together 
in new ‘publics’. The first is constructed as a rational, liberal democratic public, including 
those who correctly participate in transparency processes: typically  the literate, the middle 
class (Webb 2012). Hetherington identifies the ‘new democrats’ in Paraguay as constituting 
such a public,, highlighting how cognitive characteristics of literacy and education obscure 
the more material class based ones. The second is made up of those who fall short of the 
demands of transparency. In Paraguay this includes the campesinos. Hetherington explains 
how the two publics in Paraguay are defined by contrasting “knowledge practices: how they 
claim to know the world.”  (Hetherington 2011, 20).  
Accountability 
The original good governance conception of accountability was narrowly focused on state 
reforms (Peter Newell and Wheeler 2006a, xv, 1). Whilst the poor are meant to be served by 
government policies for development, they often struggle to access or navigate formal 
channels such as judicial review, ombudsmen and scrutiny in national presses (Peter Newell 
and Wheeler 2006b; Peter Newell and Wheeler 2006a). The “New Accountability Agenda” 
argued that accountability should go beyond traditional formal liberal democratic 
mechanisms and get into “places it can’t reach” (Goetz 2003; Goetz and Jenkins 2005). It 
was hoped that civil society, working outside of formal governmental channels could 
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achieve a deeper level of democratic and public accountability than more “technocratic” 
forms of government (Hickey and Mohan 2008, 234; Benequista 2009). The World Bank 
developed the concepts of social accountability, involving mechanisms beyond just voting, 
and demand-side governance (World Bank 2005b, 2, 5). The practical techniques suggested 
in the Social Accountability Sourcebook - protests, petitions, participatory budgeting and the 
participation of civil society in policy formation – sought to draw non-elites into formal 
governance structures, empowering marginalised groups (World Bank 2000a, 2003a, 2016b). 
Many scholars have analysed patron-client relationships as offering a form of accountability 
(Haller and Shore 2005; Rivkin-Fish 2005; Blundo 2012; Blundo 2014). Echoing the legal 
pluralism approach, state agents are rarely simply accountable or not, but subject to multiple 
forms of accountability to different actors (Macdonald and Allen 2015). Schomerus and 
Rigterink use strength of phone signal as a proxy for how well different villages in South 
Sudan are able to hold their local politicians to account (Schomerus and Rigterink 2015). 
The assumption is that the possibility of direct phone communication with political figures is 
a form of accountability.  It specifically connects with discussions of answerability, the 
aspect of accountability where the citizen has the right to seek answers from their elected 
official (Schedler 1999). Multiple conflicting demands have to be ‘virtuously navigated’ by 
actors situated in webs of rival norms (Anders 2002). Pitcher, Moran and Johnston urge us to 
focus on how patrimonial authority is rendered legitimate through reciprocity. Following 
their line of argument, we should pay attention to the “mutual dependence” between patron 
and client, and “institutionalized means of holding each other accountable” (Pitcher, Moran, 
and Johnston 2009, 139).  
Public and Private Realms 
The idea of political accountability operating through patron-client relations raises the 
possibility that important mechanisms of good governance operate outside of the public 
sphere as traditionally conceived. There is a long history of debates over the division 
between public and private in government, and its relationship to development. Many of the 
ills of African governments have been attributed to the failure to properly observe the 
boundary between public and private in the use of state resources, resulting in corruption as 
public funds are diverted to private pockets (Amundsen 1999; Andvig et al. 2000; Rose-
Ackerman 1996; DeLeon and Green 2004; DeLeon and Green 2001). Médard described neo-
patrimonial states as blurring public and private realms, resulting from a lack of commitment 
to ‘public norms’ (Médard 1982). Neopatrimonialism is has been described as the 
‘privatisation of the state’(Hibou 1999).  
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Alternatively, market-based critiques of government locate the state’s lack of effectiveness 
or efficiency and accountability in the way that public sector institutions use different 
incentive structures and allocation mechanisms to the private sector. Scholars of the New 
Public Management, for example, advocate the involvement of the private sector in 
providing public goods and the introduction of private sector ways of working in public 
sector institutions. Alternatively, where the public sector lacks finance or skills to deliver 
public goods and services, the private sector provides a reservoir of resources that the public 
sector can call upon.  
These two lines of argument focus on different units of analysis; the first deals with the 
public sphere as a sphere of shared interests and resources, and the private sphere as a sphere 
where individuals act according to their own interests and preferences and accumulate 
wealth as private individuals. The second line of argument looks at systems and structures, 
and asks whether the public interest is served better by requiring public servants to pursue it 
directly, following rules and protocols; or by permitting individuals in a market to pursue 
their private interests, through the profit motive, with competition and performance based 
incentives directing the pursuit of private interest to serve the public good indirectly. 
However, the link between them is the role given to private interest: is this a liability to be 
tamed or a power to be harnessed for the public good?  
Scholars engaged in studying the everyday state in Africa have highlighted the way that 
these theoretical debates about public and private play out in reality. Bierschenk argues that 
in many African states, public servants are provided with no resources with which to 
perform their public duties, forcing them to mobilise their own private resources for public 
ends. He cites examples of Beninese officials using their own mobile phones, gendarmes 
carrying prisoners to jail in their own cars, police stepping in to personally provide for 
prisoners who the state and then their own families have failed.  “This”, he argues (2010, 9) 
“is the other face of the creeping privatisation of public services, which is otherwise only 
viewed exclusively from the perspective of corruption.” Blundo shows that the public sector 
may rely on private individuals to perform tasks which on paper are meant to be done by 
officials hired in the public sector. In his study of how market taxes are collected in a 
Senegalese town, he shows that services “have functioned for about twenty years thanks 
largely to the support of non-administrative, sometimes ‘voluntary’ personnel — personnel 
who perform secretarial tasks, drive the customs vehicles, and collect the municipal taxes 
instead of official collectors” (Blundo 2006:804). This shows that, faced with a lack of 
resources, the state, representing the public sector, may call upon private resources, not only 
in the systemic sense of contracting out public services to private firms, but through drawing 
on the resources and skills of individuals in a private capacity. Therefore, practices that 
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could be seen as corrupt because they blur the line between public and private, are actually 
vital to the ongoing effectiveness of the state and its ability to serve the public interest.  
Ekeh’s theory of the two publics, where citizens engage with the state via both the 
primordial public and the civic public, offers an alternative interpretation to the binary of 
public and private (1975). Ekeh’s theorisation has been highly influential in the study of 
Nigeria and African politics more widely (Mustapha 2012, 4; Osaghae 2006, 233). Ekeh 
famously argued that the legacy of colonialism in Nigeria had led to the bifurcation of the 
public realm. The state existed in the civic public, the realm of amorality, whereas what 
could be thought of as the moral ‘public good’ existed in the primordial public. The 
primordial public is made up of the social spaces among associations, groups and communal 
units outside the state. Ekeh describes a strong contrast between citizens' amoral behaviour 
in the civic public and their moral and principled behaviour in the primordial public, such 
that one can ‘rob’ the civic public to serve the primordial one (1975).  
Olutayo and Omobowale add nuance to this picture, by showing that state action and the 
civic realm is not so denigrated that it is ‘amoral’. Their study of community engagement 
with governmental and non-governmental development projects shows that people act 
differently in relation to government development projects compared with community 
projects. Rather than a binary between the moral primordial public and the amoral civic 
public, each is sustained by different norms of appropriateness and values (Omobowale and 
Olutayo 2010). One of the criticisms that has been levelled at the Two Publics is that it 
implies that a unified public realm, as Ekeh asserts exists in the West, is normatively 
superior (1975, 91). Thus, Osaghae argues, Nigerian society is cast as a deviation from the 
norm, which reflects and reproduces Euro-centric assumptions about politics. Specifically, it 
implies that the civic public needs to be strengthened and the primordial public dismantled 
such that the state can enjoy a normative supremacy (Osaghae 2006, 237). 
Anthropologists have argued that people sometimes base their judgements of what counts as 
a good governance on factors that fall outside of the public sphere, as traditionally conceived 
as the formal realm of the state. Patients of a hospital in Russia, navigating the constantly 
shifting and insecure landscape of post-Soviet transition, may use informal gifts to 
circumvent the official healthcare system, which is seen as unjust. They seek to develop a 
relationship between them and their doctor of ‘lichnyi vrach’, meaning ‘personal doctor’, 
implying that personal agreement has superseded the official framework (Rivkin-Fish 2005, 
49–52). This contrasts with the way that such a relationship would be viewed from a 
bureaucratic perspective as preferential and unwarranted 'special treatment', which assumes 
the system that provides non-special treatment is fundamentally fair.  
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What is interesting about Rivkin-Fish’s case study is that the value of the relationship is not 
simply that the service received may be better than it would otherwise, it is that the 
relationship in itself is of value, for the affective and emotional security it brings.  James 
Ferguson develops the idea that hierarchical but affective relationships may be valued, 
through his elaboration of the concept of dependence. Whilst dependence is, “to the liberal 
mind”, dehumanising and the opposite of freedom, it has historical antecedents, for instance 
in followership, that in themselves become a mode of agency (J. Ferguson 2015, 145–46). 
He writes: 
“... the socially thick recognition that comes from being looked after by the local 
party-state is after all preferable (for many) to the frighteningly ‘thin’ recognition of 
the iris scan – if only because it implies a humanly social (rather than 
technocratically asocial) and actively affective bond between state and citizen.” (J. 
Ferguson 2015, 160–61) 
Ferguson develops the concept of dependence as a means by which people can enter into 
distributive networks, albeit on different terms. Combining the affective and the material, 
some scholars have pointed to cases where what one receives is evaluated according to how 
it is given. In Rivkin-Fish’s work this is reflected in the performance of affect determining 
whether a contribution is viewed by the doctors as a cheap bribe or a respectful gift. 
Hussaini’s work on how grassroots mobilisers pick which politician to support in Nigeria 
suggests that trust and a sense of – mediated - personal connection can lead them to take 
money from one candidate and yet campaign for another (Husaini 2015).  
Political theory has often neglected the “material embodied and affective” elements of 
politics, and restricted itself to the abstract realm (Schnitzler 2012, 672).  Von Schnitzler 
cites Arendt’s claim that political theory is unconstrained by the “urgency of life processes” 
(Schnitzler 2013, 672). Feminist political theorists have argued that the construction and 
then enforcement of a distinction between public and private realms serves patriarchal 
interests. Gender and politics are mutually constituted through divisions of who may hold 
power over whom in different contexts (Jay 1981; Meyers 2010; A. Ferguson and Hennessy 
2010; McAfee 2014). Other scholars have explored embodied forms of subjectivity that 
might not be traditionally considered ‘political’. Hasty’s ethnographic study of how anti-
corruption officials in Ghana conceptualise corruption shows that both good governance and 
misbehaviour in office were thought of in terms of socially embedded exchanges, rather than 
calculated individual action. For her participants, corruption was “conceptualized … in 
terms of sociality and affect”, and happened when flows and connections between 
representatives of state and society were of the wrong sort; overflowing and too intense. 
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Good state society relations were conceived as a flow of sociality that observed the correct 
degree of closeness and distance (Hasty 2005, 284).  
Thus, these debates highlight the way that the mainstream international conception of good 
governance asserts the need to strengthen and police the boundary between public and 
private to ensure that states can better serve the public interest. However, within the same 
broad school of thought there are privatising impulses, with scholars arguing that the 
importation of market systems into the public sector can introduce the motivational power of 
private interest into service of the public good. Scholars from anthropological, constructivist 
and feminist backgrounds have argued that the distinction between public and private is not 
a natural fact of political life, but is a contested construction with consequences for power 
and distribution. This raises questions about how changing conceptions of good governance 
re-draw the distinction between public and private in different ways to serve ascendant 
interests, and draws our attention to the ways that everyday political action at the grass-roots 
may subvert that distinction. 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, the literatures considered through this chapter have presented conflicting ideas of 
the political. Where politics ends and more technical ideas of governance begin is a central 
issue for the debates around donor conceptions of good governance and their effects on 
developing countries. The work of scholars like Abrahamsen and Death warn of the 
replacement of politics with governance in a world of partnerships and, what this thesis 
terms, ‘self-selecting good governance states’. According to this line of argument, 
governance has so fully colonised what were previously understood as realms of the 
political, that there is little opportunity for the assertion of agency and conflicting interests 
by African states in the international system. Scholars writing from a neo-patrimonial 
perspective have highlighted what they see as the permeation of the public realm, which 
should serve an uncontentious ‘governance-style’ conception of the public interest, with 
politicised private interests.  
Diverse literatures have rejected the assumption that governance always is and should be 
delivered through monopolistic formal state authority, these include literatures covering 
informal institutions, hybrid governance, practical norms and legal pluralism. Moreover, 
scholars from these literatures highlight the ways that even in the most seemingly Weberian 
states, politics and governance are interwoven. The final section traced how some scholars 
have drawn on in-depth studies of specific cases to show how interests are asserted and 
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values contested in a variety of arenas that are not usually considered political. Whilst some 
scholars have argued that the reality of politics at the grassroots shows the political potential 
of the private realm, others, like Ekeh have argued that the public realm is not as unitary as 
Western analyses might suggest. The existence of alternative publics therefore creates spaces 
for the expression of parallel expectations of good governance within the same political 
system. The contribution of this thesis is to further the investigation of the politics of 
competing conceptions of good governance in self-selecting good governance states.   
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Chapter 3 - Historical Background, Methodology and Methods 
Introduction: Framework and History 
My research question is: what were the politics of good governance in Oyo State between 
2011 and 2015 and how did different conceptions of good governance play out in political 
competition?  Conceptions of good governance include norms, principles and values, which 
are expressed in a specific world view which includes beliefs about what the government, or 
more generally those who exercise authority, should do and what development should look 
like. In this thesis I use the term ‘model’ to signify a package of reforms, policies and 
practical commitments, which rely on a certain understanding of how government 
interventions lead to different development outcomes. A model is a practical and specific 
agenda for government action, whereas conceptions of good governance operate at a deeper 
level of more abstract normative beliefs.  
Therefore, this research identifies case studies which are representative of a certain model of 
development, the Lagos Model, and uses in-depth empirical research to look at the deeper 
conceptions of good governance that lie beneath the model and resistance or opposition to it. 
One of the main challenges of my research question is how to study something that is 
invisible. How people conceptualise abstract concepts like the state and governance is not 
possible to grasp simply through observation. The first section of this chapter considers two 
broad ways of making the invisible terrain of normative political judgements concrete: first 
through quantitative analysis, as if attitudes were fixed objects, and the second through a 
constructivist qualitative engagement that seeks concrete “moments of emergence”, and its 
implications for which methods are most fruitful. The second section considers how others 
have studied changing normative ideas in African states and explains the selection of case 
studies, field-sites and participants. The final section considers my position in the field as a 
young, white, female researcher from a prestigious British university, and reflects on how it 
affected knowledge production in elite and non-elite settings.  
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1. Historical Background 
Historical Overview of Nigeria 
Before the turn of the twentieth century the area covered by modern day Nigeria was made 
up of around 300 different smaller polities with their own political structures, some 
centralised, others less so (Awe 1999, 5). Under colonialism, the state operated with its 
primary objective not being the public interest of those within its jurisdiction but the 
interests of the British metropole (Osaghae 2006, 234; Awe 1999, 5–8). Colonialism had 
uneven affects on different regions of Nigeria. Missionary schools had brought Western 
education to the south of Nigeria comparatively early, and even before colonial rule the 
spread of Christianity and Western education in the south led to a growing gap between the 
south and the north (Peel 1978, Simpson and Oyetade 2008). By the time Nigerian elites 
were close to securing independence, the ethnic character of Nigerian politics had been 
entrenched (Awe 1999, 10–12).  
Nigeria became independent from Britain in 1960, and upon Independence entered the First 
Republic under a civilian regime. Following the collapse of the First Republic amidst 
corruption allegations, and a subsequent civil war until 1970, power alternated between 
military and civilian rule for the next 30 years (Enweremadu 2010:5). Nigeria’s post-colonial 
experience has been of alternation between military and civilian regimes (Mazrui 1976; 
Nwankwo 1987; Adekanye 1989; Adekanye 1993). There have long been debates over the 
relative importance of democracy versus other understandings of good governance such as 
anti-corruption. For example, in 1983 an unpopular civilian regime was overthrown in coup 
by General Muhammadu Buhari and General Tunde Idiagbon on the bold programme of 
waging a War on Indiscipline (Otite 1986; Charlick 1993; Adekanye 1993, 1989; Akande 
1987; Idachaba 1986). However, military regimes historically have been equally corrupt as 
well as highly authoritarian, ruling by decree and using military courts, violence and 
detention without trial to silence opponents (Shyllon 1980; Ihonvbere 1996; Awe 1999, 13). 
Over the 1970s, Nigeria experienced a very rapid growth in oil revenue, from $718 m in 
1970 to $9.4bn in 1978. From being a major exporter of agriculture in the years after 
independence, Nigeria became a petro-state, reliant on oil for the vast majority of foreign 
exchange earnings and government revenue (Subramanian and Sala-i-Martin 2003, 14–15). 
Since then, the relationship between the federal government at the centre, and regions and 
states at the periphery, mediated through debates over oil, has been a central concern of 
Nigerian politics. When oil prices fell in 1983, the federal government was unable to meet 
loan repayments and had little to fall back on in terms of internally generated revenue. 
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Buhari’s highly authoritarian interlude lasted only until 1985 when he was removed in a 
counter-coup by General Ibrahim Babangida (Ihonvbere 1993, 143; Bangura 1994a, 272).  
The new military regime was forced to meet the demands of creditors and the IMF to 
maintain solvency, implementing a package of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs). In 
1986, the IMF programme was accepted by the military regime, complete with 
conditionalities requiring economic restructuring, balanced budgets, policies aimed at 
minimising inflation and cuts to the public sector (Lewis and Stein 1997). SAPs sought to 
shift the economy from being reliant on public sector activity to investment from private 
entrepreneurs (Akinola 1998, 238–39; Herbst 1990, 949–58). They also aimed to divert 
productive potential away from urban commerce and towards rural agricultural production, 
long ignored by ruling elites (Bates 1981; Jamal and Weeks 1993). The result, however, was 
that the government was delegitimised in the eyes of the poor majority as it stopped 
providing social programmes and services essential to public welfare were abandoned to 
“neglect and deterioration” (Ihonvbere 1993, 142; Bangura 1994b, 790–92; Agbaje and 
Guyer 2002, xxxi). Counter to the initial impetus of the reforms, what remained of the state 
grew bloated as public servants tried to retain what was left of their access to resources 
(Olukoshi, Olaniyan, and Aribisala 1994; Hutchful 1994; Williams 1994).  
After Babangida initiated the controversial structural adjustment reforms he announced that 
he would hand over to a democratically elected leader. The elections took place between 
1992 and 1993, with the popular Yoruba businessman and politician M.K.O. Abiola uniting 
voters across ethnic blocks in his bid for the Presidency (Hoffman and Nolte 2013). 
However, the elections were annulled and the result never announced, though Abiola was 
presumed rightful winner, and protests broke out led by what came to be known as the June 
12th movement. What followed from 1993 was a military regime led by General Sani 
Abacha, that represented the nadir of federal abuses of oil revenues, military rule and 
disastrous economic policies (Mkandawire 1999). Abacha destroyed what was left of the 
country's democratic institutions and formal policy-making process, government became 
predatory, and cronyism, corruption and state violence were widespread (Lewis 1996; Lewis 
and Stein 1997; Olopoenia 1998).  
Abacha died in 1998 and in 1999 a new constitution enshrined democracy in Nigeria’s 
‘Fourth Republic’ with regular elections and a civilian federal government (Enweremadu 
2013). Presidential elections were held every four years, and there was a major transferral of 
power from the central government to elected state governors and local governments. 
Around half of the revenues in the Federation Account were to be shared among the lower 
tiers of government (Iledare and Suberu 2010, 3). Olusegun Obasanjo, the Yoruba General 
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who had come to power in 1976 and managed the transition to democracy in 1979, was 
returned to power as President for the People’s Democratic Party in 1999 (Enweremadu 
2010).  
With each Presidential election, there was confirmation that the military had been 
successfully sent back to the barracks and the potential that the Fourth Republic would 
survive in a democratic civilian form was strengthened. Though the PDP reliably maintained 
control of the Presidency, Obasanjo’s dubious bid to remain in power beyond constitutional 
limits and seek a third term as President eventually failed. In 2007 Obasanjo handed over to 
Umaru Yar’Adua, a Muslim northerner who ruled for three years before dying in office. He 
was succeeded by Goodluck Jonathan, a comparatively young politician who had served as 
Governor of Bayelsa State. Jonathan became president having won no major elections: both 
when he became Governor and President it was via promotion from the position of Deputy. 
However, elections in the Fourth Republic continue to be characterised by misconduct, 
intimidation and weak rule of law. Moreover, following democratisation, there has been a 
spike in communal and ethnic violence (Kraxberger 2009; Okeke and Innocent 2013; 
Enweremadu 2010; Yagboyaju 2011; Enemuo 1999; Ikelegbe 2005, 490). 
Historical Overview of Ibadan and Oyo State 
The early 19th century was a time of instability in Yorubaland, with the fall of the Old Oyo 
Empire in the 1820s. In this chaotic environment, a “motley band of marauders” found 
success in military domination of rival towns, and in 1829 established a war camp in what is 
now Ibadan (Watson 2003, 4–5). The state-building process in Ibadan was based on warfare 
and conquest. It grew by attracting displaced groups from the Old Oyo Empire and other 
defeated Yoruba kingdoms to its strategic trading location (Awe 1964; Ajayi and Smith 
1971; Falola 1984; Ajala 2005, 108; Ejiogu 2016, 68).  
Ibadan, along with its historic rival Oyo town, signed a treaty with the British in 1893 
cementing the imposition of colonial rule and becoming a British Protectorate. The British 
exploited the town for its raw materials, whilst contributing to the continued growth of the 
city as a commercial and administrative centre. During the colonial period, migrants from 
further afield came to settle in Ibadan, including the Hausa from northern Nigeria and the 
Lebanese. These influxes shaped the social geography of the town, creating new districts and 
neighbourhoods. Its position at the convergence of major trade routes and the routing of the 
newly constructed Lagos-Kano railway through Ibadan in 1901 helped to develop the city 
(Onibokun 1999; Freund 2007, 70).  
Ibadan became the seat of government for the Western Region, under a unified Nigeria, in 
1952. Just before independence in 1960, Lagos Island was turned into a federal territory, 
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administratively separate from the rest of the region. By then, Ibadan had grown to be the 
largest city in Sub-Saharan Africa by area. The Mid-Western Region was created out of the 
Western Region in 1964 and Lagos Island merged with its surrounding areas to form Lagos 
State in 1967. Throughout the changes of status from 1940s to the 1960s, Ibadan was the 
centre of federal establishments and home to a new wave of research institutes, media 
centres and telecoms.  Later, the city grew with a variety of new, oil-funded, developments 
from 1973, including the expansion of the city along the Ibadan-Lagos expressway in the 
1980s. In 1976 what was then called the Western State was divided into Ogun, Ondo and 
Oyo states (Ajala 2008).  
Under Abacha’s military regime, Ibadan suffered neglect and underinvestment. Other than 
the creation of a number of new states9, which reduced the size of Oyo, the state was largely 
neglected under the military regime. It was seen as an outpost of opposition to the military 
government, with the National Democratic Coalition, the major pro-democracy campaign 
group, having a base in Ibadan (Areola 1994; Agbaje 2002; Fourchard 2003; Ajala 2008, 
160–63; O. A. Akinola 2013, n. 6). The 2006 census put the population of Oyo State at 
5.6million, with the National Population Commission estimating an increase to 6.4m by 
2010 (NBS 2013, Table 45.2). Ibadan’s population has been estimated at 3million10 
(Fourchard 2003). In 1991 Ibadan’s administration was divided into 11 independent Local 
Government Areas (LGAs), 5 core urban LGAs11 and a further 6 semi-urban LGAS.12 The 
biggest occupations in Ibadan are traders and civil servants, with some agricultural 
production and processing in urban and peri-urban areas. Across the whole state, agriculture 
is the main industry, with major poultry production (Adelekan et al. 2014, 1, 22).Today, the 
South West Zone is the richest13 in Nigeria (DHS 2014, Table 2.5). Oyo is comparatively 
well integrated into the national and global economy: there are around twice as many bank 
branches in Oyo State as the state average (excluding Lagos) with more being built every 
                                                          
9 In 1991, Osun was carved out from Oyo, and in 1996 Ekiti was created from part of Ondo 
state.  
10 Official estimates in 2010 put the city’s population at 2.9m (NBS 2013, Table 45.2; NPC 
2010, 294–52011). 
11 Ibadan North, Ibadan North-East, Ibadan North-West, Ibadan South-East and Ibadan South-
West.  
12 Akinyele, Egbeda, Ido, Lagelu, Ona Ara and Oluyole.  
13 Almost half the population are the top wealth quintile nationally and only 8.3% are in the 
lowest or second lowest wealth quintile.  
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year14 (CBN 2012a). Despite this comparative wealth, poverty is widespread even in the 
state’s biggest city. An estimated 76% of Ibadan residents are food insecure and 30% report 
experiencing moderate to severe hunger (Ajani, Adebukola, and Oyindamola 2006). In 
general its social indicators are above the national average but worse or average in relation 
to its more cosmopolitan neighbours like Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Ekiti (DHS 2013). 
On measures such as vaccination rates Oyo scores around the national average, but 
significantly worse than its southwestern neighbours15 (DHS 2014, fig. 10.3). 
                                                          
14 Table A2.7.2: Number of Commercial Bank Branches in Nigeria (by States) and Abroad, 
Statistical Bulletin 2012 Section A  
15 On the percentage of children aged 12-23 months who are vaccinated, Oyo scores just 26%, 
only 1% more than the national average, and worse than most of its neighbours, who have a zonal 
average of 41%.  
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2. Studying Conceptions of Good Governance: Methodology and 
Methods 
 
Previous attempts at making the invisible concrete: quantitative methods 
Using quantitative methods, many studies on governance look at the prevalence of different 
practices and policies, whether positive or negative, and explore the connections with other 
social, economic and political trends. Quantitative studies rely on a positivist epistemology 
whereby there is a distinct reality out there to be studied, and researchers must seek to 
represent it as objectively and truthfully as possible. The Good Governance Index and the 
Corruption Perceptions Index measure states’ performance in certain areas, and produce 
rankings comparing countries. The former evaluates how well countries demonstrate 
political traits deemed desirable by the good governance model (Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 2010; Galtung and Pope 1999). The latter developed in the 1990s and inspired 
extensive attempts to see which factors were causally associated with poorer corruption 
rankings. Building on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (Lamsdorff 
1995), these studies used large-n quantitative cross-country analysis to run regressions 
investigating the correlation and causal relationships between corruption and other factors 
(Lancaster and Montinola 1997; Treisman 2007; Bardhan 2006; Montinola and Jackman 
2002; Graf Lambsdorff 2005; Goudie and Stasavage 1998; Lambsdorff 2001; Bardhan 
1997). However, the reliance on perception of corruption – often by outside elite experts and 
sometimes self-perpetuating (Miller 2008) – has been called into question. It has been noted 
that perception indices do not correlate strongly with measures of experienced corruption 
(Treisman 2007).  
Using similar methodologies, scholars have attempted to explain what leads to differences in 
populations’ acceptance of corruption and other political attitudes. One approach has been to 
compare perceived levels of corruption with variations in a country’s cultural values using 
the World Values Survey, such as whether the national culture is more oriented towards 
survival or self-expression, or how hierarchical the major religion is (Husted 1999; 
Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005, 112). Others have inverted the approach, looking at how 
attitudes towards corruption correlate with other national-level variables. These rely on 
obtuse single questions where the respondents rate the statement “Someone accepting a 
bribe in the course of their duties” on a scale from 1 -10 (never to always justifiable) 
(Manzetti and Wilson 2007, 995).  
Such approaches take whole countries as units of analysis as if all citizens share a single set 
of attitudes, and homogenise a broad set off practices under the word corruption as if it is  
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“essentially the same” everywhere (Johnston 2005, 186). Corruption becomes reified as a 
defined object and understanding corruption becomes a case of knowing what background 
factors make people more or less accepting of ‘it’.  The use of cross-country standardised 
measures of governance quality suggests that what counts as good governance remains 
constant across contexts. Indeed, Kaufman et al. defend the composition of their 
perceptions-based Worldwide Governance Index on the grounds that their data suggests “it is 
implausible that the preferences of businesspeople regarding good governance differ so 
dramatically from those of other types of respondents” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
2007, 13). However, Kurtz and Schrank (2006) show that even a broad-brush questionnaire 
can reveal stark differences between how different groups, such as business people and 
others, in society evaluate government action.  
However, on the whole, normative judgements about politics do not submit well to 
quantitative analysis (Schatz 2009, 2) and quantitative studies often fail to “tell us anything 
about the experience of ‘corruption’ for the majority of people” (Harrison 2004, 139). For 
example, Cheeseman has used surveys of political attitudes to test Barrington Moore’s 
hypothesis of “No bourgeoisie, no democracy” in Kenya. Using Afrobarometer data, where 
attitudes are broken down by income and other variables, he evaluates whether class, defined 
variously by education, employment, wealth and lived poverty, explains variations in support 
for democracy, attitudes to presidentialism and attitudes to freedom of association. 
Cheeseman adds some qualitative data in the form of an analysis of elite politics in Kenya 
(Cheeseman 2015, 648, 652).  
Whilst this approach benefits from a sample size of approximately 2400 respondents, with 
consistent descriptive data about the respondents, the data on attitudes is very thin. The 
terms of reference are imposed by the questions, rather than being inductively generated by 
participants, and respondents must choose between one of two opposing statements such as: 
‘A: Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many 
political parties in Kenya.’ and ‘B: Many political parties are needed to make sure that 
Kenyans have real choices in who governs them’. There were 5 possible responses for each: 
strong agreement with A, agreement with A, neither, agreement with B and strong agreement 
with B. This leaves little room for a more nuanced understanding of how respondents 
understand political life, nor can it pick up on important political values that fall outside of 
the rubric of pre-determined questions. The psychological assumption of such positivist 
work on ‘political attitudes’ is that individuals have concrete and coherent preferences and 
attitudes, which surveys can measure as easily as personal characteristics like height and 
weight.  
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Where quantitative studies have yielded revealing results is where they have been combined 
in multi-methods research design with qualitative methods and context specific 
understanding. Rogger’s study of the Nigerian Federal Civil Service built on long-term 
observation and focus-groups to formulate survey questions which were pertinent to the 
concerns of civil servants and their managers (Rogger 2014). Forthcoming work on taxation 
and political legitimacy in Lagos combines survey data with longer in-depth interviews to 
deepen the analysis, allowing participants to offer their own interpretations of politics 
(Cheeseman and Klaas 2017).   
What is missing in many of these discussions is a positive and substantive sense of what 
alternative conceptions of good governance actually consist of. Indeed, the universalists 
formulate universal values such as transparency and accountability in such a compelling 
vocabulary, and the discourse promoting such conceptions is so dominant, that it is hard to 
imagine alternative values outside of these frameworks. Take for instance the World Bank’s 
widely used definition of transparency as “the citizenry’s right to know and access to 
information” (Kaufmann and Bellver 2005, 1). It seems perverse to argue against this as a 
good thing, as surely there is nowhere citizens do not wish to access information. The 
process of thinking through alternative conceptions of good governance therefore does not 
start with a critique of dominant conceptions and then reason to an improved conception. 
Rather it must be an inductive process where actually existing politics on the ground is 
studied in-depth and without pre-conceptions to allow popular conceptions of good 
governance to emerge inductively. 
Making the invisible visible: constructivist methodology and its implications for 
inductive qualitative methods 
A constructivist approach is well suited to the study of political ideas and how people 
conceive of ‘good governance’ because it can capture the way that political ideas are 
constitutive of political reality in themselves, and mediate how people understand the world, 
rather than simply being perceptions or evaluations of an external reality.  
Scholars have employed a variety of methods to try and capture the way that different ideas 
are constructed in political life, with the aim of developing more nuanced accounts of how 
people understand politics. Burbidge invited youth in Nairobi to keep a diary of their 
thoughts on the election for the month surrounding the 2013 elections, to track how their 
affiliations changed (Burbidge 2014). However, the most popular methods are in-depth 
interviews and ethnographic participant-observation. Ethnographic methods, based on close 
and prolonged observation of the everyday life of a setting or group, offer a way of 
uncovering the richness and nuance of political life. Corbridge et al. and the States at Work 
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research agenda are major contributions to the ethnographic study of the state and its 
workings. Both are inductive, taking the “real” workings of the states in the third world as 
their focus, rather than comparing empirical case studies to pre-existing paradigms such as 
good governance or neopatrimonialism (Corbridge et al. 2005; Bierschenk and Olivier de 
Sardan 2014).   
Historians, sociologists, anthropologists and politics researchers have found useful ways of 
employing a constructivist methodology in such a way that ‘invisible’ normative ideas can 
be made visible, if not ‘concrete’. Ruth Watson studies how civic culture developed in the 
history of Ibadan from the mid-19th to the early 20th century, and finds that civic culture is 
never a concrete object but it is an ever-changing interaction of multiple perspectives and 
experiences that resists definition. She argues that when studying broad ideas and how they 
are shared or contested in a society, we should not search for neat or definitive answers as in 
the positivist methodologies above. Rather, civic culture is “a contentious historical process 
rather than [...] a fixed set of political attitudes” (Watson 2003, 9) Anthropologists of 
development studies have similarly built methodologies on the assumption of diverse, plural 
and multiple understandings of a central imaginary. Corbridge et al., in Seeing the State, 
argue that rather than trying to study ‘the state’ as a monolithic entity, researchers seek to 
gain an understanding of how different groups ‘see’ or encounter the state. The state is not a 
unitary entity or actor, but only exists from these multiple and divergent ‘sightings’, none of 
which is privileged as holding the truth to the ‘real’ nature of the state (Corbridge et al. 2005, 
19). 
Therefore I sought to cultivate an ethnographic “sensibility” (Cerwonka and Malkki 2008) 
or “attitude” (Flick 2014) even though the empirical data-collection was done through 
interviews, observation and secondary materials rather than ethnography’s traditional 
method, long-term participant observation. This means prioritising the meanings informants 
give to their social and political reality and a general sympathy for interlocutors (Schatz 
2009, 5,7). These epistemological and methodological orientations have implications for 
methods: the practical tools of gathering data and producing knowledge. The first 
implication was that I needed to seek the perspectives of a wide cross-section of actors: both 
those who made policy, those who worked in government implementing policy, and ordinary 
people who were in some way that recipients, targets, or victims of government policy. Each 
category would provide a different ‘sighting’ of the state, as well as differences within the 
categories. Moreover, these considerations reminded me that whatever data I got from each 
interview should not be understood as data about the respondents fixed preferences. Rather it 
was a contextual product of the  professional or social role they occupied in that instant, their 
response to me as a researcher and the contingent pressures shaping their perspectives at that 
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point in time. One way of doing this was to collect characteristics data on each of my 
respondents, where appropriate, concerning their role, background and identity, to help 
contextualise the position they occupied in the political structure.  
Furthermore, it made me aware that my research needed to interrogate the shifting and 
historically situated nature of political ethics and norms. Conceptions of good governance 
and, conversely, corruption, exist at the nexus of a variety of complex moral and social 
issues concerning legitimacy, duties, and morality (Pardo 2004; Harrison 2004, 140). To 
fully understand how people normatively evaluate different forms of state action, and 
interactions with the state, we must investigate the ‘intersubjective meanings’ involved 
(Taylor 1974). Corbridge et al. remind us that to understand how those within the state 
conceive of good governance, we must broaden out from simply understanding officials in 
their formal roles and consider their social worlds to “give a stronger sense of their 
embeddedness in local society” (Corbridge et al. 2005, 152) What this means for methods is 
that we cannot do the interpretative work of reconstructing the meanings that respondents 
give to political events and policies, if we do not cultivate a rich background understanding 
of the social world in which they exist.  Ajala’s ethnographic investigation of “community 
perception and conception of local politics” in Ibadan relied on his insider status and 
existing rich background knowledge. He describes his ethnographic methods as creating 
opportunities for a “multiplicity of intersubjective encounters” (Ajala 2008, 150–51). As an 
outsider, who had not been exposed to Yoruba life and culture before arriving in Lagos for 
the scoping trip in July 2013, my contextual knowledge was shaped by my outsider status 
which meant I had no intuitive grasp of the “inter-subjective understandings” that Ajala used 
to generate insights in his work.  
The typical response to the challenge of how to develop this background knowledge through 
ethnographic field-work is “immersion” in the field site. This suggests a complete and 
prolonged exposure to the lived reality of the field site, and isolation from other experiences 
or connections to the ‘outside world’. However, this idea of ‘immersion in the field’ has been 
problematized by scholars. The conception of the field as a bounded and unitary unit is a 
construction, and neglects the inter-connected and trans-local reality of a globalised world 
(Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 2011; Borneman and Hammoudi 2009; DeWalt and DeWalt 
2002; Fife 2005). Furthermore, the idea of immersion occludes the reality of mobile phone 
and internet connections to home, and other privileged aspects of the researcher’s lifestyle in 
the field. Following Gupta and Ferguson (1997), Cerwonka and Malkki explore how each of 
the field-sites they worked in presented “complex forms of community and isolation” 
(Cerwonka and Malkki 2008, 7).  
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Whilst aware of the complexities of the idea of ‘immersion’ and without a singular ‘field’ in 
which to immerse myself, I nonetheless sought to embrace my time in Nigeria as an 
opportunity for learning about diverse aspects of social, political and religious life. I 
participated in as many aspects of everyday life in Ibadan as possible, though of course, 
what counts as ‘everyday’ varies by class, gender, religion and innumerable others factors. I 
attended church services and Islamic events with Nigerian friends and informants, 
approached travelling on public transport as an activity in itself and went shopping regularly 
in a variety of markets and shopping complexes. I kept field-notes with descriptions of the 
research process and everyday experience of Ibadan.  
I hired three research assistants over the course of my fieldwork who helped to provide 
knowledge of the “inter-subjective” meanings and background cultural and social context. 
All three were male native Yoruba speakers between the ages of 25 and 40 and were from 
Oyo State. The two who worked with me in the markets and non-elite interviews were both 
master’s students from the Anthropology Department at the University of Ibadan. Joseph 
was an established professional research assistant who had worked with numerous Western 
researchers in Ibadan before. Buky was recommended to me through a friend, and had 
worked with NGOs that were closely linked to Western donors. They were adept at 
translating between the academic world in which my research questions were generated, and 
Yoruba social life from which I hoped to find answers. My third research assistant, Gbenga, 
had experience working for political figures in Ibadan and worked with me on some elite 
interviews and on tours of Ibadan where he narrated our routes through the city, through the 
political significance of different neighbourhoods. Working with research assistants was also 
useful for interviews in English, where the differences in dialect and tone meant that at times 
I misunderstood without knowing I had misunderstood, and through talking through the 
interviews afterwards my assistants were able to clarify (Becker and Geer 1957, 29). 
I also consulted a wide range of newspapers, social media articles and official documents. 
Previous work on politics in Nigeria has attested to the usefulness of newspaper sources 
(Ajala 2008, 151; Hoffman 2011, 10), but it is important to be aware of each paper’s biases 
resulting from ownership of most newspapers by major political figures16. Indeed, learning 
to pick up on the ways that different news sources prioritised and presented events, and the 
                                                          
16 The Nation is owned by Bola Tinubu, the Tribune was founded by Obafemi Awolowo and 
has long associations with the Awolowo family (Adesoji and Alimi 2012), and the Daily Trust is the 
only major northern-based paper. The Premium Times currently offers the most developed 
investigative journalism, for instance partnering with the International Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists to help break the Panama Papers in April 2016 (Premium Times Nigeria 2016a).  
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broader political orientations this reflects, was part of the process of building up a 
background knowledge.   I consulted the newspaper archives and university libraries and 
IFRA-Ibadan, a French government research institute based in the University of Ibadan. I 
also consulted some masters and dissertation theses in the University of Ibadan and the 
University of Lagos (Fagbemi 1990; Akinfala 2005).  
Prior to my PhD research I had been to Nigeria once, spending a month living with a family 
and conducting environmental research in Maiduguri, a state capital in the northeast, in 
2009. For my PhD I spent 6 ½ months in Nigeria, spread over three trips between July 2013 
and August 2015. My first trip for this project was for 2 weeks in July 2013. I visited Abuja 
and Lagos, attending a conference and conducting pilot interviews. My second research trip 
was conducted as part of an Economic and Social Research Council funded Overseas 
Institutional Visit to the University of Ibadan (UI), in Oyo State. I conducted a further 9 pilot 
interviews with elites in Lagos and Ibadan. My final trip lasted 4 months from April to 
August 2015, during which time I was registered as a visiting researcher in the Department 
of Political Science, University of Ibadan. In total I conducted around 150 interviews and 
focus groups with around 200 respondents (see interview list in Appendix for details).  
72 
 
 
3. Case and Field-Site Selection 
The States at Work research agenda provides a rich and thoughtful set of ethnographies from 
which the team of scholars draw insightful theoretical contributions about the day-to-day 
running of states and the way that normative issues are navigated by state agents17 (Blundo 
2006; Olivier de Sardan 2014). However, my research diverges from States at Work in terms 
of how the historical moment of the fieldwork is understood. Much of the State at Work 
research is understood as portraying the ongoing ethnographic at present. The dominant 
framing is the “day-to-day”, the “routinized”, and the “banal” (Bierschenk and Olivier de 
Sardan 2014, 3). This emphasises those aspects of bureaucratic actions that are ongoing, 
recurring and consistent. By contrast, my research question identifies a moment of 
intentional change. It is concerned with the efforts of the Governor of Oyo to introduce 
elements of novelty, rupture and transformation into the existing “day-to-day”, “routinized” 
and “banal” ways of doing things. Therefore, it looks at the dynamic, rather than the 
habitual. 
There have been studies of political change and transformation from within the States at 
Work research agenda. Michael Roll and Gerhard Anders both address moments of actual or 
attempted change, but they conceptualise the change within different normative frameworks. 
Roll’s study of pockets of effectiveness in the Nigerian federal civil service, relates closely 
to the themes of my research. He considers how ‘pockets’ within the Nigerian bureaucracy 
can adopt radically different modes of operation to the rest, and explores what internal 
politics and processes lead to the delivery of ‘good governance’. Pockets of effectiveness are 
conceptualised as positive anomalies; they are “public organisations that deliver public 
services effectively in contexts of largely ineffective government” (Roll 2014, 365). His 
work reproduces the binary of corruption and good governance as universal normative 
categories, where good governance is “what works” to deliver public services, and bad 
governance is that which fails on this criterion18. Gerhard Anders takes a legal pluralist 
perspective, studying how civil service reform policies imposed on Malawi by donors are 
evaluated, accepted and resisted by different categories of Malawian civil servants. He 
                                                          
17 State agents include anyone acting on behalf of the state, whether as political office holders, 
in the civil service or public service, i.e. the police, public schools, the legal system etc.   
18 It is worth noting that whilst Roll reproduces the evaluative framework of the mainstream 
good governance literature, he differs from the mainstream literature in his analysis of how effective 
‘good governance’ is achieved and therefore his prescriptions for reform. For more discussion, see the 
review of the Developmental Patrimonialism literature in chapter two.  
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highlights how individual actors within the civil service are held accountable to numerous 
different conceptions of what they should do to provide good governance (Anders 2002, 
2005, 2009, 2014).  
The Manchester School of sociologists and social anthropologists were interested in how the 
dynamic can emerge from the habitual. In a series of in-depth case studies of African social 
life, Gluckman, Mitchell and others drew on what were new post-structural social theories to 
critique the dominant functionalist and structural theories of the time (Mitchell 1969; 
Gluckman 1965). The important insight of these explorations is that field-workers can look 
for ‘oments of emergence’ (Turner 1957), moments where these systemic forces were 
disrupted and their contradictions revealed (Kapferer 2006, 136).  
These differences in epistemology, methodology and focus translate into different strategies 
for methods and case selection. Roll assumes normative universalism for his case selection. 
He employs a scale for ranking government organisations from effective to ineffective, 
according to how well they deliver public services, and selects cases on the basis of 'criteria-
led' discussions with 'experts'. In contrast to Roll’s case selection that relies on a normative 
consensus, I drew on the idea of ‘moments of emergence’ (Turner 1957) and sought case 
studies of thematic or policy areas within Oyo State government that would present 
contradictions. Anders advises ‘following the policy’ through what Nader calls a ‘vertical 
slice’ of government, tracing the normative and political goals of elites, into policy-making, 
through the different levels of government to how policies are implemented, resisted and 
subverted on the ground (Anders 2005; Nader 1980). There is always a trade off in 
qualitative research between depth, in the sense of ‘getting deep’ into one locale or group of 
people (Waquant 2004: viii), and breadth, to understand a whole field and how the 
viewpoints of different groups tie together (Mische 2008: 9). I chose to focus my data 
collection on two specific issues or policies within the Oyo political landscape, and pick 
places and organisations that could give privileged and direct insights to the issue. This was 
because I wanted to be able to build up a picture of what the main political ideas were in 
Oyo State politics as a whole, rather than focus on a specific bounded community or 
institution.  
I chose to focus on Oyo State as it provides an example of state government that is seeking 
to enact rapid and transformative changes to governance, based on a new model. The Lagos 
Model has been studied extensively in Lagos State but this research studies its propagation 
in a context of more meagre fiscal resources and strongly established indigenous political 
organisation. My case selection within this overall case study followed two criteria. The first 
was that case studies should be controversial and contentious within political discourse in 
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Oyo State. Controversial policies gave me the opportunity to look at why different actors 
came to different evaluative conclusions and thus tease out the different conceptions of what 
it means to provide ‘good governance’. The second criterion was theoretically derived. I 
knew that I wanted to explore how archetypal policies associated with international 
conceptions of good governance were received and contested in Oyo State. Therefore, I 
looked for policies and programmes that represented one of the key principles of the good 
governance agenda, such as accountability, transparency and progress through private-
sector-led development. With these criteria in mind I generated possible case studies 
inductively upon my arrival in Ibadan, through reading newspapers and initial interviews 
and conversations.  
Case Study 1: Urban Renewal 
I arrived in Ibadan just days after the gubernatorial election in April 2015; and urban 
renewal, specifically the clearing of roadside traders, was a ‘hot topic’ as required by my 
first case selection criteria. Supporters saw it as necessary modernisation, whereas opponents 
argued it prioritised elite interests over ordinary people’s livelihoods. Furthermore, it met the 
theoretical criterion as a policy that represented the concerns of international good 
governance. Donors do not directly recommend demolishing informal shops, but similar 
policies in nearby Lagos, were celebrated by donors and the international business press for 
improving the city’s business environment. I selected a number of field-sites with the aim of 
identifying categories of respondents who had different experiences of government policy. 
By intentionally looking for those who had different ‘sightings’ of the state (Corbridge et al. 
2005) I hoped to build up a sense of political meanings as ‘contentious processes’ involving 
plural voices rather than a single unified narrative (Watson 2003, 9).  First I selected one of 
the modern neighbourhood markets that was built by the government to provide shops for 
displaced traders. I selected one of the neighbourhood markets - which I refer to by the 
pseudonym Neighbourhood Market - on the basis that newspaper reports and conversations 
suggested it was especially successful. It was an opportunity to study the Lagos Model’s 
conception of good governance in a context where it had been most clearly enacted.  
Through the initial interviews at Neighbourhood Market I identified two informal roadside 
market locations from which traders in Neighbourhood Market had been cleared. This 
generated two more field-sites for the urban renewal case study, which I refer to as Highway 
Market and Junction Market. These sites represented categories of traders who had 
responded to government policy in different ways: those who had complied with the 
instruction to relocate to Neighbourhood Market and those who had disobeyed and returned 
to near their original roadside location. A further two less detailed field sites provided 
alternative experiences of government urban renewal policy. Central Market is a large 
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established market. Despite not being along the roadside, it has been partially demolished by 
government at various points in its history, and then rebuilt. At the time of my fieldwork, 
sections of Central Market had been destroyed three years earlier by Ajimobi’s government 
for sanitation reasons and there were reports of plans to ‘modernise’ it, but as yet it had not 
been directly affected by urban renewal. Central Market Extension, the final field-site for 
this case study, had no history of demolitions. Within the markets I first engaged in a rough 
process of stratified sampling, where I randomly selected participants from different sections 
of the market, before pursuing purposive sampling to find respondents who were involved in 
political networks.  
I decided to build up multi-site case studies around the market field-sites to see how those 
implementing government policy conceived of good governance. For each market area I 
conducted interviews in the local government, which took me to three local governments in 
Ibadan for which I use pseudonyms. Central Market is in the Ibadan Central, Highway 
Market and Neighbourhood Market are in Ibadan Metropolitan, and Junction Market is split 
across Ibadan Metropolitan and Ibadan Downtown. Based on 2011 figures, the populations 
of the local governments under study ranged from approximately 170,000 to 350,000. 
However, population growth for the 4 years previous was around 15% so the population had 
probably exceeded that by 2015 (NBS 2013).  
In each local government I interviewed the three most senior members of the local 
government civil service; the Head of Local Government Administration (HLA), the 
Director of Finance and the Director of Administration and General Services (DAGS).  
When I arrived at each local government compound these were the figures that I was 
encouraged to approach first, and they had the discretion to permit me to do interviews with 
staff lower down in the organisation. Moreover, their positions gave them an overview of the 
activities of the local government. I also sought interviews with the Director of Education 
and Social Services, who oversaw the Community Development Unit (CDU), which was 
charged with responding to community association requests for small scale public goods, 
like boreholes, transformers and refurbishment of community halls. The local government 
Chairmen were not officially available for the duration of my 4-month visit, as they awaited 
re-appointment. However, I secured an interview with Chairman of Ibadan Central through a 
party contact.   
In each LGA, I conducted interviews with the executive of the Community Development 
Council (CDC). The CDC is an assembly of all the Community Development Associations 
in the LGA, made up of landlords and tenants associations and other community groups. The 
strength and activities of CDCs varied across the local governments but their main roles 
76 
 
were to facilitate self-help community development projects and work with the local 
government CDUs to propose, implement and monitor small-scale government-funded 
projects.   
Case Study 2: Empowerment 
The second case study was theoretically derived. I looked for a case study that would 
provide a mirror image to urban renewal, i.e. a policy of the state government that went 
against the prescriptions of the international good governance agenda, or even one that 
would be seen as corrupt. This led me to an interest in the practice of empowerment. In the 
Nigerian political context “empowerment” refers to the distribution of food, money or 
equipment for income-generating activities (see Ch.8).  Empowerment events are spectacles, 
often held in a stadium, marquee or other festive venue, where a patron publicly distributes 
empowerment goods. They are almost always accompanied by political messages imploring 
those who have benefitted from reciprocating by voting for the politician in an upcoming 
election.  
From newspaper reports I identified potential field-sites where I could build up a case study 
of empowerment programmes connected closely to the Governor:  Ajumose Food Bank and 
the Ajumose Widows Initiative and ABC Clinics. These were linked to the Governor’s wife 
but often invoked by Ajimobi in speeches as examples of his government’s good work. One 
challenge I faced was not being able to attend or interview anyone who was directly 
involved in the provision of these empowerment events. Whereas the contentious and 
controversial nature of urban renewal policies was highlighted by the abundance of debate 
and news coverage, the controversial position of empowerment became clear through the 
relative secrecy surrounding it.  
Urban Renewal and Empowerment at the State Government Level 
In keeping with the procedure of 'following the policy' and taking a 'vertical slice' of 
government I wanted to interview members of the local or state governments who had 
responsibility for the two case studies I looked at: neighbourhood markets and 
empowerment schemes. First of all, whilst I selected local governments based on their 
connection to different market areas, my interviewees in local governments insisted that they 
had not been involved in the neighbourhood market policies because they were state 
government projects. Eventually, I was able to secure a formal interview with a senior staff 
member at the Ministry of Trade, Cooperatives and Investments, who informed us that 
actually the Ministry had no remit over neighbourhood markets, which was instead being 
managed by another office at the direction of the Governor. 
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Empowerment schemes, where they happened at the local government level, were run by 
either the CDU or other elements of the Department for Education and Social Services. 
However the local governments explained that they were not involved in either of the 
schemes I was interested in, nor had they run their own schemes since the slump in oil prices 
had cut their revenues at least 9 months earlier. Interviews in the Ministry of Women Affairs 
revealed a similar situation with regards to the major empowerment schemes run by the 
Governor. I spoke with senior staff with responsibility for Women's Empowerment, Poverty 
Alleviation and Community Development. When I had asked about empowerment 
programmes in the local and state government, I had been told that they were run by the 
Governor’s wife, out of the Office of the First Lady. Attempts to get interviews with the First 
Lady or her team were unsuccessful, despite a visit to the ABC Hub – the headquarters of 
her health charity - and the Office of the First Lady.  
In reaction to the difficulty of finding the organisers of empowerment schemes, I searched 
for beneficiaries. I obtained contact details for widows' associations from the Women 
Development Unit in the state government. I visited two groups: the first was a training and 
support centre run by an individual, and the second was a self-help association of widows 
and widowers. I interviewed the leader of the first and conducted a focus group with 12 
members of the executive of the second. Whilst the interviews and focus groups deepened 
my understanding of how associations interact with government, and the modalities of 
empowerment more generally, I still didn’t find any direct beneficiaries of the Ajumose Food 
Bank or Widows Initiative.  
I conducted three interviews over three visits to Ajumose House, which was the Governor’s 
private sponsored vocational training centre-cum-campaign headquarters. I initially 
identified this as a site because training is often offered by politicians as ‘empowerment’ to 
their clients, and I guessed that the training centre could be a way for Ajimobi to build a 
constituency. Serendipitously, I discovered late in my fieldwork that a number of the market 
women from Neighbourhood Market had attended Ajumose Food Bank events, via links 
they had with the Governor’s political party (See Ch.8).  
Elite Interviews 
I also conducted interviews with a wide range of other individuals who had different 
positions within the political structure of the state: some were successful politicians19, some 
                                                          
19 I-7 Former progressive member of the Federal House of Representatives for an Oyo State 
constituency, Ibadan 20/10/2013; I-29 Former progressive member of the Federal House of 
Representatives for an Oyo State constituency, Ibadan 20/10/2013 and I-23 Former High Ranking 
Member of Ajimobi's Executive Council, Ibadan, 06/05/2015  
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were unsuccessful candidates20, some were individuals who had worked in various capacities 
for godfathers21, some were academics, journalists, or professionals. I conducted 49 elite 
interviews, of which 4 were follow up interviews. A further nine ‘field interviews’ were 
conducted which were more informal than an interview, and just recorded in notes, but for 
which the same consent procedures applied. I used snowball sampling where respondents 
were invited to connect me with other individuals who they thought would illuminate the 
core issues, as well as purposive selection to identify respondents who could provide a 
viewpoint not already represented in my sample. These elites often had privileged access to 
information about elite politics or were in a position to give an overview of a situation, say 
from experience as a journalist or academic.   
In my field notes, I reflected on conversations I had with taxi drivers, shopkeepers, cleaning 
staff and students. I also observed, in person and in the press, how politicians behaved and 
how they sought to present themselves to the public. I traced which of their actions and 
gestures were well-received by the people around them and their constituents, and which 
were criticised, whether publicly or privately. In trying to understand the underlying 
principles of good governance in Ibadan society, I tried to draw out the themes that recurred 
again and again, across different groups in society.  
 
 
                                                          
20 I-19 Academic and Gubernatorial Aspirant, Ibadan 29/04/2015  
21 I-15 and I-48 Former aide to Adedibu, Ibadan 22/04 and 10/08/2015 and F-5, F-6, F-7, F-8 
Former aide to Arisekola family, Ibadan, 12/05, 15/05, 22/05, 18/04/2015  
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4. Positionality and its Effects on Knowledge Production: 
Scholars are increasingly rejecting the conception of the interview as an unproblematic 
‘snapshot’ of what is going on inside the respondent’s head and warn that “we take at face 
value the image of the self-revealing subject at out peril” (Atkinson and Silverman 1997, 
322). On a constructivist understanding, an interview is an “interactional product” (ten Have 
2012, 35) which is “created by the encounter between two or more persons” (Baker and 
Edwards 2012, 32). Crenshaw’s distinction between position, the fixed forms of privilege, 
and dynamics, where privilege ebbs and flows depending on contingent factors, is useful for 
exploring how the effect of one’s position influences the knowledge you can create in 
different contexts (Kimberle Crenshaw 1989; 1995). Salient aspects of my position were my 
racial identity as white, my gender (female), my status as a Western outsider and my age as a 
junior or youth, but these had different effects depending on context. I was surprised by the 
fluidity and contingency of my position in different hierarchies, with the dynamics of 
privilege changing from one day, or even one room, to the next, as I moved between 
different hierarchies within and between tiers of government and different social worlds: 
from that of roadside traders to the swish offices of state level power-brokers. 
The following section explains some of the ways that my position was expressed in the 
dynamics of different interviews, the effect this had on the ‘interactional product’ and the 
strategies I used to mitigate the obstacles my position presented to access and understanding. 
In addition, I highlight some of the ways in which my identity as a researcher interacted with 
the process of gaining access to generate insights about my research topic.   
Negotiating my position in the non-elite field sites 
In markets and other non-elite sites I was generally a high status outsider. Being white and 
speaking English, which is the language of government in Nigeria, traders often assumed I 
was at the market in some official capacity, perhaps on behalf of government. This 
potentially presented a barrier to relaxed discussion because many of the traders had suffered 
losses to their livelihood through demolitions at the hands of government or feared that 
speaking to me might have repercussions i.e. becoming visible on government records and 
being taxed (Alakinde 2012, 888). However, some respondents, for instance at the Widows 
Association, asked whether I was from an NGO and if talking to me might result in some 
development benefits. Both the fear of talking to me, and unrealistic expectation of benefit, 
necessitated strategies to ensure informed consent. This meant that I ensured, either directly, 
or through a research assistant, that they understood who I was and what the research was 
and that I would ensure confidentiality and anonymity. I complied with LSE’s ethical 
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procedures22 throughout (LSE 2014) but these on their own did not provide clear 
mechanisms of understanding and consent for the non-elite respondents. Initially, at the 
recommendation of my university I used consent forms for the first 14 pilot interviews. The 
use of paperwork was off-putting even to my most ‘elite’ Nigerian respondents, so for the 
rest of my interviews I obtained oral consent. My research assistants were vital in mediating 
my identity for the respondents, for instance by explaining their own family background as 
someone who had family connections to Ibadan and attended local schools. Whereas the 
consent form and documentary infrastructure of my home institution relied on linking me to 
official laws and regulations, the documents that mattered in the field were those that linked 
me to recognisable and reputable Ibadan-based institutions such as the University of Ibadan 
where I was officially based.  
A key consideration of how to maintain ethical conduct was the process of anonymising my 
research in written form. I have anonymised the name and locations of my field-sites in 
Ibadan, which involves a trade off between “maximising protection of participants’ identities 
and maintaining the value and integrity of the data” (Saunders, Kitzinger, and Kitzinger 
2015, 617). It also limits the extent to which I can use news reports to back up certain 
narratives, because to do so would reveal the location and identities of informants. However, 
the important findings in this thesis pertain to the political and social processes rather than 
specific empirical cases so the essence is maintained. I have used pseudonyms for people 
and places, and in some cases changed details, such as a trader’s trade to obscure them 
further, reflecting the fact that anonymity is a continuum (C. R. Scott 2005). In some very 
limited cases I have presented a single informant as two separate people in the write up, so 
as to avoid an ‘information jigsaw’ whereby separate pieces of information can be put 
together to identify the respondent (Saunders, Kitzinger, and Kitzinger 2015; Tilley and 
Woodthorpe 2011; Tolich 2004). In the one case where I use photos to help explain the 
context of my research, i.e. in chapter six where I explain what differentiates neighbourhood 
markets from other markets, I digitally edited the photographs to remove potentially 
identifying features.  
Gaining access to markets in Ibadan was not difficult. Whether housed in purpose-built 
stalls, or built informally along the roadside, markets in Ibadan are highly organised. 
Membership of the market association is generally mandatory, and there is a Babaloja – male 
                                                          
22 For the research completed when I was a student at King’s College London in 2013 I 
complied with their ethical procedures, which are slightly different in format, but have the same result 
of ensuring informed consent and no harm.   
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leader – and Mamaloja or Iyaloja – female leader – for the market, as well as heads of 
association for each trade represented in the market who we approached through the course 
of our research (Oladejo 2015, xiv). In this regard, the process of choosing who to interview, 
i.e. sample selection, was influenced not only by methodological considerations but also by 
considerations of what was seen as appropriate and respectful in the market context. 
Especially in Neighbourhood Market, which was enclosed in a compound, distinct from the 
rest of the built environment and generally quiet, it was imperative to respect protocol to 
visit the Babaloja as soon as possible after arriving, to seek his permission and schedule an 
interview with him as head of the market.  
Some of the interviews were ‘focus groups’, where participants would come and go, or call 
over friends to come and join in, so did not have a fixed number of participants. The 
interviews were semi-structured. My questions fell into two groups: characteristics questions 
asked about marital status, state of origin and the size and nature of their business; and 
position questions asked about attitudes, opinions and preferences. I had a list of standard 
questions but allowed the conversation to develop naturalistically. The list of sample 
questions was itself an inductive product of the research, and a result of ongoing iterative 
collaboration with my research assistants.  The wording of the questions came out of 
phrasings that my respondents used and my research assistants automatically generated: the 
questions “Can I know you?” for eliciting background data and “Has this government 
touched you in anyway?” were phrased in ways I would not have devised before entering the 
field. The question sheet (see Appendix) did not include any question that directly asks about 
what respondents understood as ‘good governance’ or ‘corruption’, because I found that the 
former elicited vague evasive answers and the latter elicited a set ‘script’ response. Rather, I 
pursued this topic through asking follow-up questions when traders mentioned a specific 
government action and “continually moving the discussion to the level of concrete personal 
experience” (Becker 1958, 32). I pursued a narrative account to draw on natural story-telling 
ability (Schutze 1977; Jovchelovitch and Bauer 2000). I transcribed the English interviews 
myself, and the interviews featuring Yoruba were transcribed by native-Yoruba assistants. 
The transcripts were uploaded to Nvivo and coded with an open coding frame to identify 
themes. 
Negotiating my position in elite interviews 
For elite interviews, the brute facts of my position as a white Western outsider were 
expressed in a different set of dynamics, which in turn shaped the ‘interactional product’. 
Scholars have documented the rise of “interview society” in a Western context, where the 
interview has become a ubiquitous social format, but conducting elite interviews in Nigeria 
comes with its own set of expectations (Atkinson and Silverman 1997, 315). Senior figures 
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will often start with a full autobiography starting with the backgrounds of their parents23. 
The dynamics put me in a junior position to the wealthy, older men who constituted the bulk 
of my elite interviews. Being younger, female and not presenting in luxurious dress, I 
slipped into a position of student or apprentice (Hossain 1999, 6) and, previous PhD 
researchers report, such interviews are often “difficult to direct”, in the sense that the 
respondents sometimes give long answers and are resistant to interruption or probing 
(Hoffman 2011, 10–12).  
Yet because of the other aspects of my position which were hierarchically privileged, i.e. my 
race and my connections to prestigious international networks, my status in these elite 
settings was unstable. The effect of elite gatekeepers on the dynamics was more complex 
and changeable than in the non-elite interviews. I became aware that my identity and my 
research project were potentially resources that others could use for their own ends. For 
instance, the rich, high status close relative of a godfather who I spoke to for interview I-924, 
arranged my interview with the senior cabinet member in interview I-1025. He called the 
cabinet member from his phone, arranging for him to stay late in the office that night, and 
had his driver take me to Government House, where the familiar number plate meant the car 
was waved through the gates. In contrast interview I-1326, with a much less important 
member of cabinet, was arranged via a taxi driver who I had told about my research. I had to 
go during office hours and wait whilst various intermediary officials approved my entry to 
the building which I had entered freely after-hours just a month before. Together these 
experiences of access suggested the porous and permeable nature of the state, and how that 
varied with the status of those trying to access it, which contributed to my understanding of 
accessibility (see Ch.7).  
In summary, my positionality affected my access to and interactions with my respondents, 
but the dynamics of that positionality varied from context to context. I took measures to 
ensure that I maintained my respondents’ confidentiality, both during research and in the 
writing up, and that they could give informed consent in ways that were sensitive to the 
                                                          
23 See past interviews with Lamido Adedibu as an example (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007, 
429; Animasawun 2013, 7).  
24 I-9 Senior member of Arisekola household, Ibadan, 28/10/2013  
25 I-10 Senior member of the Governor's Executive Council, Ibadan, 30/10/2013  
26 I-13 Junior member of the Governor's administration, Ibadan 02/12/2013  
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context. These methodological considerations in turn shaped my understanding of key 
themes and the choice of data used in the rest of this thesis.  
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Chapter 4 - Background to the Case Study: International and 
Indigenous Conceptions of Good Governance in Oyo State 
Introduction 
This chapter considers conceptions of good governance that are indigenous to Oyo State and 
Yorubaland. It traces how these conceptions have been leveraged by politicians on the 
ground, shaping competition for followers and later votes. As discussed in the introduction, 
scholars have analysed Nigerian politics through the lens of neopatrimonialism and 
prebendalism. Some scholars have argued that very unequal systems of patronage and 
corruption have endured in African states because they are seen as legitimate in the eyes of 
the population, which does not believe in the universal obligations of state to citizen. 
Arguments about the neopatrimonial nature of Nigerian politics have been used to advocate 
a break from existing forms of politics. This chapter will show that conceptions of good 
governance and appropriate state-society relations have existed in evolving but identifiable 
forms in Oyo state politics. Yoruba thought is obviously not a monolithic entity, nor are the 
boundaries between indigenous Yoruba ideas and others in national and international 
circulation rigid. Indeed, much of Yoruba ethno-genesis has been oriented towards interface 
with influences from missionaries, colonialism, and ideas from the international 
development industry. These conceptions have been part of what society has demanded from 
leaders, and the strategies that leaders have used to maintain legitimacy. That is not to say 
that political leaders have universally abided by these notions, but that they have utilised 
them to maintain power.  
The chapter opens with a history of external and domestic attempts to reform the Nigerian 
government in line with the good governance agenda since the return to democracy in 1999. 
Reforms like the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the National 
Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) sought to wash away the 
modes of governance that had come before and replace them with more technocratic 
institutions. Politicians subverted the reforms, seeking to instrumentalise values like 
transparency and accountability from the international conception of good governance in a 
variety of self-seeking ways. Section two sets out how indigenous conceptions of good 
governance have changed and been contested over time. It focuses on how two broad lines 
of politics, the progressives and the populists, have positioned themselves with regards to 
three key themes, which serve as recurring points of reference in political debate. These 
include legitimate leadership, distribution of economic benefits and progress. In section 
three these themes are traced through contemporary Oyo State politics, starting in 1999 
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leading up to 2011. In particular, it considers the role of godfathers in this time period who 
are understood in the mainstream literature to embody neopatrimonial governance. It shows 
how the definition of godfather is fluid and different individuals draw on various ideas and 
norms for legitimacy. The final section looks at how, in the run up to the 2011 gubernatorial 
election, there were two major shifts in the political realities of Oyo State which opened the 
way for new forms of governance, and new debates about what good governance meant in 
contemporary Nigeria. Elites believed that their material interests would be better served by 
a political system that corresponded more closely to international conceptions of good 
governance. 
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1. International Good Governance Agenda in Nigeria 
Since democratisation in 1999 there have also been international efforts to transform Nigeria 
from a country characterised by corruption to one that meets the criteria of “good 
governance”, albeit under a different dynamic than many other donor-dependent African 
countries. Nigeria has historically been one of the least aid dependent countries in Africa due 
to lucrative petroleum sales: in 2004 foreign development aid made up 0.6% of government 
spending compared to a mean of 43% in other Sub-Saharan African countries (House of 
Commons 2009; Amundsen 2010, xii; Bräutigam and Knack 2004, 267). However, President 
Obasanjo faced extremely high levels of debt and heavy debt servicing repayments (Sachs 
2003). He initiated an engagement with donors to secure debt relief under the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. Therefore, whilst Nigeria wasn’t dependent on donors for 
income, there was still a financial imperative to satisfy donors in order to reduce the state’s 
expenditure obligations and to access foreign capital (Enweremadu 2010, 6–7). 
Obasanjo launched NEEDS in 2004, a national strategy for development and reform, that 
functioned as Nigeria’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Like all PRSPs it 
reflected the current thinking that dominated the World Bank, the IMF and DFID (see 
chapter two for a discussion of PRSPs). NEEDS ran alongside numerous interventions by 
donors at the federal level to improve Nigeria’s system of government in line with good 
governance principles27. Obasanjo was eventually successful in 2005 when $18bn was 
forgiven by the Paris Club (Enweremadu 2010, 6–7). Internationally, Obasanjo championed 
the NEPAD. Launchedin 2001, NEPAD was “an attempt to re- envision development 
partnership on the basis of good governance” and strongly conformed to the prescriptions 
and principles of neoliberal economics (de Waal 2002; Abrahamsen 2004b). It was seen as 
an additional route to aid money and capital investment, on top of that promised under HIPC 
(Loxley 2003, 121).  
                                                          
27 These included the joint donor funded Democratic Governance for Development (DGD I and 
II) project which ran from 2010 to 2015. This aimed to “strengthen democratic processes” and 
“promote democratic outcomes” as defined jointly by the Federal Government of Nigeria, United 
Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the UNDAF’s Country Programme 
Action Plan for Nigeria (UNDP 2012). State level governance programmes include the State 
Governance and Capacity Building Project (World Bank 2016) and its successor, the $120million 
Nigeria Public Sector Governance Reform and Development Project 2010-2016, and worked with 
lead states with the “broad objective of good governance and institutional development” (World Bank 
2010a).  
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NEEDS and NEPAD provoked debates among African scholars and donors about neo-
colonialism and the need for transformation. First was the question of African agency in 
adopting ‘good governance’, against a background of reforms being imposed by donors. The 
NEPAD launch document emphasises the “African-ness” of the initiative, whereas African 
critics saw it as “opportunistic pandering to the external donor community” (Olukoshi 2003) 
and “a Western wolf in African sheepskin” (Adebajo 2003). A further issue was the idea that 
successful interventions would facilitate a break with the past: extricating’ the continent 
from the “malaise of underdevelopment” in which it found itself (“NEPAD” 2001, 1; 
Abrahamsen 2004b, 1457). The NEEDS document identified 4 focus areas: growth, service 
delivery, government reform and the more ambiguous “transformation of values to overcome 
corruption and inefficiency” (NPC and IMF 2005). The need for transformation and newness 
is in tension with the idea of enduring African-ness which NEPAD claims nonetheless 
characterises the proposals. As one American academic styled it: NEPAD came out of “a 
new generation of enlightened African leaders” (Hope 2002, 387).  
Domestically, Obasanjo “recruited a team of technocrats” (Amundsen 2010, x) to reform 
Nigeria’s governance. The Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2007 was passed which aimed “to 
institutionalize budgetary transparency and accountability as well as effective management 
of the public sector” (Iledare and Suberu 2010, 6). Other recent governance reforms include 
the NEITI Act, Excess Crude Oil Account, Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 (FRA), Public 
Procurement Act (PPA), and Electoral Reform Committee (ERC). In 2007 the Federal Inland 
Revenue Service was streamlined and harmonised (UK Parliament 2012; Olayode 2014; 
Pérouse de Montclos 2014). Obasanjo set up two new anti-corruption agencies, the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and the Independent Corrupt Practices 
Commission (in part to satisfy the conditions of the HIPC) (Enweremadu 2013, 58).  The 
effectiveness of these good governance policies at the federal level has been called into 
question, with Adebanwi and Obadare (2011, 186) arguing that efforts to bring corruption 
under control have functioned as a façade for its increase.  
The discourse of good governance, though international in its origins, has been picked up by 
domestic political actors in an effort to mobilise its positive associations, and potential 
power to attract resources. The Federal Information Minister under President Jonathan, 
Labaran Maku, organised a ‘Good Governance Tour’ where he surveyed federal and state 
government projects around the country, such as hospitals and roads, with an entourage of 
journalists. In this context, use of the term ‘good governance’ represents a new name for an 
old practice, with clear continuities with earlier promotional exercises that Information 
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Ministers have undertaken since at least the days of military rule28. Maku’s tour was derided 
by the Nigerian press and opposition politicians as a waste of money that merely paid lip-
service to the idea of good governance. Criticism centred on the weakness of simply viewing 
projects as a form of accountability in the absence of information about the project’s funding 
and political origins. Some opposition governors used the tour as an opportunity to draw 
attention to the federal government’s neglect of the northeast and the partisan allocation of 
central funding and projects (Ibeh 2013; Wakili 2014; Iredia 2013; The Will 2013; Onikeku 
et al. 2016). 
For this thesis, it is also important to understand the way that changes in governance have 
affected state-level governance. The 1999 constitution stipulated the basis for the sharing of 
oil revenues. Oil revenue is directly paid into the federation account from which it is 
disbursed to state and local governments in monthly subventions29. However, the petro-
economy within Nigeria is very geographically skewed, with 27 of the 36 states not 
producing any oil or gas, meaning that different states have different interests in terms of 
retaining locally generated revenues or pooling them in the centre (Iledare and Suberu 2010, 
3). The formula for determining how much each state receives is complicated and has been 
subject to major contestation since democratisation. The current revenue sharing formula, 
determined by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) 
relies on a mish-mash of lump-sum payments added to weighted allocations according to 
population and needs, and internal revenue generation efforts, and finally the derivation 
principle which returns 13% of the revenue from oil and gas back to the states where it was 
extracted (Iledare and Suberu 2010, 4). The 1999 constitution changed the federal 
redistribution formula, doubling the allocation to states and local government. This altered 
the balance of power between different tiers of government and gave state governors 
“considerable capacity to effect visible change”, with schools, basic health care, local roads 
and water and sanitation under their remit (Hoffman 2014, 13). In terms of federal-state 
relations, LGAs and states depend on the government for 90% of their finances (World Bank 
2003; NBS 2013). Thus the lower tiers of government are vulnerable to discretionary 
                                                          
28 Babangida’s Minister of Information wrote a ‘letter to his countrymen’ highlighting his 
boss’s achievements in office. Frank Nweke Jnr and Professor Jerry Gana both ran tours of 
Obasanjo’s projects as Ministers of Information. Nweke reportedly nicknamed his jaunt ‘lest we 
forget’ (Iredia 2013). 
29 The formula of revenue division between the different tiers of government is as follows: 
Central Government 48.5%; States 26.72%; LGAs 20.60%; and centrally Controlled Special Funds 
4.18%.  
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withholding of payment by the central government, especially opposition states (Fourchard 
2011; Today 2014).  
Federal fiscal arrangements also affect the way states interact with their electorates. With 
such a high percentage of revenue coming from central government there is little incentive 
for states to raise money locally30. The second implication of this funding arrangement is 
that the states receive a huge sum of money each month but “are neither responsible to the 
centre nor accountable to their constituents for the use of the transfers” (Suberu 2010, 469). 
Suberu argues that the allocations are essentially “unconditional” and they are “a particularly 
powerful inducement to corruption at the subnational level” (2010, 469) The ‘Security Vote’, 
a discretionary portion of executive budgets that is not subject to oversight, has often been 
used to fund semi-official militias (Egbo et al. 2012).  
 
 
                                                          
30 Lagos is a historical exception (see chapter five). LGAs collect some low level taxes, see: 
(Eme, Izueke, and Ewuim 2013).  
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2. Indigenous Conceptions of Good Governance in Oyo State 
Indigenous understandings of good governance in Oyo state are varied and fluid, however 
they must engage with three key themes. The first is legitimate leadership, encompassing the 
processes that produce legitimate leaders and how these processes relate to identity. The 
second is the idea of leaders ensuring that economic benefits are distributed to ordinary 
people; this can involve the distribution of patronage and amassing a followership, or using 
state power to generate tangible immediate benefits for ordinary citizens. Third is progress, 
drawing on the Yoruba concept of olaju, meaning civilisation or development. This section 
looks at the ways that the three key themes have come into alignment or tension at different 
key points in the political history of the state, from colonialism to democratisation. It charts 
the struggles of leaders with different priorities to meet popular expectations for all three at 
once, and how their interpretation has evolved with developments in Yoruba society. 
Key Themes: Legitimate Leadership, Economic Benefits and Progress 
The first key theme is legitimate leadership. Legitimate leadership is partly shaped by 
identity, but in the sense of ethnic or religious identity as a linkage between voters and 
candidates. Identity mattes insofar as legitimate processes for cultivating and selecting 
leaders are embedded in ethnic and town-based structures. Islam and Christianity are 
roughly evenly represented among the population (with about 45% each) (Nolte et al. 2016, 
546). Religious tolerance is a key element of both Yoruba Christianity and Islam, and other 
forms of identity have historically overshadowed religious identity (Peel 1978; Peel 2000; 
Nolte, Danjibo, and Oladeji 2009; Adebanwi 2014). The process by which individuals rise 
up through political society into leadership positions reflects “moral ethnicity”. This is a 
term that Lonsdale used to distinguish moral and instrumental ethnic claims in politics. On 
the one hand moral ethnicity is where ideas of moral political behaviour and obligations are 
constructed with reference to a bounded ethnic community. On the other hand, political 
tribalism denotes political claims that invoke divisive and morally vacant ideas of ethnic 
difference to capture state power (John Lonsdale 1994). It emphasises the capacity of 
indigenous political organisations to offer the possibility of accountability and avenues for 
redress.  
In pre-colonial Ibadan, political authority, in the form of chieftaincy titles, was won 
according to military merit and citizenship of the town. The experience of the Yoruba Wars 
during the nineteenth century, and Ibadan’s emergence as the centre of Yorubaland through 
military conquest, contributed to a sense among Ibadan indigenes that they had proven 
themselves as natural kings of Yorubaland, or at the very least, that Ibadan should never be 
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ruled over by an outsider (Awe 1964; Moore 1969, 24; Falola 1984; Watson 1998, 467; 
Watson 2003). Within Ibadan, processes of leadership selection were gerontocratic. Whether 
individuals won their place in the hierarchy through being hereditary head of their ‘ile’ or 
town, or through political or military prowess, they rose through political structures 
according to a strict system of seniority. Adeboye (2007, 263) analyses how Yoruba language 
expresses the wisdom, tact and maturity accumulated through experience in the phrase 
“ogbon agba”, meaning elderly wisdom. As the bases of political competition changed, first 
with education coming to replace military might as the key index of political power, and 
then with the rise of party politics, the system evolved but maintained its gerontocratic 
character. Elders had a right to occupy the ‘summit’ of political structures, with attendant 
social roles and rewards, but those who neglected their responsibilities would soon lose their 
status. Such norms meant that outsiders or upstarts were illegitimate leaders, not because 
they lacked the ascriptive identity of ‘Ibadanlander’ per se, but because they had not risen 
through the legitimate channels. Where processes of leadership selection were challenged it 
was typically by rival lineages of similar structures: the longstanding rivalry between 
traditional leaders in Oyo and Ibadan for priority (Watson 1998) and the challenges to 
traditional hegemony in Ijebu-Remo (Nolte 2009). Whilst the young were relegated to the 
bottom of the hierarchy, they enjoyed the prospect of mobility and their own “ascent” (Foner 
1984, xiii; Adegbindin 2011; Adeboye 2007, 263–64). 
 Whilst Ibadan’s establishment as the centre of Yoruba politics perpetuated a strong sense of 
indigenous identity and right to rule, its expansion was thanks to its acceptance of diverse 
groups of migrants from Yorubaland and further afield. Within 20 years of its founding it 
was a bustling, multi-cultural commercial centre. Indeed, many surrounding villages saw 
Ibadan as a source of security, and willingly placed themselves under the city’s protection 
(Freund 2007, 16; Chokor 1986). However, integration and stratification continued 
simultaneously, with indigenes deriving income from migrants and strengthening their 
dominant position through the collection of rents on roads, markets and dwellings. This laid 
the foundations for a sense of differentiation between Ibadan indigenes and other Yoruba 
groups, which developed in response to various political developments (Guyer 1992; Ajala 
2008, 153–57).  
Delivering economic benefits is a second key theme in Yoruba politics, expressed both 
through the idea of being a good patron and sharing the resources conferred by political 
office. Like legitimate leadership, this theme has been contested and reinterpreted over time. 
From pre-colonial times, the norms of leadership dictated that not only should leaders be 
military figures, but they should cultivate a following of clients, through their patronage and 
generosity.  The “gaze” of followers confers ola a form of social honour or authority (Barber 
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1995, 213; Watson 1998, 467; Watson 2000, 26–27). Traditional oriki poetry and proverbs 
reflect norms of generosity and the importance of leaders sharing their wealth. An oriki from 
1871 remarks about one leader that “there’s always something to eat in [his] house” and of 
his followers who eat from his “thousands of plates” in his kitchen31 (Watson 2000, 477). 
The English translation of a Yoruba proverb re-affirms these values: one cannot be tight-
fisted (selfish), and be endowed with honour (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007, 432).  
Yet money has negative associations too, “as a destabilizer and corrupter” (Agbaje 2002, 5). 
Through Ibadan’s history its populace has been cautious about the generosity of wealthy 
leaders, on the basis that acceptance of patronage should not oblige the populace to support 
irresponsible leaders (Barber 1995; Guyer 1995). Omobowale and Olutayo (2010, 459) 
argue that in Yoruba society patrons are chosen not only on the basis of their financial clout 
but also their good character, based on “philanthropic deeds and wisdom.” What a patron is 
able to provide materially is closely intertwined with what they can contribute emotionally, 
and in terms of advice and playing being a good baba-isale or role model (Omobowale 
2008). Therefore whilst leaders are expected to share economic benefits, this must be done 
appropriately, and patronage cannot trump accountable leadership.  
A final key theme is progress. This builds on the Yoruba concept of olaju, meaning 
development, enlightenment or civilisation. Olaju has connotations of “connection with 
distant places” (Peel 1978, 146; Ajala 2008, 153). First used to refer to the “the cultural 
package brought from outside by, above all, missionaries”, it built on a long-held conviction 
among Yoruba rulers about the relationship between knowledge and power, with the two 
reaching “a kind of fused pinnacle in the person of the King.” (Peel 1978, 147, 145)   
The significance of olaju changed over the course of the colonial encounter. Whereas in the 
days of the warrior kings knowledge was seen as scarce, and to be hoarded by the king, the 
association of olaju with conversionary religions such as Christianity re-cast it as 
“something to be spread about” (Peel 1978, 149). With the rise of tools of bureaucratic 
government, such as taxation and controls on international trade, olaju became a concept 
supported by material power and the opportunity for ‘individual career advancement’. These 
developments disrupted the system of political authority in Ibadan. The rise of the 
                                                          
31 The case of Baale Dada serves as an example of the costs of stinginess in a followership 
based socio-political structure of colonial Ibadan. Baales who did not spend ‘adequately’ for their 
chiefs were accused of stinginess, and their followers taken over by more junior rivals. In 1907 Baale 
Dada fell afoul of these political expectations and had his followership taken from him: “[w]ith no 
people, he had no civic power and consequently, no political life – he committed suicide” (Watson 
2000, 469).  
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bureaucratic state opened positions of power to those with Western education but no 
indigenous connection to Ibadan. Moreover, ‘pacification’ of the region by the British 
eliminated military experience as a route to authority. New strategies of contestation 
emerged with the ‘War of the Pen’ (Watson 2000, 29; Watson 2003, 8). Iwe, or Western 
education, became a route to the most desirable jobs in the colonial administration. The 
region’s embrace of Western education resulted in the educated making up the majority of 
“school teachers, clerks and other white collar workers within Nigeria” during colonialism 
(Bescom 1969, vii–viii). However, there have long been tensions between the promise of 
modernity in olaju and a return to Yoruba tradition, what Ayandele (1966) calls the “paradox 
of Yoruba cultural nationalism”. This was the tension between the educated Yoruba elite’s 
attempts to assimilate themselves in European modernity represented by the colonial state 
and the contempt with which the bastions of European modernity regarded Africans and 
African culture. The Yoruba elite therefore wanted to be modern whilst also defending and 
validating African tradition in the face of racial disparagement.  
However, these religious, educational and governmental processes did not seamlessly 
converge around a shared understanding of progress. Together, the two themes of economic 
benefits and progress represent the balance that leaders must strike between short term and 
long-term benefits. The most prominent Yoruba politicians through the late 19th through to 
the mid 20th century combined a command of iwe and olaju, and in turn translate it into 
oselu, meaning mastery of partisan politics (Peel 1983, 10; Ajala 2008, 158–62). 
Key Themes in Political Competition: Progressives and Populists 1940-1999 
Debates within and between political groups reveal the ways that key Yoruba values have 
been in tension throughout Oyo State’s history. There are two broad political traditions, the 
progressive and the populist. Obafemi Awolowo, first Prime Minister of the Western Region, 
is seen as the father of a ‘progressive’ line of thought in the politics of Yorubaland. His 
efforts to build a pan-Yoruba identity show the intersection of debates about what qualities a 
legitimate leader must have and education. Peel (1989, 200) writes “the vast bulk of peoples 
who now know themselves as Yoruba did not do so in 1900… ethnic consciousness had to 
be worked at.” During the 1920s the spread of Christianity and education carried Pan-
Yoruba identity to the educated elites. Christianity was in key ways the midwife of a distinct 
Yoruba identity, with the decisive History of the Yorubas written by a Church Missionary 
Society educated priest (Johnson 1921). Regional and international economic processes like 
export of cash crops expanded the sphere of social relations with sub-groups increasingly 
seeing themselves as part of a Yoruba whole (Peel 1989, 200–201).  
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Starting out in politics in the National Youth Movement in the 1940s, Awolowo was soon, 
like other members of the Yoruba intelligentsia, disillusioned by attempts at pan-Nigerian 
nationalism. Nigerian politics increasingly split into three mega-tribes: the Hausa-Fulani in 
the north, the Igbo in the east and the Yoruba in the west (Peel 1989, 201; Nolte 2002, 176). 
Awolowo focused his energies instead on anti-colonial Yoruba organisation, founding the 
‘Egbe Omo Oduduwa’32 in London in 1945. The Awoist form of Yoruba identity evolved in 
contra-distinction to a central Nigerian identity, and reinforced economic agendas of regional 
independence within the federal system (Laitin 1986, 97). Other strands of Yoruba identity 
were incubated from the nineteenth century onwards in Lagos’s communities of former 
slaves and Brazilian immigrants, many of whom were successful international traders 
(Whiteman 2013). Ajayi (1961) describes how these Lagos-based elites were more 
enthusiastic about a nationalist Nigerian identity, with a positive progressive vision that was 
not defined in localised ethnic terms. By contrast, Awolowo argued that Nigeria was not a 
nation, in the sense of having a shared identity (West African Pilot 1946).  The diversity 
between different linguistic and cultural groups in Nigeria, he argued, was an obstacle to 
their shared development. Instead, he proposed devolution of power to the regions and total 
autonomy to allow groups like the Yoruba to accelerate beyond their less developed 
neighbours (Awolowo 1947; Arifalo 2001). From this point on the promotion of 
development and civilisation took on a parochial ethnic tone. The Yoruba identity became 
consolidated as ‘inherently modern’ and ‘progressive’ (Adebanwi 2014, 59). 
Awolowo was strongly modernist, focusing on the role of education as a universal means of 
empowering and developing Nigeria (Falola 2015). This informed the emerging belief 
among progressives that legitimate Yoruba leaders must be educated and exposed to 
enlightenment, such that they can fulfil the progressive potential of the Yoruba people. The 
Egbe Omo Odudwa went on to form the Action Group political party in 1951, which enacted 
this vision of enlightened leadership (Olayode 2009, 8–10; Arifalo 2001). Peel (1983, 159) 
describes the Action Group as using social policy as “the grand enactment of olaju.” For the 
Action Group, education and progress both shaped domestic policy objectives and formed 
the basis for Yoruba demands for regional autonomy and self-actualisation.  
Whilst olaju and pan-Yoruba identity shaped how progressives made claims to legitimate 
leadership, it also marginalised those who did not have formal education. Ibadan elites, who 
had traditionally been suspicious of Western education, found themselves marginalised. Few 
                                                          
32 Translation: Society of the Children of Oduduwa  
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of the independence-era Action Group leaders were from Ibadan, rather they were from other 
Yoruba sub-groups such as: Ijebu, Egba, Ekiti and Oyo. Ibadan was for a long time 
conservative towards Western education, whilst mission schools were permitted in the city it 
was the children of outsiders who were sent there. Quoranic education was preferred by 
local elites.  The inequality in education levels influenced the distribution of political power 
from the 1960s onwards, when local government expanded, multiplying the need for 
educated representatives who could navigate the bureaucracy. Therefore, Ibadan was the seat 
of government, yet Ibadan elites were not participating fully in the new political 
dispensation. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Ibadan could “not generate enough 
manpower to compete within its socio-economic and political space.” Rather, “Ibadan 
indigenes served only at the lowest level of administration as gardeners, gate men, cleaners 
and security guards” (Ajala 2008, 160–62). This meant that, for Ibadan elites, the need for 
progress defined in Awolowo’s terms, came into conflict with long-standing Ibadan-centric 
processes for generating legitimate leaders. 
From this intersection of political aspirations and demographic tensions within Yoruba 
society emerged a populist line of politics in Ibadan. It was made up of politicians who were 
willing to build political alliances with other ethnic blocs at the centre to gain access to 
patronage, rather than commit to a separate Yoruba identity. This is represented most clearly 
by Adegoke Adelabu and later Lamidi Adedibu33. Adelabu was an Ibadan indigene who 
contested the 1956 parliamentary election on the NCNC ticket, hoping to become premier of 
the Western Region (Layonu 2003, xiii). Indeed between 1951 and 1966, the end of the First 
Republic, Ibadan and Ibadan supported the NCNC, which was seen as the Igbo-led 
nationalist party, over the Action Group (Peel 1989, 201). Adedibu was another Ibadan 
native, of a younger generation, who “learnt his politics” from Adelabu, building up 
patronage systems within Oyo State based on connections to central government (Ademola 
Adeyemo 2008). Adedibu’s political career started with running for office with Awolowo’s 
Action Group in the 1950s, but he then devoted his energies to supporting other candidates, 
first for the Action Group then for the National Party of Nigeria from the 1970s onwards 
(Agbaje 2002; Omobowale and Olutayo 2007; The Chronicles 2007).  
These populist politicians emphasised short term economic benefits over long-term progress 
whilst responding to unmet needs for a sense of connection with leaders. Popular 
acquiescence was secured through distribution of the most extreme examples of short-term 
                                                          
33 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Alhaji Adelakun, also known as a Eruobodo dominated 
Ibadan politics using a similar clientelist structure as Adelabu (Omobowale and Olutayo 2010, 453). 
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economic benefits, hot meals and small sums of cash, to legitimate a system where the major 
economic benefits were controlled by political elites. Adelabu’s support base was among the 
socially excluded mekunnu – cocoa workers. The ‘mekennu’ movement renounced the 
power of Western education as a means of controlling state resources and the inequality that 
resulted. Williams (1974, 122) describes Adelabu as a populist whose appeal lay in his 
promise to “secure for the small man the favours that were monopolized by the 
(predominantly educated) ‘big men’”.34 Similarly, by the 1990s Adedibu had built up a 
following of popular mass grassroots associations - social groups, religious unions and trade 
unions - whom he would feed daily a Yoruba staple dish of amala and gbegiri at his 
residence in Molete (Omobowale and Olutayo 2010, 454; Animasawun 2013, 15).  
This populist trend has been subject to extensive debate. Scholars like Agbaje and Albin-
Lackey contend that the progressives and the populists do not represent alternative 
conceptions of good governance, but that the progressives represent good governance and 
the populists poor governance. Agbaje describes the populists as ‘new’ elites and describes 
Adedibu as a “warlord”. He highlights the use of thugs and control of the police to 
intimidate opponents, which has more recently been extensively documented by Human 
Rights Watch (2007). Based on his analysis of Oyo State politics in 2003-4, Albin-Lackey 
(2012, 134) argues that the godfather relationship is only about money and violence and 
their power comes largely from “their proficiency in criminal activity” and their only 
motivation is personal wealth. Agbaje argues that the populists have little legitimacy beyond 
the provision of patronage through their alliances with military governments in the centre. 
Whilst working class Muslims may have been susceptible to mobilisation by Adedibu 
because they too lacked Western education, Agbaje sees little positive grounds for their 
supporting populists (Agbaje 2002, 5–10).  
Other scholars argue that despite the role of violence and patronage, godfather politics can 
nonetheless be grounded in political values. Beyond his use of violence and access to state 
resources, Adedibu’s populist appeal lay in his enduring reciprocal relationships with mass 
grassroots organisations (Hoffman and Nolte 2013, 27–28, 43). After initially backing 
                                                          
34 Whilst Adelabuism politically played on a fear of the educated elites, he embraced ambitious 
intellectualism in his self-presentation. His autobiography explains how he was accelerated beyond 
his age cohort three times in his “brilliant scholastic career” yet “[d]espite this, I never took second 
position throughout my school days ... I was always several laps ahead of my runner up...” He hints at 
the “coherent philosophy” he had invented “which will do for intellectualism what Einstein has done 
for physics” (Layonu 2003, 20–22). 
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Abiola in the annulled 1993 election, Adedibu shifted alliances in 1996 in an attempt to re-
insert himself into central oil revenue-based patronage networks by backing Abacha’s 
attempts to stay in power (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007, 439–40). However this was 
unacceptable to his local base of support who responded with riots and civil unrest, and he 
was forced to do a U-turn. Hoffman and Nolte (2013, 27–28) argue that in this way “the 
local roots of politics continue to contain the possibility of popular expression”. Moreover, 
Olarinmoye argues that godfathers play a ‘brokerage’ function. They act as a go-between, 
mediating politicians’ relationship with voters due to their “intuitive grasp of what appeals 
and what incentives are most appropriate to each group [of the voting public]” (Olarinmoye 
2008, 67). On this view the godfather’s position is not one of absolute control over the 
protégé but he is “dependent and precarious”, relying on “a continuous renewal of his 
knowledge of local terrain and networks” (Olarinmoye 2008, 67). Adedibu himself said in a 
2005 interview “Anyone who succeeds in by-passing his followership will regret it at a later 
stage” (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007, 440). 
In Adedibu’s and Adelabu’s politics, and the later accounts which celebrate them, small-
scale short term economic benefits were couched in a discourse that emphasised the 
closeness of populist leaders to the masses. This combination of patronage and discourse 
responded to the sense that ordinary people were excluded from the elite visions of progress 
and an unmet need for inclusion in a valued political community. The professionalised elites 
of the progressive camp promised voters that they would fulfil their obligations as patrons 
by providing the benefits of development in the long run, even if voters did not have the 
education to understand development now. Falola and Ihonvbere (1985, 1) give an especially 
pointed evaluation of Independence era leaders’ attitudes to the uneducated poor as follows: 
"The question of involving the masses of the people whose lives were being planned in the 
process of development was out of the question. They were seen as too ignorant and too 
lazy.”  
In contrast, populist figures offered something of value to their followers that the 
progressives were seen to lack: an empathetic connection.  As Sklar (1979) observed of 
Adelabu: “No Nigerian leader was closer to his people or more familiar with their thinking.” 
Adedibu drew on idioms of traditional Yoruba leadership, conveying a sense of caring 
patrimonial authority, and rejected tropes of the modernity from which many felt excluded. 
Adedibu had some Quoranic education and attended primary and secondary school in the 
‘Western’ system but never attended university nor did he come from an affluent background 
(Omobowale and Olutayo 2007, 429; Agbaje 2002, 17–18; Adeboye 2007, 276; Ajala 2008, 
161). He became known as “Alaafin” of Yoruba politics (Omobowale and Olutayo 2010, 
454) or “Aare/Baale Molete of Ibadan” (Ajala 2008, 166). Adedibu echoed Adelabu in his 
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performed suspicion of olaju in favour of a “symbolic attachment to Ibadan culture”, 
manifested in dialect and dress (Ajala 2008, 161). Thus money-politics can only be 
understood through its normative framing which sought to capitalise on the failures of the 
progressive line of politics. 
The conflicts over gubernatorial elections in the 1980s brought the tensions of legitimate 
leadership based on sub-regional identity, and those based on progress, into sharp focus. 
Whilst Ibadan fielded some minor political candidates it was consistently non-indigenes who 
served as Governors. In 1983, Chief Bola Ige, who had won the election for Governor of 
Oyo State against an indigene candidate, rebuked Ibadan elites for believing they could ever 
field a governorship candidate when they were so uneducated. This statement led to outrage 
among the political elites in Ibadan. Adedibu, as recorded in an interview in 2004, explained 
that “enough is enough: that Ibadan is the capital of the Yoruba nation.” Whereas Ibadan had 
historically supported leaders from sub-groups35, it would now ‘parapo’, come together, and 
perform ‘layipo’: a political trick that only Ibadan knows. That year Omololu Olunloyo, an 
indigene, won the Governorship election, and the slogan Omo wa ni e je O se – our own son 
must be allowed to lead the government – was established. The motif of layipo signalled that 
Ibadan was willing to drop ‘ingrate’ non-indigene Yoruba political leaders in favour of 
national coalitions with other major ethnic groups. To this day there remains a strong belief 
in Ibadan that the city is entitled to have one of its own control the state government (Ajala 
2008, 162–64).  
In the late 1990s a movement emerged in the southwest which revealed the failure of both 
populist and progressive elites to respond to popular grievances.  The Oodua People’s 
Congress (OPC) was a membership organisation, made up of urban Yoruba youth, based in 
Lagos and the southwest. At a time of demographic explosion (Alanana 2003), the OPC 
represented a generation of young people who came of age with no job and no prospects for 
individual advancement under the current system. The state and formal economy had been 
decimated by structural adjustment, unemployment was high, incomes had been eroded 
through devaluation of the naira and the southwest’s productive potential had been 
intentionally neglected under Abacha (Mustapha 1991; Ihonvbere 1993; Meagher 1995; 
Meagher and Yunusa 1996; Agbaje and Guyer 2002). The OPC rejected existing political 
structures and were linked to communal violence and ethnically motivated killings (Ajala 
2008, 164; Nolte, Danjibo, and Oladeji 2009, 71). 
                                                          
35 Chief Obafemi Awolowo from the Ijebus, S.L. Akintola from the Oyos and Bola Ige himself, 
from the Ijesas.  
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Adebanwi (2005, 342) offers a penetrating analysis of the pertinence of the OPC. Adebanwi 
returns to Peel’s (2000, 317) observation that “the main strategic choice faced by the 
contemporary Yoruba has been where to place the continuities and the ruptures with what 
has gone before.” In this case the ‘return to culture’ was in response to perceived oppression 
of the Yoruba by the Hausa-Fulani dominated central government in which figures like 
Adedibu were complicit. Rather than drawing on modernising discourses of Christianity, as 
with the earlier Yoruba nationalists, the OPC mobilised discourses of democracy and human 
rights. The OPC’s members were ill served by ideas of progress which had visibly failed to 
raise living standards over time (Subramanian and Sala-i-Martin 2003) and neglected the 
pressing needs of everyday survival. However they nonetheless resented the piecemeal 
efforts of populists connected to central government to buy them off with amala. One of the 
OPC’s leaders, Gani Adam, was an okada-rider and failed carpenter. He positioned himself 
as a man of the people who could represent the excluded majority against elitist, out of touch 
Yoruba elders (Adebanwi 2005, 345; Nolte 2007; 2008). There was a sense that elites on 
both sides had failed them and so the OPC, with its young leader who had not risen up 
through established processes, challenged the gerontocratic norms that previously defined 
legitimate leadership. The supposed wisdom and responsibility of elders - “ogbon agba” - 
(Adeboye 2007, 263) and processes for generating accountable leaders had failed to deliver 
on its obligations of progress or economic benefits to those lower down the generational 
hierarchy.  
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3. Leveraging Indigenous Conceptions of Good Governance in Oyo State 
Politics 
The themes of legitimate leadership, economic benefits and progress continue to be 
important in Oyo State politics as they intersect with political competition on the ground. 
The decentralisation of spending after democratisation in 1999 raised the stakes of state- 
level politics; the renewed importance of mobilising the masses for electoral purposes 
combined with the existing informal power structures gave ‘godfather’ figures like Adedibu 
an important role in the new dispensation (Albin-Lackey 2012, 140; Animasawun 2013). 
Whilst Adedibu was outmanoeuvred in the immediate aftermath of 1999, from 2003 his 
approval was required for almost any political office. Once in office his ‘protégés’ paid 
regular tribute and allowed him control of the state treasury (Omobowale and Olutayo 2010, 
454). This section sets out the trajectories of Oyo State’s three major political figures since 
1999, showing how each embodies a plurality of values across the spectrum of what it can 
mean to be a ‘godfather’. Adedibu, introduced in the previous section was the first godfather, 
but his support was built on radically different bases to the other two: Lam Adesina and 
Alhaji Abdulazeez Arisekola Alao (Arisekola). Each wielded different combinations of 
resources to mediate the intersection of state power with social support and representation; 
whether economic benefits, progress or regional or religious identity. This demonstrates the 
fluidity of the godfather role and how it blurs with the obligations of patrons and politicians 
more generally. This final section looks at how the three themes and the interests of the key 
godfathers played out in the tenure of Governor Christopher Adebayo Alao-Akala between 
2006 and 2011. It explains the way that changing circumstances and interests led to a shift in 
elite conceptions of good governance in the years leading up to Ajimobi’s election in 2011.  
Arisekola was a multimillionaire businessman and the Aare Musulumi of Yorubaland, 
meaning the leader of the Muslims in Yorubaland with close ties to Islamic leaders and 
groups in Ibadan. He was a major ‘kingmaker’ in Oyo State, meaning he was influential in 
the selection of the Governor. Between the 1960s and 1990s he built up a network of 
contacts among the northern military elite, serving as supplier of provisions and Islamic 
religious adviser to a number of heads of state including Abacha and Babangida. Over time 
he acquired banks, a motor dealership, petrol stations and flour mills. He famously supplied 
the Nigerian ECOMOG troops in Liberia in 1990, demonstrating an ability to profit from 
connections to Abuja. Yet, as with Adedibu, he was perceived by the Ibadan grassroots as 
having betrayed the city with his support of successive military leaders. On several 
occasions in the 1990s Arisekola and his properties were attacked by anti-Abacha youths 
(Ejime 1998; IRB 2002; Agbaje 2002, 13–15; Paden 2006, 65,170).  
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Arisekola managed to rehabilitate his image and used his money and status to exert 
significant influence on political outcomes after democratisation. Political aspirants at the 
national and state level sought out his approval and relied on his financial support 
(Akinrosoye 2003; ThisDay 2000; Ehigiator 2003). Like Adedibu, he was a well-known 
philanthropist; he endowed mosques and fed the poor from his home each week. Arisekola 
therefore embraced the role of the generous patron, whilst drawing on his identity as a 
Muslim to access Muslim northerner controlled networks. While he had no special claim to 
western education, his position as an Islamic leader and his connections to other centres of 
Islamic learning beyond Nigeria gave him the gravitas of a scholar and a civilised man, with 
an American scholar of Muslim civilisations quoting him as an expert on Islamic history 
(Paden 2006, 101–2).  
The Awoist movement returned to prominence in the 1990s in opposition to military rule and 
the perceived marginalisation of the southwest by repeated northern-dominated 
administrations. The Yoruba progressive elites formed a new organisation, the Afenifere, 
which would serve as their focal point through the 1990s. The group grew directly out of 
networks of Awolowo’s associates, taking the name Egbe Afenifere36 in 1993. The group 
went on to be the backbone of pro-democratisation struggles in the 1990s; fielding the 
People’s Solidarity Party under Babangida, and later creating the National Democratic 
Coalition (NADECO). Yet out of this sense of sectional grievance the movement coalesced 
around MKO Abiola’s campaign for the presidency. Abiola himself was a northerner and not 
a member of the Afenifere, and his aborted electoral success represents a rare moment of 
cross-ethnic solidarity. For the Yoruba leaders, 1993 represented another example of the 
West’s deliberate political marginalisation at the hands of the north (Olayode 2009, 10, 18; 
Adebanwi 2014, 233).  
When Abacha died suddenly in 1998 the Abubakar-led interim regime quickly handed over 
to democratic elections. The Egbe Afenifere joined together with a multitude of other 
progressive groups to form the Alliance for Democracy (AD), a pan-Yoruba party (Olayode 
2009, 10). Lam Adesina, a Yoruba stalwart, won the 1999 election and was Oyo’s first 
democratic Governor of the Fourth Republic. Adesina does not fit the description of a 
godfather put forward by Albin-Lackey – he was democratically elected to office where he 
was respected for delivering public goods. His legitimacy came from a perception of him as 
a ‘civilised’ educated man, who like Awolowo before him, demonstrated olaju. Before 
                                                          
36 Translation: Society of the lovers of good things (Olayode 2009, 5). 
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entering politics, he was a teacher and a public intellectual, with a popular newspaper 
column.37 He balanced an ambitious, somewhat technocratic vision of developing Oyo State, 
with a willingness to engage in public patronage and philanthropy (Olasebikan 2002). 
Identity was both a resource and a constraint for Adesina. At the time he drew legitimacy 
from the public belief that the Yoruba had been disadvantaged by the successive military 
regimes and doubts about Obasanjo’s loyalty to the northern elites over his Yoruba home 
region (Adebanwi 2005). Adesina himself had been detained by the military and represented 
the Yoruba pro-democracy legacy (Animasawun 2013, 15). Obasanjo’s party, the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP) had strong central control, winning a majority in the federal Senate 
and House of Representatives in addition to the Presidency. This gave the PDP power to 
control patronage from oil revenues (Ihonvbere 1999; Lewis 2003; Suberu 2007). As 
members of the opposition, Adesina and the rest of the AD Governors were cut off from 
central government patronage. This was initially accepted as an acceptable trade off for the 
pride of a united Yoruba opposition (Hoffman and Nolte 2013).  
Whilst his identity as a strong Yoruba progressive worked in Adesina’s favour, he was not 
from Ibadan. He perennially came under attack from Ibadan elites – both in the PDP and 
traditional rulers – for marginalising Ibadan interests under his tenure (Adetunji 2003). 
Adesina’s Deputy Governor and Secretary to the State Governor were both from the Oke 
Ogun hinterland region and Adedibu accused them of running the Adesina government from 
the backseat. Adesina had also just been challenged in court by Arisekola, the Central 
Council of Ibadan Indigenes and the Olubadan for his proposal to create 34 new Local 
Government Areas, which was seen to be to the detriment of Ibadan’s continued dominance 
in the state (Nwakanma 2002). Towards the end of his four years in office, Adesina’s 
strength in terms of olaju was not holding up against his inability to deliver economic 
benefits whilst the AD was in opposition. Whilst he was not seen as stingy, he also could not 
deliver material benefits for his followers and electoral constituency (Hoffman and Nolte 
2013).  
The rise of the PDP and Akala 
In the 2003 gubernatorial elections the PDP swept to power in a “hurricane” across all the 
southwestern states bar Lagos, thanks to Obasanjo prioritising the region (Adebanwi 2014, 
230–34). Rashidi Ladoja of the PDP was elected with Adedibu’s support. On coming to 
office Ladoja rejected the reciprocal obligations of the godfather politics that Adedibu 
                                                          
37 I-40 Local Government APC Chieftain, Ibadan 30/07/2015  
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represented and refused to give him access to the state treasury (Omonijo and Ajayi 2006). 
In 2006 Adedibu orchestrated Ladoja’s impeachment38 and replaced him with a more 
compliant protégé, Christopher Adebayo (Akala) Alao-Akala. His political debut was as 
local government Chairman in nearby Ogbomosho, the second largest city in Oyo State, and 
it was Ogbomosho and the outlying towns and rural areas of the Oke-Ogun hinterland that 
provided his support base (Ademola Adeyemo 2007; Omonijo 2007).  Akala served an 11-
month interim period and contested the 2007 election as the PDP candidate (HRW 2007; 
Omobowale and Olutayo 2007; Ademola Adeyemo 2007; Hoffman 2011; Albin-Lackey 
2012; Hoffman and Nolte 2013).  
The 2007 gubernatorial election pitted Adedibu’s power against a coalition of emerging 
political forces: support for Ladoja that was independent of Adedibu’s backing and a 
growing base for the progressives. Akala was backed by Adedibu and the central PDP 
headquarters, defeating locally popular rivals including Ladoja for the PDP ticket. However, 
Adedibu’s impeachment of Ladoja “lionized [Ladoja] politically in the state” where he 
enjoyed “public sympathy” especially among civil servants (T. Sanni 2007a). Ladoja’s 
campaign as part of his newly adopted Labour Party was a test of how much of his previous 
support he could maintain without Adedibu (Omonijo and Gabriel 2007).  
Whilst Lam Adesina was no longer Governor, he remained a central godfather figure in his 
party, which by then was called Action Congress (AC)39. The serving Senator Abiola 
Ajimobi, who had come to politics from a multi-national oil company, ran for the AC ticket. 
In the context of constant violence between supporters of Adedibu, Akala and Ladoja, 
Ajimobi was seen as a vote for security and was favoured by Ibadan business elites. After a 
dispute though, Adesina blocked Ajimobi’s bid and the AC ticket went to the more 
established Prof Taoheed Adedoja. Ajimobi was welcomed into the much smaller ANPP 
where he was seen as very much an outside candidate in the gubernatorial election40 
(Omonijo 2007; Omonijo and Gabriel 2007; O. Ajayi 2009). The progressive opposition was 
split in two. At the last minute, Ladoja urged his supporters and other Ibadan elites to vote 
for Ajimobi, to stave off Akala’s return or Adesina’s candidate, both of whom were cast as 
                                                          
38 The original Ladoja impeachment vote wasn’t endorsed by the required two thirds of the 
State House of Assembly, and the impeachment was invalidated by the Supreme Court in December-
January 2007. Ladoja returned to office to serve out his term until the 2007 election (Adeyemo 2007). 
39 The AC changed its name to the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) in 2011.  
40 I-40   
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unqualified to rule over Ibadan from the state’s hinterlands (T. Sanni 2007a; Ogunyemi 
2007a). 
In the end Akala won with over 350,000 votes, in an election that suffered from extensive 
irregularities. Ajimobi came second, beating the AC candidate by around 90,000 votes. 
Whilst Adedibu’s power to dictate state politics remained solid, Ajimobi exceeded 
expectations and was widely believed to have won the election had it not been rigged. 
Ajimobi challenged the election result in court, and was largely vindicated in his accusations 
against the PDP but was not instated as Governor. Akala returned to Government House for 
a four-year term, but there were signs that Adedibu did not have complete control over the 
political arena (Sanni 2007d; Sanni 2007c; O. Ajayi 2007; Bamidele 2007a; Bamidele 
2007b; Aziken 2007; Adeyemo 2007; Ogunyemi 2007b; ThisDay 2007). 
The cases of Akala and Ajimobi in the years before 2011 show that godfather politics does 
not involve a single all-powerful figure, free to impose his will over the state as represented 
in the Human Rights Watch report (2007). There were a number of elite godfather figures, 
including Arisekola, who had to be accommodated in the balance of power. Whilst the 
godfathers were influential in their own right, they were also interdependent, and when in 
competition served as a check on each other’s ability to entirely determine political 
outcomes. For example, both Adedibu and Arisekola were influential in Akala’s 
appointments of commissioners and nominations for federal ministerial roles (Omonijo and 
Ajayi 2006; Tunde Rahman and Sufuyan Ojeifo 2007). One political commentator noted in 
2007 that “there were fears that Akala might not win the election” because Adedibu had 
failed to get Arisekola’s support (Adeyemo 2007; Sanni 2007b). Furthermore, Adesina was 
strong enough within the Action Congress to determine who got the party ticket for 2007, 
but he was not able to command a support base to then vote for his chosen candidate.  
In office Akala ruled via patronage, intimidation and grand corruption. He regularly emptied 
the state coffers, and procurement was known to be discretionary and based on personalistic 
ties (The Street Journal 2011). Akala’s rule was marked by violence. Via Adedibu, Akala had 
the support of the NURTW, the Oyo branch of the National Road Transport Workers’ Union. 
The Union, as they were known, were led by a key ally of Adedibu’s and provided a pool of 
young men to enforce Adedibu’s decisions through street displays of power and violence. 
Civil society groups were intimidated41, and other labour unions were treated with a heavy 
hand42 (Olusesan and Osakwe 2007).  
                                                          
41 I-25 Director of active Ibadan-based NGO, Ibadan 15/05/2015  
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The economic circumstances of Akala’s tenure were favourable enough for the distribution 
of patronage to succeed as a strategy for forestalling outright popular resistance. Throughout 
his tenure the global oil prices were rising which in turn drove year on year increases in the 
federal allocation from the federal government to the states. Public sector employment 
expanded considerably under Akala. Under his administration the number of registered 
teachers increased by 82% between 2007 and 2011 (NBS 2012, 265)43. He was nicknamed 
ATM for how freely his dispensed cash. His campaign director explained this as being 
“because his style of governance made sure there was money in the pockets of his people”, 
adding that through using only local Oyo State contractors Akala avoided capital flight (Alao 
2015; K. Filani 2015). At a speech to Muslim worshippers at Eid-el-Kabir he declared that 
his administration would “continue to deliver dividends of democracy to every nook and 
crannies of the state” (Bamidele 2007c) The implied promise was: the money will keep 
flowing, and everyone has a chance of benefitting. Akala signalled some sensitivity to the 
demand for economic benefits, through ad hoc distribution of patronage, but failed to 
provide social progress, and had weak claims to being a legitimate leader. Akala explicitly 
espoused a vision of politics as the exchange of economic benefits for political support: he 
explained in a 2011 interview that he couldn’t understand why the Ibadan Elders Forum 
didn’t back his re-election considering he had bought all of them cars and upped their pay 
(Adesina 2011). However, this was widely seen as illegitimate. In addition to being rebuffed 
by the Ibadan Elders Forum, the Olubadan, one of the state’s most senior traditional rulers, 
joined Adesina and Ladoja in rejecting an Eid gift of a car from Akala, condemning it as a 
‘greek gift’ and violating the rule of law (Loremikan 2010). Approaching the 2011 election 
Akala was widely seen as having failed to meet the requirements of legitimate leadership. A 
commentator remarked that “the Oyo State people [were] tired of Akala's abrasive and 
ostentatious style of governance” (Gbadamosi 2011) and the Ibadan Elder’s Forum 
admonished him for “contribut[ing] immensely to the backwardness and lack of 
accountability and transparency” in the state (Jegede 2011).  
Lastly, the issue of identity was a source of power and weakness for Akala. Akala was 
plagued by his status as a non-Ibadan indigene, which meant he was judged as not having 
                                                                                                                                                                    
  
42 I-14 Leader of Oyo State branch of major national union, Ibadan 21/04/2015  
43 Table 262: Teacher Registration Council of Nigeria, Registered Members by State and 
Gender. Source: Teachers Registration Council of Nigeria. Reprinted in the National Bureau of 
Statistics’ Annual Abstract of Statistics 2012 pg. 265.   
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risen up through legitimate political structures. Though Adedibu backed him, his outsider 
status meant Adedibu conveniently had Akala ‘on thin ice’ as he had “no right to rule”44. 
Akala’s supporters claimed that he was a “symbol of unity” because he upturned the 
“continual domination” of Oyo state by Ibadan. He drew on centuries-old lines of 
competition between Ibadan and Oyo town, over which traditional rulers should be 
recognised as most senior, aligning himself for the majority of his term with the Alaafin of 
Oyo (Samson 2007; Olumekun 2007; S. Balogun 2007; O. Ajayi 2008). However, Akala 
didn’t respect norms of traditional identity, which confer legitimacy on alternative leadership 
figures within the state, routinely offending traditional leaders. Several times Obasanjo or 
Arisekola had to intervene and calm the waters on his behalf (Ademola Adeyemo 2007; T. 
Sanni 2007b; O. Ajayi 2008). The next section explains why, by 2011, Ibadan elites were 
increasingly unwilling to put up with Akala’s behaviour and were keen to shift the state to an 
alternative mode of politics.  
 
                                                          
44 F-8 Former aide to Arisekola family, Ibadan 15/05/2015  
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4. Domestic Meets the International: Changing Elite Preferences in Oyo 
State 2008-2011 
Adedibu died in June 2008 changing the political landscape of Oyo State radically. His 
political legacy immediately started to unravel: the candidate believed to have been chosen 
by Adedibu for 2011 was ignored (Timothy 2008). Whilst elements of a PDP political 
machine remained, it had no central coordinating figure to grant decisive approval to 
aspirants, or dictate the terms of tribute from the state treasury. Furthermore, it opened the 
field to candidates who didn’t rely on Adedibu’s control of the NURTW and the police. 
Moreover, the interests and values of Arisekola and the other Oyo elites began to change. 
Based on their negative experiences with Akala, and a growing anticipation of future anti-
corruption efforts, Arisekola and other influential elites changed their interests to focus 
someone less obviously corrupt(Timothy 2008).  
As discussed in section one of this chapter, from 1999 until the time Akala was in power, 
donors were pushing for international good governance reforms at the national level, seeking 
to strengthen institutions, improve transparency and expand the role of the private sector in 
service provision. From 2004, the agencies of the central government that were responsible 
for complying with the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and meeting the 
Millennium Development Goals - the National Planning Commission, Ministry of Finance 
and the Presidency - encouraged state governments to replicate donor initiatives at the state 
level. Through a 2005 benchmarking exercise which partly determined which states would 
receive donor funding, they tried to hold states to account for creating State Economic 
Empowerment and Development Strategies (SEEDS) (NPC 2007). States were ranked on 
four areas:  policy, fiscal management and budget process, service delivery, and 
communication, transparency, and corruption (World Bank 2010a, 16–17). Oyo participated, 
creating a SEEDS Secretariat and producing a report in 2004, but it was amongst the poorest 
performing states, alongside much poorer northeastern states like Borno and Nasarawa 
(Ekwedike 2005; SEEDS Secretariat, Oyo 2004). Oyo was not selected for donor attention 
and ‘OYSEEDS’, as the scheme was known, was quickly forgotten.45 However international 
ideas of good governance did filter down to the state level in other ways, which affected the 
                                                          
45 Other donor initiatives in Oyo included: a state-level Community and Social Development 
Agency, which was a mandatory obligation upon all states in order to receive and direct funds from 
the World Bank’s Community Development Funds (CSDP Nigeria 2011). There were a number of 
urban environmental projects prior to democratisation (Ogbazi 2013; Bank 2000; Chokor 1986).   
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interests of political operators on the ground. A wave of new anti-corruption legislation in 
the US and the EU raised the potential costs of corrupt transactions for foreigners in Nigeria. 
In 2010 the US passed the Dodd-Frank Act, stepping up the requirements for transparency in 
American businesses in extractive industries. In the same year the UK passed the Bribery 
Act which was seen as especially onerous in the requirement upon British firms working 
abroad to prevent corruption (Firger 2009; Alldridge 2012; Bean and MacGuidwin 2012; 
Vieyra et al. 2014). The prosecution of the Shell contractor Panalpina, on bribery charges in 
2010, resulted in sizeable fines from the American SEC and Department of Justice (DOJ). 
Shell, one of the most high-profile multi-national companies in Nigeria, came under 
investigation and was forced to settle with the DOJ in the same year. These cases sent a 
message to multi-nationals in Nigeria to take extra care that they were not associated with 
corrupt dealings (Kochan 2011, 117–19). 
An elite informant highlighted how for the first years of his tenure, Akala was at least 
predictable and easy to work with. After decrying Akala’s profligacy, he remarked “but if 
you helped him [gave him money], he would acknowledge you”.46 However, after Adedibu’s 
death, Akala was no longer accountable upwards to his godfather and increasingly failed to 
meet even the most minimal conceptions of acceptable governance. What he had earlier 
framed as generosity collapsed into outright venality with no sign of progress. He was seen 
as “profligate and arrogant” and Arisekola was becoming “fed up” by the demands of 
reining him in.47 Even other “more respectable” PDP chieftains were looking to reject 
Adedibu’s legacy (Timothy 2008). As one major businessman and politician said, “We all 
wanted Akala to go because of misrule.” 48 The combination of these international anti-
corruption reforms and the establishment of the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) in 2003 raised the stakes for those who were engaged in potentially 
corrupt acts. By 2008 the EFCC’s prosecution record was poor. Yet the opportunity for 
determined individuals, like Nuhu Ribadu, to use anti-corruption bodies to pursue high 
profile individuals indicated that there was potential for more forceful investigations in the 
future (BBC 2005a; 2005b; 2005c). The EFCC was seen as targeting political opponents of 
Obasanjo (Aiyede 2008; Obuah 2010; Amundsen 2010, 24; US Department of State 2010), 
and Akala’s repeatedly bad behaviour made him a liability for anyone connected to him 
                                                          
46 F-5 Former aide to Arisekola family, Ibadan 15/05/2015  
47 F-5   
48 I-31 Businessman and political operator, Ibadan 30/05/2015  
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(Aiyede 2008; Obuah 2010; Amundsen 2010, 24; US Department of State 2010). If elites 
wanted to keep making money and doing business they had to think strategically about 
emerging anti-corruption standards. 
The neopatrimonialism thesis, and Albin-Lackey’s (2012) application of it to godfather 
politics, assumes that godfathers have fixed preferences for corrupt politicians who they can 
manipulate. In the case of Oyo State, godfathers were instead agents in the push towards a 
cleaner, more reliable mode of governance, albeit for largely pragmatic reasons. Arisekola’s 
entourage became paranoid about how past corrupt deals might be dealt with in the future, 
with some making preparations for possible future plea bargains by collecting incriminating 
evidence against rivals. In the words of one informant who worked closely with the 
Arisekola family: 
“He wasn’t careful. Everyone, like Ari[sekola] started getting worried that he would 
be indiscrete and then they have the EFCC coming after all of them. ... They said, 
we need to find someone who we can work with, who won’t have the EFCC after 
us”49. 
Finally, there was also the belief among elites that a politician who had visibly performed 
might have some protection against a corruption investigation, compared to someone with 
few achievements to point to50. Fashola was given as an example: “Of course Fashola is 
really really rich, but at least he’s done something.” That the Governor engaged in corrupt 
deals wasn’t in itself a risk factor, so long as this was mitigated by a record of delivering 
some public benefits51.  In this way, developing conceptions of good governance in a 
neighbouring Yoruba state – Lagos – coincided with shifting priorities for political operators 
on the ground. For both ideological and practical reasons, elites were turning against the 
style of governance that endured under Adedibu.  
                                                          
49 F-5   
50 Moreover, a story from an informant close to Arisekola showed how the godfathers 
reinforced their moral position by drawing on shared conceptions of good governance. He recounted 
an alleged meeting between Arisekola, other traditional leaders and Akala before the 2011 election. 
The informant claimed that, when challenged on his unimpressive record in government, Akala 
retorted “I am not accountable to you!” Arisekola is said to have replied, “But your 5-year-old son, is 
he not a citizen of Oyo State? Are you not accountable to him?” The point is not whether this is a 
veridical account of a real meeting, but that this sort of story is used by godfathers in an effort to 
legitimise the otherwise dubious control the godfathers had over the state. They draw upon the idea 
that godfathers exercise their power in the interests of the people. Therefore, pragmatic and self-
interested concerns about being implicated in corruption were interwoven with claims to stewardship 
or responsibility for the general wellbeing of the state.   
51 F-5   
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As the kingmakers approached the 2011 election, the enduring themes of good governance 
in Oyo State – patronage, olaju and Ibadan identity - remained salient. After Akala it was felt 
that the Governorship should return to an Ibadan native. Whilst Adesina and Arisekola52 
lived to see Ajimobi come to power, and were influential in his success, the impact of 
Adedibu was felt by his absence. The demise of Adedibu and the declining importance of the 
violent groups he commanded meant that new elite coalitions and political strategies could 
be employed to win power. Yet the influence of godfathers like Arisekola, whose legitimacy 
was built in part on mass philanthropy, remained. Emerging political circumstances, driven 
by the international environment, meant that a new mode of governance was required to 
protect elite interests. 
Conclusion 
Whereas modern ideas of good governance urge a break with what isseen as Nigeria’s 
exclusively corrupt and neopatrimonial past, this chapter has argued that there are various 
existing values and principles which structure understandings of good governance in 
Yorubaland. Yoruba political culture contains both a strong instinct towards progressive, 
developmental, enlightenment thinking, as well as the seeds of an equally well-established 
opposition to elite claims to enlightenment. The realities of everyday struggles for survival 
and dignity in a situation of economic turmoil and poverty mean that whilst progress is a 
necessity to build a better future, and ordinary voters also have more immediate material 
needs. Leaders must find ways of responding to both, as they abide by norms of 
accountability and legitimate leadership. Whilst the progressive line has a more natural 
claim to progress, and populists to immediate economic benefits, the history of 
contemporary politics in Oyo State shows that political competition is shaped by each side’s 
innovative responses to popular needs unmet by the other. With the approach of 
democratisation, there were doubts over whether either political tradition was capable of 
meeting popular demands for good governance.  
This chapter has shown that, through demands for progress, indigenous Yoruba conceptions 
of good governance have long developed in conversation with external Western values. Over 
the years various modernising projects have been couched as natural corollaries of the 
Yoruba enthusiasm for progress and imitation of the West. How progress is interpreted, and 
how Yoruba society should assimilate into Western modernity is contested and continues to 
be contested in the period under study in this thesis, 2011-15.  The rest of the thesis deals 
                                                          
52 Arisekola died late in Ajimobi’s first term, on 19th June 2014 (NAN 2014).  
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with how the Governor of Oyo State from 2011 to 2015 has built on the progressive line in 
Yoruba politics. It looks at how he has remade good governance as conceived of by Obafemi 
Awolowo to reflect new political goals and a renewed engagement with international 
conceptions of good governance. This evolving conception of good governance undergirds 
the policies and principles of the Lagos Model described in the next chapter.  
Even in moments of progressive dominance, when leaders have been fully committed to 
embracing all that is foreign and new, the idea of a break with the past remains ambiguous. 
Traces of past political practice, old legacies and historical attachments linger in the political 
imagination. Disagreement over which practices are important to retain and which have lost 
legitimacy are always couched within the core political principles through which people 
think and act. Therefore, the key themes raised in this chapter form the basis for the structure 
of the second half of this thesis: chapters six interrogates the idea of progress in the Lagos 
Model, chapter seven considers contested ideas of legitimate leadership and chapter eight 
explores the contradictions in the Lagos Model’s approach to delivering immediate 
economic benefits.  
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Chapter 5 - Good Governance as Rupture and Continuity: The 
Lagos Model in Lagos and Oyo States 
Introduction 
An IMF Working Paper from 2003 described past efforts at increasing the transparency and 
accountability of government in Nigeria’s petro-economy as “impossible”, and that “even 
the most optimistic observer” would admit that strengthening such functions would take “a 
long time” (Subramanian and Sala-i-Martin 2003, 18). Nigeria was seen as an example of 
neopatrimonial bad governance; state authority is exercised via the head of state’s personal 
relationships, with the formal bureaucratic rules of the state simply a façade. In the years 
after democratisation in 1999, the consensus was that Nigeria’s neopatrimonial structures 
had been largely resistant to efforts at reform and intervention (Adebanwi and Obadare 
2011; 2013). Against this background of a transformation longed for but frustrated, the 
success of Lagos State as an active reform-minded state government was welcomed by 
international institutions. It represented a break with the past and a symbol of Nigeria’s 
future. Here was a state government that was both willing to work closely with donors 
implementing governance reforms, as well as having a commitment to a transformative 
vision of good governance that was independent of donor pressure.  
This chapter introduces the Lagos Model, a model of developmental governance, first 
developed in Lagos State, Nigeria, from 1999 and later replicated across a number of other 
states in the southwest of Nigeria. It is a vision of good governance that values 
modernisation, transformation and performance. Through this model, successive state 
Governors have achieved significant gains in infrastructure, economic growth, quality of 
governance and service provision. Whereas Lagos State has been the subject of both 
academic and donor attention, less is known about the implementation and effects of the 
Lagos Model in other states. This chapter contributes to filling that gap by detailing how the 
Lagos Model was replicated in Oyo State under the leadership of Abiola Ajimobi from his 
election as Governor in 2011. It extends debates about how ideas of continuity and change 
between the Lagos Model and existing forms of politics in Nigeria are used to legitimate 
different forms of state action. This chapter does not deny that Lagos State has achieved 
improvements in governance and development that have benefited its population. Rather it 
draws attention to the way that this model has been framed in debates about good 
governance, and how an eagerness to welcome the Lagos Model as a ‘good news story’ has 
permitted a number of troubling political trends to emerge.  
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Lagos State has been celebrated as not only having achieved a transformation, where the rest 
of Nigeria lags, but that this transformation has been the product of a commitment to the 
“rupture” (Joseph 2013, 310). Political elites associated with the Lagos Model also have 
their own purposes for which they drew lines of continuity and rupture between their ‘new’ 
form of governance and what had gone before. The chapter explains how good governance 
was part of their political strategy of rupture at three levels: political rupture in terms of 
good governance, regional rupture to gain independence from and differentiate themselves 
from the central government, and indigenous rupture, where old Yoruba politics ideas were 
repurposed to legitimate new political configurations and win elections. The Lagos Model 
draws on continuity with certain parts of the Yoruba project, to render new forms of 
government action legitimate.  
The chapter closes by considering whether the claim that the Lagos Model is a rupture is 
accurate. The dominant framing of Lagos State politics as a rupture with the past allows the 
reframing of old acts as new. A discourse of rupture occludes direct continuities of 
authoritarian governance that extend back to the 1980s, including legitimising the state 
government’s forced evictions of the exact same communities that suffered under military 
rule (Amnesty International 2006, 2013). These authoritarian continuities are not anomalies 
within the Lagos Model, but core to its modernising project.  
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1. Model: Political Rupture 
The Lagos Model is a model of developmental governance first set out by Bola Tinubu as 
Governor of Lagos State between 1999 and 2007, and developed by Babatunde Fashola, his 
Chief of Staff and then, from 2007-11 his successor as Governor. When Tinubu came to 
power he was the state’s first democratically elected Governor since 1983 and expectations 
were high. At the same time, there was a sense of deepening urban crisis. Tinubu feared that 
the city, already one of the densest and fastest growing in Africa, would not be able to 
support its growing population considering already intense pressure on land due to its coastal 
position53 (UN 2011; M. Filani 2012, 11–14). Tinubu and Fashola were united in the 
ambitious goal of breaking with the chaotic past and transforming Lagos into “a modern, 
orderly, and prosperous megacity” (de Gramont 2015, 5). As Fashola built on Tinubu’s 
legacy it became clear that a consistent ‘model’ was emerging, with continuity between the 
two Lagos Governors. Tinubu and Fashola came from the same progressive opposition party, 
and Tinubu has explained that subsequent Lagos governors from the All Progressives 
Congress (APC), as the party has been known since a merger with other smaller parties in 
2013, have all been working to the same programme. In office Tinubu “laid the governance 
foundation and started the first lap” and then “handed the baton to Fashola” (Ezeamalu 
2015b). Their style of governance came to be known as the Lagos Model, a coherent vision 
and associated policies that could be replicated elsewhere.  
The Lagos Model is one of long-term economic transformation through private sector led 
growth, with interventions from an activist state to attract investment. The core policies 
were: governance reform, a focus on urban environment and transport infrastructure, 
security, tax reform to increase internally generated revenue (IGR), and the use of PPPs. The 
Lagos Model involves not only a change in government action but an attempt to change the 
standards and values by which governance is assessed; namely, the idea that government 
should be held accountable to the idea of performance as defined by the mega-city vision 
(Fourchard 2011; Filani 2012; de Gramont 2015). This model strategically engaged with 
donor-backed international conceptions of good governance, as well as forming the basis of 
a political strategy for Tinubu and the APC. 
                                                          
53 The official 2006 census put the state’s population at 9.1million (NBS 2013) whilst the 
Lagos State government estimated it at 17million in 2010 (Ekundayo 2013, 225) and 20million in 
2016 (Lagos State Government 2016).  
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International 
Donors have been involved throughout Lagos State’s transformation, and its status as a 
poster-child of good governance has led to its repeated selection for further donor funding 
and assistance54. It was one of five states selected by the World Bank for funding and 
partnership on the basis of selectivity, whereby they chose which states to work with based 
on their willingness to reform and proof of commitment to international engagement 
(Ekwedike 2005; World Bank 2010a). In July 2015 the World Bank approved a $200m loan 
to the Lagos State government to support budget and investment reforms in the state 
(Ezeamalu 2015a). The Lagos State government’s planning processes involved close 
cooperation with donor sponsored consultants and built on numerous interventions by 
international institutions (Lagos State Government 2010). DFID’s SPARC programme 
focused on public financial management and accountability in service delivery, and major 
reform programmes focussed on tax collection (SPARC-Nigeria.com 2015). For donors, the 
Lagos Model sets an example for the rest of Nigeria to follow (DFID 2014). 
The Lagos Model is celebrated by donors and the business press as representing a break with 
more typical and historical modes of governance seen in Nigeria. Richard Joseph has been a 
leading academic proponent of the idea that Lagos State has achieved international 
conceptions of good governance. Writing in two volumes edited by current and former 
World Bank Chief Economists (2013; 2015), he argues that Lagos State is both 
“developmentalist” and that it is “adhering, in significant measure, to a ‘good governance 
agenda’ of accountability, transparency, the rule of law and operational efficiency.” (Joseph 
2013, 307). He draws on work theorising corruption as a collective action problem 
(Rothstein 2009). Lagos, according to Joseph, has succeeded thanks to a “macro-institutional 
rupture” solving this collective-action problem, with a simultaneous shift in “multi-level as 
well as multi-sector strategies” (Joseph 2013, 310).  Joseph’s analysis reflects a binary way 
of thinking about good governance and existing prebendal modes of governance (Joseph 
2013, 305).55 Indeed, the interpretation that Lagos State has achieved success, against a 
                                                          
54 Along with Kaduna, Lagos is the state that has participated in the most donor-led governance 
projects; DFID’s State and Local Government Programme, Security, Justice and Growth Programme 
(DFID 2007), SAVI (State Accountability and Voice Initiative), and SPARC (State Partnership for 
Accountability, Responsiveness and Capacity). The World Bank has engaged via the 2005 State 
Governance and Capacity Building Project. Lagos was also a lead state in the multi-agency Country 
Partnership Strategy between 2005-09 and UNDAF 2009-12.  
55 He presents a diagram with the two as opposing positions of how different African states 
have developed. On it Nigeria as a whole is placed on one side as worryingly prebendal whereas 
Lagos is placed on the positive developmentalist side (Joseph 2013, 305).  
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background of generalised Nigerian failure, through wholesale rupture with the past is 
popular among international commentators (The Economist 2011; 2015; Financial Times 
2012; Kaplan 2014;).  
However, Joseph’s comparison of Lagos State to a more familiar example of an African 
developmental state, Rwanda, suggests some of the ambiguities of ‘rupture’. There is a sense 
that the ends will justify the means. He observes favourably that what Rwanda only achieved 
following a genocide, Lagos State Governors, Bola Tinubu and Babatunde Fashola achieved 
through a commitment to a developmentalist vision. Some scholars have highlighted how 
the changes in governance were more incremental than this analysis allows (de Gramont 
2014b).  It is important to examine the effect of ideas of rupture in the actual politics of the 
Lagos Model on the ground. Despite the rather sinister comparison to genocide in Rwanda, 
Joseph casts rupture as a positive thing. It is positioned as an instrumental idea that 
politicians can pick up and have ‘elite commitment’ to, in order to further the goals of 
development. However, whenever there is rupture, there are some institutions, things and 
people who will be washed away. In this somewhat Manichean view of the world, the 
rupture is with prebendal governance – interpreted expansively to mean 
“state/politics/economy fabric” -- which should be washed away (Joseph 2013, 310).  
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2. Explaining the adoption of the Lagos Model 
Good Governance and Rupture as Regional Political Strategy 
The Lagos Model goes beyond lip-service of good governance and genuinely incorporates 
policy recommendations from the good governance agenda: specifically, the governance 
reforms in the civil service and tax agencies, the liberalisation of the business environment 
with simplified regulations and the willingness to engage the private sector via PPPs.56 In 
fact, Lagos State voluntarily embraced initiatives like PPPs that the World Bank has long 
been encouraging in Nigeria at the Federal level with little success.57 However, the adoption 
of these good governance policies can be explained as simultaneously meeting donor 
prescriptions and facilitating a political strategy of rupture from regional networks which 
advances the economic aspirations and party-building agenda of key southwestern elites. 
Revenue from non-oil and gas sources in Nigeria has been consistently low (Guyer 1992); in 
2012 income tax was only 0.8% of GDP and VAT and sales tax only 0.2% (UK Parliament 
2012, 7).  This has left state governments heavily dependent on oil revenues, disbursed via a 
monthly statutory allocation from the federal government. However, “a historical 
antagonism between Lagos-based politicians and the federal government” since colonial 
times, left Lagos at the mercy of erratic and politically motivated withholding of the 
statutory allocation (Suberu 2001, 88; Fourchard 2011, 45).58 Following democratisation in 
1999 there were very high expectations of government from the population at large, who 
anticipated benefiting from the ‘dividends of democracy’. Moreover, within Tinubu’s 
political networks there was demand for patronage to build the party, ready to fight elections 
(de Gramont 2014b, 2015). Whilst Tinubu and Fashola were trying to implement their plans 
to rapidly transform Lagos, the central PDP government obstructed state-led plans to build 
power stations and roads, and withheld the state’s federal allocation, ostensibly because the 
                                                          
56 Public Private Partnership is defined as “a risk-sharing relationship … between the public 
sector and one or more partners from the private and/or voluntary sectors to deliver a publicly agreed 
outcome and/or public service” (Grimsey and Lewis 2007, xiv).  
57 In 2008 the Federal government established the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory 
Commission via the specialist World Bank Institute for Public Private Partnerships. Its stated 
objectives are to improve the use of performance indicators in PPPs and increase the “acceptance” of 
PPP in Nigeria (Dowden 2013). 
58 A thorough discussion of the historical evolution of this issue can be found in (Fourchard 
2011, 45). 
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state had created new local councils and were exceeding state powers. In reality, central 
government simply withheld funds from Tinibu to reduce his chances of re-election (de 
Gramont 2015, 6; Today 2014; Fourchard 2011, 47). Tinubu responded to this political and 
social pressure by adopting a strategy of autonomous development at the state level, 
independent of the federal statutory allocation. Central to this plan was a sustained push to 
improve the state’s ability to raise funds internally.  Compliance with the fiscal provisions of 
the good governance agenda coincided with the political imperatives on the ground. Tinubu 
pursued internal revenue generation policies that served three purposes. He demonstrated the 
state’s fiscal responsibility to international audiences as well as building up an economic 
base that allowed continued social spending and reduced his reliance on the statutory 
allocation from the central government.  
Policies 
Tax reform was a flagship part of the governance reform under the Lagos Model. Various 
reforms aimed to improve efficiency and transparency, including computerisation, the hiring 
of private consultants and a reinforced cadre of enforcement officers. By focussing on 
enforcement, the state avoided raising tax levels on international firms and investors. In 
tandem with a reformed Land Bureau, multiple or nuisance taxes were streamlined, 
lightening the regulatory burden on companies in order to create a welcoming economic 
environment for foreign capital (UK Parliament 2012, 108). Tax receipts increased 
astronomically from N600m a month in 1999 to N7bn in 2007 to more than N15bn in 2012. 
Over a similar time period, the number of people paying tax in Lagos State expanded from 
500,000 to 4million, mostly under PAYE (Filani 2012, 22–33; de Gramont 2014b; de 
Gramont 2015; Eurasia Research Group 2015). DFID was closely involved in governance 
reform, working alongside the Lagos State Inland Revenue Service on tax reform and the 
creation of a ‘better business environment’ through consultancy and advocacy work (UK 
Parliament 2012, 108). 
Working with donors helped to build up Lagos State’s credit rating with other commercial 
lenders (Burnell 2005). Moreover, with the state’s finances improving steadily – by 2014, 
70% of the state budget came from IGR and the government was able to raise its own capital 
through bond sales, leveraging its income to further expand finance available for improving 
services. This included the Lagos Security Trust Fund, for police and security, and the 
floating of capital bonds in 2002, raising $15bn to refinance other short term loans and pay 
for infrastructure (Financial Times 2012; Ezeamalu 2014).  
There was an overlap between the good governance agenda’s emphasis on streamlining the 
civil service to make it more efficient and the political need for Tinubu and Fashola to 
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disentangle themselves from the civil service as an antagonistic political constituency. 
Institutionally, the public service was a symbol of the old modes of governance, with 
inefficient, rent-seeking civil servants who were resistant to new market-inspired ways of 
working. Key economic agencies, like the Lagos State Inland Revenue Service, were 
transformed into technocratic enclaves with elevated salaries, and insulated from the rest of 
the state civil service (Adenugba and Ogechi 2013). Tax collection was contracted to a 
private company Alpha Beta, which is reported to have links to Tinubu himself (Sahara 
Reporters 2016; Ezeamalu 2016; Ezeamalu 2015a). Within the civil service, reforms were 
implemented that borrowed private sector methods of operating from New Public 
Management and there was a shift to meritocratic recruitment rather than hiring of 
indigenes. In 2015 the State Head of Public Service launched the Service Charter Initiative 
which aims to “ensure that there is no difference in the way businesses are run in the private 
sector and the public sector” (“Governance Share Fair” 2013, 6; Nigerian Tribune 2015). 
Thus the public sector was implicated in the old system from which the APC sought to make 
a break. 
When Tinubu arrived in office the institutional arrangement for urban governance was 
fragmented across the city’s 20 LGAs59, with little ability to plan on a city-wide scale. Under 
Tinubu, the relationship between the city and government was rationalised, with technocratic 
planning and managing of development towards specific goals of cleanliness, order and 
infrastructure development. Tinubu merged existing organisations into a variety of city-wide 
agencies to deliver coordinated services and enforcement60 such as Lagos State Waste 
Management Authority and Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (Kofoworola 
2007; Oresanya 2008). Environmental and physical planning coincided with donor 
aspirations for the city. It was listed as a priority in the 2005 LASEEDS document, the 
state’s version of the national level collaboration with donors, and was a key aspect of the 
$200m, World Bank funded, Lagos Metropolitan Development and Governance Project 
(World Bank 2006; M. Filani 2012, 18, 35). 
                                                          
59 16 of these are in Lagos State and four are in Ogun. A further 4 LGAs in Lagos State are not 
counted as part of the city. 
60 These included: Lagos State Signage and Advertisement Agency (LASA), Lagos Waste 
Management Authority (LAWMA), Lagos State Bus Services, Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport 
Authority (LAMATA), Lagos State Water Authority, Lagos State Emergency Management Agency 
(LASEMA), Lagos State Emergency Medical Services (LASEMS) and Lagos State Microfinance 
Institution (LASMI).  
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Cleanliness, order and infrastructure development came together under the policy of urban 
renewal, overseen by the revitalised Lagos State Urban Renewal Authority (“Lagos State 
Urban Renewal Authority (LASURA)” 2016). Informal sector shops and hawkers were 
cleared from around major roads and new roads and flyovers built. In place of traders came 
landscaped green spaces; a policy known as beautification. Modernisation of the city meant 
cleanliness, orderliness and large-scale infrastructure projects. Fashola in particular adopted 
an old proverb as the city’s motto: Eko O Ni Baje: “Lagos shall not spoil”. He radically 
improved waste disposal coverage and regularity, through collaboration with over 90 small 
private contractors (de Gramont 2015, 9). The state government invested in expanding and 
upgrading roads, and created new agencies to enthusiastically enforce traffic regulations. 
The result was a dramatic improvement in the traffic congestion in Lagos, despite a growing 
population (Financial Times 2012).  
Urban renewal was an end in itself but it was also a component of a broader economic 
strategy. Part of the Lagos Model is the belief that a clean orderly modern city is part of 
creating a literal ‘enabling environment’ for domestic and foreign capital. Security was a 
further priority as it was a major obstacle to attracting foreign companies and to the authority 
of the state government. In 2000, President Obasanjo threatened to impose a state of 
emergency in Lagos, bringing it under federal control, if Tinubu could not impose order and 
stop the wave of violence attributed to the ethnic organisation, the Oodua People’s Congress 
(OPC) (Johnson 2000) and local gangs who menaced Lagos Island, known as Area Boys 
(Rasak 2000; Momoh 2000; Adebanwi 2005, 348). Tinubu took on the Area Boys, and 
absorbed some of them into the state traffic enforcement and waste management services (de 
Gramont 2014a, 64–68). A rapid response team and emergency call centre were set up to 
respond to criminal incidents more swiftly (Filani 2012, 38).   
The state government played an activist role in attracting private sector investors and 
companies to collaborate with the public sector. Tinubu believed that the public sector did 
not have the capacity to deliver the scale of benefits quickly enough to guarantee re-election 
(de Gramont 2015). PPPs had already gained popularity internationally in the late 1990s and 
2000s primarily because they allow government to deliver public infrastructure rapidly 
“without immediately raising taxes or borrowing” (Akintoye and Beck 2008; Loxley 2013). 
Lagos State government collaborated with private sector representative to promote the use of 
PPPs, through forums like the Biennial Lagos State Economic Summit, first held in 2000, 
and passing legislation facilitating PPPs (M. Filani 2012, 19–21; “Governance Share Fair” 
2013, 6). In Lagos PPPs have been used to build and finance major high-cost transport 
infrastructure investments such as the Lekki-Epe expressway, the Lekki-Ikoyi Link Bridge, 
the Bus Rapid Transport System and the Blue Line Light Rail. The state government also 
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involved private providers in utilities, for example Independent Power Plants and the 
privatisation of the Lagos State Water Corporation (BMI 2009b, 2009a, 2010; IRJ 2011; 
Financial Times 2012; M. Filani 2012, 27–30; K. Smith 2013; Briginshaw 2013).  
This new Lagos Model was a success. The economy of Lagos grew out of step with the rest 
of Nigeria, tax revenue multiplied and the APC appeared to have found the recipe for 
development and electoral success. Tinubu was re-elected in 2003 and succeeded by Fashola 
who served two terms from 2007 to 2015, with landslide victories (Financial Times 2012; 
Filani 2012, 21–28; Ezeamalu 2014; Today 2014; Adams 2015; Wallis 2015; Premium Times 
2015).  
The Lagos Model as a Response to Indigenous Rupture 
Alongside a political strategy which required the Lagos Model to be cast as a rupture with 
the past, there was also a need for elites to position the Lagos Model with reference to 
existing, indigenous conceptions of good governance. From the beginning, Tinubu asserted 
that the Lagos Model was a continuation of the politics and philosophy of Obafemi 
Awolowo, and was part of “rebuilding the Awolowo political family” (Adebanwi 2014, 
223,30). The Egbe Omo Odu’a, Awolowo’s Yoruba political grouping, turned into the 
Afenifere in the 1990s. This maintained continuity between the Awolowo’s parties, the 
Action Group and then the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), and the Tinubu-led progressive 
parties: Alliance for Democracy, Action Congress, Action Congress of Nigeria and from 
2013 the All Progressives Congress. Tinubu joined the Afenifere when he returned from 
exile in 1998 (Adebanwi 2014, 232). They drew continuities with Obafemi Awolowo’s brand 
of Yoruba Nationalism and the achievements of the UPN that legitimised the Lagos Model 
as “moving forward by returning to the past” (Adebanwi 2014, 223). 
Adebanwi draws on Giddens, noting that “[o]ften, the 'authority which the past exercises 
over the present' is fabricated in the present” (Giddens 1979, 201; Peel 2000; Adebanwi 
2005, 341–42). Tinubu repurposed the Awolowo’s ideas to meet popular needs that had 
previously been neglected by a progressive politics. The progressives had long built their 
legitimacy on the grounds that it was the vehicle of Yoruba nationalism in Nigerian politics, 
however, demographic and social changes described in the previous chapter meant that 
political innovation was needed to respond to unmet popular needs. The OPC highlighted the 
failure of Yoruba elite to deliver economic benefits alongside long-term progress, and led 
them to challenge the gerontocratic structure of Yoruba politics.  This imperative was 
especially strong in Lagos, which was especially badly affected by the OPC crisis with 
repeated incidents of ethnic and communal violence (Ikelegbe 2001; Ukiwo 2003).  
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Tinubu succeeded in responding to the unmet need for economic benefits that had led to 
widespread disillusionment with Yoruba elites as shown in the rise of the Oodua People’s 
Congress (OPC) in the 1990s and 2000s. Whilst the Lagos Model offered a clear vision of 
progress, the progressives at democratisation had to skilfully adjust their offering to respond 
to demands based on the other two key themes: economic benefit and legitimate leadership. 
Tinubu’s pragmatism represented a means of balancing the need for progress or olaju with 
social programmes that indicated that the benefits of state power would not solely be 
enjoyed by the elites. He set up free healthcare programmes for high risk groups (Lagos 
State Ministry of Health 2016) and created thousands of jobs to absorb the otherwise 
unemployed young men who had made a living as criminal Area Boys, via mass 
employment in agencies like LAWMA, KAI and LASTMA. Tinubu was also able to direct 
patronage through a broad network of market and traders associations (Carothers and de 
Gramont 2013; de Gramont 2014a; 2015). Lagos State’s ability to provide economic benefits 
was dependent on its success at tapping the potential for internally generated revenue as the 
commercial capital of Nigeria.  
Moreover, from Awolowo onwards, high profile positions within the Action Group and UPN 
went to Christians. Among the Muslim masses there developed a sense that they were being 
denigrated by the progressive Christian elite (Agbaje 2002). By having a Muslim figurehead 
in Lagos, in the form of Tinubu and then Fashola, the Yoruba progressives signalled the 
compatibility of Islam and modernity, and ended what had been seen as the implicit 
marginalisation of the Muslim masses. Other contemporaries in the Alliance for Democracy 
like Bisi Akande and Lam Adesina, Governors of Osun and Oyo, were also Muslim. In 2011, 
when the next wave of ACN Governors were in power across the southwest, four out of the 
five ACN governors were Muslim (Adebanwi 2014, 237–38). The incorporation of Islamic 
versions of modernity was a key element of the Lagos Model’s re-positioning to respond to 
unmet indigenous demands. Moreover, this shift made a parochial pan-Yoruba vision of 
development more politically acceptable to the southwest’s religious diverse electorate.  
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3. Propagating the Lagos Model Across the Southwest  
The Lagos Model in the Southwest 
Whilst Lagos was surging ahead of the rest of the federation in terms of IGR, in the other 
southwestern states, ACN Governors relied on sporadic allocations from central government 
and were unable to keep up with popular demands to see the immediate benefits of 
democracy, referred to as the ‘dividends of democracy’. In the 2003 gubernatorial elections, 
the centrally funded PDP 'hurricane' swept the ACN from power in all the states of the 
region, bar Lagos. Whilst a sense of regional pride and opposition to Obasanjo had carried 
the ACN to power in 1999, it was not enough to sustain electoral majorities in the face of 
dwindling resources (Adebanwi 2014, 230–34; Hoffman and Nolte 2013). Therefore, the 
provision of development and resources outside of central government patronage became an 
electoral imperative beyond the Lagos bubble.  
In addition to autonomy from the rest of the federation, Tinubu’s strategy in the southwest 
was to build a new economic base for political power, through connections with external 
sources. When Tinubu stepped down as Governor in 2007 he became “the new power centre 
in Yoruba politics” (Adebanwi 2005, 224–25). He devoted his energies and financial 
resources to cultivating a network of ACN Governorship candidates who could replicate the 
Lagos Model in the other southwestern states (Adams 2015; Ezeamalu 2015b; Ogunlesi 
2012).61  
The DAWN Commission is a regional development organisation funded by the Governors of 
the South West zone, with a framework for the development of a regional political and 
economic strategy (Oladele 2015b). The DAWN Commission is firmly part of the machinery 
of the Awoist progressive movement in its origins and symbolism. It originated in online 
discussions among Yoruba in the diaspora and in its early stages the process was overseen by 
the Afenifere Renewal Group, a late 1990s spin-off of the Egbe Afenifere (Adebanwi 2014, 
242) .62 Plans for the commission were developed in 2011 at a summit in Ibadan, and it was 
officially launched in 2013 with its offices at the iconic Cocoa House in central Ibadan63. It 
                                                          
61 As Fashola took over, journalists started to talk about a “Tinubu Tendency” and a “Tinubu 
School of Politics”, reflecting the prominent role that Tinubu still played from behind the scenes 
(Omonijo and Gabriel 2007).  
62 I-33 Senior staff member of DAWN Commission 1, Ibadan 05/06/2015.   
63 Cocoa House was built by Obafemi Awolowo, from cocoa revenues, and was the first tower 
block in Nigeria. It is seen as a symbol of Oyo State as a land of ‘firsts’ and the progressive potential 
of the Yoruba people Osun Defender 2011) 
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conducts research, advises on policies and facilitates coordination across the 6 states, 
organising workshops and information sharing events64 for civil servants and politicians 
(DAWN 2011, 6–10, 2016; Olofinlua 2015). 
Like Tinubu and Fashola in Lagos, the DAWN Commission simultaneously positions itself 
as fulfilling international conceptions of good governance, as well as pursuing political 
strategies facing progressives in the southwest and normative concerns rooted in Yoruba 
political history.  
From a donor perspective, DAWN is helping to propagate the new technocratic mode of 
governance and outward-looking economic strategy seen in Lagos State that DFID explicitly 
advocates should be replicated across the country. Its ‘five pillars’ include policies to 
continue building an alternative economic base for the southwest which depends not on 
central government oil revenues but private-sector investment. DAWN facilitates the 
economic integration of the states so they can operate more as a regional block, which 
brought political and economic advantages. The ability of states to act as an economic unit 
and to implement the same “core economic policies” also allows for “economies of scale” 
(DAWN 2011, 8–9. 16) and joint ventures among states have already been undertaken in 
power and infrastructure (BMI 2011).  
Just as actors within the donor community are keen to partner with reformist southwestern 
governments, the DAWN Commission actively pursues the involvement of international aid 
donors, as part of the region’s political strategy. DAWN’s strategic roadmap explains that the 
southwest must mobilise capital to escape the “glass ceiling” imposed by the current 
political arrangements and “establish strong links and partnerships with international 
development partners, multilaterals, and international DFIs [Donor Funded Institutions] to 
access global finance opportunities” (DAWN 2011, 6–23) 
However, there are elements of the DAWN Commission’s agenda that reflect the practical 
political imperatives facing the ACN/APC. It notes that through replicating a shared 
economic strategy, in line with the Lagos Model, other southwestern states stand a better 
chance of “power retention and strengthening of democratic legitimacy”, i.e. winning 
elections (DAWN 2011, 17). Just as Tinubu had to include some provisions for short term 
                                                          
64 Examples include a Pre-Inaugural Meeting on the Regional Technical Team on Climate 
Change and Sustainability in the southwest, Heads of Service Strategy briefing on the DAWN 
Development Index and a Regional Workshop on Security, Law and Order (DAWN 2016).  
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benefits for the masses, DAWN states that its fifth pillar is “social and human development” 
(2011, 6–23). 
Furthermore, DAWN’s strategic roadmap also sets out a vision for the collective 
development of the Yoruba on ethnically-parochial grounds that are at odds with the liberal 
universal ideas of donor conceptions of good governance (Craig and Porter 2006). Drawing 
on Awolowo’s ideas of olaju dating back to the 1940s, it says: “differences in exposure to 
and embrace of Western education have created varying levels of modernisation and 
economic development amongst the various ethnic groups”. Those who are the most modern 
and the developed – the Yoruba – have been held back by the “concentration of legislative 
power and fiscal resources in the federal government” and “ethnic colouration” of 
government by certain “dominant groups” i.e. the Hausa-Fulani (DAWN 2011, 12). As a 
result of these obstacles, Yoruba progressives continue to demand greater regional economic 
and fiscal autonomy, through DAWN and the 2014 National Conference for example (The 
Punch 2014a; Ajayi 2014a; Premium Times Nigeria 2013a). 
The Lagos Model in Oyo State  
Governor Abiola Ajimobi in Oyo State was one of the ACN protégées. His bid for Senator in 
2003 was sponsored by Lam Adesina, part of Tinubu’s generation of AD governors. In the 
Senate he swiftly went on to establish himself within what Adebanwi calls the “Yoruba-
Awo-Progressive fold”, serving as minority leader for the Alliance for Democracy in the 
House of Assembly from 2003-2007 and Deputy Minority Whip from 2005. Ajimobi gained 
a reputation as a clean hard worker (Ologbondiyan 2005a; Ologbondiyan 2005b). He was 
reported to have rejected a bribe from Obasanjo, and spoke out publicly against 
godfatherism when Oyo State godfather, Lamido Adedibu, was at his most powerful. Like 
Tinubu, he was a Muslim and had a shared background working in an international oil 
company (Ekpunobi 2006; Ogunyemi 2006; Aziken 2006; Aziken 2007; Omonijo 2007; 
OSG Website 2011). Once Ajimobi was elected in 2011, the Oyo State government adopted 
the Lagos Model, stating there was no need to “reinvent the wheel” (“Governance Share 
Fair” 2013, 6, 13).65 
Oyo replicated the ruptures seen in Lagos. Ajimobi signalled a rupture with old modes of 
governance, explaining that the “modern” Oyo State would be “a clear departure from the 
                                                          
65 The process of sharing led Oyo to adopt OYES, a youth employment scheme initially 
developed in Osun, and they stated an interest in replicating Ekiti’s social security scheme and 
Lagos’s SDP.  
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one bequeathed to him by past administrations” (ThisDay 2013) According to Ajimobi, Oyo 
state under PDP rule was marked by “violence, thuggery, maladministration, profligacy and 
impunity.” (Arulogun 2015). Ajimobi rejected Amala politics, a system of distributing small 
immediate benefits, like cash and food, to secure popular acquiescence to corrupt and violent 
elite rule, instead promoting the Lagos Model’s conception of accountability as performance 
(Sun News 2015; Ajimobi 2015b). Ajimobi’s “mission to transform the State” necessitated a 
rupture with the past in order for the state to be transformed into a radically new world, akin 
to a “revolution” (OSG Website 2013a; Oladele 2013). Where Fashola’s vision was the 
‘Mega-city’, Ajimobi’s dreamt of the “New Modern Oyo State” and the “New Ibadan” 
(Ajimobi 2015b). 
In contrast to the way that donors were at the heart of Tinubu’s reforms from the beginning, 
Oyo State had few donor interventions or partnerships until a major World Bank loan was 
agreed in 2014. During that time, however, Ajimobi nonetheless invoked good governance in 
all his major public speeches (Osun Defender 2011; Ajimobi 2015a; OSG Website 2014a; 
OSG Website 2013). The hypothetical spectre of judgement and sanction by external donors 
and investors was discursively called upon in Ajimobi’s justification of unpopular policies to 
deflect responsibility for policies that were in the APC’s strategic interests.  
Ajimobi enacted Oyo’s version of regional rupture, tying the state to the regional political 
strategy of building an alternative economic base for the APC, separate from the central 
government. As such, Ajimobi signalled a decisive shift towards pro-private sector 
development and away from the perceived inefficiencies and antagonistic constituencies 
seen as inherent in a public-sector dominated economy. Ajimobi announced that the civil 
service must be “able and willing to evolve and productively manage a private sector led 
Oyo State economy” (OSG Website 2013). Soon after his election he cut the civil service 
payroll through updating computer records to eliminate ghost workers and retiring those 
who had reached the statutory age limit or 35 years of service (The Street Journal 2011). In 
2014 further reforms were unveiled “with a view to eliminating overlapping functions and 
bureaucratic delay” (Tribune 2014). A member of Ajimobi’s cabinet explained that there 
were other wide-ranging reforms to government and the civil service that were not 
“codified”, i.e. not publicly advertised. These were explicitly inspired by the experience of 
key members of staff from Ajimobi’s administration working in multinational companies66. 
Similarly, anti-corruption strategies allowed Ajimobi to simultaneously signal his 
                                                          
66 I-46 Senior Member of Ajimobi's Cabinet, Ibadan, 24th July 2015  
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commitment to international conceptions of good governance and strategically cut links 
between the government and the previous regime’s patronage network. As soon as he arrived 
in office in May 2011 Ajimobi announced that the state and local government bank accounts 
had been frozen pending inspection, and he would review all ‘hasty decisions’ made and 
contracts allocated by the Akala government.  
Ajimobi’s tax policy aimed to replicate the rapid improvements in IGR seen in Lagos, both 
by “extend[ing] the tax net to those hitherto outside the net” and making the tax 
administration “effective and efficient” (Jegede 2013a). He was committed to a “realism of 
budgetary proposals” and the “monitoring and evaluation of budget implementation” 
(Ajimobi 2015b) i.e. not running deficits (Osun Defender 2011; Jegede 2013a; O. Ajayi 
2011b). Oyo State government’s internally generated revenue grew by 75% in between 
Ajimobi arriving in office in 2011 and the end of his first term in 2015. Despite these 
reforms, Oyo State’s financial capacity was tiny compared to Lagos. In 2015 Oyo’s IGR was 
just 6% that of Lagos State (Tribune 2014; Tribune 2014; DAWN 2014, 22). 67   
As in Lagos, PPPs were employed by Ajimobi as a way of transforming the state using 
economic mechanisms that were both outside of central government control and bypassed a 
reliance on the potentially obstructive civil service. PPPs were mainstreamed for “the 
adequate provision of semi-public goods and services” including for waste disposal, refuse 
management and the upgrading of roads (Jegede 2013a). However, the utility of PPPs went 
beyond simply using private sector resources to provide goods and services that the 
government was obliged to provide to its citizens as a minimum. PPPs were also used to 
build flagship elite investments such as a light rail system as in Lagos, and a number of 
luxury shopping centres, hotels and housing estates (Oladeji 2014; Ajimobi 2015a; BMI 
2015b; Oxford Business Group 2013a). The state government passed the PPP Bill in 2013, 
creating a dedicated office outside of the Ministry of Trade, Investments and Cooperatives. 
The Bureau of Investment Promotion and Public Private Partnerships (BI4P) was to handle 
the “administering and regulating of all PPP activities”. At the same time the state 
government announced its intention to use PPPs to “revive moribund companies owned by 
the state” (Oxford Business Group 2013a), thus lessening the state’s role in the economy in 
the long-term whilst creating new income opportunities for key agencies within the state in 
the short term.  The state owned Oyo State Finance and Investment Company Limited made 
                                                          
67 Table: Internally Generated Revenue at State Level (2015). Data source: National Bureau of 
Statistics / Joint Tax Board/State Boards of Internal Revenue. National Bureau of Statistics Website.  
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moves to reduce public ownership of wholly owned subsidiaries, including interests in paper 
production, management of a theme park, as well as concrete and cashew nut processing. 
The state government offered “a package on structured incentives to attract investors” in 
industries68 identified as key to the state’s development strategy (Feyisipo 2014; Oxford 
Business Group 2013a).  
To support the expansion of private investment the Ajimobi administration took action to 
create “an enabling environment for investors to come in” (Oderemi and Alao 2015).  Whilst 
Oyo State did not have the same challenges of traffic congestion, Area Boys and an 
impending population explosion, it did have acute urban governance problems of its own. 
Waste disposal contributing to flooding has long been a major problem in Ibadan, which sits 
at the confluence of a number of major rivers.69 Thus in Oyo State urban renewal was both a 
way of modernising the city for investors and preventing flooding along with other health 
hazards. As in Lagos, Ajimobi focused on cleanliness and order on the streets, infrastructure 
and security (Oladeji 2014). Ajimobi rehabilitated roads and bridges, dualized roads at the 
entrance to major cities, built a flyover at Mokola in central Ibadan and built motor parks 
(OSG Website 2013a). In the first two years of Ajimobi’s first term major informal trading 
centres that had previously defined the urban landscape were dismantled70: shops were 
demolished and fines issued to traders who tried to return71. Speaking at the site of extensive 
demolitions at Molete Bridge in November 2012, the Governor explained how the urban 
renewal policy was “meant to make the state attractive to visitors and investors, as well as 
halt periodic accidents that claim the lives of street traders and hawkers” (Sanni 2012). 
Whereas in Lagos Area Boys were the major security concern, Ajimobi was faced with street 
                                                          
68 These are: agriculture, agro-industrial processing, manufactures, transport infrastructure, 
culture and tourism, solid minerals and power.  
69 In 2006 it was estimated that 50,000 tonnes of waste are generated in the city every year, and 
much of this is dumped in open sites on the outskirts of the city, leading to significant contamination 
of water sources and soils. Waste disposed of in drainage systems causes blockages that exacerbate 
flooding. In 2010, 2011 and 2012 there were devastating flooding incidents in the city. The worst was 
on 26th August 2011, causing an estimated N30bn of damage, including the destruction of Apete 
Bridge (Adewumi et al. 2005; Omoleke 2004; Adelekan et al. 2014, 30–32; Sustainable Ibadan 
Programme 2010; Agbola et al. 2012).  
70 Demolitions and beautification were undertaken at all the city’s key intersections, including: 
Toll Gate, Iwo Road, Ojoo, Mokola, Molete Bridge (Sanni 2012), Mobil and Dugbe (Osun Defender 
2012).  
71 HM2-2 Focus Group of Roadside Traders. Highway Market, Ibadan 20/05/2015  
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violence between rival factions of the National Union of Road Transport Workers72 
(NURTW). Ajimobi banned the NURTW in Oyo State and setup Operation Burst, a multi-
agency law enforcement squad. Burst was funded via a Security Trust Fund, as in Lagos. A 
news article from late April 2015 lists “peace and sanity” as an achievement that won 
Ajimobi the election, and notes that “he caged members of the NURTW” (Osun Defender 
2011; Sahara Reporters 2011b; Oderemi and Alao 2015; Ogunyemi 2015).  
The Lagos Model in Oyo State and International Conceptions of Good Governance  
The foregoing discussion shows how, within the Lagos Model, both international 
conceptions of good governance and indigenous conceptions of good governance were 
mediated by political actors on the ground to meet political imperatives. However, the 
interaction between international conceptions of good governance and those underlying the 
Lagos Model is multi-directional. There is evidence that Ajimobi and his team had 
internalised the values of the international conceptions of good governance – a belief in the 
superiority of corporate culture, and a need for private-sector intervention in government. In 
turn these values shaped how Ajimobi re-interpreted Awolowo’s ideas for contemporary 
political realities.  
The presentation of Governor Ajimobi himself, by his press team and APC colleagues, 
reproduces the value of ‘exposure’ to foreign knowledge as a source of olaju or progress 
(Peel 1978). One senior politician, who had served on Ajimobi’s cabinet, defined exposure 
as:  
“Travelling all over the world, reading the literature, attending programmes in 
enlightened communities like universities, lectures seminars, at least to broaden his 
horizons.”73  
Among his cabinet and colleagues, Ajimobi was seen as “very very enlightened” and 
“multinational”: they admired what they saw as his ability “to replicate what he has seen 
abroad, in his local environment”74, such as dualized roads and generator powered 
streetlights. Moreover, Ajimobi’s position as a ‘technocrat’ emphasises the value of expert 
and elite knowledge, cultivated through western education.  Colleagues are keen to describe 
                                                          
72 Around the time of Ajimobi’s inauguration there were several clashes, leading to at least 20 
deaths, the burning of 60 cars and millions of naira of damage.  
73 I-23 Former member of Ajimobi's Executive Council, Ibadan, 06/05/2015  
74 I-26 and I-32 Head of Ibadan-based law firm, Ibadan, 21/05/2015 and 30/05/2015; and I-46.
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him as having a “track record” that includes a degree from an American university (O. Ajayi 
2014b). His supporters claimed that voting for an “international person” like Ajimobi 
brought about “the era of intellectualism in governance” (Arulogun 2015) and also simply a 
vote “for intellect” (Adedayo 2015). 75 Likewise, innate intellectual difference was used to 
explain his predecessors’ poor performance records. Ajimobi’s press officer explained: “you 
couldn’t blame them: they did all within their grasp and depth” (Oladele 2013).  
Under the UPN, the principles of equity, equality and social justice found expression in the 
expansion of government services, in particular education, on a universal and free basis 
(Joseph 1987, 118). Ajimobi, like other ACN governors, “constantly remind people that they 
too live by Awolowo’s ideas and ideals” and follow in the “footsteps of Papa Awolowo” 
(Adebanwi 2014, 223,30). The cardinal pillars of the UPN social policy included free 
healthcare, free education, full employment and rural development (Arifalo 2001). The 
statist orientation of the progressives prior to adjustment echoes broader tendencies towards 
bureaucratic modes of organisation and normalisation of state intervention in western 
Nigeria at the time. Enlightenment, accordingly, meant the wholesale transformation of 
society through these social policies. A healthy, educated populace would be better able to 
participate in modern society (Peel 1978; Akinola 2010).  
The contemporary incarnations of Awoist thinking are significantly more in favour of 
markets and permissive of economic inequality than the classic programmes of the UPN. 
Rather than emulating the Western welfare state, as Awolowo’s UPN aimed for with its four 
cardinal programmes(Arifalo 2001), the Lagos Model locates enlightenment in exposure to 
international capitalism and the corporate culture of multinational companies.  Ajimobi’s 
vision of modernity, for instance, was summarised on a poster outside government house 
that read: “In 2 years Ibadan is like London, in 4 years it will be like Dubai”. This combines 
the colonial era desire to emulate the metropole, in Nigeria’s case represented by London, as 
well as looking to beacons of Islamic capitalist development, such as Dubai. 
                                                          
75 Anecdotes were used as part of the official discourse to present Ajimobi as someone who 
inherently embodies the values of excellence and intellect. In one news report his Special Adviser on 
Media describes a scene where Ajimobi almost cannot help himself, so strong is his internal 
dedication to excellence: “If you are ... with Ajimobi for thirty minutes, especially in the office or 
his home, you will notice that he stands up momentarily and goes to properly place a table that had 
slanted or a chair that was misplaced. He is a perfectionist who desires equilibrium in human affairs.” 
(Adedayo 2015).  This story is invoked to show how deeply the values of the progressive movement 
are ingrained in Ajimobi as an individual. 
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Influential political elites in Oyo asserted continuities with Awolowo’s politics whilst 
advocating ideological standpoints that represented a marked shift in its interpretation. 
ACN/APC party stalwarts and highly placed staff members within DAWN cited the UPN as 
inspiration for entering politics, in particular the transformative social programmes76. Yet 
when they compared UPN programmes to Ajimobi’s current policies they drew on quite 
different normative assumptions about governmental provision of services. As one local 
government politician explained “the AC is like the UPN” with its four cardinal 
programmes. He said that Awolowo’s public provision of free health care was being 
replicated through the Governor’s wife’s non-governmental organisation, ABC Clinics77. 
Therefore, whilst both are free at the point of use, the universal basis of government 
healthcare under the UPN is replaced with the philanthropic and ad hoc provision of 
healthcare by the state’s First Lady (this will be discussed in more detail in Ch.6 and Ch.8). 
Others who, on the one hand, insisted that they wished to return to the policies of Awolowo, 
nonetheless objected to the idea of free services on principle. A senior member of the 
DAWN Commissionexpressed exasperation with the “something for nothing culture” 78 that 
had grown up over the years among citizens of Oyo state. He complained that: “they’ve been 
used to something for nothing they just want the government to do it … ‘The government 
should do it!’, they want free education, free health, free this, free that.”79 
Ajimobi’s motto for the state was “Ajumose”, which is a concept from Yoruba morality 
meaning partnership or cooperation. It is translated as “doing in unison” or “let us do it 
together”80. There were Ajumose buses, Ajumose food banks and Ajumose Keke – a tricycle 
hire-purchase scheme (see chapter seven for more discussion of these programmes and the 
Ajumose Coalition Movement). Ajumose comes from a wider moral context which 
emphasises the cultivation of the individual character (iwa) through habitual expressions of 
one’s character, such that the social collective can come together for a harmonious purpose 
of social survival (Omobowale 2008; Omobowale and Olutayo 2010). Whilst it might be 
expected that a government stressing communalism and collectivism would extend the scope 
of government to cover more services and areas of life, in Ajimobi’s ideology it means the 
                                                          
76 I-28 Local Level APC Politician and Member of Ajimobi's Campaign Team, Ibadan, 
26/05/2015, I-39 and I-40 Local Government APC Chieftain, 28/07/2015 and 30/07/2015; and I-47 
Senior Staff member of DAWN Commission 2, Ibadan, 26/06/2015  
77 I-39 and I-40  
78 I-33  
79 I-33  
80 Ajimobi gave a longer version in his 2013 budget speech: Ki Oyo lee daa, Ajumose gbogbo 
wa ni (“Text of Gov Ajimobi’s Budget Speech” 2015).  
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opposite. APC politicians in Oyo suggested that the task of providing necessary services for 
the population was simply too huge for the government. Even the upgraded, efficient 
government, which the Lagos Model sought to build through governance reforms, would 
need ‘help shouldering the burden’ from the private sector.  This helps explain Ajimobi’s 
motto, which otherwise might suggest contrary political aspirations. Society should do the 
job of providing services together with government, and take on some of the ‘burden’. 
Therefore, participation in government, by private companies, communities or individuals, 
means not an expansion in government but a restriction and transfer of responsibilities to the 
private sector and market. This usage echoes the slipperiness of ‘participation’ as a concept 
that has been noted elsewhere (Mohan and Stokke 2000; Miraftab 2004). This phasing out of 
the universal commitments of the welfare state, and their replacement with more market-
based visions of development, risked ignoring popular demands for economic benefits from 
government for ordinary people who had faced declining livelihoods since structural 
adjustment. However, it also had more immediate implications for the most marginalised 
members of society. 
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4. Domestic Politics of Rupture: Criticisms of the Lagos Model 
The preoccupation with rupture and change in the Lagos Model had political effects. The 
discourse of transforming the state to attract investors legitimates increasing inequality, and 
government use of resources to improve the wellbeing of the most well off in society. 
Examples from Lagos include the Eko Atlantic City project and the role of private 
companies in road rehabilitation. In Oyo State the provision of luxury hotels for visitors is 
justified by a reconfigured version of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. The idea of rupture 
justifies the ‘washing away’ of not only physical waste but social cleansing of those who are 
unconducive to the creation of an enabling environment for investors. Certain activities that 
were deeply embedded in Lagos and Ibadan urban society, such as okada motorbike 
transport, were rendered antithetical to the aims of good governance and development by 
their very presence in public space. For some social groups who were seen as an obstacle to 
the mega-city vision, they were not merely asked to desist from certain behaviour but 
removed from the state entirely.     
The Legitimisation of Inequality 
Critics have identified the highly unequal distribution of the costs and benefits of 
development in Lagos under Tinubu and Fashola. Eko Atlantic is emblematic of the Lagos 
Model’s elitist aspects. The project will create a new luxury neighbourhood of Lagos on land 
reclaimed from the Atlantic Ocean, next to the upmarket city-centre Victoria Island. It is set 
to become a commercial hub and will include major infrastructure to prevent coastal erosion 
and flooding. A public-private partnership, it is advertised by the state government as a key 
element of Lagos’s transformation into a ‘global mega-city’; it will be “Africa’s Big Apple” 
(Okeowo 2013). Initiated by Tinubu in 2006, the project is managed by a private concession 
and financed by major national and international banks (Leadership 2010; Okeowo 2013; 
Africa Research Bulletin 2013; Adeola Adeyemo 2013). Civil society groups and local 
traditional rulers have criticised the project as having no benefit for the vast majority of 
Lagos’ residents, who will be excluded from the privately provided amenities, including 
safer buildings built to higher-specifications and private security (Leadership 2010). 
The Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre urged the government not to “hand over the 
development of Nigeria to individuals and to private agents” (Africa Research Bulletin 
2013).  
Looking at the Oyo State case study sheds light on how inequality is not a by-product of 
development under the Lagos Model but is written into its model of economic growth and 
the sequencing of different developmental goods. In Lagos, successive Governors were able 
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to draw on the abundant sources of internal funding to deliver broad social programmes and 
incorporate key groups into state patronage to deliver immediate benefits to the poor, whilst 
the private sector accelerated provided gains for the rich. However, Oyo reveals the tensions 
and trade offs at the heart of the Lagos Model because it does not have the resources or 
capacity to implement all stages simultaneously. Indeed, whilst Lagos could sweeten the pill, 
Ajimobi had to enforce deferred gratification.  
The challenges of replicating the Lagos Model in Oyo State, with greater fiscal constraints, 
led to new ideological innovations to justify inequality as instrumental to development. 
Ajimobi and his close political associates combined ideas of modernisation, transformation 
and performance with a specific interpretation of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs (1943) to 
justify an elite-focused agenda as a route to poverty alleviation. In a 2013 interview 
Ajimobi’s Press Officer cited Maslow’s model and explained that in Oyo this meant that 
“after security of lives and property ... aggressive infrastructural drive and environmental 
renewal are next on the ladder, followed by education, health services and the like” (Oladele 
2013). At other times Ajimobi described the model as “our Pyramid of Development” 
(Oderemi and Alao 2015), “the State’s hierarchy of needs” (Ajimobi 2015a) and “like the 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs” (O. Ajayi 2014c). The first step in improving security was 
celebrated in Oyo State; but the order of the next two steps proved controversial. The Lagos 
Model already established that infrastructure and environment had to be improved so as to 
attract investors. However, through the idea of Maslow’s hierarchy, the sequencing of 
government interventions chronologically, that is the order in which they are implemented, 
became blurred with the basic-ness of human needs. Ajimobi explained:  
“The pyramid is similar to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, where you have basic 
needs; security as well as self-actualisation. We basically had four steps in our 
pyramids; we felt that the foundation of that pyramid must be peace and security” 
(Oderemi and Alao 2015). 
Ajimobi justifies the priorities on the basis that by providing the top priorities, the ones 
further down the list will follow.  This conflation of the need to attract investors, with the 
idea of a more basic human need leads to some surprising policies. In May 2012 the 
government commenced construction on a “150-room five-star hotel in the heart of Ibadan” 
via a PPP at a cost of N6bn with government covering 10% of the costs and providing 3.5 
hectares of land (OSG Website 2012). The hotel will include “an international conference 
centre and banquet facility” and would be of “international standard and with a touch of 
class that his administration had been known with in the last one year” (OSG Website 
2012a). At the launch ceremony Ajimobi said it was “a key prong his administration’s 
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restoration and developmental initiatives” and would be part of a “developmental corridor” 
through central Ibadan. In explaining the rationale for the hotel, Ajimobi suggested it would 
employ thousands of local staff, provide IGR and become a tourist attraction, making up for 
an absence of an ‘international standard’ of hospitality facilities in the state. Additionally, the 
government encouraged the development of high-end bars and night clubs to bring to 
Ibadan, a famously sleepy city after dark, a “rebirth of night life” (Facebook 2014). He cited 
a mention of Ibadan in the Financial Times as evidence that his development strategy was 
paying off (OSG Website 2012). 
 Within this rubric, advances in consumption, such as having two Shoprites and outlets of 
Dominos Pizza, are regarded as equivalents to productive investments like food processing 
and private infrastructure such as high-speed internet (“Capturing Africa’s Transformative 
Urban Growth” 2011; Olofinlua 2015). The provision of luxury accommodation and leisure 
activities was positioned as a basic step to provide the bare minimum required to attract 
investors. This idea created two contradictions: whilst the state claimed to be struggling to 
meet the burden of providing health and education, it nonetheless was spending money on 
hotels for visitors. The choice of which goods and services were to receive scarce resources 
was inverted in the name of eventual development for the poor.  
Secondly, there was a contradiction in terms of whose needs and what sorts of needs were 
important for achieving development. Because the enabling environment model was 
understood to mean not only making investment possible in Oyo State but making the state 
attractive and pleasant to potential investors, it raised the meeting of (hypothetical) investor 
‘preferences’ to the status of a development necessity, whereas the demands of the masses 
for their basic needs to be met was postponed until long-term development had taken hold. 
Therefore, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is turned upside down, and with it government 
priorities: on this model, meeting the preferences of the rich is the best route to meeting the 
needs of the poor. This reinforces the idea of two publics in Oyo State. The enlightened are 
also the affluent, whose desires are consistent with the immediate strategy of modernising 
Ibadan. The rest can only have their demands met in the long-term, once modernisation has 
been achieved (the idea of the ‘enlightened public’ will be developed in the next chapter). 
Thus in Oyo, the idea of a ‘pyramid of needs’, prioritises luxury corporate tourist 
infrastructure whilst dismissing short term demands of the poor majority as unattainable and 
illegitimate.  
Modernisation as Social Cleansing 
This final section considers how the Lagos Model requires and legitimates social cleansing, 
both through forced evictions and the removal of ‘social undesirables’ from the streets. 
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These policies were initiated in Lagos before being replicated in Oyo State. The propagation 
of the Lagos Model therefore brings the expansion of social exclusion as well as the 
expansion of development.  
In Lagos, part of urban renewal involved ‘upgrading’ slums and ‘blighted areas’81 (Amnesty 
International 2006, 6). In 2006, one such upgrading project began, which was due to take 
seven years and affect 1.1m inhabitants on an average income of $170 a month. This project 
included roads, toilets, boreholes, youth employment, healthcare and education. 
Redevelopment and upgrading projects, such as these, have involved the forced eviction of 
tens of thousands of residents in the city’s poorest areas. The state government claims that 
where homes are destroyed, they provide displaced families with temporary accommodation 
and financial assistance (M. Filani 2012, 35). However, in Badia East, Amnesty International 
has documented demolitions on at least four separate occasions between 2003 and 2013, 
affecting upwards of 12,000 people, carried out by Lagos State Kick Against Indiscipline 
Brigade, armed police and Lagos State Environmental and Special Offences Enforcement 
Unit (Task Force). Violence, arbitrary detention and the use of live ammunition against 
residents have been reported. There was inadequate consultation and no compensation was 
paid nor resettlement undertaken82. Indeed, rather than upgrading the slum areas for those 
who already live there, a pattern has emerged of evicting poor tenants and leasing the land 
for luxury developments.  The repeated forced evictions at Badia East are “part of a broader 
pattern of forced evictions by the Lagos state government.” In Makoko, a floating slum in 
Lagos Lagoon, there have also been four instances of forced evictions, affecting over 5,000 
people in 2005, 2010 and 2012 (Amnesty International 2006, 1, 2013, 6–44, 51–53; Okeowo 
2013).  
The practice of evicting poor communities is one example of a continuity between the 
Fashola-Tinubu era’s Lagos Model and earlier modes of metropolitan governance. A Lagos 
master plan developed with the support of UNDP in 1979, signalled an intention to ‘upgrade 
slums’. The World Bank granted an $85m loan facility in the early 1990s for the Lagos 
Drainage and Sanitation Project, as part of which in 1996 16 slum communities were 
earmarked for destruction (Amnesty International 2013, 10, 15). Remarkably, in some cases 
                                                          
81 Lagos State Government: Lagos Metropolitan Development Project (LMDP), Draft 
Technical Proposal for Upgrading 9 Blighted Areas in Lagos, draft final report, Stoveland Consult, 
Kristiansand, Norway, 2002, p. 6.   
82 Amnesty International and SERAC assisted residents with mounting cases against the state 
government, resulting in a minority being awarded some compensation.  
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the state government under Fashola engaged in demolitions and forced evictions in exactly 
the same places as the military government. For instance, the violent demolitions in Badia 
East from 2003 share marked similarities with government-ordered demolitions in 1973 
(when the community was evicted from Oluwole Village), 1986 and 1997 (Amnesty 
International 2013, 13–15). Similarly, in Makoko a major eviction exercise was undertaken 
in 1990, with identical justifications of slum upgrading, where again consultation and 
compensation were absent (Amnesty International 2006, 1).  
In Oyo State there is a similarly long history of demolitions to sanitise and modernise the 
city. Urban renewal built on repeated interest in sanitation and urban renewal from earlier 
governors (Manton 2013), but implemented changes to the built environment on an 
unprecedented scale. Under Buhari’s military administration from 1983, a military-run 
Environmental Sanitation Task Force demolished illegal structures in Ibadan. A report from 
three years later observed that this push “largely succeeded in removing most of the 
unapproved structures and wastes that deface the environment” (Chokor 1986, 115).  
Existing debates about elitism in Lagos help to contextualise the discursive division of 
society into those who are conducive to modernisation and those who are obstacles to it. 
Tolu Ogunlesi writing in the Financial Times (2012) notes that the poor and those in the 
informal economy bore the brunt of Fashola’s reforms.  Moreover, Neuwirth shows how 
Fashola’s programme of urban renewal, and the crackdowns on street trading and hawking 
that came with it, harmed the city’s informal economy and up to three quarters of the 
residents who earn their living from it (2012). Debates about the ‘elitism’ of the Lagos 
Model centred on okada motorbike riders, who Fashola banned from the city’s major 
arteries. One APC governorship candidate in Lagos state explained the issue: 
“For you to understand where we were, check the statistics in respect of Okada-
related deaths, Okada-related accidents, Okada-related crimes, check the statistics.... 
So what we should encourage is enlightenment and let the citizens and Okada riders 
know that this is in everybody’s good. In a good clime [good society], we should not 
be talking about this Okada riding in the 21st century.” (Ezeamalu 2014) 
The quote invokes the familiar discourses of modernity, with issues of security, safety, 
enlightenment and the need to join the club of 21st century ‘good climes’.  
Whilst okada drivers were prohibited from plying the main roads of the city, beggars were 
removed entirely: forcibly deported to their assumed states of origin. The Lagos deportations 
received mixed attention from the press, as well as criticism from Governors of the states to 
which beggars were sent back (Sahara Reporters 2014; Premium Times Nigeria 2013f; 
Falana 2013). This precedent was replicated in Oyo the same year. Similar removals were 
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undertaken, and extended to include the collection and detention of ‘lunatics’ from the street. 
Drawing on the Oyo case, these deportations can be understood in the context of broader 
aspirations of urban renewal revealing that social cleansing is not an anomaly in the Lagos 
Model but part of its core modernising agenda.  
Indeed, there was a repeated assertion of a chain of equivalence linking dirtiness, old-ness, 
poverty and social undesirability in the government descriptions of urban renewal. Urban 
renewal targeted “motor park touts” who have a legal role in public transport but are seen as 
potentially aggressive. News coverage celebrated Ajimobi’s programme for removing those 
social groups who were linked to insalubrious practices. The report describes the Toll Gate 
area as previously un-modern and backwards, looking like a “village market” which “used to 
house the mentally deranged and miscreants” (Oladele 2013). However it had now been 
‘beautified’ and “sex workers and traders in illicit products” who seen as bringing an air of 
criminality to the area were removed (Oladele 2013). 
This discourse was reflected in policies which sought to cleanse the Ibadan environment of 
both material waste and people who represented obstacles to modernity. In 2013 an 
investigation by Tribune Newspaper, which is otherwise relatively sympathetic to Ajimobi 
and other ACN/APC leaders, revealed that along a main thoroughfare in the centre of the 
city, ‘lunatics’ had been picked up in the street and put in a minibus marked with state 
colours.  Initially the removal was managed by the Ministry of Environment83: the same 
ministry that carried out urban renewal demolitions. The state government reportedly 
commissioned the ministry to “rid the road of mentally challenged” and take them to a 
“designated camp”. Unlike other urban renewal actions the government did not publicise the 
policy and there was no press release: the newspaper only found out when contacted by 
“astonished” residents (Tribune 2013). Ajimobi later explained that the state government had 
contracted three companies to “clear the roads of mad people” and rehabilitate them 
including returning non-indigenes to their state of origin (Vanguard News 2014; Obilo 
2015). 
A similar policy of detaining people who the government didn’t want to see on the streets 
was enacted towards beggars. In January 2013 Ajimobi’s government announced that street 
begging would no longer be tolerated. Speaking at an event where 200 disabled people were 
given food and gifts, the Special Adviser on People Living with Disabilities said that the 
government would provide “destitute persons” with the skills and resources to start a 
                                                          
83 The programme was later moved to the Ministry of Women Affairs.  
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livelihood. However, he warned that if they were still on the streets of Ibadan after two 
weeks they would be “detained in rehabilitation homes” (Osun Defender 2013).  
Joseph (2013, 308) concedes that Lagos state has not entirely purged itself of prebendalism, 
but fortunately “it has not been of a level to hinder the significant socio-economic and 
infrastructural advances.” But misuse of state resources for private gain, as he defines 
prebendalism, is not the only sign of poor governance. Authoritarianism, however 
scrupulous financially, is also a problem. The importance of these forced evictions and 
deportations goes beyond simply noting that development has costs. Rather, it provides 
counter-evidence to the narrative that the Lagos Model is fundamentally different to the 
modes of governance seen elsewhere in Nigeria and previously in the state: what Joseph 
(2013, 310) describes as “macro-institutional rupture”. In the case of Lagos, where good 
governance is framed as the ability to enforce a rupture in politics, and the effects of 
modernisation of the city are celebrated, there is a risk that exclusionary and authoritarian 
policies like social cleansing and forced evictions are justified as a means to an end.    
Different Presentations of the Lagos Model for Different Audiences 
Yet the need for the Lagos Model to fulfil different objectives, and fulfil different criteria of 
good governance at once, posed tensions. The extent and significance of continuities with 
the past, specifically the emphasis on Awolowo and ethnic difference, are subtly managed in 
DAWN and state government dealings with different audiences. In contrast, the importance 
of political ideas is downplayed when dealing with business audiences. In a DAWN 
Commission economic outlook report, there is no mention of the Yoruba people, race or 
nation, and Obafemi Awolowo is referred to only once on page 33 as someone who 
previously took a regional approach to economic development. The document is aimed at 
investors and business audiences, and instead focuses on projections of growth and 
economic opportunities in the region with numerous graphs and statistics. The document 
simply notes that the people of southwest Nigeria are “accommodating, enterprising, highly 
sophisticated and educated” (DAWN 2014, 3,33) Awolowo’s vision is leveraged in dealings 
with donors, even though the implicit ethno-nationalist framing of progress in DAWN 
Commission documents is at odds with the universalist normative commitments of the 
international conception of good governance.  
Similarly, the idea of continuity between the Lagos Model and Awolowo serve certain 
objectives of the donor community. This idea of an intellectual continuity between and 
indigenous Nigerian thinker and the Lagos Model was widely noted by those international 
observers who interpreted the Lagos Model as an African example of widely agreed donor 
conceptions of good governance (Joseph 2013, 307). The idea that policies that they 
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advocated had legitimacy in the Nigerian context through connection with popular post-
independence figures was useful to donors. It helped them to frame Lagos State as a ‘home-
grown’ African Developmental State, and was a counter-example to claims that good 
governance and other donors’ interventions were imposed on African states. This fits with 
the role of ideas and elite commitment or political will to reform, being an integral part of 
developmental transformation. Developmentalism, according to the Developmental State 
school, is propelled by leaders who are committed to “moving their societies out of the low-
growth equilibrium, building globally competitive economies” (Joseph 2013, 306; Booth 
and Golooba-Mutebi 2012). Ideology and a nationalist wish to ‘catch up’ with the west were 
equally important in the rise of the southeast Asian developmental states (Leftwich 1994, 
380–81). Having a clear Nigerian intellectual precedent for current desirable reforms, meant 
that Lagos was an example of elusive ‘local ownership’ (Lawson 2004; Whitfield and Fraser 
2010).  Therefore, it is convenient for donors to frame the Lagos Model as a rupture with 
Nigerian business as usual, and yet a continuity with Awolowo.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the Lagos Model. It has explored how it was developed and 
implemented in Lagos State between 1999-2015 and consided its role as a broader replicable 
model of governance and its adoption in Oyo State. This shows how the same model of a 
strong state facilitating outward-looking private sector led development was reproduced in a 
state with a different set of governance challenges. The Lagos Model is seen as achieving 
good governance through rupture with the neopatrimonial politics characteristic of Nigeria 
more generally. This is useful to donors who were on the look-out for home-grown African 
versions of development strategies, providing local ownership of policies that international 
donors had long promoted. Furthermore, it serves as a counter-example to accusations that 
the World Bank and other development donors persist in imposing reforms on unwilling, but 
powerless developing countries. 
The Lagos Model was part of a political strategy of building fiscal independence from the 
hostile central government, and expanding its resource base to respond to political and 
developmental challenges. However, whilst ACN politicians used the idea of rupture with 
the immediate past, they also relied on existing indigenous conceptions of good governance 
for legitimacy. As shown by the idea of ajumose and the reconfiguration of olaju as 
knowledge that comes from interaction with international market-based institutions, ideas 
from the past are being put to use in new ways which signify continuity as well as change. 
The success of these politicians in Lagos State using the Lagos Model to navigate these 
divergent demands, was evidenced in the repeated re-election of APC Governors. Re-
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election meant that the wider task of building an APC economic and political block in the 
southwest could continue. 
The final section examined the impact of a politics of rupture and transformation within 
domestic politics. It argued that exclusionary forms of state action, which could be viewed as 
a repetition of earlier, pre-democratisation authoritarian practices, are legitimised as part of a 
transformative agenda. In Oyo State, the population is divided into those who understand the 
imperative of development as transformation, and those who don’t.  
The Lagos Model also legitimised the widening of inequality on the grounds that it was part 
of a long-term development strategy, whether through the dubious use of PPPs to serve the 
needs of the richest in Lagos, or the prioritisation of luxury tourist infrastructure over basic 
needs in Oyo as dictated by the ‘pyramid of needs’. Finally, the Lagos Model includes an 
authoritarian tendency towards social cleansing, forced evictions and demolition of shops. 
This is not the vestiges of a lingering ‘old’ form of politics as Joseph’s analysis would 
suggest, but is part of the process of modernising the city and beautifying it to attract 
investors.   
In summary, this chapter has considered the way that continuity and change between the 
Lagos model and the rest of Yoruba history is instrumentalized both by donors and local 
elites themselves. This chapter has shown that accounts of why states adopt donor-friendly 
good governance policies must take a longer-term historical view. In the case of the Lagos 
Model the creation of the DAWN Commission in the early 2010s can be traced back to a 
political strategy of differentiation, and a desire for autonomy from central government 
based on a parochial Yoruba ethnic nationalism dating to at least the 1950s. Yet, along with 
the power of the past in the present to legitimise government interventions, the opposing 
idea of rupture is simultaneously revealed to be a productive political imaginary. ‘Rupture’ 
both enables changes that radically shift a state’s development trajectory, as well as being a 
potentially more sinister way of legitimating exclusionary and authoritarian state practices. 
The rest of this thesis considers how the much vaunted ‘new’ model of good governance is 
contested by alternative models of good governance within Oyo State. It asks how, in a 
context of much more limited financial resources than in Lagos, the Oyo State government 
led by Ajimobi sought to navigate these competing demands, and the contradictions this 
involved.  
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Chapter 6 - Neighbourhood Market: the Enlightened Public and 
Surviving the Sacrifices of Development 
Introduction 
The sounds of the busy roundabout fade, and you join the highway that swings 
westward round the bottom of Ibadan’s commercial centre. As the road opens out, 
the buildings on either side grow into unassuming blocks. After a minute or two, the 
taxi swerves across the three empty lanes, cuts the median and drops you at the kerb. 
You’re looking for the Governor’s flagship urban renewal project: Neighbourhood 
Market. ‘Hyper-modern’, with 6,000 stalls, it should be easy to find. 
But you appear to be in the middle of nowhere. An old guy selling mineral drinks is 
perched on a stool in front of a bank of scrubby bushes. He looks up, surprised - 
“Neighbourhood Market?” - and waves you up a potholed slope. After 100 yards 
you reach the gates. Long red-roofed blocks zigzag into the distance. It is half past 
nine in the morning and two dozen women have set up their wares around the 
entrance. There are onions, peppers, and stacks of floppy cow skin set out under 
umbrellas.  
However, as you turn into the shaded corridors of the buildings, where it is cooler 
and quieter, you realise that the hubbub at the entrance quickly peters out. The 
buildings are mostly empty. You walk through block after block. In a few, there are 
dusty tables and storage boxes. You greet a group of women, sat on the step of an 
empty stall, a baby asleep on a wrapper on the ground84.  
 - - - 
From 2011-2013 Governor Ajimobi relocated tens of thousands of traders from various 
roadside areas to newly built neighbourhood markets. This chapter focuses on the 
eponymous Neighbourhood Market. Soon after it opened, the governor attended in person 
with great fanfare to distribute loans to the traders who thronged the market, sharing each 
open stall between four. However, by the time I arrived in spring of 2015 the place was 
                                                          
84 From author’s field notes, Ibadan 13/05/2015.  
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nearly empty, with only one in five stalls being actively used85. As the vignette above shows, 
the first puzzle of Neighbourhood Market is: where is everyone?  Faced with poor sales in 
the new market location, from mid-2014 many traders returned to the roadside, and with the 
election approaching the government did little to stop them. As more and more traders left, 
trade at Neighbourhood Market declined even further. 
I talked to a middle-aged garment seller called Momo and her friend in front of her lock-up 
shop. A new puzzle emerged. I asked about sales and Momo explained, “[Sales are] little bit. 
Because nobody is in the market now.” “It’s a new place”, her friend added by way of 
explanation. I asked how much they sold on an average day: “Small. In a week you may not 
even make 1 naira. [I’m] hungry now, since morning.” I was confused and checked that I 
understood correctly, “So you’re saying you haven’t had a sale in maybe one week?” “Yes. 
For a month!”86 Whereas my first question when I arrived in the market was “why had 
everyone left?” the crux of this chapter will focus on a second question: why would anyone 
stay?  
- - - 
The story of Neighbourhood Market and the ‘hardcore’ traders helps illuminate the tensions 
within the Lagos model’s conception of progress. Progress, along with economic benefits 
and legitimate leadership, is one of the key themes in Yoruba indigenous conceptions of 
good governance that politicians must respond to. For Ajimobi, progress meant 
transformation from a backward present to a modern future. This conception of progress as 
requiring a rupture from the present contains an inherent tension in terms of accountability. 
Whilst some of Ibadan’s elite residents were already seen as enlightened, from ‘exposure’ to 
foreign influences or good education, the majority of the population were seen as trapped by 
the backward understandings of the existing political system. Seeing as they were not seen 
as understanding the need for transformation, then being accountable to their current desires 
and demands would stand in the way of the transformative progressive project. 
                                                          
85 I carried out a survey of traders in Neighbourhood Market on two separate days in May and 
July 2015 covering 125 and 332 stalls respectively.  Both times myself and an assistant walked the 
same route, on the second trip missing out a block for the sake of time. We covered 8/33 blocks on the 
first day and 9/33, giving a sample of about a quarter of the total market stalls. The lock-up shops, 
unlike the stalls, were not allocated free of charge so were subject to different conditions, thus I 
excluded them from my study.  On both days the percentage being used for selling (wares on display, 
even if no one was attending them) was 20%.   
86 NM2-2 Focus Group with Garment Seller and others, Neighbourhood Market, Ibadan 
20/05/2015  
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The Lagos Model, as enacted by Ajimobi, attempts to resolve this tension through the 
construction of an ‘enlightened public’ to which the governor should be accountable. 
Membership of the enlightened public is defined by whether one understands the 
government’s agenda. Understanding the role that the ‘enlightened public’ played in 
Ajimobi’s politics helps explain why the ‘hardcore’ traders stayed in Neighbourhood Market, 
despite the costs to their livelihoods. Being present and visible in the market is part of a 
strategy of producing themselves as enlightened members of the Governor’s public, and 
complying with his instructions to leave the roadside. However, the traders must find ways 
to adjust to the reality of progress that has not yet delivered any tangible benefits. The 
tensions within the principle of progress, as conceived by the Lagos Model, are revealed in 
the case of Neighbourhood Market as lived contradictions for the traders.   
The chapter starts with a brief discussion of methods before giving an overview of the 
government’s urban renewal policy and the field-site. The second section draws on 
newspaper reports, speeches and interviews with policy makers to show that Ajimobi’s 
administration sought to resolve the tensions inherent in the principle of progress through 
constructing “an enlightened public” to whom a transformative government could be 
accountable. It develops the implications of this enlightened public in the case study of 
urban renewal. Section 3 shows that the discourse of an enlightened public is frequently 
reproduced by those who have chosen to stay in Neighbourhood Market, but contested by 
those who have been forced through economic necessity back to the roadside. Section 4 
focuses on the family support and commercial survival strategies of the more affluent 
‘hardcore’ traders. Section 5 explores the role of political associations linked to the 
Governor’s party, the All Progressive Congress.  
Methods 
For this case study I conducted over 50 interviews with traders, of which 20 were in 
Neighbourhood Market, the rest were in roadside locations and other markets where 
demolitions had taken place. I spoke to a small sample of the Neighbourhood Market 
‘hardcore’, representing a range of different sections. Initially they were selected randomly 
from the traders who were present, but I later moved to purposive sampling to find 
informants with a range of experiences. Of these interviews nine were focus groups with two 
or more participants and eleven were with just one respondent. The vast majority of 
respondents were Yoruba from Oyo State, with a minority of Igbo who had been in Ibadan 
for decades, selling ethnic Igbo food in Neighbourhood Market87 or electricals by the 
                                                          
87 NM1-1 Focus Group with Igbo Food Sellers, Neighbourhood Market, Ibadan, 13/05/2015 
(four respondents)   
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roadside88, and a couple of Yoruba from neighbouring states89. I also spoke to four staff of 
Prestige Associates, the company that has the contract for building and maintaining the 
Neighbourhood Market, and two representatives from the State Ministry of Trade, 
Investment and Cooperatives.   
All the traders I spoke to in Neighbourhood Market were women, and overall the market 
was dominated by women. The two market sections in which men dominated were butchers 
and mobile phone sellers, but these sections were at the two far ends of the site, and on my 
visits these sections were empty. The Market Manager and Assistant Manager at Prestige 
Ventures were male, and the Babaloja had no official female equivalent. This reflects the 
broader gender characteristics across the traders I spoke to at different locations, with only 
seven out of 51 interviewees or focus groups members being male respondents. This may 
reflect the different informal economic opportunities open to men and women, with okada 
motorcycle- and taxi-drivers, another major informal economic activity, being exclusively 
male. The market was divided into sections allocated to different trades such as food, 
clothing, cloth, events planning and hairdressing, which were predominantly retail rather 
than wholesale.  
The rest of the interviews were in informal market locations that had previously been 
demolished and cleared by the government: Junction Market, Highway Market, and Central 
Market.90 A further interview and focus group were conducted in one of Ibadan’s very old 
established markets, which I refer to as Central Market Extension. The interviews were 
audio-recorded except for four91. The interviews were conducted in a mixture of English, 
Pidgin and Yoruba, with the sections not in English translated for me by a research assistant. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
  
88 JM2-2 Roadside Electricals Seller, Junction Market, Ibadan, 03/07/2015 (one respondent). 
JM2-6 Elisabeth, Former Roadside Trader, Ibadan 3/07/2015 was also Igbo but no longer a trader.  
89 JM1-7 Roadside Artisan, Junction Market, Ibadan 18/05/2015 (one respondent from Kwara 
State) and NM3-4 Focus group with Beauticians, Neighbourhood Market, Ibadan 30/06/2015 (one 
respondent from Ondo state)  
90 20 in Neighbourhood Market, 16 at Junction, 8 at Highway, two at Central, five at Central, 
and one who was no longer trading at all.   
91 The interviews that were not audio recorded are: HM1-1 Small Scale Roadside Trader, HM1-
3 Roadside Phone Seller, HM1-4 Roadside Phone Seller, Highway Market, Ibadan 19/05/2015 and 
NM2-1 Manager of Neighbourhood Market, Prestige Associates, Neighbourhood Market, Ibadan 
20//05/2015. The three traders at Highway Market were the most precarious, they were very close to 
the main highway and feared being imminently removed again, which could explain their increased 
wariness at being recorded.  
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1. Urban Renewal and Neighbourhood Markets 
Ajimobi came to power promising a visible transformation of Ibadan. There was to be no 
roadside trading in the future (OSG Website 2012), in line with the Governor’s aspiration to 
modernise the city and create the “New Ibadan”. Starting in 2011, demolitions of informal 
shops and roadside markets were carried out by a mixture of police, YES-O cadets from a 
government youth employment scheme, and military personnel from Operation Burst 
(Adebowale 2013; Premium Times Nigeria 2013i). Demolition of informal and illegal shops 
were overseen by the Commissioner for Environment and Habitat, Mr Lowo Obisesan92, 
and, on occasion, the Governor himself93. The demolitions were distressing for many of 
those affected. Many of the traders whose shops were destroyed had invested substantial 
capital in their businesses and their base of customers over time. Protesters objecting to 
demolitions also complained that they had not been provided with any alternative locations 
(Osun Defender 2012). Around December 201194 Ajimobi ordered that all local governments 
should build a modern neighbourhood market in their local government area.He announced 
the first round of neighbourhood markets95 and declared that every trader who had been 
cleared from the roadside would be allocated a new shop (Channels TV 2012; T. Sanni 2012; 
A. Sanni 2013). These new markets, of which there were to be 27 in total, were designed to 
rationalise and sanitise consumption practices in Ibadan (OSG Website 2013a). 
 Many traditional markets in Ibadan lack basic amenities. A study of Oja’aba and Oje 
markets, found that 70% of the roads in markets had no drainage, there was no water supply, 
no parking and each market had only one public toilet (Balogun 2013, 1). Whereas the state 
government framed roadside trading as chaotic, messy and dangerous, the neighbourhood 
markets were designed to be ordered, planned and controlled spaces, thus achieving values 
that are important to the Lagos Model and Ajimobi’s political vision: transformation, 
modernisation and performance. The modern markets consisted of covered concrete stalls in 
numbered rows with electric lighting, public toilets and organised waste disposal. With the 
                                                          
92 NM2-2   
93 JM1-3 Roadside Cloth Seller, Junction Market, Ibadan 18/05/2015, HM2-3 Iyaloja of 
Highway Market, Ibadan 20/05/2015 and DLG1-1 Head of Local Authority, Ibadan Downtown Local 
Government, Ibadan 13/07/2015   
94 NM4-3 Babaloja of Neighbourhood Market, Neighbourhood Market, Ibadan 2/07/2015  
95 These were: Temidire Market, Scout Camp, Samonda and Oke-Bola, and two at Toll Gate. 
Further stalls were announced at Ibadan South West Local Government Area and Adamasingba 
Shopping Complex.  
  
147 
 
traders gone from the streets, traffic moved more freely and it reduced what was seen as the 
haphazard disposal of refuse into gutters.  
The building of new, orderly markets was framed as a flagship part of Oyo State’s 
implementation of the Lagos Model. It replicated efforts in Lagos and elsewhere in the ACN 
controlled southwest to rid urban spaces of “indiscipline” through modernist infrastructural 
development. Scouts’ Camp, another of Ajimobi’s modern markets,  was inaugurated 
alongside New Garage Motor Park in Podo (also “ultra modern”) and the soaring Mokola 
Flyover (Oladipo 2012; The Citizen 2012). Mokola Flyover came to be a symbol of 
Ajimobi’s first term, and a variety of high profile ACN VIPs attended the official launch,, 
including the father of the Lagos Model, Bola Tinubu (The Guardian Nigeria 2013). The 
modern markets became sites of political attention. Ajimobi visited Scout’s Camp market on 
January 17th 2014 to distribute N20million96 of interest free loans to the traders (ThisDay 
2014). 
 Figure 1 View of stalls in a modern market. 
By late 2014 traders started returning to the roads. The Ajimobi administration maintained 
that the policy of urban renewal was not being softened, they simply did not have enough 
enforcement officers to keep the traders away. However, it was widely believed that the 
                                                          
96 £1 = N250 approx. Central bank of Nigeria: Monthly Average Exchange Rates of the Naira 
(Naira Per Unit of Foreign Currency) – 2014   
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government was making concessions ahead of the 2015 election, unwilling to harass 
potential voters97 (Atoyebi 2015). Debates over whether these traders were justified 
dominated the 2015 election, with politicians from the PDP, Labour Party and Accord 
accusing Ajimobi of not having a ‘human face’ in his policies (Amusat 2015; Esan 2012; 
Taiwo 2014; Adekanmbi 2013a; O. Ajayi 2014d; Vanguard News 2015). That is, they 
condemned his policies as too harsh and not including sufficient palliative measures. This 
chapter presents the case of one such modern market, in an anonymised form. Using the 
pseudonym “Neighbourhood Market” it traces the constraints and aspirations of those 
traders who try to make a living in the new generation of markets, and interrogates their 
experience of participating, sometimes peripatetically, in the “New Ibadan”.  
 
Figure 2. An example of a modern market in Ibadan 
The story of Neighbourhood Market mirrors that of the other modern markets built by 
Ajimobi. Whilst traders arrived in their hundreds in the immediate aftermath of the 
demolitions in 2011, it took some months before the site was ready for traders to move in 
and the traders helped to clear the site98. In the meantime, some of the traders prepared a 
small area and erected small shops with plastic sheeting and sun umbrellas99, later moving to 
the access road when construction was underway. During this time, government officials 
from the State Ministry of Trade, Investment and Cooperatives instructed the traders to 
                                                          
97 NM4-2 Babywares Seller, Neighbourhood Market, Ibadan, 2/07/2015 and NM4-3   
98 NM4-3   
99 NM3-3 Director of Prestige Associates NM3-3, Telephone Interview, 30/06/2015  
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group themselves into associations based on what they were selling, and that spaces at the 
market would be allocated on that basis. Eventually a list of names was published, and 
traders received their space free of charge, sharing each stall between as many as four 
traders100. Initially, the sales were strong in the market with many sellers and plenty of 
customers. However, as happened across the city, from the middle of 2014 traders started 
leaving Neighbourhood Market and trading at the roadside again101. Yet some traders 
remained in the new market. This chapter seeks to explains why, drawing on interviews 
conducted between May and August 2015, after the re-election of Governor Ajimobi but 
before the appointment of a new administration. As was happening at a national scale, it was 
a time of political limbo and waiting, to see what configuration the new administration 
would take and what they would do once fully installed in office. 
                                                          
100 NM4-2   
101 NM1-2   
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2. Sacrifice for Development: Demolitions and the Enlightened Public 
In his 2011 inauguration speech Ajimobi explained to the assembled crowds that the march 
to restore the state “requires a collective resolve to change our attitude, commitment to hard 
work, patriotism, respect for due process and diligence, as well as our general values” (Ajayi 
2011). Whereas the problem had previously been seen as material – one of poverty – it was 
recast as a problem of attitude and values.  
This idea of progress being tied to a certain standpoint or way of seeing, was reflected in the 
urban renewal programme, which was always explained through the imagined lens of an 
outsider. The Governor’s spokesman explained that urban renewal “won the state so much 
fame in the eyes of the world” (Adedayo 2015). In the pro-government press the rejuvenated 
city was described in terms of how it looks to “travellers from Lagos”, who see the “alluring 
green lawn and flowers” and “beautified” medians (Oladele 2013). Regionally this was 
reinforced by the DAWN Commission’s vision statement: “to make the Southwest Region of 
Nigeria the preferred place to live, to work and to visit” (DAWN 2011, 6; 2014, 4). This 
positions those outside the region – potential investors, resident and visitors – as the targets 
to attract via the region’s development.  
As part of transforming the state, the people of Ibadan needed to re-see their environment 
and behaviours as if through the eyes of a potential investor. Looking back on his 
government’s efforts to fix the unclean environment, Ajimobi noted that “the major 
challenge was the psychology of a great people” who through the previous governors’ 
failings had been “left fallow”. Fortunately, he noted, the problematic psychology had been 
replaced with “a can-do environmental cleanliness spirit” and “a passionate disgust for filth” 
(Ajimobi 2015). Therefore, the key to development was for people to have the right 
understanding and affective dispositions. As his Special Adviser of Public Affairs put it: 
“The Ajumose progressive train is on the move around Oyo State ...  no ticket needed, just a 
mind shift” (Arulogun 2015)  
Together, this reformed populace was formed discursively by Ajimobi as a new enlightened 
public. Those who are members of the enlightened public want the ‘right things’, and are 
seen to have correct understandings of their own interests, thus the government can be 
accountable to their demands. For those who are unable to become members of the 
enlightened public, the government has a duty to give them what they need rather than what 
they want. Part of why people feared transformation was because they suspected that people 
like them, people of the past, might not survive transformation to become a part of the 
enlightened public. If, as one of his aides described him, Ajimobi was a tidal wave 
(Arulogun 2015), they feared they might be washed away.  
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In Oyo state, debates about urban renewal showed how the interests of roadside traders 
themselves could be overridden in favour of policies that were concerned with how traders 
might superficially appear to visitors. A major motivation for transformation was to lose 
what was described as Oyo State’s reputation as “one of the filthiest states in the country” 
(Oderemi and Alao 2015; T. Sanni 2012) The origins of the nomenclature are a UN Habitat 
report on Ibadan from the 1990s. Since then, the report has achieved a mythic status as an 
objective outsider’s view of Ibadan, which resonates the external, international orientation of 
olaju. Dirtiness came to symbolise not only untidiness and a lack of hygiene but all that was 
backward and old about the state. A news report in the Tinubu-owned Nation newspaper 
provides an example of the Governor’s discourse. It describes Ibadan as “a typical African 
town grappling with the challenges of transition from an ancient settlement to a city in the 
21st Century.” (Oladele 2013) Signs of the ‘ancient settlement’ are listed as “[r]ustic roofs, 
heaps of refuse, flying dirts, untarred roads and rickety vehicles”, whilst markers of the 
modern city include:“[b]eautiful landscapes, modern buses, clean environment, expanded 
and tarred roads and free flow of traffic” (Oladele 2013). The backwardness and lack of 
development was paired with ideas of Ibadan’s specificity as an African and Nigerian city. 
As it moved towards modernity Ibadan would shed the practices and visual signifiers that 
marked it as African and adopt more universal homogenous practices of the ‘modern world’. 
The drive to achieve a more modern aesthetic in Ibadan and Lagos was not limited to 
physical infrastructure. The waste disposal and dumping problems that were castigated as 
obstacles to modernity existed for the most part in low-income, high-density 
neighbourhoods (Alakinde 2012, 890).  In a video that Ajimobi’s team posted on YouTube, 
the governor is shown inspecting a flyover under construction. From out of shot a journalist 
asks, “What about the traders who have been evicted?” Ajimobi responds:  
“I have already spoken to them. We have moved them to a new location where they 
will not cause any... any eye sore. I mean the message is, is that Oyo State must 
change, we want a clean state. Everyone is saying we... there was this United 
Nations World Body that in 2011, 2010 said Oyo State is the ... dirtiest state in the 
world. And we are removing that. We don’t want to be the dirtiest state. So we want 
the cooperation of all our people”.102  
This interview snippet captures a number of the key themes from the discourse of urban 
renewal in Ibadan. Firstly, roadside traders need to be moved out of sight where they are not 
                                                          
102 YouTube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HJkrlXcHnCI#t=118   
  
152 
 
an “eye sore”. Secondly, the state must be transformed from a dirty state to a clean state, and 
traders are part of that. Third, he mentions the imperative to clean up, and the authoritative 
evaluation of the state as dirty comes from outside eyes: in this case the UN. Finally, the 
traders themselves are exhorted to participate in the clean up but ultimately the clearing of 
roadsides will happen whether the people consent or not.  
The destruction involved in demolitions posed a framing challenge for the government: how 
could it say it was a good government whilst causing so much suffering? This speaks to the 
broader questions raised in chapter five about the ideas used to legitimise a government in 
the process of developmental ‘rupture’. The biggest complaint against the Ajimobi 
government was the scale of the losses suffered by those who saw their shops destroyed as 
part of the urban renewal programme. But Ajimobi didn’t deny or downplay the negative 
impacts. In 2012 Ajimobi said that the urban renewal programme “like anywhere else in the 
world, would not come without some measure of pain.” He urged traders to “take it as their 
sacrifice towards beautifying the state and making it better than it used to be” (T. Sanni 
2012). In fact, the idea that development would require a sacrifice from the people was an 
oft-repeated and explicit part of Ajimobi’s agenda. In his budget speech in January 2013 he 
re-emphasised that “sacrifice will be required from all concerned” (OSG Website 2013). 
Even in strongly partisan pro-government pieces in the news media the divergence of 
opinion between elites and “victims of the urban renewal programmes in the state” is noted 
(Oladeji 2014). 
There were some moves to diminish the perceived injustice of the traders’ sacrifice. Ajimobi 
suggested the sacrifice would in fact fall heaviest on the “the administrative and political 
leadership” who bore the burden of unpopularity, rather than the demolished traders (OSG 
Website 2013). There was also some moves towards labelling the traders as ‘illegal’ and thus 
the demolition was not illegitimate (A. Sanni 2013; T. Sanni 2012). However, on the whole 
Ajimobi did not shy away from accepting the scale of loss and disruption caused by the 
demolitions. Where Ajimobi did differ from the protesting traders however, was in terms of 
what their attitude towards sacrifice should be. Ajimobi’s special adviser on Public Affairs, 
explained that in voting for Ajimobi the electorate had shown that they had an appreciation 
for the necessity of, what he describes as, the saying, 'No Pain No Gain'. He explained that 
they could put the sacrifice in its correct perspective of future gain: “They can see the 
promise land and are willing to break eggs to make the developmental omelet [sic]” 
(Arulogun 2015). It is the ability of people to see their sacrifice in the context of expected 
benefits that distinguishes those with the correct understanding.  
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From the beginning, the government had to work hard at linking the suffering of demolitions 
to the overall benefits that would accrue to the state through development. The following 
quotes are taken from two newspapers strongly supportive of the Governor, the Tribune, 
based in Ibadan, and the Nation, a Lagos-based paper owned by Ajimobi’s political 
godfather, Bola Tinubu. A key component was a specific discursive construction of the 
suffering as being worth it: 
“While some traders ground their teeth, the political opposition screamed blue 
murder. But the government insisted that the pains that came with the traders’ 
movement to the new market, which was under construction then, were a sacrifice 
during a change process.” [italics my own] (Sunday Tribune 2015) 
Not only was the move from the roadside constructed as a sacrifice, it is described as a 
sacrifice imposed on the unenlightened by a benevolent authority. The Babaloja of one of the 
new markets, Scout’s Camp, had close interactions with government by virtue of his 
position. He justified the policy through a metaphor of a kindly father looking after a baby, 
the traders: 
“Surgery is painful but the baby and the father had to endure the pains because they 
are confident that after the surgery the baby will enjoy a good health.” (Okwuofu 
2014) 
The paternalistic theme is repeated when the Governor explains how ordering the 
demolitions was in fact something of a sacrifice for himself as well, because he knew it 
would make him unpopular but it was for the best. Reminiscent of the disciplinarian’s refrain 
'it’ll hurt me more than it’ll hurt you', he says: “The decision of the governor to clean up 
Ibadan, though hard for the government to take, drew a lot of criticisms from some of the 
people, especially those in the opposition.” (Okwuofu 2014). There are frequent narratives 
of transition from an unknowing past, to a new understanding. The Babaloja explains, 
“Today, we have forgotten those pains and now we are very happy.” (Okwuofu 2014) In this 
repertoire of transition and discovery, there is no need to downplay the “hue and cry” at the 
time of demolition, because the initial pain only vindicates bravery of Ajimobi’s ultimately 
right decision (Okwuofu 2014).  
The idea of sacrifice provides a gloss not just for the pain of demolition, but for the need for 
government force. Taking a rather Rousseauian approach (Rousseau 1762), the government 
can maintain that for those who understand the need for sacrifice, they will not feel the 
government’s actions as coercion, but as being set free. When Ajimobi visited the market to 
distribute small cash loans, he said the money “was the dividends of obedience for the 
traders who decided to assist his government’s urban renewal programme by removing their 
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wares from the streets” [italics my own] (Okwuofu 2014). The phrase ‘the dividends of 
obedience’ echoes the much-used phrase in Nigerian politics, ‘the dividends of democracy’. 
In Nigeria this phrase is used to assert a claim by individual citizens to benefits from 
government. The ‘dividends of obedience’ would therefore resonate with an audience of 
traders, whilst emphasising that compliance with government demolitions makes one 
deserving of consequent benefits. In summary, the government uses discourses of modernity, 
reasonableness and safety to define the public to whom it should be accountable, and to 
whom accountability is not required. 
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3. Discursive Identification with the Enlightened Public  
One of the ways that traders constructed themselves as participants in the reasonable public 
was through emphasising that they were not coerced or forced to leave the roadside. Rather 
they chose to, in line with Ajimobi’s advice. The hardcore traders distinguished themselves 
from other ‘unenlightened’ traders who failed to understand the need for urban renewal and 
therefore had to be forced to comply with government’s policies.  
The traders who remained in Neighbourhood Market described themselves as having 
willingly moved from the roadside when asked. Mrs Thomas103 was one of the Igbo food 
sellers. She was in her forties, Catholic and came to the city from eastern Nigeria decades 
ago. Her account of the demolition process was sedate and uneventful: “they just told us 
calmly to move. But some stubborn people remain so the authorities came and removed 
them forcefully.” Asked if she was still there when YES-O cadets came to demolish the stalls 
she answered, “No, I already left because I like my life and I didn’t want any trouble.” 
Whilst not denying that some people were removed by force, she delineates herself as a 
compliant individual from the stubborn people who brought the violence upon themselves. 
Similarly, Momo104, the garment seller with the lock-up shop, explained that “No, it was not 
us that was destroyed, it was the people who refused to pack their things that was 
destroyed.” Asked outright, the beauticians105 stated that no one was forced to come to 
Neighbourhood Market, “We were asked to leave those locations because of accident and 
bad happenings and that was how we all got here.” 
Others emphasise how they took the instruction to move and aligned their own reasoning to 
it. Rather than an instruction, it became a reasoned decision that they should leave the road 
because the dangers were too great. Where the government constructs the idea of a 
reasonable public that will understand the rightness of their decision, some traders responded 
by constructing themselves as members of that enlightened group. Mrs Adelola, a stall 
holder, narrates the process of relocation as instruction followed by affirming the instruction. 
She said, 
                                                          
103 NM1-1   
104 NM2-2   
105 NM1-4  
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“Haa! They asked us to leave the road for the fear of accident and untimely death, 
iku leni iku lola! [death today! death tomorrow!]. Oncoming vehicles crushing 
everybody including children of the traders and hawkers to death and when I also 
reasoned I decided to leave and never want to go back to the road side”106. 
The Babaloja corrected me when I asked what happened when he and the other traders from 
his area were first moved from a nearby roundabout to Neighbourhood Market: 
“no be government move us self… we the traders move ourselves to come here 
because government did not force us to move to this place…we the traders know the 
right thing…we know the quality of this place than that market…”107 
Crucially, the Babaloja places the traders within the same sphere of knowledge as the 
Governor: “we the traders know the right thing.” They are of like minds with the Governor, 
and therefore part of the enlightened public.  
The most extreme form of the discourse of knowledge and sacrifice was from the interview 
with a well-connected provisions seller in the market. I asked her how she first found out she 
would be moving to Neighbourhood Market. She explained how the governor sent his 
representative to clear the streets and explain to the traders how dangerous the roadside was. 
She continued by explaining the lifestyle of some traders on the roadside who face health 
threats with ignorance: “Some people are smited, they wouldn’t even know.”108 Finally, she 
discussed how Ajimobi was able to transcend ignorance through travelling abroad. He 
“knows that comfort is good for human beings.” The implication was that roadside traders 
are not intelligent enough to understand the threats they faced, and if they did they would 
have stopped trading in that place. Her account does not acknowledge the imperative to 
generate an income, which for most of the traders I talked to who returned to the roads, was 
an overwhelming imperative (see the following section).  
In a more limited form, the same sentiment was repeated by the other hardcore traders in 
Neighbourhood Market. The Igbo Food Sellers justified the moving of traders on health 
grounds, saying “It’s because of their lives this is why the governor asked them to leave the 
roadside but people don’t want to leave and that are the problem.” Finally, this idea of being 
                                                          
106 NM3-1 Ready-made Seller, Neighbourhood Market, Ibadan 30/06/2015  
107 NM4-3   
108 NM1-5 Provisions Seller, Neighbourhood Market, Ibadan 13/05/2015  
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forced to be free, or at least, forced to be safe, surfaced in ambivalent statements from the 
hardcore traders. The ready-made garment seller explained the relocation process as follows: 
“We like it oo! Because he chased us away from road side and death…even when 
rain falls now we have where we can hide our heads and markets. So we like it.”109  
[italics my own] 
The paradoxical idea of having to be chased away from death, rather than fleeing death, 
exemplifies the complicated position of traders who attempt to participate in the enlightened 
public. The above account suggested that the demolitions were imposed against her will, but 
that over time, she came to view her own situation through the lens of transformation and 
retrospectively agreed with the demolitions. Thus actions that in the moment were coercive, 
with hindsight become almost a form of freedom. These quotes illustrate the discursive 
practice of producing oneself as the enlightened subject: not a victim of forced demolition, 
but one who moves when asked and understands the Governor’s motives.  
The traders who had either remained or returned to the roadside engaged with the 
government’s actions and justifications in markedly different ways than those who stayed in 
Neighbourhood Market. By returning to the roadside despite the government’s warnings, 
they were violating the idea of the correct modern ways of conducting trade, just through 
their presence. None of the traders I spoke to disagreed with the government outright: they 
described trading close to the road as dangerous, polluted and stressful, and would prefer to 
trade from calmer, more secure premises. But they also believed that it was the government 
who had understood the situation wrong.  
Some explained that the government had shown a lack of understanding of their livelihoods 
by moving traders without providing an alternative. Poverty drove people to trade in 
dangerous conditions110. An elderly man who worked as an artisan at Junction Market 
explained:  
                                                          
109          N3-1 
110 JM1-7, JM2-7 Very Small Scale Roadside Trader, Junction Market, 03/07/2015, JM2-1 Local 
Trader, Junction Market, Ibadan, 03/07/2015, JM1-1 Cloth Seller, Junction Market, Ibadan, 
18/05/2015, JM1-5 Underwear Hawker, Junction Market, Ibadan 18/05/2015  
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“It is because there is no money. If there is money [i.e. capital or credit] I will also 
go to New Gbagi [a large built market] to secure a shop where I can trade. People 
will come and locate me and I will be happy to attend to my customers”111.   
For some of those who returned to the roadside it was a case of survival: the next step would 
be to steal112. One of the Phone Sellers in a focus group at Highway Market had lost his 
stock and display cabinet in the demolitions, but remained at the roadside. He said:  
“[W]e still have wife and children at home which we fend for day and night. We also 
pay for house rents and the likes. I cannot steal nor become a robber I just have to 
continue with this business”113. 
Rather than aligning their views to the governments, the Iyaloja and other traders at 
Highway Market described “pleading with the Governor” to make him see the situation from 
their perspective114. Furthermore, some roadside traders challenged the idea of a binary 
between dangerous and backward roadside trading and safe and modern markets. Instead 
they explained how the situation could be resolved by moving traders by just a few feet 
further from the direct traffic, or onto nearby service roads. The Babaloja at Junction Market 
indicated that such adjustments had already been made. 
“our own traders [under my control at Junction market] are not so close to the road 
o…if you look here now, you will see it is free [of shops] …even if you look at the 
other side, it is the same thing. So, we have moved them back”115. 
The inhabiting of these shades of grey between roadside trading and modernity showed that 
these traders were not engaging in the same discourse of transformation, as the present 
situation could be remedied through pragmatic and incremental adjustments. The next 
section details the hardcore traders’ performances of loyalty and dedication to the market 
continued as the traders faced renewed economic hardship in the market. 
  
                                                          
111 JM1-7   
112 HM1-1   
113 HM2-2 Focus Group of Roadside Traders. Highway Market, Ibadan 20/05/2015  
114 HM2-3, HM1-5 Roadside Vegetable Seller, Highway Market, Ibadan 19/05/2015 and HM1-6 
Iyaloja and Babaloja of Highway Market, Highway Market, 19/05/2015  
115 JM2-3 Babaloja, Junction Market, Ibadan 03/07/2015  
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4. Familial and Economic Adaptation Strategies 
There were a number of factors that contributed to economic hardship from 2014 onwards. 
As international oil prices fell, the state government saw its federal allocation fall and 
consequently civil servants’ salaries were 3-5 months in arrears by May 2015. Over the 
summer of 2015 there were also two fuel crises, where the price of petrol and kerosene 
dramatically spiked. I highlight these issues to make clear that the hardship in the market 
was not unique, though perhaps it was amplified. However, the economic activity in the 
market was limited even compared with the rest of the city. The problem of low sales, and 
the attendant financial struggles such as struggling to pay school fees116, moving their 
children into cheaper public schools117 and skipping meals118, was the number one problem 
for traders in Neighbourhood Market. Everyone I spoke to in the market mentioned it. 
Remaining in Neighbourhood Market the traders had to pay transport costs, reaching several 
hundred naira119. Some of my informants attributed this to the hard to access location120 but 
the consensus within the market was that it was because it was new and unknown121, and 
that the traders on the road picked up all the customers and stopped them having to come 
inside the market122.  
Above I discussed how the hardcore of Neighbourhood Market traders construct themselves 
as obedient and willing subjects of demolitions. They performed a similar discursive move 
in response to the challenge of low sales: the traders who remained insisted that they had 
never gone back to the road. In interviews with the hardcore of Neighbourhood Market 
traders, I had the sense that their insistence was not only an explanation of their practices, 
                                                          
116 NM4-1 Focus group with Food Sellers, Neighbourhood market, Ibadan 2/07/2015: “It has 
affected me ooo. In fact, I have withdrawn my first born from school.”  
NM1-1: “You are now looking at me. I am emaciated, I have changed already. I have nothing in my 
hand. Then if you call me, ...Yes to feed me and my children. Last term I am still owing my children’s 
school fees. But there’s no much there. It’s affecting me seriously. But nobody to tell, only 
government.” 
117  NM3-4  
118  NM2-2  
119  For the women in Focus Group NM3-4 and the Ready-made Seller in NM3-1 it was around 
N400. 
120  NM1-5 Provisions Seller, Neighbourhood Market, Ibadan 13/05/2015 
121  NM1-4 Focus group with beauticians, Neighbourhood Market, Ibadan 13/05/2015, NM1-6 
Provisions Seller, Neighbourhood Market, Ibadan 13/05/2015, NM2-2, NM3-1, NM4-2. 
122  NM1-1, NM3-4, NM1-2, NM1-4. 
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but a performance of loyalty in itself. An elderly herbal medicines seller assured us that she 
had consistently stayed in the market. My research assistant translated to me her account: 
“She said once they asked them to move she left and she’s been around this place 
since then. So they allocate a shop to her, and she has never gone out. She didn’t go 
out to sell. She thanks god.”123 
The hairdressers echoed this sentiment. Asked if any would go back to the roadside they 
replied, “No, no we are not going back. We are not going back; we like it here. We are going 
to make it here.” Another woman added: “We like it here, we believe it that we are going to 
make it.” The secretary spokeswoman translated for the women sat next to her: “She herself 
has made a point of it to always come here every day despite the fact that there are no sales.” 
In a focus group the food sellers repeated a similar theme:124 
“For instance, people like us whether we sell or not we are still sitting and we remain 
here. We have decided and prayed that this market will be our own prosperous domain 
since the Governor has built it for us”125.  
Faced with livelihood challenges, these contradictions invite us to ask how traders find ways 
of performing this vision; how do they stay in Neighbourhood Market whilst staying alive? 
What are the costs of maintaining this vision, and how are they met? Who is able to 
participate, who is forced to go elsewhere?  
Those who were able to stay in Neighbourhood Market drew on a variety of socio-economic 
and political resources. I spoke to 23 traders in Neighbourhood Market. In the following 
section I map their various strategies for maintaining an active presence on the market. I 
then briefly contrast this with the stories of those who were not able to remain and their 
attempts at and motivations for maintaining a more limited presence.   
Almost all the traders who stayed in Neighbourhood Market when I was there had 
alternative sources of income. Among those with alternative income, the traders were 
divided between those who were supported by relatives and those who supported themselves 
through other businesses. 
                                                          
123          NM1-3 Herbal Medicines Seller, Neighbourhood Market, Ibadan 13/05/2015 
124  NM1-6 
125  NM4-1  
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I had previously read in a newspaper that the government provided “free education” to 
indigenes in Oyo State (Ogunyemi 2014). Seeing as she said she had three children in 
school, I put this claim to Mrs Adelola:  
“Haaa! Ijoba bon i o mob a wa san wo ile iwe! [How will government pay our 
children school fees for us, when government doesn’t sleep with us!] It is the father, 
ooo. ...We thank God but it is my husband that caters for the family so we thank 
God”126. 
Mrs Adelola’s husband was a tanker driver and returns to Ibadan every month. This helped 
explain how she could continue to spend the N400 a day on travel to and from the market, 
whilst reporting almost no sales in the market. Normally she traded wholesale, and still had 
some customers who would call her for stock, but she had also diversified into smaller scale 
retail in the hope of picking up a few small sales in the market127. Her friend, Mrs Adekunle 
sold soap in the other half of the stall128. She was also supported by her husband, a civil 
servant at the State Secretariat. She had downscaled her business recently too, only buying 
N20,000 or N30,000 a month in stock. With no children and some financial backing from 
her husband she was confident that she could endure low sales for another four to five 
months.  
Most of the active sellers had moved their goods to the stalls on the edge of the market, with 
direct access to the internal road and with it a chance to attract any passing customers. 
Walking through the quiet middle lanes of the market I met a group of older women. They 
were sat together around the benches at the back of the stall, with a few bright plastics laid 
out in the middle: bowls, bins and washing up racks. Perched on the step, the owner of the 
stall agreed to talk to us129. “Firstly”, she said, “because of my age my children give me 
money, so whether I sell or not I’m not really concerned, my children take care of me.”  130 
She explained that her son was in the military and she built her own house years ago using 
money saved from 30 years of trading. About a fifth of the 50 plastics sellers in her 
association are retired. Whereas these older ‘mummies’ came early in the day to enjoy the 
                                                          
126  NM3-1  
127  She had been to Lagos the day before to stock up, with N200,000.  
128  NM3-2 Soap Seller, Neighbourhood Market, Ibadan 30/06/2015 
129  NM1-3 Focus group with Plastics Sellers, Neighbourhood Market, Ibadan, 13/05/2015 
130  NM1-3  
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calm of the market, the rest tended to arrive later, in time for the evening rush hour131. The 
older plastic sellers stayed in what they felt to be the market’s pleasant environment because 
they could afford to. However, some of the women are able to cultivate alternative 
commercial activities to support themselves to stay in the market.  
The day we met, Momo was dressed in a glossy pink fabric, with glittering embellishments, 
and had heavy gold on her ears and around her neck. She commanded a small congregation 
of friends and discussants on the benches outside her lock-up shop where she sold garments 
– one in a row of identical windowless shops with lockable front doors. She invited me 
inside. I browsed in the shadows, and, among the bolts of fabric and piles of plastic wrapped 
clothing, I stopped at her collection of photos stuck to the wall. She showed me customers 
wearing her wares, family members in aso abi uniform132 and podgy babies zipped into frilly 
dresses. She said that this lock-up was costing her around N70,000 a year, on top of the 
N5,000 she paid initially for the form133. She estimated that she made one sale a week in the 
market, maybe one a month. Fortunately, she still had another shop, twice as big as this one 
in Central Market, which she was paying N75,000 a year for. An apprentice looked after it 
whilst she was in Neighbourhood Market. With the other business still running, she kept up a 
healthy stock turn over, travelling to Lagos or Kano to spend upwards of N500,000134. 
Building up to this size of business had taken time - she started trading in 1995 - but her 
commercial success had enabled her to withstand the economic shock of demolition in the 
first place. Significantly, it also allowed her to invest time in establishing her personal profile 
at Neighbourhood Market.  
Other traders who lacked capital cultivated alternative commercial activities which were less 
lucrative, but functioned as survival activities. Lady Ayeesha was the Secretary of the 
Babywares vendors135. She was a middle aged, energetic Muslim woman. It was her idea to 
do an interview, after she initiated conversation by playfully taking some biscuits out of my 
                                                          
131  NM1-3: She saved regularly through her life and built her own house and sent her children 
to school.  
132  Often families or groups wear matching outfits of the same cloth, known as aso abi or 
‘family uniform’ on special occasions. 
133  Paying for a form to register, or express interest, is common practice in Nigeria. Forms to 
stand in election, sit exams or apply for a nursery place for your child all cost money. 
134 She may have been exaggerating this a little to make herself appear a big woman. She 
remarked “Its not for everybody o, some people are just 200, so it is not everybody who has big 
money.” In comparison, her friend who also owned a lock-up shop here, but didn’t have another shop 
elsewhere was more modest about her own stock trips, estimating that she took about N200,000 every 
two to three months. NM2-2  
135  NM4-2  
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hand one lunchtime. Occasionally as we were talking in an empty stall other women came 
up and gently harassed us – “you should collect money from her!”. She dismissed them with 
a reassurance that things were under control: “they are student…we are only lending them 
brain”136. She was clearly both well known and respected by other traders in the market.  
Like the Momo the garment seller, Lady Ayeesha ran a successful business before the roads 
were cleared. She sold babywares wholesale: all high value branded goods. Previously she 
had purchased a container to use as a shop for N150,000. However, unlike Momo, her main 
shop was destroyed as part of the urban renewal programme. Including the contatiner, she 
estimated the total value of her losses at N400,000. Since arriving in Neighbourhood 
Market, her daily sales in the market were erratic, perhaps N500 or N1,000 a day. She 
explained that this money was used to cover basic daily expenses: 
“It is not easy I have children at home that I will send them to school, I buy a lot of 
things for them, is it what I am selling now that I will use to buy something for 
them.”137 
Talking about the general experience of other traders in the babywares section, she explained 
that even with significant stock, it was hard to accumulate any capital with such poor sales:  
“...since the time we have come here some people use almost N1m to buy a lot of 
goods that they wanted to sell but one day, you can just sell N2,000…N3,000, from 
there you are just taking the money to buy food and it is not easy to get the money 
together again.”138 
For her, she managed to stay in the market by adjusting her important money-making 
activities, which were in fact conducted elsewhere. At 3pm every day she left 
Neighbourhood Market to sell to her existing network on credit. Meeting her old customers 
in their shops, she would lend them around N20,000 each time for a couple of days. This 
allowed her to maintain a turnover, and she still occasionally made stock trips with 
N500,000 to N1million every few months, depending on how sales were going.  
For both Lady Ayeesha and Momo the maintenance of existing networks of customers was 
decisive to their enduring commercial success. However, they also needed resources to 
maintain that network. In the case of Momo, she had to be able to employ an apprentice to 
                                                          
136  Translated from Yoruba: “omo school ni won…awa kan ya ni opolo ni.” 
137  NM4-2 
138  NM4-2 
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continue to serve her existing customers in Central Market. For Lady Ayeesha it was her 
continued ability to buy in bulk and extend credit to her network that facilitated her 
continued position as a wholesaler. For those who had no access to capital, their 
diversification took on different forms.  
Mrs Adegbite139 had already seen two lines of trade fail before she decided to sell apples. 
Unable to progress beyond secondary school she had trained in selling pharmaceuticals, 
before trying her hand at cloth trading across the Benin-Nigeria border. Finally, she settled 
into selling apples, spending 10 years at a busy roundabout in Ibadan. Sales there were good 
enough for her to make a start on building her own house. “Though I wasn’t force, I still felt 
bad when the YES-O officers came”, she says, “Sales were better [at the roundabout], it is 
incomparable... [there] I was able to do my parental responsibility but things are hard now.” 
With no access to capital, she hawks her goods round the city each day after she leaves 
Neighbourhood Market.  As the stories of the Momo, Lady Ayeesha and Mrs Adegbite show, 
traders who chose to stay in Neighbourhood Market seek alternative sources of income, with 
varying levels of success. Whereas Momo and Lady Ayeesha continue to command 
significant revenues (if not necessarily profits), Mrs Adegbite deals with much smaller 
volumes which she can hawk as a survival strategy, with no prospect of accumulation.  
Others were able to draw on a combination of familial support and external customer loyalty. 
Niyi, for example, was an elderly seller of herbal medicines, who trades alongside her grown 
up daughter. She had been trading over 20 years and has built a house already. Though she 
set out her wares in Neighbourhood Market each day, her customers were mostly people she 
had worked with for years140 and they often phoned her with orders. However, the question 
remained why these traders chose to invest time in maintaining a presence in the market 
when other income opportunities were open to them141. A further question concerned the 
other 16 of the 23 Neighbourhood Market traders I spoke to, who had no apparent family 
support or commercial strategies for adjusting to low sales in the market. How did they 
manage to stay in the market?
                                                          
139  NM5-1  
140  Families stick with the same herbal medicines seller for years, returning to one who they 
found to be trustworthy and effective. 
141  For Niyi, as for anyone who has loyal customers who prioritise trust over convenience, or 
are able to differentiate their product from rivals, Neighbourhood Market actually offered a good deal. 
Obtaining a shop space was free and the environment was comparatively quiet and sheltered.   
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5. Political Strategies 
Along with the food sellers, the beauticians were the biggest group I encountered. And yet, 
they seemed the worst off. They were young and most had children142, but none mentioned 
any family members they could rely upon, or economic diversification strategies. Did they 
have another strategy, of which staying in the market was part? During my first focus group 
with 5 or 6 beauticians143, one woman with a feathery weave and gold earrings took charge. 
She introduced herself as the Secretary of the Beauticians’ Association. She wore a tight 
navy t-shirt, and sat back, filling the one plastic chair, whilst the other women sat on the 
step. The raucous conversation bubbled around her, but occasionally she would talk over her 
colleagues to give the ‘official’ line on an issue. I asked how business was going and there 
were moans from around the group: “it is very dry here”. The Secretary shook her head. 
“The business is fine,” she said firmly. When I pushed her - “but it looks like no one is 
here?”- she conceded that some people left because the market was not yet “moving”.  “Why 
didn’t they go back?”, I asked. “We... we don’t want to disappoint our governor. Because he 
has done well!”  
Later in conversation we returned to this issue. Asked why she believed the market would 
improve she replied, “I trust my Governor; he will work on it.  … The one and only!”In this 
final section I show that there were two forms of political incorporation in Neighbourhood 
Market. The first is participation in a number of Ajimobi loyalty groups, and the second is to 
take on a leadership role in the market association. Together they explain why some traders 
were able to survive at Neighbourhood Market despite low or no sales in the short term, and 
also why they expected benefits from political participation in the long term. The headline 
requirement of both was loyalty to Ajimobi, primarily performed by remaining visible in 
Neighbourhood Market and not returning to the roadside. 
Many of the Food Sellers are part of the Ajumose Solidarity Forum, a group set up in 2011 
as a spin-off from the APC and Ajimobi’s Campaign organisation. ‘Ajumose’ is the slogan 
that Ajimobi uses with many of his projects meaning “We will do it together”144. The brand 
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144  See chapter five for analysis of the word’s connotations and chapters five and nine for 
details of more Ajumose projects. 
166 
 
extends to another, albeit formally unrelated145 youth group, the Ajumose Marines146, and is 
the official name for the subsidised buses147 and motorised tricycle taxis that the state 
government rolled out in Ajimobi’s first term (Salami 2013; ThisDay 2013; OSG Website 
2013a). They meet regularly with the umbrella body in Ajimobi House148 which is the APC 
campaign headquarters in Oyo State.  They claimed the group had more than 500 members 
and they used the hotel near the market for meetings.149 The presence of pro-Ajimobi 
political groups was not surprising: Neighbourhood Market is seen as Ajimobi’s market. 
Asking one of the food sellers why she went to an Ajimobi rally, she responded that she is 
not in any political party, but “I went because I am in Ajimobi’s Market.”150 Others referred 
to the area as the “Ajimobi Market Zone.”151 
By building the market and directing patronage to its traders through interest free loans, 
Ajimobi can build a base of support. If the markets are replicated throughout all the local 
government areas as he has directed, then this will build a physical and social infrastructure 
of support to be called on at key political moments. Some of the food sellers had attended a 
pre-election rally near the governor’s house and they saw it as their role to tell people about 
the governor’s good schemes, like his wife’s healthcare projects152.  
The benefits of being a member of the Ajumose Solidarity Forum were inclusion in the 
government’s social empowerment schemes. These schemes were well publicised by 
regional newspapers and on the Governor’s Facebook page, but always after they happened. 
I spoke to the informal leader of the food sellers, who was nicknamed Ewedu, after the 
vegetables she sold: 
“Part of things we have benefited [from] as members is that they give us slots 
whenever there is a programme coming up such as the one I told you earlier. When 
they want to give free vaccines for the children, they gave our members slots and 
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146  Ajumose Marines Youtube channel [accessed 22/09/2016] 
147  However, most people I spoke to called them Ajimobi Buses. 
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151  NM5-3 Focus group with Food Sellers, Neighbourhood Market, Ibadan, 9/07/2015 and 
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when they want to make provisions for the widows, our members are invited and 
given slots. We sent five aged women and they were given drugs and N10,000 each 
to support themselves. And some of our members in this market contested for 
elections and they won as honourables [executive members]”.153 
Leadership in the Ajumose Solidarity Forum came with the power to choose who was 
allocated 'slots'. Ewedu was one of the group executives, and she explained that they tried to 
be fair when it came to choosing who would benefit from each new round, focussing on 
women who were new to the group and hadn’t benefited before. Interestingly, Ewedu 
mentioned that not everyone in the Ajumose Solidarity Forum actually wanted the slots, 
because “some of us don’t really like going out while some have the time and like it.”154 This 
reinforces the idea that maintaining the visibility and identity of someone who is a loyal 
follower takes time and resources, which some of the members do not see as a useful 
investment.  One of the Food Sellers, specialising in garri, a food staple, described some of 
the benefits that had attracted her: 
“As a new member not much benefit just yet but there are a lot of benefits in this 
forum. Recently the governor gave 10 education scholarships, also sponsored some 
pilgrims -Christian and Muslim- to the holy land”. 155 
The links between the Ajumose Solidarity Forum and the governor trace Ajimobi’s two 
bases of power: his control over party members in local government and his personal 
political following funded partly via his wife. Ewedu explained how they found out about 
upcoming events: 
“Number one, the chairman of Ibadan Downtown156 LGA is close to us, like our 
patron, he will inform us. Also, there is a woman very close to the First Lady Iya 
Omotola157 she can inform us and we will ask of how many slots is given to us”. 158  
To get access to these benefits, the Neighbourhood Market group had to put in a good 
showing at the higher level meetings. Being a member of Ajimobi’s market required 
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constant work at identifying the group as loyal. The food sellers at the focus group told me 
about an occasion when traders from Neighbourhood Market attended a rally en masse, “We 
are so many o. All of us went.” 159 Another urged my research assistant to make sure I noted 
their readiness: “Please help me to tell her that we have a group for him [Ajimobi] here in 
the market”.160 Ewedu explained how she ensured that the Neighbourhood Market 
contingent is noticeable at the Solidarity Forum meetings: 
“For instance, if we are given twenty slots, we may add extra five in case they will 
allow them. We also have uniform and they know us. Our own is tagged Ajumose 
Solidarity Forum, Neighbourhood Market: we have t-shirt, we have Ankara, and we 
have Kampala”161. 
She emphasises that through this sort of visual branding “they know us”. In addition to 
clothing, the members contribute N20 a week which is often spent on buying banners; 
another tool of visibility and self-identification162. They used the banners “occasionally, 
when the Governor is around and during general meetings whereby different zones are in 
attendance as a means of Identification and relevance”. She explained that the benefits of 
visibility were numerous, “it shows the relevance of your zone thereby attracting gifts e.g. 
money, scholarship etc. as incentives even employment in some cases”163. Visibility as a 
group is therefore a route to gaining access to benefits. In addition to the discursive work of 
identifying oneself as a member of the enlightened public, here traders identify themselves 
in rather more visual ways, by emblazoning themselves with their group identity.  
Within the market there were associations for each section, as well as some ad hoc 
associations such as for the elderly.164 Strong norms of group loyalty mean that members 
face high social costs, and a possible loss of the material benefits that come with 
membership, if they betray a collectively made decision to offer loyalty to a patron. This 
enables associations to make credible commitments which make them desirable to 
politicians in electoral calculations (Omobowale and Olutayo 2010, 458). Government 
patronage, such as interest free loans, was distributed through the associations. The loans in 
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2014 were distributed first via the Babaloja and market executive, and then through the 
sections165. Lady Ayeesha, the babywares seller, was also Acting Secretary of a women’s 
group linked to the market166. She explained that there was an expectation that should any 
funds be distributed in the future, it would come via these channels: “[I]f government wants 
to do anything for us, it will be done group by group, so we are advised to separate ourselves 
group by group.” For her group, being seen as united and organised (with weekly meetings 
in a nearby building) provided a springboard to collectively negotiate to give their support to 
someone who could “help” them. She said that by associating as a group, “[if] they wanted 
to raise us we are ready.” This strategy had worked: before the election they were visited by 
representatives from the four main parties in the election167 including the wife of the main 
opposition candidate, Ladoja.  
Leadership of one of the market associations also provided an opportunity to become part of 
the patronage distribution network. Being able to command a followership, whether based 
on sectional association or not, provides opportunities for political leverage. As with groups, 
visibility was key to individual advancement. In the first instance this requires attending 
meetings in person.  One must have 'good attendance' to become a prominent member168. 
Lady Ayeesha emphasised the importance of being “active” to rise to a leadership position: 
“Reason is because when we started then I was very active. Because everything 
depends on how active you are when you are in a congregation of people. For 
example, when I saw you here I came to meet you by myself and asked about what 
you are doing”169.  
Whilst the hope of getting some patronage from Ajimobi via the Forum was a strong 
motivation, the actual receipt of those benefits was shaky. Another woman admitted that she 
knew of no one from the Neighbourhood Market forum who had been employed as yet, but 
explained that it was because “it is a new forum, we are still growing.” She was hopeful for 
the future, saying she expected “empowerment”, meaning money, training or trade materials. 
Finally, I pushed her on why she thought it was necessary to join the forum to get 
empowerment: “Simple, you have to understand that to enjoy benefits and opportunity from 
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a government you have to associate with the government.”170  Her assessment of the contract 
involved in benefiting from government captures well the mode of operation of the schemes 
Ewedu mentioned. She said that they had sent widows to various events to collect food and 
money, and that on another occasion she went to receive food gifts with up to two hundred 
other women. These events are typically promoted after the fact in Tribune Newspaper and 
the Governor’s Facebook page, under the banner of the Ajumose Food Bank and Ajumose 
Widowhood Support Initiative171.  In official news reports and press releases these events are 
described as helping targeted disadvantaged groups such as poor widows. Fairness was 
supposedly guaranteed by the geographical distribution of benefits, where an equal number 
of widows are invited from each of the local government areas or the project rotates through 
a different LGA every two months.  
In reality, the women from Neighbourhood Market had been attending the Food Bank not as 
widows of the local area but via the Ajumose Solidarity Forum’s city-wide network. Ewedu 
confirmed that the project she attended was called “Ajumose Food Bank” and that they 
received invitations to attend events in a wide range of LGAs, which they travelled to, not 
just their local one. She said, “they are organizing it from one local government to another 
and the wife of Governor instructed us to go to any where it is organised and we are given 
slots.”172 She confirmed that it was Ajumose Food Bank, organised by the wife of the 
Governor. The programme involved hundreds of market women: 
“They also did one at [the town hall] and we requested for slots and all the people 
that went with us were up to two hundred. We all lined up before Ajumose bus to 
collect the Food Bank then.”173 
She described the benefits of obtaining a slot at the Food Bank in a central location in 
Ibadan, over two years before. She had received “Rice, beans, milk, corn, Bournvita, 
cornflakes are all packed in nylon [a plastic bag].”174 She listed another four events in 
different local governments that members of the Ajumose Solidarity Forum had attended 
recently.  
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I asked Ewedu if she could introduce me to some members of the Forum. After a few days of 
false starts, I finally got introduced to two women who I was told were very “strong” 
members. Both hairdressers, Nike and Bunmi175 were young, in their twenties or early 
thirties. They explained that actually they were part of the youth wing, Ajumose Youth 
League. Their branch of 45 members met every Thursday in the market, and then they went 
as a group to state level meetings in Ajumose House every Saturday. The leaders of each of 
the sub-groups form the EX-CO (executive committee) that meets in Ajumose house on 
Thursday. As above, the young women strongly believed that they benefited from 
participation, but the benefits came as part of being embedded in political networks where 
the flow of resources was not only one way. The Youth Forum supported the Governor at 
election rallies and by broadcasting short jingles about him on the radio. To join the group, 
they had to pay N1,000 for the membership form, and the radio adverts were paid for by 
collecting among themselves. However, the rallies were an opportunity to receive: the going 
rate was about N1,000 for attending a one-day rally.  
Nike confirmed the importance of working as a group to take advantage of the opportunities 
of the state meeting: 
“In the [general] meeting we discuss on how to strategize to get benefit and dividend 
of democracy from the government. This benefit includes employment, 
empowerment and scholarship etc.”176 
I enquired what sort of strategies they used as a group if they were trying to get recognised 
at the meeting. She reiterated similar themes to Lady Ayeesha, of presence and visibility, in 
this case in numbers; “We are punctual and we attend with a large number of 
representative[s].” She insisted that “the strategy works and the benefits are numerous.”177 
Through the organisation Nike had been awarded a scholarship. She was studying Business 
Administration at a private polytechnic in Ibadan. However, it was not a full scholarship, 
leaving her to cover about half of the costs, which added up to N70,000. Whilst Nike had 
done well out of membership of the Youth Forum, her friend Bunmi had not yet managed to 
cash in. She explained that she had been offered a pilgrimage to Mecca but had to turn it 
down “because I’m not Muslim”. Again, the receipt of benefits was neither guaranteed, nor 
well targeted, but continued active membership was a strategy that had the potential to 
deliver a pay-off in the long term.  
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The Outside Perspective: 
The previous section explored the opportunities for advancement and remuneration for the 
hardcore of traders who remained in Neighbourhood Market despite low sales. What about 
those who had returned to the roadside? I found that many of the returned traders still 
cultivated some links to the market, with many attending weekly section meetings178. 
However, for those who had left, participation was piecemeal and partial. Traders who were 
able to attend meetings regularly and be active, visible members were more successful in 
rising to leadership positions.  
There were other reasons why traders discontinued their connections to Neighbourhood 
Market: either they found the sections socially claustrophobic179 they preferred the freedom 
of hawking180 or they didn’t think the market would offer commercial benefits even in the 
long run. For some, the costs of cultivating any sort of continued connection were too high, 
and the long term benefits too uncertain, in the face of daily demands. Meagher describes the 
options available to those who do not have time or resources to devote to associations as 
‘desperation strategies’; “among these poorest of producers, membership in associations is 
minimal, owing to a lack of time and resources for effective participation”(Meagher 2007, 
430). 
Elisabeth181 was one of the traders who had left Neighbourhood Market early on. Before the 
shops were officially allocated the section leaders demanded a ‘token’ from those who 
wanted to sign up for a shop in their section, and at the time it was beyond her means. 
Instead she took up a number of other wage jobs from which she was able to eke out a living 
for her four children and her husband, who was recovering from a long illness. In 2015, I 
returned and found out she was now working in a warehouse in Oke Ado. I went to 
interview her one afternoon in July. The room was dark and opened on to the main road. It 
was stacked to the ceiling with bundles of paper, like hay bales. I perched on one of these 
bales, whilst Elizabeth sat behind the sole desk, a pen and A4 ledger open in front of her. As 
we talked, her husband sat in the doorway in the last of the evening sun, their youngest 
daughter on his knee.  
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We talked about the people I’d met in Neighbourhood Market; their associations, their 
numerous commercial ventures, the overwhelming sense of waiting for the future to arrive. 
In contrast, Elisabeth didn’t go back for meetings, and had not visited the market in the two 
years which had passed.  
“Because if you really want to stay there you will sacrifice your time and money, the 
reason had been that there were no sales there, so it will look as if you are gambling 
with your money. I don’t have much fund on hand so I cannot gamble with my 
fund.”182 
Her choice of words echoed those of the government: staying in Neighbourhood Market was 
a sacrifice. Only, rather than wait it out, she had been unable to survive the sacrifices of 
development, and enjoy the rewards of relocating to a modern market in the long run. In 
contrast to the idea of sacrifice as a steady investment, she cast it as an uncertain gamble. 
The urgency of her everyday demands had forced her to abandon her earlier trading business 
and find a new source of income to get by from day to day.  
Other traders I spoke to at the roadside faced similarly discordant temporalities to the ones 
imagined by the government. The two groups, the hardcore and those who had returned, 
were tied to the past and the future in divergent ways. The hardcore were waiting on the 
future in which they had invested. They suffered now but they were waiting on a pay off to 
come. Some people at Neighbourhood Market consequently saw those who had returned to 
the roadside as “impatient”183 as they wouldn’t, as they saw it, defer gratification. By 
contrast, those at the roadside talked not about investment in the future, but being tied to 
debts from the past, which they balance with meeting daily needs in the present184. In 
Junction Market the electricals seller was indebted to her stockist by about N25,000 and 
scared she wouldn’t be able to pay it back. She’d stayed in Neighbourhood Market long 
enough to get the N10,000 rotating loan, but this was just another payment to juggle.  
Similarly, in Highway Market a middle-aged woman selling grain185 had returned to the 
roadside on the hope of better sales and lost her stock when her precarious position on a 
hillside was flooded, putting her in debt. My research assistant translated: “Until she offset 
the debt before she can have rest of mind. The only thing she thinks of is the problem of 
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flooding.” Other told similar stories of how the fear of debt186 pushed them to choose the 
immediate certainty of sales at the roadside over the gamble of Neighbourhood Market187. 
For the traders with less of a financial buffer, and no familial, commercial or political 
connections to call upon, they could never escape the debts of the past long enough to think 
about taking the leap and investing in an uncertain future.   
Conclusion: 
This chapter has explored the tensions within the Lagos Model’s conception of progress. In 
neighbourhood markets, which embody this conception of progress, the tensions can be seen 
to play out in practice. Traders experienced these tensions as dilemmas about whether the 
sacrifices involved in progress will pay off in the long term and for whom. Ajimobi invoked 
the long-term pay-offs of progress to justify the pain of demolishing roadside stalls by 
framing it as a sacrifice for development. In so doing, he discursively constructs an idea of 
an enlightened public. Due to the enlightened understanding of its members, characterised in 
this account by attitudes and mind-set, this public is constructed as the proper group to 
whom Ajimobi can be accountable. For Governor Ajimobi, accountability should only be 
offered to those who have undertaken the “mind shift” (Arulogun 2015) required to 
understand the long-run benefits of his urban renewal policies.  
The case study of the ‘hardcore’ traders at Neighbourhood Market showed the extent to 
which people on the ground are willing to identify themselves as part of the ‘enlightened 
public’ and the material resources they command to participate within it. They seek to 
include themselves in that public by 'speaking the same language' as the government, and 
casting themselves as rational, modern subjects. This sheds light on how people respond to 
the Lagos Model’s conception of good governance as transformation. They position 
themselves on the side of transformation, the new, the enlightened, the people of the future. 
However, to speak that language, they must remain in Neighbourhood Market, something 
that requires a certain level of resources to endure the losses of demolition and low sales in 
the short term. I have shown that those who stay in Neighbourhood Market either do so 
because they have access to alternative incomes from family members, or because they have 
sufficient capital to run other businesses at the same time. Those without recourse to family 
support or commercial alternatives invest their time and money in political organisations 
aligned to the party in power, the APC. Notwithstanding the definition of the enlightened 
public in terms of attitude or mind set, what actually determined the allocation of benefits in 
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the short term is party loyalty. Once in such organisations, traders similarly invest in being 
active and visible, to maximise the chances of receiving benefits.  
What ties the performance of the enlightened public to membership of party political groups 
is that the party loyalists must stay in Neighbourhood Market, as if it is a well-functioning 
market. They must act as if the vision of development described by government is already a 
reality. What makes the performance of their ideological reality possible is a network of 
party organisations which provides just enough piecemeal immediate benefits for the traders 
to survive despite not making sufficient sales to live on. 
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Chapter 7 - Legitimate Leadership in the Lagos Model: 
Performance and Popular Conceptions of Transparency and 
Accountability 
Introduction: Competing Conceptions of Legitimate Leadership  
The international conception of good governance presents legitimate leadership as 
government that is effective and accountable (World Bank 1997). However, there are 
inherent tensions between effectiveness, whereby the government is free to deliver policies 
without constraints, and accountability, where various groups within and outside of 
government can intervene to hold powerful state actors to account (World Bank 1992, 14; 
2004). For government to be effective, they may therefore have to cut themselves off from 
certain forms of accountability. This chapter takes this tension as a starting point for 
investigating how the Lagos Model seeks to make its leadership legitimate, and how it is 
contested by alternative conceptions of transparency and accountability. 
The international conception of good governance resolves the tension between 
accountability and effectiveness by distinguishing between technical and political decision-
making. Technical agencies can legitimately be cut off from democratic accountability 
mechanisms and replaced with managerial forms of accountability (World Bank 1997, 10). 
These recommendations have specific implications in highly centralised executive political 
systems, like the subnational state governments in Nigeria (Suberu 2010). 
This chapter considers how the Lagos Model interprets the demands of accountability and 
effectiveness in government, in the idea of ‘performance’, and highlights the continuities 
between this and the international conception of good governance. Empirical analysis of the 
internal workings of the state government under Ajimobi show how he reconfigured formal 
and informal structures so as to pursue his own political objectives and conceptions of 
accountability, whilst fulfilling international recommendations for governance reform. The 
creation of insulated technical agencies is shown to serve a variety of political imperatives 
and the centralisation of power in the office of the Governor is shown to be directly linked to 
increased state effectiveness in terms of implementing state government policies at the local 
level. 
However, there is a tension between what the Lagos Model and international conception of 
good governance conceive of as legitimate leadership, and popular conceptions of good 
governance. This chapter reconstructs two interrelated principles that are commonly used to 
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evaluate leaders across different political and societal contexts, and that leaders invoke to 
demonstrate their legitimacy. The principles are transparency in people and accountability as 
accessibility. The common idiom of good leaders “carrying the people along” is explored as 
an idea that showcases elements of both principles. 
Finally, core areas of the Lagos Model’s economic strategy are explored which highlight the 
tensions between these competing conceptions of good governance. The two case studies are 
the orientation of the Lagos Model upwards to Ajimobi’s regional godfather, former 
Governor of Lagos State Bola Tinubu, and the use of Lagos-based and international 
contractors for government projects. Empirical examination of how these policies were 
justified by Ajimobi and then received by people on the ground, show how it is exactly those 
aspects of economic strategy that make Ajimobi’s Lagos Model leadership ‘good’ according 
to international conceptions of good governance, makes his leadership untrustworthy and 
reduces its legitimacy according to popular conceptions of good governance. 
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1. Detaching from Accountability Downwards: Performance and 
Effectiveness 
Accountability and Effectiveness in Donor Debates and the Nigerian Context 
The international conception of good governance holds that key agencies of government 
administration should have freedom and autonomy to pursue goals and targets efficiently. 
Mahmadou Dia of the World Bank advocated the “Enclave Approach”, whereby ‘enclave’ 
agencies could be developed as efficient pockets within otherwise sluggish and bloated 
African civil services (Dia 1993; Anders 2014, 338). The organisational and institutional 
mechanisms used to pursue efficiency nonetheless encourage the disengagement from 
governmental checks and balances, potentially undermining accountability188. 
The World Bank resolves this tension between efficiency and accountability by dividing the 
work of government into two different spheres: the political and the technical (Polzer 2001, 
7; P Newell and Bellour 2002, 9). Technical issues are conceived of as those which are 
susceptible to resolution through the application of rational, expert knowledge and subject to 
managerial forms of accountability to performance goals. For those issues which are 
technical, decision-making should be insulated from political processes usually used to 
ensure accountability. In the World Development Report 1997, the World Bank argued that 
“focused, performance-based public agencies … can be provided more flexibility in 
exchange for their greater accountability for results, via financial accounting and 
performance monitoring” (World Bank 1997, 10) This is what Mkandawire, as noted in 
Ch.2, calls the “politics of insulation” (Mkandawire 1999, 338). 
The division between technical and political branches of government in itself an act of 
politics. In practice, due to the direct donor and WB funding of these agencies and projects 
tended to be better resourced and better funded than the rest of the civil service (Bierschenk 
2010, 8; Anders 2014, 339). Furthermore, they tend to closely mimic the political priorities 
of the donor institutions who help set them up and fund them. Under structural adjustment in 
the 1980s, the Nigerian federal government created ad hoc technocratic committees like the 
‘Presidential Commission on the IMF Loan’ which produced neoliberal policy 
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recommendations almost identical to those of the IMF (Bangura 1994, 284)189. Those 
agencies and individuals upon whom donor governance reforms confer the power to make 
“technical” decisions, are empowered with external legitimacy and resources (Boahen 1989; 
Mkandawire 1999). Indeed, IFIs have themselves instrumentalized the dichotomy of 
political and technical, deliberately enhancing “the political positions of those they think are 
more favourably disposed to their policies” as ‘reformers’ and denigrating opponents as 
meddling ‘politicians’ (Mkandawire 1999, 336). 
In Nigeria, this debate about accountability and effectiveness has been concerned not just 
with the division of political and technical, but also the division between formal and 
informal institutions and systems. The need for accountability in the country is seen in the 
context of prebendalism and neo-patrimonialism: extensive patronage and the erosion, 
bypassing or subversion of formal institutions by informal institutions, resulting in 
corruption, waste and ineffective government (Joseph 1983). Therefore, the typical 
conclusions drawn by critics of Nigeria’s degraded political environment over the last 30 
years (see: Joseph 1987; 1991 and Amundsen 2010)  is that there must be a reduction in the 
opportunities for patronage and a strengthening of formal institutions. However, the formal 
institutions of government at the state level, as defined in the Nigerian constitution, are 
heavily skewed towards the executive branch and the office of the Governor. The Governor's 
position is akin to the President at the federal level. The Governor is directly elected every 4 
years, and once in power can appoint a wide range of office holders (Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The cabinet, known as Executive Council and shortened 
to Exco, is made up of Special Advisers and Commissioners, who head their respective 
ministries. The formal checks on the Governor’s executive power include the State House of 
Assembly (HOA), made up of 32 directly elected Assembly members (Suberu 2010). The 
HOA must screen appointments of special advisers and commissioners, as well as Caretaker 
Chairmen of local government when interim arrangements apply as they did throughout 
2011-15 (Akindele, Olaopa, and Obiyan 2002; Adeyemi O. O 2012; Eme, Izueke, and 
Ewuim 2013). 
Where the Governor’s party has a legislative majority in the HOA there are very few 
accountability mechanisms that formally constrain his power apart from the threat of not 
being re-elected. As Governors are subject to a two-term limit electoral accountability is 
weakened in the second term (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). This 
                                                          
189  Bangura (1994) provides an excellent analysis of the relationship between technocrats, 
intellectuals and the Nigerian state between 1960 and the 1990s.  
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can enhance effectiveness, as the Governor can force through policies or it can lead to a 
government which is both unaccountable and ineffective, as the Governor is free to use or 
abuse his position. Moreover, the influence of informal institutions translates formal power 
into patronage opportunities. Commissioner and Special Adviser roles are a key way of the 
Governor incorporating key elites into patronage systems (Iredia 2012). Commissioners 
especially are lucrative positions as they have control over Ministerial Budgets190. Whilst the 
Governor is a powerful position with potential for effective, if unaccountable rule, the rest of 
the bureaucracy and formal political system is “highly open” and “highly penetrated by 
interest groups”. Writing in the 1990s, Bangura notes that this interpenetration of state and 
society may have advantages of providing accountability even under military rule, but it 
proves an obstacle to the sort of ‘insulation’ that accompanies technocratic governance 
(Bangura 1994a, 292). 
The juxtaposition of mainstream debates in the donor community with the Nigerian case 
study shows that effectiveness and accountability can interact in a variety of ways. 
Democratic accountability can be threatened either by technocratic government as argued by 
Mkandawire, by informal institutions as argued by Joseph, or by the overly centralised 
design of executive-heavy formal institutions as in Nigerian state governments. Likewise, 
different understandings of effectiveness bring with them new conceptions of accountability, 
whether the managerial performance goals of the technocrat, or the accountability to 
different elites through informal institutions. 
Accountability and Effectiveness in the Lagos Model: Performance 
The progressive elites involved in the Lagos Model had their own distinctive conceptions of 
accountability and good governance that intersected with the requirements of their 
engagement with the international system and the political realities of controlling state 
resources. The centrality of international networks to the regional political strategy meant 
that they were under pressure to follow the recommendations of international conceptions of 
good governance, leading to a trajectory of accountability ‘up’ to international donors and 
investors and ‘out’ of the structures that could impose immediate demands for patronage. 
However, this logic of ‘up and out’ is shared by the Lagos model’s conception of good 
governance. 
                                                          
190  The most powerful is the Commissioner of Finance who attends monthly Federal Allocation 
Committee meetings in Abuja with the Governor, where federal money is disbursed to states. Personal 
communication with Former Technical Adviser to the Governor of Bayelsa State, London 24th 
February 2015. 
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During a public address in 2014, Ajimobi set out his vision of good governance. The 
following quote from that event clarifies how he conceived of accountability and 
effectiveness. Moreover, it contains clues to what the internal workings of government 
should look like under the Lagos Model: 
“Government is like a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) which must provide 
quality services, such that set objectives are met timely and effectively. But 
bureaucracy makes government tedious in Nigeria. However, as leaders offered the 
opportunity to serve, we must find every means to deliver qualitative services. A 
good leader takes people to where they want to be while a great leader takes them to 
where they ought to be.” (Oladele 2014) 
The tensions raised by Ajimobi’s quote, between accountability and effectiveness, and 
whether public sector modes of operation can deliver either, resonate with debates from the 
development studies literature discussed above. Detachment from immediate political 
accountability is described both necessary and justified on the grounds of accountability as 
long-term performance. Performance means the delivery of tangible, visible, high quality 
physical outputs and the idea of performance was at the heart of Ajimobi’s conception of 
legitimate governance. 
Accountability as performance operates over an electoral cycle: after four years, people 
should evaluate the government based on the changes they have effected. Indeed, the 
experience of Tinubu and Fashola in Lagos strengthened the belief among ACN/APC party 
leaders “that preserving power depends on continued good performance.” It was seen that 
Fashola’s re-election in 2011, for instance, was attributable to his success in rehabilitating 
roads and providing other public goods in his first term (de Gramont 2014, 36; Momoh 
2000). APC chieftains used newspaper interviews to urge the electorate to adopt this 
conception of accountability: “In Oyo State, we should be looking at the performance and 
achievements of elected public officers” (Adekanmbi 2015) 
The concept of performance resolves the apparent conflict between accountability and 
effectiveness. Performance at once demonstrates effectiveness, because the state has been 
able to implement policy and achieve stated goals, and accountability, because the outputs 
are evidence that government resources have not been stolen or wasted. One local 
government Director of Finance described the desired effect of seeing tangible government 
outputs would have on constituents: 
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“[P]eople will now assess the government whether they are performing or they are 
not performing and that can only be felt through execution of capital projects and 
that will be a result of good governance.”191 
The next section discusses Ajimobi centralisation of his power over the state government 
and political structures, achieving a high degree of control over policy implementation. This 
increased effectiveness was not achieved through a bureaucracy but through centralised, 
private-sector inspired executive action which bypassed both formal and informal 
institutions which could otherwise have imposed short term political demands. Whilst the 
state government was more insulated from external patronage demands than previous 
regimes, it created new opportunities for patronage. Examples of the implementation of state 
government policies at the local government level show how this centralisation improved 
state effectiveness, but at the same time the Governor faced competition from an entirely 
different conception of accountability and legitimate leadership. 
                                                          
191  IBCLG 2-1 Director of Finance for Central Local Government, Ibadan, 14/07/2015 
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2. Centralising Power for Effectiveness 
The ‘Tsunami’ and Technocrats 
The imperative enforced by accountability to international gatekeepers to streamline and 
professionalise the public sector coincided with Ajimobi’s political strategic goals to bypass 
the restrictive political demands of the cabinet and state civil service, and deliver key 
programmes through ad hoc technical committees and technocratic consultants. Ajimobi 
strategically employed the discourse of ‘performance’ to frame contentious political 
activities as apolitical and technical. The appointment of Commissioners was a political 
process of appeasing and rewarding key elite factions. Ajimobi re-framed it as a technical 
process. Early in his term Ajimobi organised a three day retreat for all his political 
appointees to instil in them the correct goal-oriented attitudes: all commissioners were 
required to submit PowerPoint presentations of their ‘4-year action plans’ and were issued 
with ‘key performance-indices’ (Issa-Kasumu 2011; Ajayi 2011b). The 2012 re-shuffle was 
described as a “performance screening exercise” where Commissioners not sufficiently 
committed to meeting goals were sacked for “non-performance” (Sahara Reporters 2012; 
Sanni 2013). 
The creation of teams of technical advisers, outside of the more politicised system of 
Commissioners and Special Advisers, is significant in the context of shifting conceptions of 
good governance. Firstly, the division of ‘leaders’ from a ‘management team’ conforms to 
the understanding of economics in World Bank prescriptions for good governance, as an 
administrative task requiring management by technical experts, separate from the 
contentious realm of politics and representation of conflicting societal interests (Leftwich 
1993; 1994). Moreover, the sense that political leadership must be supported by experts 
should be seen in the context of the Lagos Model’s connection to Awolowo and the idea of 
olaju (see Ch.4 and 5), where political progress comes from a mastery of modern, 
specialised knowledge. So the form of governance that emerges is simultaneously fulfilling 
these two overlapping but distinct conceptions of good governance. Secondly, the insulation 
of economic decision-making within the Executive and away from political influence, was 
strategically productive for Ajimobi as it allowed him to protect the decisive aspects of his 
agenda from interference on the grounds that they were ‘technical’ decisions. 
This section shows how, through canny political manoeuvres and circumstance, Ajimobi 
freed himself from the formal and informal checks that had the potential to constrain his 
power. Ajimobi consolidated his control over the state government through political 
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manoeuvres. When he first came to power his party the ACN only had 15 out of 32 seats in 
the State House of Assembly. This presented a major check on Ajimobi’s power because 
appointments to the cabinet, known as Executive Council (Exco), as key form of patronage 
available to the Governor, are subject to approved by the HOA (Iredia 2012). Ajimobi 
struggled to get his initial list of appointees approved, and had to form an alliance with 
Rashidi Ladoja’s Accord party192, appointing seven Accord members to the Exco as 
Commissioners, to secure their support. He continued to govern through a coalition for the 
next year (O. Ajayi 2011c). In May 2012 two Assembly members defected or “crossed the 
floor” to ACN, one from Accord and one from PDP. This tipped the balance, giving the ACN 
a majority in the HOA, of 17 out of 32 seats (O. Ajayi 2012; Sahara Reporters 2014a).193 
From mid-2012, Ajimobi focussed on limiting resistance to his rule within his own party. In 
November 2012 Lam Adesina, the former Governor, died. Tunde Sanni, long-time political 
journalist at ThisDay described Lam Adesina as “the only influential party member that was 
standing, technically, in the way of the governor” (2013). Within a week there was an initial 
reshuffle. Portfolios were re-allocated and three commissioners who Ajimobi said were 
“forced upon him by vested interests” were dropped outright (Sahara Reporters 2012). 
Among those sacked was the Commissioner for Trade, Kareem Adedeji, a member of the 
progressive Afenifere since the early 1990s who had served in the House of Representatives 
before Ajimobi. Adedeji had run against Ajimobi for the ACN ticket in 2011, and later 
complained that Ajimobi had broken a gentleman’s agreement that he would step down after 
one term (Oketoki 2010; Ajayi 2011a; Premium Times Nigeria 2013j; The Street Journal 
2013; Sanni 2013). 
However, a further reshuffle initiated in September the following year was even more wide-
ranging. Ajimobi dissolved the entire cabinet, terminating their contracts, on September 23rd 
2013, and waited six weeks until he submitted a new list of appointees on the 6th November. 
People within the Governor’s inner circle referred to the reshuffle affectionately as “the 
Tsunami”.194 The reputable Premium Times newspaper described it as “a total purge [of] all 
members of the state cabinet, including the secretary to the state government, … Chief of 
Staff, …  leaving only the governor and his [elected] deputy, … behind” (Jegede 2013b). It 
                                                          
192  Ajimobi and Ladoja had worked together politically before, when Ladoja issued a last 
minute endorsement for Ajimobi in the 2007 gubernatorial election (T. Sanni 2007a; Ogunyemi 
2007a).  
193  The rest of the seats were divided: PDP had nine and Accord had six (Ajayi 2012). 
194  I-17 Special Adviser to the Governor, Ibadan, 22/04/2015. 
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was an opportunity to detach himself further from potential opposition, and left a hardcore of 
Ajimobi’s most loyal allies as well as some weaker junior appointees195. For instance, 
Ajimobi fired his powerful Chief of Staff, Dr Adeolu Akande, whose role involved acting as 
gatekeeper to the governor. 
There was one member of the Exco who remained in the government offices over those two 
months, on caretaker duty: Abimbola “Bimbo” Adekanmbi the Deputy Chief of Staff. A 
chartered accountant, he was personally invited by Ajimobi to join the cabinet in 2011.196 
The role of Deputy Chief of Staff was low profile and received no media coverage at the 
time.197 Adekanmbi embodied the international, technocratic attitude of the administration. 
Between 2011-2015 Adekanmbi was officially Deputy Chief of Staff as well as being 
appointed to lead on all the projects that involved working with the World Bank: the Ibadan 
Urban Flood Management Project, the Oyo State Community and Social Development 
Agency and creation of the YES-O youth employment scheme (Oladele and Johnson 2015; 
The Nation Nigeria 2013; Vanguard News 2013). The role in the Oyo Community and Social 
Development Agency (OYCSDA) was not stated on the agency’s website alongside the 
other staff, but a senior member of the Exco198 described Adekanmbi as the “Chairman” and 
staff of an Ibadan-based NGO said that in the course of their professional interactions with 
the OYCSDA they were introduced to Adekanmbi as the man in charge199. Sources linked to 
the APC emphasised the pivotal role that Adekanmbi played in the implementation of Lagos 
Model reforms in Oyo State200, with one of Ajimobi’s Special Advisers describing him as 
being “in the engine room of decision making”201. Members of Arisekola’s household 
entourage were of the belief that Adekanmbi had not only the Governor’s confidence but 
Arisekola’s too, and they suggested that Adekanmbi could follow in Ajimobi’s footsteps.202 
                                                          
195  Such as Dapo Adesina, who at 35 (b. 1978) was very young for a Yoruba politician.  
196  I-10 Senior Member of the Governor's Executive Council, Ibadan, 30/10/2013. 
197  There is no mention of the Deputy Chief of Staff in any news articles reporting the process 
of HOA approving Ajimobi’s nominations (PM News 2011; Daily Times Nigeria 2013; Ajayi 2013; 
Ogunyemi 2013). Moreover, whereas other appointments to his administration, like the Chief of Staff 
and Secretary to the State Government, were advertised on the ACN blog, the Deputy Chief of Staff 
role was not (“Ajimobi Appoints SSG, Chief of Staff, Media Aide” 2011). 
198  I-46 Senior Member of Ajimobi's Cabinet, Ibadan, 24th July 2015. 
199  I-25 Director of active Ibadan-based NGO, Ibadan 15/05/2015 
200  F-3 Professor, University of Ibadan, Ibadan 07/05/2015 
201  I-17  
202  Author’s field notes: conversation with personal assistant to member of Arisekola 
household, Ibadan, 01/11/2015 
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All this suggests that Adekanmbi had a central role in the Governor’s administration, beyond 
what would be expected of a junior title like Deputy Chief of Staff.203 
Whilst the reshuffle enabled Ajimobi to assert his control, the new cabinet nonetheless 
reflected ongoing obligations to key state elites. At least four Commissioners in the new 
cabinet were children of powerful local kingmakers, including Arisekola, the Olubadan, the 
Alaafin and the Soun of Ogbomosho (Daily Times Nigeria 2013; O. Ajayi 2013; Ogunyemi 
2013a; Bayo Adeyinka 2013).204  Rival elites’ ability to check Ajimobi’s power on the Exco 
were minimised but not eliminated. Ultimately the lingering patronage obligations in the 
political organs of the State Executive were of limited importance as Ajimobi bypassed the 
Exco and traditional civil service in key decision-making areas. 
As Ajimobi curtailed the influence of rival elite political factions in his government, he 
expanded the role of technocratic advisers. He created ad hoc technical teams and appointed 
technocratic advisers on keys issues like economic policy. The creation of the Bureau of 
Investment Promotion and Public-Private Partnerships (BI4P) is one example of the way that 
major economic policies were managed by new agencies rather than traditional ministries. 
Another is the Oyo State Socio-Economic Management Team (OSSEMAT) inaugurated 
early on in Ajimobi’s first term, in October 2011. OSSEMAT were allocated N20m a year in 
the 2014 and 2015 budgets, as part of the Ministry of Finance (OSG Website 2015b). The 
group was influential, with the Commissioner for Economic Planning and Budget 
recognising OSSEMAT’s “tremendous contribution” to the design of Ajimobi’s first budget 
in 2012 at its presentation to the HOA (Olarinde 2012). Ajimobi explained that ‘visionary 
leaders’ needed “a coherent, knowledgeable and committed economic management team” to 
assist them, and that the team would focus in particular on “purposefulness in [the state’s] 
fiscal operations” (The Nation 2011; Facebook 2011). 
The creation of technical economic executive agencies like OSSEMAT tied Oyo State into 
broader networks associated with the international good governance agenda. Professor 
Ademola Ariyo, the Vice-Chairman and Coordinating Consultant of OSSEMAT, provided a 
clear line of continuity to national and international neoliberal organisations205. With degrees 
                                                          
203  Though outside the time scale of this thesis, Adekanmbi was subsequently appointed 
Commissioner of Finance and Budget by Ajimobi in July 2016, placing him in control of the Ministry 
of Finance (Lawal 2016; Ojoye 2016; The Nation Nigeria 2016; OSG Website 2016).  
204  I-23 Former High Ranking Member of Ajimobi's Executive Council, Ibadan, 06/05/2015 
205  Mr Joseph Olasunkanmi Tegbe was another member of OSSEMAT who served as a link to 
the international private sector. He is a partner at KPMG Nigeria The Nation 2011; KPMG 2010). 
Both Tegbe and Ariyo later advised the regional state-owned Odu’a Investment Company Ltd. on 
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from America, Prof Ademola Ariyo served on previous state and federal governments in the 
1980s and 1990s. His role in shaping the Governor’s economic strategy came with a long 
history of promoting public-private partnerships. He has served as Director of the Centre for 
Public-Private Cooperation since its inception in 1995 and is Chairman of the Board of the 
University of Ibadan School of Business (“Profile: Prof Ademola Ariyo” 2016). He was 
closely involved in NEPAD, Obasanjo’s regional governance and free market initiative, that 
largely reproduced neoliberal prescriptions for development through liberalisation 
(Vanguard News 2003; Ariyo 2004; African Cities Driving the NEPAD Initiative 2006, 80; 
Bunwaree and Ndedi 2011). In 2006 he presented at a meeting of the NEPAD Business 
Group, Nigeria, where companies were invited to make use of international funding for 
business investment via various NEPAD affiliated-facilities (NBGN 2006, 5–7). 206 Prior to 
OSSEMAT he presented at the Governor’s retreat on “Planning and Budgeting for Effective 
Transformation of Oyo State” (O. Ajayi 2011d; The Nation 2011; Facebook 2011). Ariyo 
was subsequently appointed to the technical committee of the proposed Ibadan Varsity 
(“Ajimobi Inaugurates Committee for Oyo Technical University” 2013; OSG Website 
2013c). When a civil society delegation met with Ajimobi to discuss the budget in 2013, it 
was Prof. Ariyo who was called into the meeting to explain the budget rather than one of the 
special advisers or commissioners. 207 Another Professor at the University of Ibadan, who 
has long been a senior member of the progressive Yoruba elite, described Ariyo’s position on 
the Exco as “very very influential... more powerful than the SSG, more powerful than the 
deputy Governor.”208 
There is evidence that suggests that the key economic MDAs relied on external consultants, 
as Lagos State did with the Lagos State Inland Revenue Service. The budgets for overhead 
costs for each MDA for 2014 and 2015 are published on the Oyo State government website. 
Each of the 70 or so MDAs submit a figure for “item (8) Consultancy Services”. Thirty of 
the MDAs quote nothing for Consultancy costs. However, there are three MDAs which 
quote consultancy costs which are much higher than the rest. Key ministries were the 
Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget. The Ministry of 
Finance, in which OSSEMAT is based, spends the most of the consultancy fees, budgeting 
N1.2bn in 2014 and N2.8bn in 2015. Second is the Bureau of Investment, Promotion and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
performance and profitability (Odu’a Group 2016).  
206  The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, the Investment Climate Facility, and the NEPAD 
Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility (NBGN 2006, 5–7). 
207  I-25  
208  F-3  
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Public Private Partnership, which budgeted N100m and N250m the next. Third is the YES-O 
World Bank Assisted Programme, which budgeted N150m and N100m. For the other MDAs 
who use consultants, yearly costs range from N50,000 to N50m (OSG Website 2015b). This 
means that the ministries associated with the Governor’s special economic committee use 
non-civil service personnel to a much greater degree than any of the other MDAs. This is 
evidence that agencies that are important to implementing the Lagos Model, and which host 
key political allies of the Governor, are insulated from the rest of the civil service. 
In summary, Ajimobi managed to gain control of the House of Assembly after initially 
lacking a legislative majority. This eliminated the HOA as a check on his decision-making 
power and to exercise more control over patronage appointments of special advisers and 
commissioners. He was not totally free of obligations to elites, and his appointments reflect 
the need to satisfy some demands from remaining elites. However, he created technical 
committees to bypass the cabinet and ministries, placing control of the most important 
policies outside the existing structures of informal political patronage, whilst at the same 
time creating new forms of patronage more directly answerable to his office. 
The Governor’s Role in Policy Implementation 
The effect of centralisation of power with the Governor can be observed in the ways the 
policies were implemented. Intermediary institutions like civil service ministries and local 
government that formally mediate the creation of policy by the Executive and its 
implementation at the local level, were bypassed and replaced with direct lines of instruction 
and accountability to the Governor himself. This means that the state government was highly 
effective, seeing a consistent and coordinated implementation of demolitions and 
neighbourhood markets as part of the Governor’s urban renewal programme. However, the 
state government became less accountable as the Governor had few checks on his ability to 
override local government decision making about the use of local government funds. 
Urban renewal involved demolition of illegal structures. Shops by the roadside were the 
focus, but buildings constructed over drains were also demolished. I spoke to Abubakar209 a 
former Director of Environment at one Ibadan local government, who had been rewarded for 
good work and loyalty with a promotion to an even more senior position at another local 
government. He characterised the difference between Ajimobi’s urban renewal Programme 
and similar initiatives under Akala210 as being that Ajimobi had “objective and follow up”. 
                                                          
209  DLG1-1 Senior officer, Ibadan Downtown Local Government, Ibadan, 13/07/2015 
210  See (Manton 2013). 
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What Abubakar described as “follow up” could well be characterised as policy 
implementation. This involved constantly evaluating the progress of the project, and 
regularly holding the Environmental Department to account: “Day in day out he will do 
assessment. ‘What has he been able to achieve with this programme? Any positive thing?”211 
What is striking about Abubakar’s account is that his local government environmental 
service was not being held to account by the ministry but directly by the Governor himself: 
“He will come to the local government twice in a week and say “’Hey oga! My 
brother, go look at so-so-so, it is not good!”212 
He recounted an instance when the Governor had come to survey their progress in the LGA 
and saw an illegally built school that the staff had missed, blocking a drain. There and then 
the Governor granted approval for it to be demolished, and the staff set about dismantling 
the building. 
Abubakar explained how under previous regimes they used to leave work around 6pm, but 
once Ajimobi came to power in 2011 their hours could stretch long into the night, and they 
would sometimes be called in on weekends. Ajimobi himself would call the local 
government headquarters asking for the Director of Environmental Services: “He [Ajimobi] 
will be on the road on his own and he will call you! ‘Come to so-so-so place!’ You would 
have to go.”213 
This was not the only story of of Ajimobi holding local government civil servants directly 
accountable. In a neighbouring local government that was home to a lot of elites, the lines of 
communication and accountability between the wealthy residents and the local government 
went via the Governor himself. A group of the most senior civil servants explained to me 
how they made sure they kept the public services up to date, and responded to any reports of 
pot-holes and the like in certain elite areas of the local government. They feared receiving a 
phone call from the Governor’s office, one of his friends or acquaintances having tipped him 
off about some failure of the local government. They feared that non-compliance would lead 
                                                          
211  DLG1-1 Senior officer, Ibadan Downtown Local Government, Ibadan, 13/07/2015 
212  DLG1-1 Senior officer, Ibadan Downtown Local Government, Ibadan, 13/07/2015 
213  In fact, whilst he was working at Environmental he initially experienced the state 
government’s new capacity implement policy as a burden.  “In fact, I nearly resigned! Because he 
forced us to do a lot of things. ... the workload was too much, because we’d been sitting idle [until] 
then. Haha, very nice. He [Ajimobi] come with his new ideas, with urban and regional planning 
programme and we now see that we have to do a lot.” 
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to them being re-located. Local government civil servants are placed by a central state-wide 
body, and they could easily lose their position in a plum central Ibadan constituency to be 
appointed to a remote rural posting214. 
Furthermore, state government projects were pushed through at the local government level 
via the informal control that Ajimobi had over both the selection of Caretaker Chairmen and 
local government funds. Ajimobi directed each local government to build a similar market, 
and two more were built (Okwuofu 2014). Yet, the neighbourhood markets were explicitly 
planned as Public-Private Partnerships, and it appears that these PPPs were driven by the 
state government (Channels TV 2012). Around the same time Ajimobi announced that the 
government had identified at least 27 locations for neighbourhood markets, which suggests 
the state would be taking overall control of the contracting and siting of the markets, not the 
local governments (Daily Post Nigeria 2012). 
Speaking to staff in one local government that had recently completed a neighbourhood 
market, the picture was more complicated. I asked a focus group of community development 
officers whether they engaged with the government’s market building programme. They 
answered all at once. “No and Yes,” said one woman. “Yes, definitely!” said another. 215 The 
de facto leader of the group looked uncomfortable and quietened her colleagues. She 
explained: “The neighbourhood markets, the Governor started it. It is our money they are 
using; it is not our project but they are using our money.” 216 She referred to another recent 
occasion where the Governor had presented a cheque to victims of a disaster; “He presented 
cheques, but it was from the local government’s pocket”.217 
This section started with a discussion of the theoretical tensions between accountability and 
effectiveness in the literature on public administration in Africa. These tensions are 
replicated in Ajimobi’s public discourse in the invocation of the idea of accountability as 
performance as a justification for centralising state power. The examples in this final section 
have shown how this tension plays out in practices. Whether in the case of neighbourhood 
markets, environmental sanitation or potholes the Governors individual effectiveness was 
                                                          
214  MLG2-1 Focus Group with Head of Local Administration, Director of Finance and Director 
of Administration of Ibadan Metropolitan Local Government, Ibadan 06/06/2015 
215  MLG1-1 Focus Group with Community Development Section of Ibadan Metropolitan Local 
Government, Ibadan, 25/05/2015 
216  MLG1-1  
217  MLG1-1  
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improved through bypassing formal government systems, especially local government. This 
enhanced effectiveness came at the cost of reduced avenues for accountability.    
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3. Popular Conceptions of Transparency and Accountability 
Whilst the first half of this chapter considers the tensions between accountability and 
effectiveness in the Lagos Model, both in theory and in practice, this section explores an 
entirely different way of understanding accountability and transparency. The central case 
study for the following section is an interview with a Adediran, popular local politician in 
Ibadan. I met him through Baba Bashiru, a key informant, whose family I met and socialised 
with. Baba Bashiru had run a major community group for years, highly regarded by other 
local NGOs, and had worked closely to get the local government to provide boreholes, 
sanitation and roads for the community. Baba was keen that I should meet Adediran; he had 
been in a senior elected position in the local government and had done a lot for the 
community association. Adediran and Baba were close. Therefore, my connection to 
Adediran came with Baba’s blessing, meaning I had a degree of credibility and trust. His 
office was cold from the air conditioner and the furniture looked new. The fridge, the TV and 
even the gold disc at the centre of the standing fan still bore the protective plastic wrapping 
they were shipped in. There was an ante room, where a secretary sat at a desk to one side, 
and the door leading to Adediran’s office was also wrapped in cellophane. Even though I 
was a clear outsider, when we met in his official office I was at least distantly related to his 
social world through Baba and this led our discussion to be more informal and relaxed than 
some of my other interviews with politicians. 
Adediran was in his fifties and looked youthful and square jawed, with flecks of grey in his 
beard. He was a successful politician, both in terms of working his way up party and 
governmental hierarchies, and maintaining a strong popular support base. Lying on his desk 
were a newly released model of Samsung smart phone and an iPad. The iPad background 
was a photo of him standing together with two men in army uniform, laughing. When we 
met, he had been in office in a new elected state-level role for two months. He had served as 
an appointed Chairman of the Local Government Caretaker Committee under two 
Governors, as well as being elected to the office when elections were later re-started. The 
people he worked with, both above and below, rated him highly: the local CDC chairman 
recommended him as “someone who did very well for us”218 and he had won a trophy from 
the national legislature for his achievements219. As such he serves as an example of a 
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politician who has legitimacy among his constituents, and understands and to some extent 
has demonstrated his ability to meet their demands for good governance. Through our 
conversation, key values emerged as defining legitimate leadership for Adediran. These 
values shared similarities with the values promoted in the international good governance 
agenda, and reflected the same core concepts, but through different conceptions. 
Transparency in People 
The concept of transparency is a key part of the good governance agenda (World Bank 1992; 
1997). In the dominant conception of transparency, as operationalised in the donor 
community and public administration, this means transparency of information as data. Data 
is transparent when it accurately represents an external reality (Hetherington 2011). Yet, in 
conversation with Adediran, and interviews with other informants in Ibadan, the idea of 
transparency was normally applied to the politicians themselves. Politicians should not hide: 
they should be visible. Rather than transparency requiring that data or documents or 
accounts should be visible, this popular conception of transparency was focussed on the 
social information concerning leaders and their qualities. Social connections in which a 
politician is embedded and their personal character should be visible. Transparency of 
people requires that citizens know the personal character of leaders and their social and 
political connections and loyalties. The key questions in this kind of transparency are: where 
are they from? Who are they connected with? Within this conception, formal bureaucracies 
are untransparent when they have meetings which are not disclosed, loyalties that are 
uncertain and relationships which are secret. 
Transparency in people represents an adaptation to a context where government data is 
inaccessible to many and often unreliable. There is extreme linguistic diversity, with many 
Nigerians speaking both majority languages like Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba, as well as one or 
more minority languages. English was promoted as the single official national language by 
the colonial and post-colonial state as a route to national linguistic homogenisation 
(Maddieson and Hinnebusch 1998, 286; Arasanyin 2008). English is the language of 
instruction and examination at all levels of the education system, as well as the language of 
government (Simpson and Oyetade 2008). However, many Nigerians do not speak English 
with proficiency, and the language serves as a barrier to education and participation in 
government rather than as medium of access (Fakeye and Ogunsiji 2016). Therefore, as 
discussed in chapter two (Gupta 2012), it is not feasible to achieve transparency through 
written documents. 
In Oyo State, literacy rates in one of the three Nigerian languages are around 72% for 
women and 82% for men (DHS 2013, 34–35) and the state scores above the national average 
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for the percentage of the adult population who can read a simple letter, at 58% (NBS 2010). 
But the percentage of the population that have completed secondary school, indicating they 
have the approximately the level of English required to read and scrutinise official 
documents, is only 27% and 37% for women and men respectively (DHS 2013, 37–38). This 
suggests published government data is only readable to around one in three people in Oyo 
State and in itself cannot make government transparent to the majority. Moreover, idioms 
such as 'talking grammar', meaning pompous but nonsensical talk220, attest to the 
slipperiness of official language, and the ease with which sophists can use words to occlude 
and confuse rather than illuminate meaning. The unreliability of representations push people 
to look to other, less manipulable forms of information. Transparency in people provides 
information that is relevant to ordinary citizens. Should they need to approach someone in 
government for assistance or to petition them with a request, transparency of people helps 
them work out who can be relied upon and what their motivations might be. 
The idea that “cabals”, small groups of unknown and unknowable individuals, are 
controlling Nigerian politics from ‘behind the scenes’, is common. Albert names cabals as 
one of three elite groupings, among mafias and godfathers, where informal networks control 
formal political processes. Whereas godfathers are generally publicly known individuals 
who promote and control protégées through manipulation of a mass followership, mafias and 
cabals describe horizontal groups of powerful elites (Albert 2012).  
Mafias are groups of individuals who together form a core of influence within political 
institutions, often united by a shared sectional interest, either religious or ethnic. Hoffman 
describes them as a “pressure group” (Hoffman 2011, 285). The ‘Kaduna Mafia’ for example 
were the core group of northern military and political elites who controlled the central 
government between the 1960s and 1980s (Takaya and Tyoden 1987). Others decry what 
they see as the continued influence of a cabal of northern ‘aristocrats’ or military elites under 
democratisation (Uweru 2010, 169; Igbokwe-Ibeto, Ewuim, and Agbodike 2015). Within the 
Action Group, Awolowo’s original progressive Yoruba party, the Ijebu-Igbo Mafia referred 
to members from the same home-town who met regularly at one of the key member’s house 
in Ijebu-Igbo221.  
Both mafias and cabals “operate in the dark and hardly make any statements that could 
betray their identity” (Albert 2012, 2). This lack of visibility makes them pernicious as they 
are “more difficult to manage than godfathers” (Albert 2012, 2). Whilst Albert distinguishes 
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cabals and mafias according to the types of interest that brought them together, political and 
economic versus sectional, a difference that emerges from his analysis is that mafias are 
identifiable, whereas cabals are unnameable. Cabals, Albert argues, “consist of a shadowy 
group of people bound together by some sinister political interests”, those who work with 
them are “unable to say who they are” (Albert 2012, 2) and those who expose their workings 
are still “careful enough not to name them” (Albert 2012, 2, 4). The accusation of the 
existence of a cabal represents both the idea that there are unknown people behind the 
scenes, and that known individuals, office holders, have connections to these unknown 
people which are being obscured. Albert quotes the Vice National Chairman of the Arewa 
Consultative Forum, a group of northern Governors, alleging in 2012 that “the leadership [of 
the nation] knows them and shields them from being prosecuted.”  
Discourses of transparency in people replicate the visual metaphors typically associated with 
transparency – visibility, exposure to light and illumination - through ideas of superficial 
appearances obscuring that which is underneath or behind the scenes. Akanle et al. (2014, 
26) link the subversive power of cabals in the oil industry to their ability to travel and 
conduct business through parallel channels, for instance through the use of private jetties to 
deliver oil rather than official ports222.  Albert posits a distinction between benevolent and 
malevolent cabals but explains how their hidden nature makes it difficult to tell one from the 
other. For instance, “on the surface people consider them to be benevolent cabals but behind 
the scenes they are malevolent cabals” (Albert 2012, 4). 
One example of a demand for transparency in people was the allegation by Aisha Buhari, 
President Buhari’s wife, that her husband was underhand in his handling of official 
appointments (BBC News 2016). Her critique exemplifies how government can be seen as 
failing to meet the standards of transparency of people. She explained that, "[t]he president 
does not know 45 out of 50 of the people he appointed and I don't know them either, despite 
being his wife of 27 years." In the context of complaints about nepotism, where 
appointments based on personal relationships are seen as a source of corruption, the 
accusation that the President and his wife do not know the successful candidates would seem 
misplaced. However, where transparency is understood as making known a candidate’s 
social affiliations, personal connections and political loyalties, then the appointment of 
candidates who by their anonymity are ‘unknowable’ in this way, is in itself untransparent.  
Furthermore, if the president himself does not know those in his government, then by 
implication other as yet hidden forces are responsible for their appointment. This means that 
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those in office are imbricated in networks which are not transparent to voters. Aisha Buhari 
made this point when she claimed that those in top posts were there due to the influence of 
"few people", which echo’s Albert’s account of shady ‘cabals’ dominating politics from 
behind the scenes.   
A further example indicates the way that visibility of social connections helps to make 
leadership transparent at the level of market associations. Lady Ayeesha223, was a female 
leader in a variety of informal associations and at her mosque. She defined transparency as 
“when you are doing something, you have to make it expose” and said it was equivalent to 
honesty.  She explained the sort of case where transparency was necessary to prevent against 
secret dealings: 
“For example now, see that Mama [pointing to a woman opposite] … you know me 
and you are close friends. If this Mama give me N1,000 [and] now if I see you, 
[then] I have to tell you that “I went to Grandma yesterday. She give me N1,000. 
This is the money” {gestures to her hand}. But for some people they [would] say 
that “Grandma no even give me anything, oo.”224 
Transparency means that were Mama to give Lady Ayeesha a gift, the Lady Ayeesha should 
tell me when she next saw me. Through telling me the gift would go from being hidden (in 
silence) to being in the open, or “expose[d]”. Lady Ayeesha was on the executive of a market 
association, and explained how they ensured transparency in a similar way, by promptly 
making social connections publicly visible. For example, “anytime anybody comes and 
gives us something”, i.e. when a patron or local politicians comes to the association to give 
them a gift, “you announce in the meeting that this person come o and give us N2,000. 
Immediately they [the secretary] will write it down inside the minutes.”225 
It’s hard to tease apart what exactly it is that should be visible when a government is 
transparent. How is it different if information is transparent or if a politician’s statements 
regarding information are true? The rest of the conversation with Lady Ayeesha helps unpick 
some of these linkages. We discussed whether the current government was transparent and 
she laughed, invoking a paradigmatic example of un-transparent government: “No ... no ... 
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no. This political people that will use N10m to do something and tell us they use N20m”226 
i.e. inflating the cost of a project and siphoning the excess. 
Her example is the epitome of untransparent behaviour as traditionally understood in the 
lens of transparency as data. Yet, when I asked her to elaborate she did so by focusing not on 
the transparency of the information itself, but the accessibility of the politicians who made 
the false statement. She explained how political people were not honest and acted in their 
own self-interest. Her example of this was their inaccessibility once in power: 
“[A]nytime you go there [to their office] for help they will not listen to you…they 
[their aides] may not allow them to see you. If you are a close friend, immediately 
the get there like this they will change their phone number or anytime you call 
them… [they say] 'Hello…hello…ha! We are in the meeting' and when you still call 
back tomorrow, 'Hello…we are in the meeting.' Is it every day they are in a 
meeting?”227 
This idea of leaders remaining visible as they move from normal social life into government 
emphasises that it is not just one’s connections whilst in office that matter, but full 
transparency and credibility require a deeper understanding of the person’s character and 
social connections across their whole life course. The following discussion of Adediran’s 
social connections to his constituents shows the importance of ongoing connections. Talking 
to Adediran, it became clear that the idea of transparency wasn’t anchored in the relationship 
that the politician has with his voters when he is in office but in the politician’s ongoing 
relationships with his local community. For instance, he occupied the post of Caretaker 
Chairman both through appointment and election. According to models of accountability 
that are entirely based on electoral relationships this should have fundamentally changed his 
accountability relationship with his constituency. However, he characterised his career 
progression as one of continuity and ongoing relationships. In the following quote Adediran 
talks about how he is tied to his constituency through a hypothetical scenario where he is 
held to account. He warns of the risks of being an absent politician, highlighting the 
importance of being visible and present: 
“By the time you run back to them, in the past 3 years we voted for you, did you 
make yourself accessible to us? Did we see you? We couldn’t see you. You were 
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staying in Abuja all the way through, we did not see you, you did not come. If you 
now come and ask for their vote, they will not give you their vote. And they will 
collect your money! [Adediran and my research assistant laugh]. A good politician 
will not do that”228 (italics my own). 
Accountability as Accessibility 
Whilst transparency in people required that politicians make themselves and their 
connections and character visible, grassroots conceptions of accountability required that 
politicians made themselves accessible. This helps explain why transparency in people is 
important, because once politicians are visible then their constituents and clients can engage 
them in forms of communication that contain the possibility of holding them to account.  
The themes of visibility, accessibility and communication are therefore closely intertwined, 
and generate an overall principle that good leaders are those who are personally close and 
knowable. 
The following quote shows the ways that ideas of transparency were connected to the 
possibility of communication. One academic lamented how politicians had become 
unaccountable and undemocratic by hiding themselves away in Abuja during their terms. He 
told me about a radio phone in show he had been listening to, that he saw as perfectly 
encapsulating the problem: 
“They asked them: do you have any access to your government? They say no they’re 
never here, and when they are there in their big house with guards all over and dogs. 
We can’t visit him, we never hear from him again.”229 
The theme of leaders who are physically inaccessible also came up in a conversation with a 
long-time NGO activist, who worked in the same communities as Adediran. He identified 
physical distance, say between rich and poor areas, and barriers, like compound walls, as 
creating a “communication gap”. He continued: 
“That’s the problem in this country, the communication gap is always there between 
the leaders and the people. When they want your vote they come down to you, but as 
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soon as they get to the office, they imprison themselves. Ordinary people don’t have 
access to them any longer”230. 
He later linked accessibility explicitly to the ability of local people to ask questions of their 
government. He listed the various services that the government did not provide – water and 
electricity - and how at the offices of the NGO where he worked he had to provide these 
services privately. And yet, he mused, he paid tax: 
“We are not benefiting and yet they collect tax, what do you do with my money? 
[pause] And I want to ask you question and you are not accessible, what sort of 
society is that? What kind of democracy?”231 
Once the state is transparent and can be seen, the ordinary citizen can insert themselves into 
that space and has the chance to create a moment of communication. 
In my conversation with Adediran, he himself volunteered the term ‘good governance’ to 
describe his rule. I asked him to tell me about the components of good governance. His 
answer focussed on the strategies for making himself accessible. All involved physical 
presence in social spaces, either at the level of city-wide civil society, or in his constituency. 
He had recently joined the committee for organising the Ibadan Day festival, with the 
Central Council of Ibadan Indigenes, an influential Ibadan Indigenes association. By being 
at the meetings where the issues that affected the city were discussed, he made sure he was 
“not far to the community” 232. Mostly though, he achieved accessibility by being present 
and visible in his constituency: attending religious occasions, receiving visitors, maintaining 
a constituency office and generally delivering “human service” 233.  He summarised: “I make 
sure that I see my people often and often, so that they will have access to me.”234 
A failure to be accessible was linked to arrogance, and seen as an expression of contempt for 
one’s supporters. Explaining why a Commissioner was sacked by the Governor in 2013, a 
reporter for ThisDay newspaper couched his unpopularity in the language of accessibility, 
and a disconnection from his supporters. In an article he explained that: 
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“[His] ‘sins’ … are many even to those outside the government. He was reported to 
have allowed the office to get into his head as he ignored the calls of even his 
friends and made himself inaccessible.”(T. Sanni 2013) 
This quote highlights how accessibility concerns having the right sort of social connections 
between those in power and their clients and supporters, or more broadly the correct state-
society relations. The reporter says that the office ‘got into his head’, suggesting that joining 
the government changed his thinking somehow. 
The sorts of knowledge that are invoked in communication between politicians and their 
constituents can be decisive to whether the connection succeeds or fails. If the politician 
relies on forms of knowledge which are obscure and too specialised for the constituent to 
understand, or alternatively if the politician is not conversant in the sorts of knowledge that 
inform the client's experience of life and thus what they want from government, then the 
communication will not work.. 
In standard conceptions of transparency, information is that which represents a separate 
reality (Hetherington 2011). However, when two people are having a direct conversation 
then the information they communicate between them may take a number of forms, not just 
as a debate over whose representation of an external reality is the most accurate. Some 
information is embodied, rather than representational. Someone’s hunger or tiredness is in 
itself a form of embodied information, and communication opens the possibility that this 
information may become animated and have effects in the world. If you are insensitive to 
such information, if you can’t understand or hear it, if you have no empathy, then you are not 
really communicating. Face to face access is so vital because it allows embodied experience 
to become a form of information, whereas communication through letters or texts rules out 
the interpretation of such experiences as relevant information. I use two examples from 
Adediran to elaborate what demonstrations of ‘human face’ involves. 
Once accessibility is achieved and people from the community have managed to find 
themselves face-to-face with their local politician, there are values that influence how good 
politicians should interact with their constituents in this private setting. I asked Adediran 
what would he do if someone came to his door right now, asking for N5,000 to pay their 
wife’s hospital fees? His initial response was that this was “common, so common in politics” 
and for him “it’s happening every day”. 235 He believed it was because of poverty. “But not 
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everything is money,” he said, “Attend to such a person in a polite manner.” 236  He 
explained how he would deal with requests that were too onerous. Rather than giving the 
N5,000 he would gently lower the man’s expectations:“‘Ah, sorry, I do not have that kind of 
money. I have two naira, let’s share it. Have this.' Then that will not be the end. I will then 
try to assist.”237 
He might ‘assist’ by following up with the case and helping the man move his wife to a 
government hospital where the fees were lower. This didn’t involve Adediran giving the man 
his own resources but enabled him to facilitate a solution to the constituent’s problem. He 
concluded that this approach normally worked quite well: “The man, they will 
appreciate.”238 
Another story reinforced the point that treating people well could make up for lack of funds. 
He told me about someone who had come to visit him that morning. A man had visited his 
constituency office asking for several thousand naira to pay his daughter’s termly school fees 
so she could go back to school: 
“I made him happy. To make him happy is not to give him money! But I made him 
happy, with what he heard from my mouth. Yes! Encouragement!... 
I told him 'my brother, this [economic strife] is general [affecting many people]. 
With all this economic things ... it is general.' By the time I told him what has 
happened to some other people, he was saying 'Thank god!' That’s just it. 
When he was going I said 'what I have for transport.' [gestures offering something in 
his hand] I give him hope. I try raise their hope, don’t darken their hope, so that they 
will soon know that oh, they will be encouraged.”239 
The ‘transport’ money would be a few small notes, perhaps N100, much less than the 
requested amount. He predicted that now, should someone ask his visitor for his opinion on 
Adediran, they would say 'Ah he is a nice person.' In contrast, had he responded by rejecting 
the request out of hand or explaining that he simply didn’t have the money: “It’s not the 
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best.” 240 Therefore, interpersonal interactions between patrons and clients matter, even when 
the material outcome of the interaction is the same, and the constituent goes home with far 
less money than he requested. 
Of course, the conclusions to be drawn from this discussion are limited by the fact that it is 
the recounting of an interaction, not a direct observation, so Adediran’s story may be 
embellished, edited or entirely false. Furthermore, it is only his perspective as a politician, 
not the constituent’s. Even if Adediran’s account is factually accurate in terms of the words 
spoken in the interaction, the client’s interpretation of the interaction may have been 
different; perhaps they were disappointed or dissatisfied. However, he had been successful 
over almost 15 years in politics and had won elections to a variety of posts. Significantly, the 
NGO who put us in touch had a very low opinion of many of the politicians in Ibadan, but 
regarded Adediran highly241. For Adediran, the way he treated people when they ‘accessed’ 
him was important for maintaining his reputation and support base. 
Carry the People Along 
Further evidence of the importance of the themes of transparency in people, accessibility and 
empathy, is the ubiquity of an idiom that encapsulates all three elements: to carry people 
along. 
Adediran gave an account of his own political career and why he thought he’d been 
successful. He explained how his initial appointment to the Caretaker Committee laid the 
groundwork for his subsequent election to the role: 
“Within these 7 months you will have seen my ability to carry people along, you 
would have seen that charisma in me that I have people in mind, you will have seen 
that I have ability to run good governance.” 242 [italics my own] 
In Nigerian newspapers and in general conversation, the phrase he “carried the people 
along” is used frequently. To carry someone along is a widespread and ubiquitous discourse 
that is used when evaluating how leaders or people with power have behaved, or when 
urging them to do something. The following examples show how it refers to some form of 
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relationship between rulers and the ruled, but includes a constellation of elements covering 
inclusion and consultation. 
The first example comes from an article in Vanguard newspaper. Following the election 
many months before, a youth group responded to rumours that Buhari was going to 
announce a round of political appointments. 
“The Youth wing of Ohanaeze Ndigbo has urged President Muhammadu Buhari to 
carry every section of the country along in making appointments to positions in his 
administration.”[italics my own] (Alaribe 2015) 
Later in the article the journalist clarifies what prompted the Youth Wing to make the 
statement: the fear that the President was appointing people on a sectional basis, instead the 
leader of the Youth Wing implores him “that appointments should be spread among the six 
geo-political zones of the country.” This quote implicitly contrasts ‘carrying people along’ 
with leaving some people behind; everyone should be included in the benefits Buhari has to 
offer. In this sense it could be seen as a form of distributional equality or fairness: if I am 
moving upwards by getting more resources, then I should share my resources with others, so 
that they are moving too. 
The next example foregrounds a more consultative meaning, where carrying people along is 
part of an obligation to communication. It occurred in conversation with one of the market 
leaders at the new Neighbourhood Market. One of the problems with Neighbourhood Market 
was that the layout of the access road made the market hard to see from the busy main road, 
leading to fewer customers than if it were visible. A provisions seller who was on the 
executive committee explained that this was a problem of poor planning; the architects 
didn’t think to draw on the traders’ experience. She lamented that the architects “didn’t carry 
the traders along.” 243 In this usage, to carry along suggested something closer to ‘consult 
with’. The concept of carrying people along was anchored in communication. Later in the 
conversation there was further evidence that the phrase “to carry along” articulated the value 
this communicative connection. When I asked if the Governor carries people along, she 
replied “Yes so far. We tell him what we want and he listens. He’s an open minded person.” 
Her response highlighted the value of being able to speak to the governor and be heard. 244 
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To carry people along means to keep you and them in the same communicative space. To 
carry people along is related to what scholars have termed answerability, the right of the 
people to ask questions and get a response, and the obligation of leaders to provide one 
(Peter Newell and Wheeler 2006, 2). To pose questions and receive answers you have to be 
in the same conversation as your interlocutor. Carrying along includes elements of speaking 
and listening: you may need to persuade people for them to understand your answers, but 
you also need to be able to listen. Rather than the movement implied in ‘carry along’ relating 
to people being moved, or propelled, by economic progress, it is a movement that maintains 
closeness or proximity. If you don’t carry people along, then you risk ending up so far apart 
that you can no longer have a conversation. Overall, popular conceptions of good 
governance include elements of transparency and accountability but interpreted in ways that 
connect with ordinary peoples’ experiences of politics and interactions with leaders in 
everyday situations. How did these values shape the popular reaction to the Lagos Model’s 
logic of ‘up and out’? 
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4. Tensions Between the Lagos Model and Popular Conceptions of 
Accountability 
In discussions of transparency of data, factors like accuracy, availability and legibility of 
data influence the extent to which transparent information is actually meaningful to different 
audiences. These concerns are retained in the conception of transparency in people, where 
the social information must be accurate, available and legible, but these are defined by 
different standards. This section considers how certain aspects of the Lagos Model are in 
tensions with the transparency in people with regards to the relationships between Ajimobi 
and his political allies in the southwest.  
The first example analyses perceptions of the relationship between Ajimobi, Tinubu and 
global networks. These relationships are seen to violate the value of transparency in people. 
Transparency practices that Ajimobi and Tinubu use to render themselves transparent to the 
international community, by meeting accounting and anti-corruption standards, are 
interpreted as just another form of opacity, used by the southwestern leaders to hide what 
they are really doing. The analysis draws on frequently propogated conspiracy theories to 
highlight some of the ways that Tinubu’s engagement with international and business 
networks are interpreted as suspicious. This is not to say that conspiracy theories are reliable 
or factually correct, but they give us access to common anxieties which lack expression in 
more respectable forms.  
The second example picks up on one specific aspect of these conspiracy theories: the claim 
that Ajimobi’s policies of infrastructure development are driven by Tinbu’s business 
interests. It presents my respondent’s conspiratorial accounts of why certain firms benefit 
from infrastructure contracts in Oyo state and why some lose out. These conspiracies reflect 
a desire for transparency in people, which is not being met through current contracting 
practices, which instead favour government effectiveness and financial sustainability. 
Together, these examples reveal that elements of the Lagos Model which are seen by donors 
as furthering the aims of good governance, may in fact lessen Ajimobi’s claim to 
transparency and accountability in the eyes of his constituents. 
Tinubu 
The importance of Tinubu to Ajimobi’s rise to power is not disputed. Tinubu has been 
decisive in Ajimobi’s political career: he was key to Ajimobi’s campaign attempt in 2007, his 
return to the ACN in 2011 and his 2011 election bid. Adebanwi’s detailed insider’s account 
of Yoruba elite politics in the 2000s attests to Tinubu’s “pivotal role” in the election of all the 
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ACN leaders in the southwest between 2007 and 2011 (Adebanwi 2014, 223). Sources in 
Ajimobi’s campaign headquarters described Tinubu as “very supportive”245 in Ajimobi’s rise 
to power.  Tinubu plays a godfather role to Ajimobi, which is not in itself seen as negative or 
un-transparent per se. Indeed, as discussed above, Albert identifies both benevolent and 
malevolent godfathers, and the relationship is often explicit and transparent. Due to the 
prevalence of godfatherism in Nigeria, many respondents naturally assumed that Tinubu’s 
financial backing came with strings attached. As one journalist explained, “[h]e’s not Santa 
Claus, he has to recoup his money”246. This isn’t a controversial statement in Nigeria, where 
showing ‘appreciation’ to one’s patrons is a well-policed social norm. For instance, much of 
the debate around the Ladoja impeachment in 2006 was about the sins of ‘ingratitude’ and 
how to negotiate political debts. Rather, it was what Tinubu represented to different political 
audiences that was seen as potentially untransparent, and where tensions can be observed 
between the Lagos Model and grassroots conceptions of good governance. 
According to the Lagos Model, Ajimobi’s cooperation with Tinubu was evidence of an 
enlightened orientation to development, where decisions were to be made at the regional 
level and connections to international resources, knowledge and people were to be 
maximised. Tinubu embodied a twenty-first century conception of olaju as engagement with 
modern private sector principles. In July 2013 Ajimobi and the ACN Governor of Osun state 
appointed Tinubu to the position of Chancellor at LAUTECH, a university jointly controlled 
by both states. Ajimobi noted that Tinubu had “an international network” that would help the 
school and he wanted LAUTECH to become a world-class institution (The Nation 2013). 
Evaluated against grassroots conceptions of good governance, Tinubu’s outward facing 
connections take on a very different meaning. Tinubu maintained a presence in Ajimobi’s 
policies in various ways that raised suspicions about what the relationship between them 
was, and what obligations it placed Ajimobi under. Moreover, Tinubu himself represented 
connections to a wider world of remote ‘international’ connections that were unfathomable 
and beyond the horizons of Oyo State.  
Knowledge of international professional norms and practices was seen as a source of 
untransparency because through international exposure Tinubu knew how to be corrupt 
whilst looking clean. People explained that what differentiated Tinubu from the likes of 
                                                          
245  I-28 Local Level APC Politician and Member of Ajimobi's Campaign Team, Ibadan, 
26/05/2015 
246  I-38 Political Journalist at a major national newspaper, Ibadan 25/07/2015 
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Adedibu is, as the journalist put it: “He’s not to walk into the treasury and cart away funds.” 
Tinubu’s perceived adeptness at utilising knowledge of international standards and systems - 
his success in cultivating the new international capitalist form of olaju – enabled him to 
engage in one sort of behaviour whilst projecting an illusion of another. As ubiquitous as the 
belief that Tinubu has merged state and personal interests, is the belief that no one would 
ever be able to prove it. One source pointed to a lapsed investigation into a tax-collection 
company in Lagos, “but there was no trail”247. A senior journalist, working in the southwest 
for a major national newspaper said that their investigations had shown that Tinubu had a 
hand in government contracts but “on paper you will not find any trace … rather than 
employing impunities like the PDP would do, they must design a clever way of approaching 
some of these things.”. 248 According to this interpretation, a familiarity with international 
norms of good governance, indeed the knowledge of how to conform to international 
standards of transparency, enabled Tinubu and others pursuing the Lagos Model to engage in 
untransparent behaviour. 
Commentators, political opponents and gossip websites promote conspiracy theories that 
link Tinubu’s political domination of the southwest to his business “empire” (Okpi 2014). 
SocietyNowNG.com (2011) claimed in 2011 that any Governor under his patronage must 
enter a “legal but intricate business arrangement with the party leader’s vehicle of commerce 
– directly or indirectly – to help recoup expended resources and make gains”. Another article 
posted on Pointblank News and widely reposted, specifically links those companies involved 
in Lagos public-private partnerships, such as Alpha Beta Consulting and Lekki Concession 
Company, to Tinubu’s status as “the emerging dictator And emperor of the south west” 
(Nkordeh 2012). 249    
As discussed above in relation to cabals, the concept of transparency in people is often 
expressed in idioms of a superficial surface impression obscuring a malevolent reality of 
unseen actors, connections and loyalties. This same metaphorical structure can be seen in 
conspiracy theories about Bola Tinubu. One article on Point Blank News contrasts “the rise 
of another seemingly righteous leader, General Buhari” – i.e. the benevolent surface image – 
                                                          
247  F-1  
248  I-38 
249  For similar claims on other websites see: http://pointblanknews.com/pbn/exclusive/tinubus-
massive-looting-of-lagos-uncovered/; http://thestreetjournal.org/2015/01/advertorial-pdp-fights-back-
names-bola-tinubu-nigerias-most-corrupt-person/; 
http://247latestnewsupdate.com/2013/06/30/nigerian-corruption-a-higher-level-tinubus-massive-
looting-of-lagos-uncovered/  
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with what it claims is the hidden real reason for Buhari’s rise, “criminal activity engaged in 
by one Mr. Bola Ahmed Tinubu” (Kayode 2015). Whilst his connections to international 
networks are celebrated by his allies (as in the LAUTECH example above), a common trope 
in conspiracy theories about him is that Tinubu’s origins and identity are not transparent. 
Articles accuse him of using fake names (News of the People 2012). This both to implies 
that he engages in fraudulent behaviour, but more importantly in the context of legitimate 
leadership in Yorubaland, places him outside of a traceable ancestral lineage. Similarly, the 
accusation that Tinubu oversees a conspiracy to uses superficially legal companies to 
construct shady networks replicates this structure of misleading and untransparent.  
Contractors 
A second example of a tension between the Lagos Model and popular conceptions of good 
governance is how the selection of contractors for state government projects in Oyo 
contravened the value of transparency in people. Some feared that Ajimobi’s economic 
policies was that major infrastructure projects were only being undertaken as a way of 
building up the APC’s economic base, with only secondary consideration given to their 
actual benefits for development. A journalist articulated a sentiment that I had heard alluded 
to numerous times in my research: “He [Tinubu] makes some contractors front for him in 
state projects ... and that’s why they [the APC governors] embarked on many of these 
projects.” 250 The suggestion was that governors in the southwest undertook big 
infrastructure projects because they created business opportunities for Tinubu’s companies. 
A lawyer who worked with local business elites, complained that, “APC central working 
committee AWC is saying to all the southwestern governors, you need to have contracts and 
give them to us, or give these companies contracts, so they can build up some money.” 251  
The accusation that Ajimobi’s government was hiring Lagos-based and foreign companies 
over Oyo-based ones was a hot political topic throughout the Governor’s first term and into 
the election. In general conversation, people treated it as fact that the landscaping and 
beautification projects were given to Lagosian companies. There was a tension between the 
Lagos Model’s principle of performance, and the principle of transparency in people and 
how the benefits of government should be distributed. The principle of performance involves 
government being accountable through the effective implementation of policies and delivery 
of public goods. To overcome the problems of uncompleted projects, Ajimobi gave contracts 
to firms that both had a good track record of performance elsewhere, and had substantial 
                                                          
250  I-38 
251  I-26 Director of Ibadan-based legal practice, Ibadan, 21/05/2015  
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financial resources of their own, so that they were not liable to delay the project should 
government funding be interrupted. Ajimobi was keen to publicise his success at initiating 
investment deals with foreign countries, such as the prospect of agriculture, trade and 
investment with South Africa (OSG Website 2015a). 
However, these criteria of having a track record and independent financial resources de facto 
ruled out many local contracting firms which had less capital that competitors from Lagos or 
abroad, and had no claim to a world class track record. An example is the contracts given out 
for infrastructure and urban renewal. The state government strategically favoured companies 
with better access to finance, which in turn could have disadvantaged firms that did not have 
a national or regional reach. The case of Apete bridge is an example of how the instability of 
government income with falling oil prices favoured larger contractors with access to their 
own finance. In 2012 floods destroyed Apete bridge in Ibadan and the state government 
awarded the contract for the rebuilding to an ‘indigenous company’. However, the original 
contractor lacked capacity for the complex engineering project, and the project was passed 
on to another contractor. In press reports, the Attorney General explained what happened 
next. When revenue fell suddenly in the second half of 2014 the government “told the 
contractor to seek fund for the project while we provide the collateral” (Atoyebi 2014) By 
January 2015, the choice to partner only with companies who could afford to be paid 30% 
upfront and the rest on completion had effectively become state policy. Ajimobi referred to it 
as “financial engineering” and notes the “the local contractors cannot finance road projects” 
(Oderemi and Alao 2015). This was confirmed through interviews. Local investors who 
pitched projects to the Governor were unable to fund the project themselves and faced 
interest rates of over 25% when they approached banks for funding252. Erratic payments 
from government, or the project being discontinued by the next Governor, were therefore 
riskier for local companies as they faced not being able to repay debts in the event that the 
project lapsed. 
However, in some instances Oyo elites were passed over, even when they had significant 
financing themselves, or were working with foreign partners. I spoke to two groups of Oyo 
elites who were resentful about what they perceived as being abandoned by Ajimobi. Both 
pitched various projects to Ajimobi in the run-up to the 2011, which they claim he assented 
to. Believing they would get the contract once they Ajimobi was office they campaigned for 
his victory, with one of the groups of investors contributing N10million to his campaign 
funds. They complained that after Ajimobi’s first 100 days in office, they realised that the 
                                                          
252  I-26  
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projects they had suggested had been followed up, but given to other companies253. There 
was a belief that local companies keep the money in local circulation, whereas foreign 
investors would take government money back home with them, something some respondents 
termed “capital flight”. This frustration was tempered by an acceptance that the benefits of a 
higher quality project could in theory outweigh the benefits of local contracting254. 
Nonetheless, local businesses felt that they were being locked out of government contracts, 
in favour of companies who were beyond the horizon of Oyo State transparency or 
accountability. 
The case study of the Oyo state government’s decision to build a light rail line in Ibadan in 
2015 reflects the hegemonic role of Chinese companies in infrastructure investment in 
Nigeria (The Nation 2015; Lawal 2015). Chinese companies, many linked to the Chinese 
state, have been driving infrastructure investment in Oyo, Lagos and the rest of Nigeria since 
at least the mid-2000s. The biggest single investor is the China Civil Engineering 
Construction Corporation (CCECC), which is the partner for Ibadan’s light rail system. Five 
years previously the same company had been announced as the main construction contractor 
for a similar light rail line in Lagos, the Blue Line NIR (BMI 2010; BMI 2015). By 2015, 
CCECC, or its parent company the Chinese Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC), had 
been awarded contracts for a further seven major railway lines across Nigeria, including the 
railway connecting Lagos and Ibadan255. Industry commentators note that there is a lack of 
capacity among Nigerian firms to take on such projects, not in terms of the actual 
construction and engineering but in terms of the legal expertise needed to navigate the 
complex legal structures associated with PPPs (IRJ 2005, 2006b, 2010, 2012, 2014; Dowden 
2013).  
Therefore, transport and infrastructure PPPs represent a major area of state government 
economic policy where forms of abstract knowledge serve as a barrier to both the 
participation of local firms in government contracts but also obscure the scrutiny of such, as 
they are beyond the comprehension of most local businesses. Someone who had worked 
with Arisekola’s household, including on business deals, explained his suspicion of 
Ajimobi’s motives for partnering with Chinese companies: 
                                                          
253  F-9 Ibadan-based graduate and businessman, Ibadan 22/05/2015 and I-31 Businessman and 
political operator, Ibadan 30/05/2015 
254  I-26 Director of Ibadan-based legal practice, Ibadan, 21/05/2015 
255  The Jebba-Minna line, Lagos-Kano line, Lagos-Jebba line, Abuja-Kaduna line, Lagos-
Abeokuta line, the Coastal Lagos-Calabar line. 
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“If a local company is seen as corrupt, the EFCC might go after them. But, if 
Ajimobi has done a corrupt dealing with a Chinese company, what are the EFCC 
going to do? They’re not going to understand it; they’re not going to be able to go 
after them. It’s going to be difficult to discover what’s going on, not to mention then 
trying to prosecute it”.256 
In this context of local companies who are unable to access contracts due to capacity and 
expertise, legislative moves at the state and national levels, such as Oyo State’s Public-
Private Partnership Bill 2013 and the federal Nigerian Railways Authorities Bill 2014, 
represent the creation of economic networks which are neither transparent to local business 
interests nor accessible (IRJ 2006a; IRJ 2015). 
Conclusion 
Legitimate leadership involves tensions between the idea of government as a political entity 
which is tied to its constituents by norms of accountability and transparency, and the idea of 
government as an organisation mandated to deliver certain outputs effectively. In principle, 
Ajimobi argues that these two can be resolved through the idea of providing accountability 
through performance. In service of the idea of performance, the international conception of 
good governance is a resource to be called upon, because it legitimises certain forms of 
public organisation which permit the centralisation of power in the Governor and key 
technical agencies. In Oyo, this provided a practical and normative blueprint for the how key 
functions of government could be dealt with in such a way that bypassed the rest of the 
formal system of the civil service. Whereas the Nigerian state has been criticised in the past 
for permitting the subversion of formal mechanisms and their replacement with corrupt 
informal institutions, Ajimobi was able to use the framework of the international conception 
of good governance to reframe such activities as developmental and likely to increase 
effectiveness. In some cases, donor organisations were deeply involved in the creation of 
these ambiguous insulated agencies. 
However, Ajimobi’s belief that the tension between effectiveness and accountability could be 
so easily resolved faced challenges in practice. There exist well established popular 
conceptions of good governance which define transparency and accountability in ways that 
emphasise the connection between government and society. Transparency in people demands 
that leaders are open about their character and social connections, lest unseen and 
unknowable ‘cabals’ be manipulating government behind the scenes. Accountability as 
                                                          
256  F-5 Former aide to Arisekola family, Ibadan 15/05/2015 
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accessibility emphasises the socially embedded nature of communication between 
government and society. Leaders should be accessible, and maintain ongoing spaces for 
direct communication with their constituents. The idea of ‘carrying the people along’ 
summarises both of these values, and emphasises that legitimate leaders remain close 
enough to their constituents to permit meaningful flows of information and communication. 
This chapter has explained the ways in which the overall logic of Ajimobi’s agenda comes 
into conflict with popular conceptions of good governance. The Governor's relationship with 
his godfather Bola Tinubu in Lagos is shown to arouse suspicions by virtue of its implication 
of unknowable global networks. Therefore, as the Governor orients himself towards meeting 
internationally defined standards and working with foreign partners on key economic 
projects, he is seen as less transparent. Furthermore, there is a sense that Ajimobi and Tinubu 
have access to unfamiliar international forms of knowledge. This leads to concerns that such 
knowledge can be used to obscure their social connections. 
The government’s pursuit of legitimate leadership as conceived by the Lagos model resulted 
in a logic of ‘up and out’.  The idea of accountability as performance led to a process of dis-
embedding the state from political structures that could either sully them with patronage-
based demands, or derail their fiscal rectitude with expensive social policies. The next 
chapter of this thesis reflects on the limits of the state’s ability to dis-embed from society in 
the face of electoral pressure. 
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Chapter 8 - Popular Demands for Economic Benefits: 
Empowerment within the Lagos Model 
Introduction 
“This government is so insensitive, lacks human face 
and basically they are clueless. [Ajimobi] his 
supporters say ‘If you go to the poultry you won’t 
believe how clean it is’ and we ask ‘what is the magic?’ 
and we check, the poultry is clean but the chicken are 
not there!... He forgets all the time that being in 
government is about serving the people.” 
Teslim Folarin PDP Candidate for Governor 2015 
(Vanguard News 2015) 
From the independence era onwards, Oyo State politics has witnessed a dialectic between 
progressive politicians in the mould of Obafemi Awolowo offering long-term visions of 
progress and their populist rivals. The populists have capitalised on grievances with elite-
driven long-term development policies that ignore popular demands for more immediate 
distribution of economic benefits in the face of widespread poverty (Williams 1974; Layonu 
2003; Nolte 2009; Hoffman and Nolte 2013; Animasawun 2013; Adebanwi 2014).  
Ajimobi continued in Awolowo’s progressive, modernist path. He saw it as his duty to 
provide a break with the past and enact transformation to modernise Oyo State (OSG 
Website 2013a; Ajimobi 2015). Drawing on his travels abroad and career spent working in a 
multinational oil company, Ajimobi’s policies sought to bring Oyo State into the global 
community of modern nations. Members of the ruling elite took pride in the fact that 
Ajimobi’s core support was among the young professional elites257. His team recognised that 
few ordinary people in the state had the same exposure to foreign influences, but argued that 
they could still get on the “Ajumose thought train”258 through what he called “mind shift” 
(Arulogun 2015). If voters changed their understanding, they could come to see the pains of 
Ajimobi’s policies as sacrifices that would be redeemed through enjoyment of the state’s 
                                                          
257  I-33 Senior staff member of DAWN Commission 1, Ibadan 05/06/2015; I-47 Senior Staff 
member of DAWN Commission 2, Ibadan, 26/06/2015 and I-46 Senior Member of Ajimobi's Cabinet, 
Ibadan, 24th July 2015.  
258 Ajumose is a political slogan used by Ajimobi. See Ch.5 Section 3. 
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future development (Oladele 2013). These people formed the ‘enlightened public’: the 
imagined political community who bought into the vision of the Lagos Model.  
The reality of how people on the ground reacted to Ajimobi’s policies did not fulfil the 
aspirations of the Lagos Model to create an enlightened public. Rather than convert people 
to seeing the sacrifices of development as in their own long-term interests, some key 
elements of Ajimobi’s adherence to the Lagos Model remained unpopular (Atoyebi 2014). 
Many of his modernising policies – increasing taxes on shop signs, clearing roadside traders, 
and fining people for environmental offences - imposed short term costs on the electorate 
(NAN 2013; Osun Defender 2012; Ajayi 2014). Bearing in mind the three key reference 
points of Yoruba politics set out at the beginning of this thesis, the construction of an 
enlightened public emphasised progress but neglected, even delegitimised, demands for 
more immediate economic benefits.   
Ajimobi and his party, the All Progressives Congress (APC), was vulnerable to popular 
mobilisation against it at the polls because they pursued the Lagos Model, which left popular 
needs unmet. A major opposition figure remarked six months before the election that the 
APC would lose in 2015 because “people will not vote for roads but what directly affects 
their lives”, where roads symbolised Ajimobi’s emphasis on modern infrastructure (The 
Punch 2014). Empowerment schemes, where the small-scale gifts of food, money or income 
generating equipment are distributed directly to constituents, emerged as a way for the APC 
to respond to popular demands for economic benefits. Empowerment schemes provided a 
quick and convenient party-building mechanism, to ensure electoral success. However, they 
had to be carefully managed to conform at least superficially to the constraints of the Lagos 
Model and to find ways of undertaking empowerment without threatening the state 
government’s growing reputation with investors and donors as a fiscally responsible 
government (Oxford Business Group 2013b; 2013a; The Guardian Nigeria 2015). 
Three case studies highlight the diverse strategies used. The first is a programme of interest 
free loans to traders’ associations in exchange for political support, which was a high profile 
well publicised event at the state level. Next is the case study of a local government for 
which I use the pseudonym 'Ibadan Central Local Government'. Here the local government 
Chairman undertook smaller empowerment events drawing on embedded local knowledge 
of the community to build up support for the Governor. The final case study looks at how the 
Governor’s wife, Florence Ajimobi, organised various schemes with radically different 
logics: a health programme called ABC Clinics and two an empowerment programmes for 
women.  
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The Lagos Model helped Ajimobi and his allies to ‘speak the same language’ as donors, with 
its promotion of ideas like financial inclusion, community-driven development and public-
private partnerships. It provided a blueprint for how the Governor could reconfigure the 
boundary between public and private interests, such that government activities could be 
presented as conforming to international conceptions of good governance whilst also serving 
political goals. However, for those empowerment activities that were impossible to square 
with the rationale of market-led growth, private spaces and an intentional lack of 
transparency were useful tools for the government to make sure certain schemes were only 
transparent to the right audience. 
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1. Challenge: How to Respond to Popular Demands for Economic 
Benefits 
Unmet Popular Demands and Opposition to the Lagos Model 
Populist politicians whose support is based on appeals to closeness to the ‘common man’ 
have what could be called a natural affinity for short term benefits.  Their instinct to assert a 
direct and emotive relationship with the masses, which is unmediated by the clutter of 
institutions and formality, chimes with the principle of accessibility. Their advocacy of 
common sense and rejection of expert knowledge, positions them to then affirm the 
knowledge that comes from everyday lived experience, and is responded to in the idea of 
‘human face’. This section shows this affinity through the examples of Adelabu and 
Adedibu, as well as more recent political opponents to Ajimobi.  
Adelabu and Adedibu are described as “people-based” leaders who “operated an open door 
policy” (Adeyemo 2008). Adedibu, for instance, was celebrated because he was accessible 
not only to high society elites but the masses: 
“Adedibu mingled with the high and the lowly in the society as could be seen in the 
fact that he never relocated from his grassroots constituency of Molete even when he 
had money in abundance to live a life of opulence in choice areas of Ibadan” 
(Timothy 2008). 
The populist narrative conveys a conception of a good leader as one who should know about 
the human experiences of his followers and respond appropriately. On this interpretation,  
empathy is the primary route to knowing ones constitutents, and their human experiences, 
rather than scientific knowledge through abstract data or information. One of the recurring 
motifs of accessibility in these historical accounts is of the leader eating with his lowly 
followers. Adelabu “stooped to take meals and drinks communally with his admirers in side-
sheds and market stalls” (Layonu 2003, 107).  
Famously, Adedibu’s ‘open-door policy’ was an open-door both for communication and 
petitions, but also for daily bowls of amala and gbegiri, a staple dish. Godfathers like 
Adedibu “gain their political relevance first and foremost through the goods they grant to 
clients clustered around rural and urban Ibadan” (Omobowale and Olutayo 2010, 460). This 
emphasis on good leaders sharing food characterises knowledge of the people as an 
openness to flows of human empathy and shared experience. Accordingly, an appropriate 
response to such knowledge is constructed as a response at the level of human emotion and 
care. Leaders should feel what their followers feel; if they are hungry, they should feel their 
217 
 
hunger. In many cases the ‘caring’ empathetic response will be to give food or money to 
alleviate the immediate experience of poverty.  
When Ajimobi was in power, the memory of earlier populist leaders was very much alive in 
Ibadan, and Adedibu’s influence could still be felt. Writing in 2010, Omobowale and 
Olutayo report that Adelabu was still remembered fondly on the streets of Ibadan as a 
“political patron who ministered to the needs of the downtrodden” (Omobowale and Olutayo 
2010, 453). The three key opponents to Ajimobi in 2015 had close ties with Adedibu, but 
varied in terms of how legitimate they were perceived to be. Adedibu’s first protégé was 
Rashidi Ladoja, an Ibadan indigene who was Governor for the People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP) between 2003-2006. Ladoja sought to cut himself free of the obligations to Adedibu 
and differentiate his style of governance from the extreme looting and patronage that 
Adedibu encouraged. He recognised that Adedibu’s system of patronage entirely failed to 
meet popular expectations of progress, whilst remaining sensitive to the need to distribute 
more immediate benefits (Hoffman and Nolte 2013; Omobowale and Olutayo 2007; 
Animasawun 2013; Albin-Lackey 2012). Ladoja continued to have a large following after 
leaving office, and continued to have links with both the PDP and ACN / APC until 
eventually contesting the 2015 election at the helm of his own party, Accord (O. Ajayi 2012). 
The two other major populist rivals to Ajimobi were also former protégés of Adedibu: 
Teslim Folarin, the PDP candidate, and former Governor Christopher Akala, of the Labour 
Party. Folarin was known as one of “Adedibu’s boys” (Timothy 2008), and Akala had been 
famously profligate and venal in office (Osun Defender 2011).   
The following examples explore how key elements of the Lagos Model clashed with popular 
conceptions of good governance and how opposition politicians – Ladoja, Folarin and Akala 
– instrumentalized this sense of grievance to garner political support through the accusation 
that Ajimobi had no ‘human face’.   
Urban renewal in particular drew much popular criticism. Ladoja framed the demolitions 
and landscaping where there had been traders as “neglecting the masses in favour of plants 
and flowers.” (Adekanmbi 2013a) Ladoja urged voters to back his Accord party “for 
deliverance from an insensitive government” (Adekanmbi 2013a). In the quote at the 
beginning of this chapter, Folarin likens urban renewal to someone cleaning a chicken house 
by removing all the chickens. The metaphor vividly captures the sense that in seeking a 
cleaner environment Ajimobi had lost sight of the point of a clean environment, which is for 
people to inhabit it. Both Ladoja and Folarin use the term ‘insensitive’ to describe Ajimobi. 
It is only through an understanding of the ideological underpinnings of conservative 
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populism in Ibadan, as described above, that one can understand what exactly Ajimobi 
should be sensitive to: the everyday human experience of the masses (Vanguard News 2015). 
The state attorney general, one of Ajimobi’s appointees, responded bluntly when questioned 
by The Punch newspaper about the criticisms of Urban Renewal. He dismissed the criticisms 
as the “frivolous” complaints of “erring traders” who failed to understand the health risks 
posed by trading on the roadside (Atoyebi 2014). By calling the traders “frivolous” and 
“erring” the Ajimobi government rejected the lived experience of the traders as a form of 
knowledge. This opened space for opposition politicians to criticise him drawing on familiar 
tropes from the Adelabu and Adedibu populist legacy. The themes of human empathy and 
care are visible in the criticisms of Ajimobi as having no ‘human face’, and not being 
‘people oriented’ (Amusat 2015). When Ajimobi presented his budget in 2012, the Minority 
Leader in the Oyo State House of Assembly encouraged Ajimobi to ensure that the 2013 
Budget had “a human face through eradication of poverty in the state” (Esan 2012)  A senior 
member of the PDP in Oyo State claimed that the APC had forgotten that leaders must have 
“empathy” and “strive to alleviate the sufferings of the people by providing palliatives”, 
citing the role of alms-giving in Islam and Christianity (Taiwo 2014). 
It is important to note that appealing to the demand for economic benefits is not the same as 
actually delivering them in practice. Adelabu, Adedibu and Akala were adept at signalling 
their adherence to popular conceptions of good governance, and leveraging the legitimacy 
they conferred whilst still perpetuating a political-economic system that did not provide for 
basic livelihoods of ordinary people. Furthermore, these values are not the sole preserve of 
populists, or in the case of Ajimobi’s rule, the opposition parties (PDP, Labour Party and 
Accord). This popular conception of good governance is widely held in Yoruba society. They 
are a normative resource that leaders of all stripes can utilise and appeal to, in order to build 
their legitimacy.  However, the dynamics of political realities on the ground made the 
tensions between the Lagos Model and alternative conceptions of good governance more 
acute.  
Political Threat of the Election 
As campaign season started in spring 2014, the government seriously feared losing the next 
election. One senior member of the APC went so far as to publicly acknowledge and reject 
speculation “that our party is not in contention at all”, due to the strength of the opposition 
(Adekanmbi 2015). In addition to Ladoja, Folarin and Akala, there was a popular new 
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challenger, Seye Makinde.259 The ability of these disparate individuals to unseat Ajimobi 
would be determined by the PDP’s success in uniting them around a consensus candidate, a 
challenge since Adedibu’s death in 2009. Ultimately, the PDP failed to coordinate effectively 
and via the intervention of powerful party leaders in Abuja, Folarin was selected during a 
farcical primary in November 2014. Folarin was seen as unpopular and inaccessible to the 
grassroots (Oladele 2015a; Waheed 2015). Akala and Makinde felt they had been snubbed 
and sought out other party structures that they could use to contest the election rather than 
back Folarin (Oladele Ogunsola 2013; Ogunwale 2014; Babalola 2014).  
Despite the desertion of key figures, the PDP had considerable resources due to their control 
of state power at the centre (Owen and Usman 2015). With Jonathan in the Presidency, it 
was anticipated that the PDP would devote significant funds to contesting the Oyo election. 
Even if Folarin did not have a natural supporter base, he would benefit from the patronage 
machine that could draw on central oil money for funds (Durotoye 2014; Akinloye 2015). 
Even when the threat of a joint PDP candidate had been eliminated, there was the risk of a 
coalition forming among the broader opposition260. Former Governor Rashidi Ladoja ran on 
the slate of his own party, Accord. He was a formidable opponent as his supporter base 
overlapped with Ajimobi’s. His strongest support was in Ibadan and among civil servants, 
who made up a significant portion of the state’s middle class voters. Ladoja secured 275,000 
votes in 2011 without the backing of any major political party (Amusat 2015; Ogunyemi 
2015).    
The third factor that made Ajimobi vulnerable was the low revenue due to the crash in world 
oil prices from mid-2014, reducing his incumbency advantage and posing an obstacle to his 
ability to show himself to be accountable by delivering ‘performance’. Incumbent Governors 
in Nigeria typically have a 15% advantage in elections due in part to their ability to draw on 
state resources, whether financial or the control of the state’s security apparatus, to mobilise 
their supporters and discourage rivals (Owen and Usman 2015, 9–12; Election Monitor 
2015). However, the state resources available to Ajimobi fell substantially in the final 
months of 2014. In 2011, when Ajimobi first came to power, the monthly federal allocation 
                                                          
259  Makinde was an engineer businessman, who had been on the political scene since 2005, and 
had built up a grassroots following in Ibadan and Ibarapa whilst switching between ANPP, PDP and at 
times supporting Ladoja (Oladele 2015; Waheed 2015) and I-44 Personal Assistant to Seye Makinde, 
Ibadan, 04/08/2015.   
260  Furthermore, a switch of loyalties was possible up until the day of the election. Days before 
the 2011 Presidential election Tinubu had agreed to back Jonathan, despite having fielded a candidate 
from his own party, Nuhu Ribadu. Ladoja instructed his supporters to vote for Ajimobi at the last 
minute in 2007. These examples suggest there was a possibility that some combination of the other 
four candidates would form a last minute alliance. 
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to Oyo State was approximately N4.2bn and the cost of wages and salaries was N2.9bn. 
However, by November 2014, the federal allocation had fallen by N1bn to approximately 
N3.2bn monthly whilst wages and salaries had grown to N5bn, leaving a monthly deficit of 
about N1.8bn (OSG Website 2014b). This was due to historically low global oil prices, 
which led to the oil price per barrel falling below even the federal government’s very 
conservative minimum expectations (Stein 2016). 
A final consideration in Oyo State was that Ajimobi’s campaign promises in the 2007 and 
2011 elections were very different to his offering in 2015, and there was a risk that people 
who had voted for him the first time would switch loyalties. Before the 2011 election 
Ajimobi ran on a platform of security and youth jobs, he said little about any plans to 
demolish roadside traders or plans to attract foreign investors (Oni 2007). He had succeeded 
on the first promise – Ibadan became less violent over the four years from 2011 – but his 
effort to provide jobs looked half-hearted. YES-O, his youth employment programme, had 
initially employed thousands, but run out of steam by 2013 and former recruits were 
complaining about unpaid wages.261 His opponents could well argue that they would 
maintain the improvements in security, and roll back the demolitions, thus diminishing the 
political capital from Ajimobi’s more popular achievements and promising to reverse his less 
popular policies. In summary, the circumstances of the 2015 election meant that the ability 
of voters to force the government to make concessions to the grassroots model of good 
governance was much stronger than it might have been if there was a less viable opposition.  
Furthermore, there was a worrying precedent in a nearby state. In July 2014 Ajimobi’s 
fellow APC Governor in Ekiti state was voted out of office in a shock defeat to Ayo Fayose, 
a former PDP Governor (Akinrefon 2014). The contest between Fayemi and Fayose was like 
the contest between Ajimobi and the PDP but on an exaggerated scale. Fayemi was the 
epitome of the Lagos Model’s most internationally palatable elements, having emerged from 
the world of civil society to be a beacon of good governance. Fayose was a populist 
extraordinaire, described as “the apotheosis of Adedibu” (Ifowodo 2014). Nonetheless 
Fayose had succeeded in rising to power, and Fayemi was out of office. He devised the 
policy of “stomach infrastructure” where he gave out bags of rice and live chicken, to 
contrast with Fayemi’s emphasis on infrastructure (Husaini 2015; Adekunle 2014; Josiah 
2015). If Fayose could come back from the dark political past to undo the ACN’s ‘progress’, 
then Akala or Ladoja could do it in Oyo.  
                                                          
261  I-26 Director of Ibadan-based legal practice, Ibadan, 21/05/2015 
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In conversations with key players in the APC campaign about how they approached 2015, it 
was clear that they believed that Ajimobi had to make decisive moves to save the election262. 
Ajimobi’s spokesman explained how the perception of taxation being heavy, for example, 
was a threat to their re-election:  
“we had to swim out of it by telling people that ‘look you cannot have development 
unless...’. But at the same time we are being very careful in terms of imposing 
taxation on the people.”263  
A former high-ranking member of Ajimobi’s cabinet described all these policies as 
“decisions that are not popular with people but are essential if you are going to transform the 
state into a modern state.” 264 The agitations of the PDP loomed large for the government, as 
a threat to be mitigated or forestalled with pre-emptive concessions or risk losing some 
“support base” 265. The government also temporarily relaxed policies associated with urban 
renewal: clamping illegally parked vehicles, punishing ‘environmental’ offences and, 
crucially, clearing traders from the roadside266.  
The government had to re-evaluate who their constituency actually was. Whilst they had 
been serving an imagined middle class public of educated persons, with the 'correct 
orientation', pragmatic political considerations sent them in a different direction. “It’s poor 
people who vote, the elites don’t vote”, remarked a Nigerian academic who has published 
widely on Ibadan’s history267.  
  
                                                          
262  I-23 Former High Ranking Member of Ajimobi's Executive Council, Ibadan 06/05/2015 and 
I-17 Special Adviser to the Governor, Ibadan, 22/04/2015 
263  I-17 Special Adviser to the Governor, Ibadan, 22/04/2015 
264  I-23 
265  I-23 
266  F-2 Academic and Activist, University of Ibadan, Ibadan 14/05/2015; I-14 Leader of Oyo 
State Branch of a major national union, Ibadan 21/04/2015 and I-23 
267  Prof Olutayo Adesina, Department of History, University of Ibadan, personal 
communication 10th August 2015 and I-38 Political Journalist at a major national newspaper, Ibadan 
25/07/2015 
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2. Response: Empowerment 
Empowerment is a paradigmatic expression of providing constituents with immediate 
economic benefits. In my interviews with roadside traders for example, when asked what 
they would do if they were in charge, all mentioned some form of empowerment268; whether 
for youths, widows, students, the elderly or the sick. In donors’ discourse the term 
empowerment means to make someone more powerful, increasing their ability to speak out 
or make claims (Cornwall and Edwards 2010). However, in Nigerian politics, empowerment 
means giving money, training and equipment to individuals. An example in the media from 
2015 shows how these terms are typically used. The Governor of Kano State trained 1,000 
barbers in modern techniques “to financially empower the barbers”. At their graduation 
ceremony the Governor announced that each would receive “N30,000 as empowerment 
package” (Nigerian Tribune 2015b). This retains some of the transformative power of the 
donor definition: empowerment money must be an amount that allows them to do something 
they wouldn’t have been able to do otherwise. A representative quote comes from the apple 
seller at Neighbourhood Market. Asked if she has any suggestions for the government she 
replied: 
“Bursary and allowances with a well-structured welfare package for the youth … 
Government cannot do it all but … Government should take care of its civil servant 
especially teachers. Youth empowerment and a more direct approach to 
implementation of packages.”269 
In deciding to deliver empowerment programmes Ajimobi had to go against his own stated 
principles on two fronts. Firstly, empowerment was equated with the patronage politics of 
figures like Adedibu and the PDP. At his inauguration in 2015 Ajimobi explicitly stated that 
he was moving the state away from amala politics (Ajimobi 2015b).  As discussed in chapter 
five, Ajimobi, his technocratic advisers and core APC politicians rejected the distributive 
norms of the welfare state and instead emphasised personal responsibility. One respondent 
condemned direct transfers to the poor for moral reasons: receiving something for free 
makes people lazy and unproductive270. Another, a senior member of the DAWN 
Commission, explained the problem as he saw it: “Oyo, over the years they’ve been used to 
                                                          
268  JM2-1 Local Trader, Junction Market, Ibadan, 03/07/2015 
269  NM5-1 Apples Seller and Oranges Seller, Neighbourhood Market, Ibadan 9/07/2015 
270  I-28 Local Level APC Politician and Member of Ajimobi's Campaign Team, Ibadan, 
26/05/2015 
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a 'something for nothing government' where they don’t offer anything in return.”271 
Ajimobi’s Ajumose slogan summarised the belief that it was inappropriate for government to 
simply ‘do things for’ the people, rather state and society should do thing together, in 
partnership. The fact that empowerment is so at odds with Ajimobi’s stated politics makes it 
a revealing case study to see how governments reconcile apparently incompatible activities 
with their overall agendas.  
This section presents three case studies of how empowerment and immediate benefits were 
distributed to select political constituencies. The first example looks at the role of the 
Ajumose Coalition Movement in delivering empowerment to traders, the second considers 
empowerment at the local government level and the final one looks at the First Lady’s 
involvement in empowerment schemes and other key social programmes. 
Loans and Empowerment to Traders 
Since the beginning of his political career Ajimobi has run empowerment projects of his 
own, out of a vocational training centre he had been running since the time when he entered 
the Senate in 2003.272 The empowerment schemes conformed to the set pattern of twinning 
training with gifts and money. The centre offered young people low-cost skills training in 
mobile phone repairs, hairdressing, tailoring and the like. One instructor at the centre 
explained the rationale for empowerment as giving the students something so that “they can 
stand on their own.” 273 The recruits received training over a few weeks or a few months, and 
at a graduation ceremony the patron of the scheme would give each recruit some equipment 
and money to start their business. As Governor, Ajimobi needed to engage in empowerment 
on a much larger scale so that it could support not only an individual Senatorial campaign, 
but increase the party’s presence across the state.  
Ade, a senior member of the APC, who held a leading role in the 2015 Ajimobi re-election 
campaign, explained the party’s strategy274. There were four groups who were key to the 
outcome of the election: civil servants, elite opinion-formers, religious groups and 
                                                          
271  I-33 
272  AJ1-1 Senior Employee, Ajumose Vocational Training Centre and Ajimobi Campaign 
Headquarters, Ibadan 21/05/2015 and AJ1-2 Teacher, Ajumose Vocational Training Centre, Ibadan 
21/05/2015 
273  At the time of the author’s fieldwork it appeared that Ajimobi had withdrawn resources from 
his initial personal empowerment programmes at the vocational centre. There had not been a round of 
empowerment for several years, beyond some ad hoc payments to a handful of students. Moreover, 
the training centre appeared to have been downsized, operating four different classes out of a single 
room at the Ajimobi Campaign Headquarters. Field-notes from visits on 21/05/2015 and 27/07/2015 
274  I-49 'Ade' Senior Member of Ajimobi's Re-Election Campaign, Ibadan 06/08/2015 
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associations. Their plan was to focus on the groups whose votes they could win, and leave 
the one group they knew they couldn’t: civil servants. Politically, civil servants represented 
the old inefficient public sector, with which the efficient, technocratic Lagos Model was to 
be a break. They were a source of both prohibitive social demands for wages and benefits 
(Manuaka 2015), and a source of resistance to reform and restructuring (Adekanmbi 2012; 
Tribune 2012). Moreover, many civil servants felt mistreated by Ajimobi for what they saw 
as a vindictive personnel audit and for his failure to pay salaries or pensions in full since oil-
revenues fell in November 2014(Daily Trust 2015). 275 By contrast, Ladoja was seen as a 
strong ally of the civil servants and it was assumed that they would back him in the election 
(Premium Times Nigeria 2015b). 
 This left three groups to target: elite opinion-formers276, religious groups and associations. 
Ade’s role was to mobilise the associations. This section explains how the associations were 
incorporated into party networks and then presents a case study of how the government 
enacted programmes that delivered immediate benefits to this key political constituency. 
In 2013, Ade started building up a network of associations called the Ajumose Coalition 
Movement (ACM). The ACM was the main method of delivering empowerment events for 
traders as part of APC party building efforts. The ACM was made up of pre-existing social 
and informal economic organisations that agreed to ally with the APC, and campaign for 
them around the election in exchange for access to some benefits. The Movement was led by 
Ade. By late 2014 the movement had 168 member groups, including the Oyo branches of the 
National Carpenters Association, the Nigerian Barbers, the Butchers Association, and a 
hairdressers association. In addition to informal economic associations, groups of young 
men - who could plausibly have been described as ‘thugs’ but Ade called ‘Area Boys’277 and 
whom the government only started ‘recognising’ at Ade’s behest - were part of the ACM.    
The formation of the network in itself improved the accessibility of the government, 
regardless of the instrumental benefits the members got from it. Ade approached the 
associations in person, to make the case for joining the movement. This was a form of 
access, and one that created spaces for negotiation, as the associations had something the 
                                                          
275  I-16 Retired Permanent Secretary to Oyo State Government, Ibadan 21/04/2015 and I-30 
Retired State Civil Servant, Ibadan 10/05/2015 
276  Elite opinion-formers were defined by Ade as “those who have control of their zone” and in 
the past included godfathers like Adedibu and Arisekola. As it stood, he explained that there were two 
elite opinion formers for the Government to focus on: Aminat Abiodun, the Iyalode (woman leader of 
market traders) of Ibadanland, and the Alaafin of Oyo, a major traditional ruler based in the state’s 
second city, Oyo town.   
277  I-49 
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APC wanted: a well structured group of members. This face-to-face contact continued over 
time. Ade went back to each group once a month to meet with the Chairmen and the 
Executive. Ade described these meetings as “interactive sessions” where information flowed 
both ways: he would “educate them about government policies” and they would tell him 
“what are those things that they want government to do for them.”278 
The flow of information upwards was important during the key campaigning period before 
the election. The members could feed back to Ade about what the opposition were up to, so 
he could better counter it in press releases. To do this, Ade gave all the members his phone 
number and that of his secretary. This represented an opening, where information could flow, 
in contrast to the detachment, and barriers that people encountered when trying to access the 
state government generally. Furthermore, having the number of a senior politician is a 
resource in itself, it marks a possibility or potential option for ordinary people that they can 
draw on should they need to call on someone in government in an emergency.  
Crucially, the ACM provided targeted access to Ajimobi himself, who otherwise was seen as 
a remote Governor. The following quote serves as an example of how accessibility provides 
space for interactions that are not simply exchanges of information in the sense of 
representations of reality. Instead they are sites where different sorts of experience can 
become relevant information. In this case, personality: 
“And when it is time for Oga [the Governor] to address them, I brought him in to 
address them, to assure them that all what the Accord people are saying outside are 
different from his personality.”279  
This opening of communication led the way for groups to make demands on government 
that were outside of Ajimobi’s espoused political agenda. In what turned out to be one of the 
most important events of the second half of Ajimobi’s first term, the major Market Trader’s 
Association in Ibadan made a series of requests to the government. Their executive asked for 
three things: vehicles, financial support and pilgrimage slots. All of these are short term, 
private or club goods that they would immediately benefit from. How did the government 
respond? 
The programme of interest-free loans to traders became one of the government’s highest 
profile programmes in the second half of the administration. Ajimobi and his team often 
referred to the loans as evidence of his ability to deliver empowerment to the grassroots and 
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thus counteract claims that his government had only helped the elites. On a calendar 
promoting Ajimobi’s 2nd term, 12 of his achievements are listed with accompanying 
photographs. The central photo is headed “Welfare and Empowerment”, and the only other 
empowerment related photo is captioned “Interest Free Loans to Market Men and Women” 
and depicts Ajimobi holding cheques whilst shaking people’s hands. A news editorial on 26th 
April 2015 lists reasons why Ajimobi won a second term, and “the Ajimobi government 
provided interest-free loans to traders” is the final one (Ogunyemi 2015). An APC 
chieftain280, cites this as a reason to re-elect Ajimobi in an interview with Tribune before the 
2015 election. He says it was a loan to “recapitalise their business” (Adekanmbi 2015). 
In December 2013, Ajimobi made promises to the traders, at what was described in the news 
as an ‘interactive stakeholder meeting’. Six market associations were to get N50m each 
(Ogunyemi 2013; Premium Times Nigeria 2013k). Every stage of the process, from the 
initial pledge to the disbursement, was attended with extensive news coverage and publicity. 
The promised funds were delivered a year later, at a ceremony at Lekan Salami Stadium that 
was broadcast by Channels Television. 6,000 traders, from six major traders’ associations in 
the State, attended.281 The event featured singing, music, dancing and photo opportunities of 
the governor handing out giant cardboard cheques (Channels TV 2014).  
The event is framed in a way that balances the idioms of popular conceptions of good 
governance, with statements tying the government to international agendas of private sector 
led development. The reporter’s voice-over explains how this program fits in to larger 
processes of economic growth that very much fit within the Lagos Model: “These traders 
now have a stronger capital base and this is expected to transform their businesses”. The 
Special Adviser to the Governor on Trade and Investment said the programme “will drive 
the state forward and bring inclusive and sustainable development” (Channels TV 2014). 
The logic of group patronage – giving the loans in lump sums to six supportive organisations 
– was re-framed in official discourse as a developmental targeting of marginalised and 
vulnerable individuals with loans that had transformative economic potential. For example, a 
representative of the Central Bank of Nigeria linked the programme not just to growth but to 
financial inclusion; “it will make funds and finance available to the most vulnerable groups, 
including micro, small and medium sized enterprises” (Johnson 2014b). The loans were part 
                                                          
280  The phrase 'party chieftain' is commonly used to refer to people with formal or informal 
decision-making power within a political party. 
281  Ibadan Joint Traders’ Association; State Market Men and Women Association; Nigeria Youth 
Traders Association; National Traders And Market Leaders Council; Oyo State Canteen Food Sellers 
And Artisan Association of Nigeria (Johnson 2014b). 
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of the CBN’s N220bn Micro, Small and Medium Entrepreneur Development Fund 
(MSMEDF) scheme, for which Oyo signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the CBN 
in July 2014 and formed part of the CBN’s National Financial Inclusion Strategy.  
This allowed Ajimobi to enact political empowerment programmes to build his party support 
base, whilst simultaneously meeting the current donor priorities such as the World Bank’s 
Universal Financial Access goal, for which Nigeria was a target country (World Bank 2015). 
Ajimobi announced that the state government had its own target of 80% financial inclusion 
by 2020 (Johnson 2014b; CBN 2012). The combination of these two discourses results in a 
peculiarly neoliberal conclusion. It asserts that the government should only assist those who 
are in the most extreme deprivation for reasons of charity rather than rights. Further, the 
costs of such assistance to the most deprived are outweighed by its beneficial contribution to 
economic growth. Therefore, government social spending is justified on the grounds that it is 
both pro-poor and economically rational. 
The external financing of the loan programme also served a variety of purposes: maintaining 
the financial probity of the state government and opening up non-budgetary fiscal space for 
Ajimobi to respond to political demands that contradicted his stated principles. The loans 
were financed via the MSMEDF which was disbursed to micro-finance institutions before 
being lent out at a higher rate of interest to the traders themselves. This enabled the Ajimobi 
to extend N300m in patronage at no cost to himself or his cash-strapped government. It also 
allowed the government to shift the burden of the cost to the future and to the beneficiaries 
themselves who were required to repay the loans at between 9% and 15% (Idowu 2016). 
This scheme shows how the Governor found ways to deliver empowerment whilst fulfilling 
international conceptions of good governance.   
This contrasts with how lower level government officials saw the empowerment 
programmes that they ran locally. In one local government, the Director of Education and 
Social Services, the officer with overall responsibility for the local government 
empowerment programmes run by the CDU, described the aims of their women’s 
empowerment as follows: 
“After the training the government will now empower them to buy the equipment 
for them so that when they get to their various homes and start doing something at 
least to make ends meet.”282 
                                                          
282  DLG1-2 Director of Education and Social Services, Ibadan Downtown Local Government, 
Ibadan 13/07/2015 
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This alternative account of the economic rationale of empowerment programmes focuses on 
women’s coping mechanisms to meet daily consumption demands. In contrast to Ajimobi 
and the CBN’s expectations that the loans be transformative, the Director expressed more 
limited aspirations for empowerment programmes.  
Within a framework of meaning that was dominated by the Lagos Model of good 
governance, there were still oblique references to ideas that resonate with the grassroots 
model. The traders are reported as coming from “across the 33 Local Government Areas of 
Oyo State” to benefit from the governor’s “Economic Empowerment Programme.” It is 
reported that Ajimobi referred to the loans as his “own stomach infrastructure” (Channels TV 
2014). This represents an acknowledgement of the PDP criticisms of Ajimobi’s lack of 
human face raised above.  
However, to some extent the brute material facts of the programme overrode the uniform but 
superficial coding of the project as anything but patronage. The overall programme – it’s 
aesthetics and its distributive party political logic – fitted seamlessly into the existing ideas 
of what ‘empowerment’ looks like, established over years of political performance by parties 
of all stripes which ordinary Nigerians are familiar with both from lived experience and TV 
and newspaper reports. The loud-speakers, the dancing, the marquees, the photo 
opportunities were all familiar motifs of the generous governor sharing the dividends of 
democracy with the people.  
In terms of the political values on display at the event in Lekan Salami Stadium, the whole 
set-up was so strongly couched in meanings drawn from the grassroots model of good 
governance, that the verbal public account of its meaning was unnecessary. This opened up 
the realm of verbal discourse to serve alternative ends and audiences. It gave space in 
Ajimobi’s speech and the contributions of government and CBN officials to an alternative 
interpretation: an interpretation of the event based on the Lagos Model and international 
models of good governance. Put another way, through the enactment of clear and widely-
understood forms of grassroots good governance, Ajimobi could do one thing and say 
another. This intentional ambivalence over the meaning of empowerment events served as a 
tool for resolving the tensions between the Lagos and grassroots model of good governance.  
In responding to the traders’ other two demands – pilgrimage slots and vehicles – Ajimobi 
stayed clear of state finances entirely. Explaining Ajimobi’s response to the demand for 
buses, Ade seemed hesitant: 
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“Oga succeeded... [pauses] in giving out about 80 to 100 buses. To all these 
associations. So each association that has the resources, they will give them 
buses.”283 
Giving out gifts of vehicles to potential political supporters presented an intense 
contradiction for politicians operating within the Lagos Model. As discussed in chapter four, 
Ajimobi’s predecessor had handed out similar gifts to high-profile elites, which were then 
spurned by the intended recipients on the grounds that the practice was corrupt. Ajimobi’s 
claim to good governance was based on his rejection of such amala politics. At this point in 
our interview Ade was faced with the tension between explicitly admitting that the Governor 
violated the Lagos Model’s stated principles, and taking credit for an achievement that was 
seen by key constituents as a demonstration of good governance. This helps explain Ade’s 
pause and reveals it as a moment of direct confrontation between competing conceptions of 
good governance.     
The Babaloja, the male leader of a section of the market association that was negotiating 
with Ajimobi, judged Ajimobi’s response positively. He was impressed with the six 18-seater 
buses that the association received, describing it as “huge money.”284 Yet, the allocation of 
buses was not advertised in the same way as the loans. In fact, the only online sources of 
evidence for such gifts was on Florence Ajimobi’s Facebook page. Between March 16th and 
April 7th 2015, 16 groups, comprising market, religious and youth associations attended 
small private rallies with Florence Ajimobi. At least four of them are shown receiving 18-
seater buses285 and others received APC-branded cloth, motorbikes and a transformer286.  
These empowerment gifts provide another example of the Ajimobi administration 
responding to requests from the grassroots with different levels of transparency depending 
on how well the request fitted in with the public commitments of the Lagos model. The loan, 
which was presented as a transformative instrument for financial inclusion was advertised on 
TV and in newspapers, with Ajimobi and members of his cabinet giving public speeches.  
                                                          
283  CLG 4-1 Caretaker Chairman of Local Government, Ibadan Central Local Government, 
Ibadan 05/08/2015 
284  CM2-2 Babaloja, Central Market Extension, Ibadan 07/07/2015 
285  https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAjimobi/posts/769530949821383; 
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAjimobi/posts/767837776657367; 
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAjimobi/posts/767842286656916; 
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAjimobi/photos/pcb.773042772803534/773041569470321/?type
=3&theater; https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAjimobi/posts/761610390613439.   
286  See Appendix 3.b for complete sources 
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The gifts of buses and pilgrimage slots that were more clearly tied to building up party 
support, by buying off a group at a time, were advertised minimally, on social media, rather 
than traditional media, and used Florence Ajimobi as their figurehead, rather than the 
Governor himself. 
Ade confirmed that it was state government money that went towards financing these 
benefits and that they were directed towards those who had signed up to the APC supporting 
Ajumose Coalition Movement. I put it to Ade that this was a form of vote buying, which he 
denied; 
“No, it’s not they are buying votes! Because we did it before the election [his voice 
grows] we are not buying vote! It is just like responsibility of government to the 
people. ... We don’t need to buy votes.  It’s because they were convinced.”287  
The network of party patronage depended on group affiliation, rather than individual 
membership. This follows long-established patterns of indigenous political organization in 
Ibadan, where clients are primarily organised on the basis of associations (Omobowale and 
Olutayo 2010). As Omobowale and Olutayo show in their study of political clientelism in 
rural Ibadan, there are a number of advantages for politicians in interacting with groups 
rather than individuals. From the point of view of patrons, associations offer economies of 
scale. Strong norms of group loyalty mean that members face high social costs, and a 
possible loss of the material benefits that come with membership, if they betray a 
collectively made decision to offer loyalty to a patron. This enables associations to make 
credible commitments which make them desirable to politicians in electoral calculations 
(Omobowale and Olutayo 2010, 458). This is supported by Ade’s statement that to join the 
ACM: 
“First of all you need to be a member of an association. And you work within the 
scope of your association. You cannot come and say 'I want to join!; NO! It is your 
association that can join. The body will join!”288 
Politicians use their client groups to conduct informal campaigning in advance of elections, 
drawing on personal networks and relationships to spread their message. Omobowale and 
Olutayo’s observation, that politicians are seen as less credible than ordinary campaigners, is 
born out in Ade’s comments.  
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“If I go to there and talk to them they will say, 'Sah, yes.' But down in their mind 
they will still say 'He’s a politician.' But let one of them go there and address them, 
they will have confidence.”289 
Informal campaigning at election time was a primary responsibility of members of the ACM.  
 “When it’s time for real legwork, I now ask each association to give me five-five 
members from each local government. And when you now add five [each from] 168, 
you now have, you see. They do what we call one on one campaign, interpersonal!” 
290 
Again this matches the wider pattern of associations campaigning for their patron, described 
by Omobowale and Olutayo. Group members “informally campaign and solicit the support 
of friends, family members and other close associates” often going “house-to-house” 
(Omobowale and Olutayo 2010, 461, 470). The Babaloja explained his own association’s 
participation in the ACM in similar terms. The campaigning was organised via monthly 
meetings (either the last Tuesday or the last Thursday of the month) at chapter and zone 
level, through which they disseminate information. The market association was a pre-
existing organisational structure which penetrated different localities around the state. Its 
members are active already for business purposes, making the association an effective basis 
for election campaigning, because it had instant reach and a ready-made audience.  
The distribution of loans and buses to groups within the Ajumose Coalition Movement 
appeared to have the intended effect of increasing Ajimobi’s political support. Many of the 
groups that had benefitted made public statements in favour of Ajimobi’s second term and 
the large umbrella groups organised an appreciation rally in early 2015 to show their support 
for Ajimobi (Adeniyi 2014), including the Babaloja of Central Market Extension291. The 
Spokesman for the Oyo Joint Traders Association announced at a rally on February 9th 2015 
that the association was endorsing Ajimobi for a second term (News Agency of Nigeria 
2015)292.  
More generally, the programme had some success in influencing the perception of the 
Governor in terms of accessibility. The Babaloja was pleased with himself for connecting the 
people beneath him to the government, and securing tangible benefits. He explained, “they 
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292  https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAjimobi/posts/743849645722847 
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cannot access the government on their own except through us”.293 From interviews with 
other traders there was evidence that even just the news of the scheme had a positive effect 
on Ajimobi’s reputation. Some of my informants who weren’t included in the scheme had 
heard about it on the radio and suspected that the reason they hadn’t benefited was because 
their market leaders had deceived them. Therefore, the loan had knock on effects beyond the 
immediate group who received the funds. This opened the possibility in the minds of other 
traders that perhaps when Ajimobi got back into power he would undertake another round of 
loans and they would benefit294.  The association leaders gave the impression that they 
approved of the Ajumose Coalition Movement process, and were comfortable with the quid 
pro quo involved. The Babaloja noted that they were successful in their demands because the 
government “needed our votes”. 
Yet, there was a sense that perhaps the Governor hadn’t got entirely what he paid for. The 
Babaloja was disappointed in his traders for not voting for Ajimobi as strongly as he hoped: 
“people didn’t do well generally.”  
“They [our members] are stupid…because the man tried for us and no past Governor 
has done so well like that. Anyway, they tried a little, only that they didn’t do up to 
what I expected despite we had series of meetings with traders.” 
He seemed frustrated that the networks he mobilised had not been as susceptible to political 
influence as expected, thus undermining his ability to act as a negotiator with politicians on 
their behalf.  
The connections this forged between the market associations and government are especially 
important given that for the first two years of the Ajimobi administration the government 
had been demolishing markets with no input from local leaders. The loan package showed 
that, in contrast to this hard-nosed image, Ajimobi was a man who could be negotiated with, 
and the Ajumose Coalition Movement had given them the channels to do so. It helped the 
government achieve accountability as accessibility, and the arrangement with the CBN 
meant that the loan package was a way of doing this that did not threaten the state’ fiscal 
record.  
The N300million loan programme was empowerment on a stadium-filling scale. It aimed at 
building state-wide political support through co-optation of elite actors like the Iyaloja of 
Ibadanland who headed state-wide networks (OSG Website 2013b). The national publicity 
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on Channels TV and coordination with national elite actors like the Central Bank of Nigeria 
extended the event’s reach, whilst placing limits on how event was carried out. The next case 
study shows how quieter, small-scale empowerment programmes were used to build support 
at the local level. The state government drew on the social embeddedness of local 
government Chairmen and CDUs to “mobilise the grassroots”295 and extent the networks of 
government patronage to the ward level. 
Local Government Empowerment 
It is an oft-repeated cliché in discussion of politics in Nigeria that local government is the 
tier 'closest to the people'. In the 1999 constitution certain functions, like primary education 
and healthcare, were delegated to local governments with the justification that they would 
know best how to direct and target resources in their local communities. Furthermore, 
community groups have a formal role in local government through a nationwide structure of 
Community Development Associations (CDAs), which bring together owner-occupiers, 
tenants associations and community leaders. The CDAs are federated into Community 
Development Councils (CDCs) at the level of each LGA, which connect with government 
via CDUs296. The CDUs report to the Director of Education and Social Services, one of 12 
directors in each local government, who then finally reports to the Chairman. As such, local 
government could be seen as well-placed to administer empowerment schemes. 
This case study shows that, just like the loan programme, local government empowerment 
programmes navigated the tensions between the grassroots model of good governance and 
the Lagos model, to which Ajimobi was publicly committed.  The programme showed voters 
that the government could respond to grassroots conceptions of good governance, but stayed 
within the policy red-lines dictated by the financial and ideological prerogatives of the Lagos 
Model. Finally, it also opened up opportunities that were not available to the Governor at the 
state level. For example, the local government was able to conduct cost-effective and 
carefully targeted empowerment programmes that both responded to the demands for 
grassroots good governance as well as delivering votes for the ruling party on a tight budget. 
Whilst this case study focuses just on one local government, which I refer to by the 
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296  There are also links between the CDCs and the State Community Development Unit which 
has field headquarters, with staff who regularly visit their local government counterparts and the Oyo 
State Community and Social Development Agency.  
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pseudonym ‘Ibadan Central Local Government’, other local governments undertake 
women’s empowerment and skills training programmes as well297.  
The Chief of Staff explained that the Local Government Chairman and himself has 
conducted empowerment in two stages. The first stage was in 2012 and consisted of giving 
out equipment such as sewing machines, pepper grinders and hairdryers, as well as small 
sums of money as ‘take-off’ grants to between 450-500 beneficiaries298. The grants were 
worth between N50,000 and N100,000, and were calculated so that everyone received 
roughly the same spread across the equipment and the grant.  A brochure given out at a 
celebration of the Chairman’s first year in office lists this programme under 
“Empowerment”299. The second phase of empowerment was a women’s training scheme in 
2013. 550 women underwent five months' training, in one of 15 disciplines. The training was 
overseen by the Chairman’s wife, and run out of a local school hall to save money. At the 
end of the programme the women were ‘empowered’ with equipment and a N10,000 grant. 
The Chairman had been planning another round until oil prices crashed and local 
government revenue fell below the monthly salaries and wages budget. These empowerment 
programmes were important elements of the Chairman’s effort to build support locally for 
Ajimobi. Empowerment was of course not the only element in the Chairman’s agenda. It 
was the ‘human development’ component of a wider package of local government spending 
which also included money of local capital projects like boreholes, toilets and drains300.  
The Chairman and his staff made it clear that the allocation of equipment was done in line 
with the bottom-up “felt needs”301 of the beneficiaries, replicating the discourse of the 
Community-Driven Development paradigm (Immerwahr 2014). The Chief of Staff 
emphasised to me that unlike previous local government politicians who would give sewing 
machines to barbers and bags of flour to shoe-makers, which would then lie unused, this 
government had targeted their resources carefully, asking the people what they wanted and 
                                                          
297  The Local Government Council Chairman at Afijio said his council had run women’s 
empowerment and children's welfare schemes and offered support for the disabled (Heritage Echo 
News 2014). The wife of the Council Chairman in Ibadan North said at one of the Ajumose events 
that her husband’s administration also offered empowerment for women through training packages 
(TopCelebritiesNg 2014). 
298  A brochure produced by the chairman states that 500 people benefited, whilst the Chief of 
Staff put the figure at 450. Interview with CLG 4-2 Chief of Staff to the Chairman, Central Local 
Government, Ibadan 05/08/2015 
299  Local government Chairman’s Brochure of Achievements 2012, obtained from Chairman’s 
office, local government compound.  
300  Ibid. 
301 CLG 4-1 and CLG 4-2  
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giving it to them. As an example he told me about one man who, to their surprise, had asked 
for a television to set up a football watching gallery. Driven by the principle that the 
community know best what they need for development, he obliged302. This ensured that 
“whatever we do for them at the end of the day, it will really have an impact in their life.”303 
There’s no evidence of whether this was in fact how benefits were distributed but it was 
obviously important that the local government be seen as operating in this way. The 
Chairman and the Chief of Staff were after all making a case to me for why they were a good 
government.  
Compared with the carefully framed loans to traders’ event at the state level, there were 
elements of the local level empowerment programmes that more clearly deviated from the 
Lagos Model and reflected the practical realities of everyday politics in Ibadan Central Local 
Government. Recipients were not given grants equal to the expected costs of a business, but 
only 60-70% because, the Chief of Staff explained, “[t]hey too should be able to run around 
their families and get certain things to augment it.”304  
The local governments were able to engage with society in ways that were politically 
sensitive and that the state government would not want to advertise to external audiences. 
Ajimobi’s predecessors, ex-Governor Akala and his infamous godfather Adedibu, were 
synonymous with thug-rule, and their rule was supported by mobilising thugs from the 
National Union of Road Transport Workers in street violence (Omobowale and Olutayo 
2007; Hoffman and Nolte 2013). Ajimobi’s most popular achievement was breaking the link 
between government and thugs, and bringing security to the state (see Ch.4 and 5). However, 
this meant that it became politically difficult to associate with thugs, lest the Ajimobi 
government undermine their successful distancing from such groups and commitment to 
technocratic politics. Yet, it was politically useful at a local level to have groups of thugs or 
touts on-side. The Ibadan Central Local Government had extended its empowerment 
programme to cover monthly payments to groups of touts in the local area, also known as 
thugs or ‘hoodlums’, as had at least one other local government in 2014305. The Chief of 
Staff explained: 
“we do meet with them periodically. To tell them, how they should operate, how 
they should conduct themselves, so that there won’t be any cause for the government 
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and them to have a face off [confrontation]. We give them certain things every 
month to maintain themselves, so that there won’t… when there is any … outbreak 
of crisis, when we call them they will have to check themselves.” 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the concept of accountability as accessibility refers to an 
ongoing communicative space where the governed and the government can meet. The 
example of ongoing communication and patronage to touts shows the benefits that this form 
of communication can offer local leaders. Regular meetings and small disbursements meant 
that the possibility of communication and negotiation remained open, should there be some 
unspecified future crisis. 
The Chairman’s implementation of the empowerment scheme appeared to have been 
influenced by international ideas of monitoring and evaluation. It was characterised by 
record-keeping and the generation of documents. I was provided with a print out of the LG’s 
achievements: a multi-page list of small-scale infrastructure, arranged ward by ward, to 
which the Chief of Staff made some additions in biro, after chasing some details by phone, 
to ensure it was up to date. The paperwork surrounding the empowerment programmes was 
even more extensive. As the Chief of Staff talked us through the scheme, he poured slips of 
A5 paper, neatly inscribed with names and telephone numbers, out of plastic folders until 
they filled the table. One document stood out because it was A4 and partly typed rather than 
handwritten. The title read, all in capitals, “CASH”, and names had been added in by hand 
below. 
This fecundity of paper had at an earlier moment been collated into a single typed document. 
The collated document had since been lost, but as far as he understood, it had been sent to 
the state government as part of a request to all LG’s for information on empowerment – that 
is, party-building-activities – which were to be ‘computerised’. Modes of bureaucratisation 
that would typically be associated with civil servants in a government bureaucracy were 
employed by appointed officials in the executive in service of party goals. The 
bureaucratisation was to facilitate centralisation, rather than representing a push towards 
improved government operations at the local level. When the information was presented to 
the public it was paraphrased in more general terms: 
“(i) Distribution of cash and equipment to over 500 beneficiaries in the first 
phase of [Central] Empowerment Programme. 
(ii) Financial assistance to individuals, organizations etc as part of social 
responsibility function.”306 
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As such, the bureaucratic tools associated with monitoring and evaluation of development 
schemes that I saw were directed upwards to assure the political godfather that patronage 
was delivered effectively. This shows the good governance technologies of power and 
practices can be reworked for a wide variety of ends. This links to James Ferguson’s wider 
claims about neoliberalism.  He writes that “specific institutional and intellectual 
mechanisms can be combined in a great variety of ways to accomplish quite different social 
and political end” (Ferguson 2015, 31). 
The local government empowerment scheme was patronage on a budget. At every stage the 
Chairman found ways to reduce the costs and extend the reach of the programmes. Those 
initially empowered were incorporated into a network of contacts who could be called upon 
in the future to take on apprentices sent to them by the Chairman, allowing him to claim to 
have empowered a second round of recruits. The use of the school for the women’s training 
event was explained in money-saving terms307.  
Most strikingly, the Chairman and the Chief of Staff took out personal loans to help finance 
empowerment schemes and financial assistance. The Chief of Staff was confident he would 
recoup the initial costs through his political career in the long-run. This material investment 
was justified because it was spent on schemes that he was sure would be popular: 
“It is the impression that people have about me that will determine what I become 
tomorrow. So even if it is uncomfortable for me I will still want to do certain things 
to please people. Because it is when they really understand the way you feel about 
their plight that they will have confidence in your leadership.”308 
Partly his confidence came from indications of loyalty and appreciation he had already seen. 
The Chief of Staff was emphatic about the political success of the empowerment rounds, 
saying that 70% of the recipients had ‘been loyal’: “That’s why up until today we still have 
some people that have felt very loyal to the government and the party.” In other words, the 
Chief of Staff was so sure empowerment schemes would make people think of him as a good 
politician, that he was betting his own finances on it. 
The First Lady 
This final case study looks at how the Governor and his wife, Florence Ajimobi, used the 
semi-official Office of the First Lady to meet political objectives and cultivate economic 
flows that contradicted the stated principles of financial probity and anti-corruption of the 
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Lagos Model. The wives of Governors, local government Chairmen and the President have 
long been famed for running “post-hoc, uncoordinated and cosmetic” ‘pet’ projects 
(Ihonvbere 1993, 146). Though the First Lady role is not constitutionally defined, the “First 
Lady Syndrome” has become a familiar feature of Nigerian public administration (Smith 
2010). For instance President Jonathan’s wife had a major media profile, sometimes shaping 
the government’s response to key policy issues, such as the #BringBackOurGirls campaign 
(Ejiofor 2014). The role is not subject to financial oversight or democratic accountability. 
and pet projects have been criticised as wasteful and corrupt, such as the Better Life for 
Rural Women programme started by the wife of General Babangida and continued by Mrs 
Abacha (Smith 2010, 249).  
Mrs Ajimobi is from a major Lebanese-Nigerian trading family and has a number of 
properties and business ventures of her own, including shops in two of Ibadan’s major new 
shopping malls (Ajayi 2011; Paper Mache News 2014; Politicoscope 2015). She runs a 
number of projects out of the Office of the First Lady which is situated in the State 
Secretariat complex (Tribune 2016; Adeyemi 2016). These include ICT, education and 
healthcare projects (Nigerian Alert 2014; Politicoscope 2015).   
This section considers two of her projects and how they contributed to her husband’s re-
election campaign. The projects represent opposing models of providing immediate benefits 
to constituents. The first is a free, open to all, health project which largely conforms with the 
Lagos Model’s publicly stated approach of ‘social infrastructure’. The second case study 
looks at two schemes which involve the distribution of small scale patronage to 
constituencies on at least a partly political basis. The way that these two diverging case 
studies are rendered transparent or otherwise to international audiences highlights the skilful 
way that the same project can be framed so as to conform to multiple competing conceptions 
of good governance.  
ABC Clinics 
 
The ABC Foundation, inaugurated in July 2013, is the First Lady’s biggest project. It has set 
up ABC clinics in 10 LGAs, each providing free healthcare to around 50 people a day309. 
Compared to government hospitals, the ABC clinics are well resourced with access to cloud 
                                                          
309  The clinics are made up of a three room portacabin, with one nurse, one computer operator 
and visiting doctors once a week. In addition to the clinics there is a central hub located off the ring 
road, with offices and a diagnostic centre.  
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storage, and online health resources. In ABC clinics, patients pay nothing, except small fees 
for diagnostic tests310.   
The provision of healthcare through private charitable channels was useful to the Governor 
in fulfilling international conceptions of good governance. The ABC clinics were presented 
by Ajimobi as a successful example of PPPs (Aboluwade 2013). Ajimobi said that such PPPs 
are especially useful in light of the “huge bills” of this “onerous task” of providing 
healthcare for the state’s 6million people (OSG Website 2013b). However, in the case of 
ABC clinics the ‘private’ that was being called to the aid of the ‘public’ was not at the level 
of economic structures and systems. For instance, private firms were not invited to bid for 
contracts to provide health care. Rather, it was the individual private resources of the wife of 
the Governor herself which were used. Whilst there was indeed collaboration between 
private and public actors, the division of public and private obscures the fact that the 
collaboration is within the same household. The public duties of the Governor were being 
met by the private resources of his wife. Official publicity describes ABC clinics as 
“primarily funded by Mrs Florence Ajimobi, wife of the Governor of Oyo State, Senator 
Abiola Ajimobi.” 311 
The claim that the ABC clinics were a partnership between the public sector public and 
private sector glosses what in reality was a more extractive relationship. The ABC Clinics 
were largely isolated from the rest of the state’s health systems. In fact, where there were 
interactions between the ABC clinics and the rest of the state healthcare system it involved 
public institutions contributing resources to the ABC clinics rather than the other way 
around. A source who had worked for Governor Ajimobi described the relationship between 
ABC and local governments as “collaborative” and he reported that the First Lady worked 
closely with the wives of the local government Chairmen312. Initially the staff were sourced 
from the state health service, via the Oyo State Hospital Management Board and Ministry of 
Health, though this had changed by 2015313. A spokesman of one LG said that the First Lady 
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paid for the drugs for the local centre, but the local government conducts “the general 
maintenance of the entire clinic” i.e. sweeping and cleaning.314  
Despite the emphasis in official publications that the ABC clinics were not government 
funded, they were frequently referred to as one of the major achievements of the Governor’s 
social infrastructure programme. The inauguration of the ABC Foundation was advertised in 
an official press release on the government website and statements made at the event implied 
that the ABC clinics were part of the Governor’s agenda:  
“Governor Ajimobi described the project as another fulfilment of his 
administration’s promises to the people of the State to use the office bestowed on 
him through their votes to change lives and make meaningful impacts in the State” 
(OSG Website 2013b). 
Moreover, the inauguration was a politicised event. One of the political godfathers of Oyo 
State, Arisekola, and other political elites such as the Iyalode (Head of Women) of 
Ibadanland, attended and used it as a platform to publicly endorse Ajimobi for a second term 
(OSG Website 2013b). As such, the ABC clinics blurred the lines between the private 
charitable activities of the First Lady, the political interests of the Governor’s re-election 
campaign, and finally government action in the public interest. 
The ABC clinics provide an example of how public and private interests interacted in the 
delivery of public goods and services under Ajimobi’s push for PPPs. The intention to use 
private sector resources and capacity in situations where the public sector is constrained is 
common throughout justifications of PPPs. Whilst creating a private charitable organisation 
enhanced the provision of healthcare in the state, it created channels for patronage to be 
funnelled from private firms to further the Governor’s private interest in re-election in 
exchange for access to the Governor. One source, who works in a health related field and has 
worked with the Governor for over a decade, claimed to have observed representatives of 
various major companies visiting the First lady’s office to offer contributions. “When you 
are in government you have a lot of good will”, he said. “[Y]ou can use your position to say 
‘If you want to make me happy, do this for me’. Many times people will even without her 
prompting, say ‘Madam, we want to do this.’”315 Among the bearers of good-will he knew 
of, was a major multinational food and consumer goods company.   
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An example of how businesses interested in contracts with the Governor helped to fund the 
ABC clinics, and in turn promote the Governor’s re-election bid, came in March 2013. Three 
Chinese companies donated to the ABC Foundation. The Camaco / YTO Group, represented 
by Mr Zhao gave tractors, the Geely Group represented by Mr Jeff Chu donated three cars, 
and the Shaolin Bus Group made a donation.  This is reported on Mrs Ajimobi’s own 
website. She is reported as thanking them for their support as the Foundation “depends 
solely on support from people and organisations as it is a non governmental organisation that 
has nothing to do with government.” (MrsFAjimobi.com 2014a) She ends by encouraging 
them to tell fellow Chinese investor to come to Nigeria (MrsFAjimobi.com 2014a). These 
three companies were in Oyo State to finalise arrangements with the government for 
building vehicle factories in the state. The investment plans were a result of Ajimobi’s visit 
to China some months before (WhatsUpIbadan.com 2015). 
Despite the multiple political purposes served by the ABC clinics, Florence Ajimobi and her 
team were adept at managing the presentation of the project and making it transparent to 
different audiences. The ABC Foundation has a lively and appealing online presence: in 
addition to its own website, it has a Global Giving page where anyone around the world can 
donate (GlobalGiving 2016). The Foundation has the stamp of approval of Global Giving. 
The webpage lists Toyin Akinfenwa as the Project Leader. There is a profusion of 
information provided about the project, and yet within the photos and reports there are key 
silences. The First Lady is nowhere to be seen.  
This stands in contrast to the marketing of the project within Ibadan. At the ABC Hub, I was 
given a leaflet about the Foundation by Toyin herself. The front cover depicted four nurses 
standing either side of a large logo of ABC painted on the wall, with the first line reading 
“Access to Basic Health Care”, and the second line, in the same size font, but darker, reading 
“Mrs Florence Ajimobi”. The back cover depicts her smiling in traditional aso oke cloth. 
Inside the first paragraph of text asks: What is ABC? The answer: “ABC represents the 
Access to Basic Medical Care, an initiative of Mrs Florence Ajimobi, wife of the Governor 
of Oyo State.” Under the objectives of the Foundation, the first listed is to “assist the 
government in achieving its transformation agenda for the state”. There is a sharp divide 
between the information directed towards international private donors on the Global Giving 
page, and the information directed towards constituents of the state.  
In one of the photos in particular, there was a telling visual silence. This photo on the Global 
Giving page depicts an ID card with an image of the southwest clinic, which I visited and 
passed by several times in my fieldwork, as it was at the entrance to the local government 
compound. There was one thing missing in the photo that I noticed as I passed: a 12-foot 
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colour poster of Mrs Ajimobi’s face, with the logo of Ibadan southwest local government at 
the top, and list of her “Other laudable programmes by her Excellency” at the bottom. 
All this is to show that the Foundation is presented in different, and mutually exclusive ways 
for different audiences. For an audience of online potential donors, it is important that the 
Foundation have no political links. The presence of the First Lady is fastidiously edited out. 
And yet, for the Oyo State audience, what was a silence turns into the main event. The most 
important piece of information for local audiences is that this is a project by the Governor’s 
wife, hence it is repeated throughout their local marketing. However, this blurring, or 
intentional obscuring of who runs the programme, is only one aspect of the grey areas that 
surround the funding and organisation of the project. From the information I gathered, it was 
not obvious that the Clinics were solely funded or run by the First Lady but had significant 
involvement of local governments and private companies looking to invest in Oyo State.  
Ajumose Food Bank and Widows Initiative 
 
Starting in October 2012, the Governor’s wife organised monthly distribution of food and 
sometimes cash to women, under the banner of Ajumose Food Bank.316 Two years later she 
commenced an almost identical scheme called Ajumose Widows’ Support Initiative and 
Widows’ Empowerment Programme, as well as a one-off Widow’s Empowerment 
Programme in May 2013 (T. Johnson 2014a; Sun News 2014).317 The stated aim of the Food 
Bank programme is to tour the state, visiting a different LGA each month to dispense food to 
widows or vulnerable market women. By April 2013 6,500 women had benefited, and there 
is online evidence of at least four rounds of the Food Bank before that date and five after, as 
well as a further five widows’ events.318 Reports suggest that the monthly events continued 
until at least December 2014 (Adekanmbi 2013b). The food bank may well have been the 
biggest of all Ajimobi’s empowerment initiatives during his first term. The total number of 
beneficiaires up until 2015 is somewhere between 10,500 and 17,000. This far exceeds the 
6,000 traders who benefited from the more widely publicised loans programme.   
Officially, the participants were chosen either on first come first served basis 
(MrsFAjimobi.com 2014b) or by their local governments and community to fill quotas from 
                                                          
316  Facebook page: 
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAjimobi/photos/a.327320784042404.80603.311844532256696/3
27322980708851/?type=3&theater   
317  https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAjimobi/posts/675601525880993 and 
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAjimobi/posts/714437151997430    
318  See Appendix 3.a for full list of sources 
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each ward in the LGA (Heritage Echo News 2014). However, as discussed in chapter five, 
many women were given slots as part of membership of Ajumose groups. The events were 
similar in their aesthetics to the loans to traders event in Lekan Salami Stadium, but the giant 
cheques were replaced with large plastic basins and bags of food, labelled “Ajumose Food 
Bank” or “Ajumose Widows Initiative”. Crowds of women, dressed up for the occasion, 
cheered as Florence Ajimobi handed them their gifts in turn. Photos of the events from 
Florence Ajimobi’s Facebook page and website occasionally depict women weeping and 
holding her clothes or kneeling in front of her to show appreciation. The language used to 
frame the events has none of the vocabulary of economic transformation seen in the previous 
two case studies, but focuses on the government’s care for women as they provide for their 
families from day to day. The foodstuffs are part of the Ajimobi administration’s programme 
of “welfare packages” to “ensure that they do not suffer hardship or go hungry”319 because 
widows are ‘dear to the heart of the administration” and “food is a basic necessity of life”320 
(MrsFAjimobi.Com 2014b; Sun News 2014).  
Ogunyankin (2014, 201–4), a scholar who has studied the Food Bank scheme, interprets the 
channelling of women’s empowerment through the Office of the First Lady as a trivialising 
the needs of women, and indicating that women are not important enough to deal with 
through formal structures. Whilst it is true that much of the justification for the focus on 
women reinforces patriarchal construction of gender roles – many of which Ogunyankin’s 
own informants contest – it is not accurate to say that in the Ajimobi administration it is the 
unimportant issues that get left to his wife. Indeed, her projects are important vehicles for 
integrating palliative social policies into a political agenda that officially states that there is 
no need for such measures. Ajimobi himself hardly features in the publicity for these events, 
only appearing in one of the photographs on his wife’s Facebook page. His absence allows 
for more leeway in terms of how the events are framed, whilst the close association with his 
wife leaves no doubt as to who the beneficiaries should vote for.   
As with ABC clinics, the ownership and funding of the programme is unclear. It is “an 
initiative of her Excellency” in “fulfilment” of her husband’s promise to prioritise women’s 
welfare321 or more generally “to fulfil the electioneering promises of Senator Abiola 
Ajimobi” (MrsFAjimobi.Com 2014b). At later events she said that the event was evidence of 
                                                          
319  https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAjimobi/posts/314027472038402 
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her husband’s “human face”322 and the programme was “being supported” by the 
Governor323. A news report from 2013 categorises it as “part of the poverty alleviation 
scheme of Senator Ajimobi’s administration” (MrsFAjimobi.Com 2014b). This places it in a 
blurred space where the actions of an actor formally outside of government are positioned as 
part of the government’s agenda. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has considered how the Lagos model responds to the final key theme in Yoruba 
politics: economic benefits. Compared to the demands for progress and legitimate 
leadership, the demand for immediate economic benefits posed difficulties for Governors 
who adopted the Lagos Model, because they relied on a consistent international 
representation of themselves as having enacted rupture with the previous mode of politics 
where voters were ‘bought off’ by profligate leaders with amala. Ajimobi faced a tension in 
the very idea of economic benefits. He had a strong normative commitment to being a 
transformative ‘great leader’ who would act on his people’s needs rather than their wants, 
which was implicitly endorsed by donor’s encouragement of insulating key agencies from 
political demands (Oladele 2014). And yet he was forced by electoral pressures to be 
accountable to demands that were based in the here and now of life for Oyo State’s poor 
majority. Moreover, the precarious livelihoods of his constituents had been made even more 
precarious with the crash in oil revenues and associated collapse in government expenditure. 
This chapter has used empowerment schemes as a lens to reveal the tensions in Ajimobi’s 
response to this demand, whilst conforming to the Lagos Model and remaining responsible 
according to international conceptions of good governance. It has demonstrated the political 
uses of an array of different transparency practices aimed at different audiences.  
The Governor’s party built up a patronage network of associations under the banner of the 
Ajumose Coalition Movement, which consisted of market associations, social groups and 
touts, among others. This network helped to build up support for Ajimobi and the party, but 
also opened up areas for the associations to make specific demands on government. The first 
case study explored how the Governor responded to demands for immediate benefits from a 
major market association. Whilst keeping his response to requests for buses and pilgrimage 
slots quiet, Ajimobi very publicly responded to their demand for financial assistance by 
offering interest free loans to their members. The loans had a large impact at a small 
                                                          
322   
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAjimobi/photos/a.327320784042404.80603.311844532256696/3
27322980708851/?type=3&theater 
323  https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAjimobi/posts/335753933199089 
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immediate cost to the government, through collaboration with the Central Bank of Nigeria, 
and were framed as transformational investments in entrepreneurs, rather than soft loans to 
political supporters.  
At the local government level, this chapter provided the example of the Ibadan Central Local 
Government and how the local government Chairman and his staff organised targeted 
empowerment schemes, that helped build up party support whilst on a budget. Finally, the 
Governor’s wife used her position on the margins of government to engage in empowerment 
and social provision whilst creating non-governmental spaces for the Governor to pursue 
party-building and economic strategies that were incompatible with international 
conceptions of good governance. The ABC Foundation is at once an example of public-
private partnership delivering high quality public services, a pet project in line with previous 
wives’ projects, and a channel for foreign companies to make donations to the Governor’s 
campaign. Via her Food Bank and Widows’ Support Schemes, Florence Ajimobi distributed 
patronage to thousands of women, at least some of whom were selected on the basis of party 
membership.  
These three diverse schemes are at once typical of Nigerian politics, as well as representing 
the Lagos Model’s attempts to demonstrate to international actors they had enacted a rupture 
with what had gone before. Ajimobi demonstrated two strategies for managing transparency 
on empowerment events to different audiences. The first two case studies showed how party 
patronage was presented in ways that conformed to international development discourses, as 
well as responding to the financial and spending constraints of the Lagos Model. In the case 
of loans to traders, party patronage was presented as both financial inclusion for the 
vulnerable and transformative capital funding for economic growth.  
The empowerment schemes of Ibadan Central Local Government utilised the processes and 
discourse of World Bank and DFID backed community driven development to extend the 
government’s networks into local communities (World Bank 2006b).  Both enabled APC 
leaders to consistently maintain a rejection of consumption-based amala politics, by 
emphasising that their payments were investments aimed at economic transformation, 
whether state or individual.  
The cases of the Food Bank and Widows Initiative, and Ade’s empowerment of traders’ 
associations were managed through strategic silence. Both had core attributes that made 
them hard to re-present within the international conception of good governance. The Food 
Bank involved the most direct form of patronage, the distribution of food, which closely 
replicated the amala politics Ajimobi had publicly disavowed. Ajimobi made no attempt to 
present the distribution of food in a particular way for an external audience, instead he didn’t 
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advertise it through official channels at all.  There is no official mention of it in the archive 
of press releases on the Oyo State government website. Rather, the event was advertised on 
the First Lady’s Facebook page324, her website and in two news articles that linked it 
exclusively to the First Lady. Similarly, Ade’s empowerment events were reported only on 
the First Lady’s Facebook page. Ade’s empowerment events were so explicitly linked to the 
party – through the branded APC cloth that was given out325, for example – that they were 
best kept out of sight of external audiences.  
The ABC clinics represent both strategies in the same project. Their presentation to multiple 
audiences involved careful performance of both transparency and silence. The GlobalGiving 
webpage involved detailed performances of transparency of certain aspects of the project, 
but meticulous silence about its political connections which conflict with the international 
conception of good governance as apolitical. For audiences within Oyo State, the political 
connections in fact constituted the Governor’s claim to good governance, and were 
repeatedly rendered transparent and visible.  
 
                                                          
324  It is reasonable to assume that First Lady’s Facebook account is indeed managed by her and 
her team. When a rival account, run by someone posing as the First Lady, was posted in 2015 the 
person who set it up was arrested (Ogbeche 2015). This suggests that the account referred to here 
must be genuine or else it would have been taken down. In fact, the case of the fraudulent account 
shows the corrupt alternative that the genuine empowerment schemes could be contrasted with. 
Whilst the allocation favours those who are part of APC networks, they do not have to pay ‘deposits’ 
to benefit, and they are not being swindled.  
325  See Appendix 3.a for sources: TAMPAN  
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Chapter 9 - Conclusion: the Politics of Competing Conceptions 
of Good Governance  
This thesis started by raising questions about two key arguments in mainstream donor and 
academic interpretations of contemporary Nigerian politics. The first is that there is only one 
conception of good governance that matters, which is the international conception of good 
governance as developed by the World Bank and subsequently adopted by the donor 
community en masse. This conception of good governance reflects universal norms and 
values, and can be contrasted with the opposing phenomena of corruption and 
neopatrimonialism (Dia 1993; Bratton and van de Walle 1994; Rotberg and West 2004; 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010; Rotberg 2014). Whilst this evolved over time, it 
maintained a core belief in private-sector led, technocratic governance which is expressed in 
a consistent development model made up of a package of policies and reforms: the good 
governance agenda (World Bank 1991, 1994, 1997; 2003a). The second key argument is that 
Nigeria, with decades of corruption and the erosion of formal institutions, is an example of 
the opposite of good governance (The Nation 2009; Cleen Foundation 2010; Amundsen 
2010; World Bank 2010b; Akinwale and Aderinto 2012; Adebanwi and Obadare 2013; 
Campbell 2013). Within this mainstream view, a thesis on good governance in Nigeria 
should assist with the task already commenced by donors and reformers, of pulling Nigeria 
out of the dark and into the light. Seen within this narrative Oyo State is a positive example 
of a transformation from one side of the binary to the other (Ajayi 2011, 200; Ajayi 2014).   
Instead, this thesis has shown that political transformations in the direction of the 
international conception of good governance are the result of complex political process. The 
enactment of policies from the donor good governance agenda serves a variety of 
unexpected interests, and is less successful in meeting popular demands than its claim to 
universality would suggest. There are multiple conceptions of good governance that shape 
Oyo State politics, and they can only be fully understood through a close analysis of how 
normative conceptions interact with political realities, interests and opportunities on the 
ground. In so doing we can trace the complexities of trying to enact rupture and replace one 
mode of politics with another. 
This concluding chapter presents a thematic overview of the thesis and its main findings. It 
then sets out three core debates to which the findings of this thesis contribute: the debate 
about African agency in interactions with donors, the debate about the ‘two publics’ in 
Nigeria, and finally debates about the role of values and material benefits in politics. 
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1. Overview 
Ajimobi, and other APC Governors in the southwest, adopted the Lagos Model for a variety 
of reasons. In part it was to signal their adherence to the good governance agenda and mark 
themselves out as a self-selecting good governance state. Chapter five showed this 
engagement with international actors allowed them to pursue policies that furthered their 
political and normative commitments. Politically it facilitated their autonomy from central 
government networks which marginalised southwestern opposition-held states, and 
connected them to international networks of prestige and resources. Normatively, it 
legitimised and, with external constraints, helped to justify domestic efforts to reconfigure 
what the normative relationship between the state and society should be. It imposed 
constraints on domestic policy which coincided with their pre-existing conceptions of good 
governance and political imperatives. However, the Lagos Model is distinct from the good 
governance agenda as it reflects the domestic political concerns of Yoruba elites, both in 
terms of political strategies which necessitate alternative policies and in terms of indigenous 
historical influences which shape the conception of good governance that it relies upon. The 
history of indigenous political competition requires all leaders to respond to popular 
demands on three key themes: progress, legitimate leadership and economic benefits. 
The logic of the Lagos Model is to detach and dis-embed the state from society to make it 
more effective and accountable in the long-term. Progress is understood as transformation, 
which only the enlightened public can understand and consent to. Legitimate leadership is 
understood as a government which performs, and through the delivery of tangible, visible 
outputs, proves both its effectiveness and accountability. The provision of economic benefits 
posed a challenge for the Lagos Model as it was associated with the politics of the recent 
past, which was seen as corrupt and backward. Furthermore, the constraints of the 
international conception of good governance and the realities of very low revenues, meant 
that from late 2014 the state government in Oyo was unable to pay salaries, let alone expand 
the distribution of resources.  
However, the Lagos Model was forced by resistance to its policies, political opposition and 
electoral pressures to respond to an alternative popular conception of good governance. The 
case of Ekiti, introduced in chapter one, highlights the risks of governments pursuing one 
conception of good governance and neglecting alternative values and demands. Chapter 
four laid out the long dialectic pattern of political competition in Yorubaland where the 
populist and progressive lines have been forced to innovate in response to the failures of 
their rivals.  
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Chapter six detailed the inherent tensions in the idea of progress. Progressive conceptions 
of development require a transformation or rupture with the existing system, where 'great 
leaders' act on the peoples’ needs rather than giving in to their wants. This poses a problem 
for how transformative leaders should be accountable. The Governor tried to carve out a new 
enlightened public, which would consist of those citizens who understood the long-term 
vision of development as transformation. In the case study of Neighbourhood Market this 
tension plays out in practice. The discourse from government suggests that if only the traders 
could see their suffering in a long-term perspective, then they would recognise that it was a 
sacrifice for future gain. Some of the more affluent or better connected traders undertook 
strategies to adjust to the poor sales, because membership of the enlightened public 
positioned them as members of a valued political community. 
In terms of legitimate leadership, the Lagos Model came up against demands for 
transparency in people and accountability as accessibility. The overall logic of this 
conception of legitimate leadership is one of connection between state and society. There 
should be close and free flows of information between rulers and the ruled, and that 
information must be legible and intelligible to an electorate where only one in three has the 
reading level in English to scrutinise official documents (DHS 2013, 34–38). Chapter seven 
presented contemporary examples of how politicians draw on these values to contest 
Ajimobi’s Lagos Model in discussions on the lack of human face in urban renewal policies 
and the lack of transparency in his connections to regional and international networks. 
Chapter five discussed how Lagos State under Tinubu and Fashola developed strategies for 
resolving the challenge of meeting demands for both short-term benefits and long-term 
progress, highlighted by the OPC crisis (set out in chapter four). Access to resources and 
long-term political control enabled Lagos State to deliver ‘performance’ rapidly enough that 
long-term policies like urban renewal and infrastructure investment, didn’t feel like pain 
without gain. It considered the differences between Lagos and Oyo State that shaped Oyo’s 
chances of repeating the electoral success of the Lagos Model, primarily in terms of access 
to internally generated resources. Chapter eight showed how Oyo State was confronted by 
competing conceptions of good governance whilst having to respond on a much smaller 
budget, and, after November 2014, in conditions of austerity.  
Chapter seven showed one strategy for dealing with popular demands that conflicted with 
the Lagos Model: ignore them. Within government, Ajimobi devised institutional means of 
bypassing political representatives and social constituencies. Technical committees like 
OSSEMAT and the Bureau of Investment Promotion and Public-Private Partnership were 
created to take control of key economic strategies like attracting investors and writing the 
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budget.  Key sections of the civil service were staffed by external consultants and donors 
like the World Bank took on a greater role in government. This allowed Ajimobi to insulate 
key decisions from intervention by more political appointees such as Commissioners.   
Another strategy employed by Ajimobi was to respond to demands for short term benefits 
whilst using the technologies of the good governance agenda itself to minimise the costs of 
meeting those demands (chapter eight). The case study of local government Chairman Ade, 
showed how empowerment was conducted in ways that ensured it was effective, giving 
constituents what they actually wanted to increase the likelihood that empowerment would 
translate into votes. Procedures that originated as tools for service provision can be equally 
applied to effective patronage distribution. Moreover the First Lady played a key role both in 
projects that were seemingly paradigmatic of the international conception of good 
governance, such as the high-tech ‘PPP’ run ABC clinics, and the more crude examples of 
patronage in the Ajumose Food Bank and Widows Initiatives. She also had a lead role in the 
distribution of patronage to traders, organised by Ade.  
Donor visions of good governance aspire to neatly cleave the technical task of managing 
development from the messy world of politics. However the findings of this thesis reinforce 
the argument that such a division is impossible (Leftwich 1994; Mkandawire 2010). In the 
case of Oyo State ideas of good governance form the basis of politics and cannot be not 
separated from it.   
The case of loans to traders, via the Ajumose Coalition Movement, in chapter eight, 
reaffirms Ajimobi’s skill at doing two things at once. The empowerment event enabled him 
to participate in a major donor-backed programme, whilst mobilising Central Bank funds to 
incorporate 6,000 traders into his party networks. Party structures were key to the targeted 
and efficient distribution of patronage to build political support. Chapter six presented a 
case study on a smaller scale. Traders at Neighbourhood Market used well-established 
networks around different trades to make themselves visible members of the party networks 
the Ajumose Solidarity Forum and Ajumose Youth League. Whilst the actual benefits of 
membership were sporadic and meagre, the efficiency of patronage spending on 
empowerment was high as it created an expectation among members of future benefits.  
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2. Contributions to Debates in the Literature 
Ownership and African Agency in Donor Politics 
Chapter two set out debates in the politics of development literature about whether there is 
any possibility of African states possessing genuine agency in interactions with donors. Even 
where self-selecting good governance states like Oyo, voluntarily enter into partnerships 
with donors, it is argued that African elites are acting upon a false consciousness, resulting 
from power exercised through governmentality. Indeed, Ajimobi and his contemporaries 
were not immune from the power of international actors to shape and define legitimate and 
illegitimate state action (Death 2010). In line with Abrahamsen’s analysis of the World 
Bank’s use of selectivity in general, Ajimobi had proven himself as “committed, responsible 
and willing to govern themselves wisely” according to “liberal democratic norms” 
(Abrahamsen 2004, 1454, 1461). This to some extent confirms the arguments that African 
states who enter ‘voluntary’ partnerships with donors are still subject to power, but through 
more pernicious governmentality than explicit coercion.  
However, to credit the entire normative orientation of the Lagos Model to international 
sources obscures the fact that Yorubaland has a long history of its own conceptions of good 
governance as an elite knowledge driven exercise (chapter four) (Peel 1978; Adebanwi 
2005). Beliefs that experts in government need to be insulated from political demands in 
order to give the people what they need rather than what they want, originate as much from 
inculcation into the political tradition of progressives in Yorubaland as they do from 
exposure to international conceptions of good governance. In fact, some principles that are 
implicit in the international conception of good governance but are impossible for donors 
like the World Bank and DFID to articulate explicitly, such as the need for coercive state 
action to modernise urban public space to attract investors, find a more confident expression 
and deeper political history in the Lagos Model. Whilst the governmentality approach sees 
African appropriations of good governance as mimetic, with a one-way transfer of normative 
content from international institutions to African elites, this thesis shows there to be more of 
a multi-directional and historically ongoing interaction. Oyo State shows that Nigerian elites 
both adopt international political ideas and mix them with their own.    
The arguments that emphasise the underlying influence of international donors’ ability to 
shape forms of legitimate state action are correct insofar as the Lagos Model is hugely 
influenced by international discourses of private-sector excellence and the importance of 
effectiveness. Chapter five showed that this goes as far as pro-Lagos Model politicians 
reinterpreting the ideas of past Yoruba leaders like Awolowo in new neoliberal terms. 
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However, there is evidence that Ajimobi made the international conception of good 
governance his own, through additional discursive and normative innovations such as an 
inversion of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs (chapter four) and the construction of an 
enlightened public (chapter six).  
Furthermore by focussing on specific actors within the ruling elite, rather than the state 
government as a unit, agency emerges in new ways. The First Lady was adept at engaging 
proactively with international donors and networks. Her projects show how governments can 
engage in activities that speak to contradictory conceptions of good governance, so long as 
their tension and contradictions are carefully managed. She employed a variety of 
transparency practices, such as making different elements of the same practice legible to 
different audiences. As Garsten and Jacobsen  (2011, 379) argue, the “processes of making 
visible and legible certain kinds of information also involve complex negotiations regarding 
what shall be displayed and what shall remain hidden.” The case studies in this thesis show 
that transparency is by no means a technocratic value, nor neutral in its implications, but a 
powerful political tool. Moreover, to use transparency in this way is a form of agency and 
shows that the practices and principles of the international conception of good governance 
can be a resource through which local elites assert their agency.  
Just as Awolowo and his contemporaries faced the difficult task of reconciling the embrace 
of Western enlightenment whilst still experiencing racist discrimination justified by the same 
Euro-centric attitudes, Ajimobi and his colleagues faced contradictions in their pursuit of 
modernity. Members of Ajimobi’s administration sought to position Oyo State in the context 
of a global evolutionary trajectory, with dysfunctional Africa behind them and pursue an 
assimilation into a vision of international capitalist modernity, “to attain the desired global 
status that she [Oyo State] deserves”  (Ajimobi 2015a). The administration explicitly drew 
on Western theories that denigrate post-colonial societies and promote an understanding of 
modernity as a peculiarly Western achievement. His Special Adviser on Media argued that 
Ajimobi’s victory vindicated Fukuyama’s The End of History (1992) thesis, whereby 
Ajimobi had achieved “the final form of human government through the advent of Western 
liberal democracy” (Adedayo 2015). 
Yet the contradictions of an African state devoting itself to an internationally defined ideal of 
modernity remain: the contradiction of accepting a belief in one’s inherent inferiority 
alongside the promise of finding value through transformation into a way of being that is 
accorded value by external arbiters. In light of these wider historical ideas of African under-
development and modernity, Ajimobi’s discourse of transformation takes on greater 
significance. The ACN/APC’s task of transforming Oyo State is not simply a project of 
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rectifying 8 years of PDP misrule, but a decades-, if not centuries-old project of redeeming 
Nigeria of it’s essential historical backwardness, and bringing it into the community of 
modern nations. This attests to the enduring relevance of post-colonialism to typically 
technocratic debates about ownership.  
Ekeh’s Two Publics 
One of the key contributions of this thesis is the exposition of alternative conceptions of 
transparency and accountability that influence how legitimate leadership is understood 
(chapters four and eight). These values show that there are pre-existing ideas of what 
transparency and accountability mean, of which the international conception of good 
governance takes no account. In popular notions of good governance, transparency is 
conceived of not primarily as pertaining to data but to people: leaders must make their 
character and social connections transparent. To whom do they have obligations and how 
can people know if they are trustworthy?  
Accessibility shares similarities with some donor concepts, such as voice (Hirschman 2004). 
A DFID Report defines voice as “the expression of preferences, opinions and views” (Rocha 
Menoca and Sharma 2008, 5). Yet, the concept of voice is too one-sided to capture the 
communication involved in moments of accessibility, where people not only speak but are 
listened to. Responsiveness means that government responds in a timely and accurate way to 
the demands of citizens, and its outputs reflect what people on the ground ask of it (Goetz 
2003, 6; SPARC-Nigeria.com 2015).  But the principle of responsiveness goes beyond what 
people described when they talked about their leaders being accessible. They didn’t talk 
about what government had done in response to their requests, they were describing the 
lesser achievement of having been able to put their request to government and be heard. In 
this sense, accessibility isn’t an instrumental concept, where the value is located in the 
outcomes it brings about, but is more inherent. There is value simply in being in a certain 
sort of communicative space. The conception of accountability as accessibility emphasises 
that there should be a fluidity of communication between government and the people, with 
ongoing opportunities for people to access their leaders.  
In the discussion of accountability as accessibility in chapter seven, my respondents 
referred to a variety of different forms of communication between government leaders and 
constituents. Many of the channels of access exist outside of the formalised procedures 
described in good governance prescription for public accountability. People complain of 
politicians not answering their calls, not being physically present in the community and 
locating their private residences in remote affluent areas. These are informal channels, in the 
sense that they are not codified in law. Moreover, the obligations of being accessible extend 
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beyond the time of the official work day and space of the government office. Within the neo-
patrimonialism framework, calls for accessibility could therefore be interpreted as calls for 
the informalisation of politics, where formal procedures are replaced by informal 
patrimonial ones (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Erdmann and Engel 2007). But in fact they are 
calls to be heard and have their concerns taken on board. Accessibility reflects a subtler 
conception of the interrelationship between the formal and informal. These informal routes 
of accessibility are demanded in addition to, not instead of, improvements in the reliability, 
honesty and effectiveness of formal government.  
These ideas contribute to debates about Peter Ekeh’s idea of the two publics (Ekeh 1975) 
and its enduring significance. Ekeh’s argument is that the state in Nigeria, which constitutes 
the civic public, has been so abusive and abused that how people act with relation to the 
state is totally disconnected from the values they use to moderate ethical behaviour in the 
primordial public realm. The findings of the chapter seven suggests there are clear popular 
demands for state office holders to engage with society in ways that abide with ethical 
norms. This builds on Omobowale and Olutayo’s (Omobowale and Olutayo 2010) 
arguments that Ekeh’s interpretation of society’s attitude towards the state and the civic 
public is too negative. Demands for accessibility show that ordinary people do have 
normative expectations of how state officials should behave in their role as state officials, 
and they seek some sort of unification of the civic and primordial public.  
Norms and obligations situated in the first instance in the primordial public – transparency 
of character and connections, accessibility and ‘human face’ – draw on embedded social and 
communal norms that are prior to the contingent formal relationship that an individual 
politician enters into with their constituents when they gain office for a term of a few years. 
The theme that emerges from the quotes is that ascendancy to formal office must not be 
allowed to sever or diminish the informal obligations of leadership. It is where leaders take 
formal office and withdraw from informal channels, i.e. stop taking calls, disappear from the 
community and move far away, that people complain about the replacement of accessible 
informal institutions with restrictive and opaque formal ones. These norms are reliable and 
intelligible for ordinary people, in a context like Oyo State where for a long time the state 
has been exclusively a source of violence and privation, under prolonged military rule and 
punishing economic reforms (Ihonvbere 1993; Agbaje and Guyer 2002; Adebanwi and 
Obadare 2010).  
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Out of all my respondents, Comrade Mohammed326 had the most visceral experience of the 
way that state violence had persisted into the democratic era. As the leader of a union he had 
directly experienced police brutality, and fought in court cases for his members who had lost 
their lives and liberty as a result of state violence. Yet through his years lobbying the state 
for better pay deals and concessions, he knew its potential to be a source of benefits and that 
law could prevail. His interview touched on the idea of transparency as making the state 
knowable. He explicitly situated his understanding of what people want from government in 
juxtaposition with the military rule that had come before. Writing in 1999 Bolanle Awe, 
renowned Nigerian historian and women’s rights activist, noted the pervasive sense of 
disjuncture at the heart of Nigerian society. She wrote, “There is no convergence in thoughts, 
objectives and actions between the rulers and the ruled” (Awe 1999, 13) Comrade 
Mohammed said, “those who first came, they came immediately after the military era, and 
the euphoria then was ‘this our government, this our government.’” He explained that in this 
context people were not interested in “prudence” or “the deliverables” 327, which means the 
fiscal responsibility and high quality public goods that the international conception of good 
governance calls for. Instead, he explained, “they were more interested in having their men, 
their kiths and kin in government”. 328 
On first sight this is a rehashing of the privatisation of the state argument, whereby a 
neopatrimonial state distributes resources and exercises authority along personal and 
patrimonial networks. Indeed, he thought that people were “interested in having a family 
member gain”, which hampered government’s ability to enact policy. However, material 
gain was only part of the reason: “So when they came, the first thing they had to do it was 
not tangible. It was intangible thing: repairing our psyche.” The citizenry was 
“psychologically depressed” by the experience of “military terrorism”. 329 He explained what 
it meant to have a civilian government which included “their men, their kiths and kin”: 
“They brought in people into governance. At least, can you get into government 
without knowing at least one person, if you do not know anybody there. Somebody 
there will know somebody, who will know somebody there. That will be a relief that 
government cannot oppress me, I have somebody I can rush to!”330 
                                                          
326  I-14 Leader of Oyo State Branch of major national union, Ibadan 21/04/2015 
327  I-14  
328  I-14  
329  I-14  
330  I-14  
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This characterises democratisation as the slow process of rehabilitating the state in the 
popular imagination as something that was safe, intelligible and had a connection to them.  
Of course, Comrade Mohammed’s example from the early days of the Fourth Republic gives 
an extreme case study of connecting the state to society through personal relationships. The 
relationships he refers to are familial and direct, literally making the state knowable by 
putting people one knows into government employment. However, the examples used in 
chapter eight, a decade and a half later, operate at many more stages of remove. The 
examples of transparency in people and accountability as accessibility describe how those 
who occupy public office should be connected to society not by personal or familial links 
but through observing values that broadly cultivate the sorts of relationship and behaviour 
that show that state officials are embedded in their wider community. These are social 
understandings of transparency and accountability but not personal ones.  
This brings us back to the meaning of public not as a sphere or realm of action but as a 
political community. Debates about corruption and governance in African societies have 
often located the source of corruption in the lack of a universally shared, national identity 
which could underlie the normative category of a ‘public interest’. Instead, African politics 
has been analysed as consisting of multiple separate ethnic publics, which justifies the 
stealing of public funds and subverting of formal institutions for the sake of ethnic 
advancement. This view of African societies is reflected in the neopatrimonialism thesis. Van 
de Walle argues that African states are linked to society through ‘primordial’ identities such 
as ethnicity, family and clan and that private connections ‘outweigh’ public loyalties (Van de 
Walle 2003). In Nigeria this instrumentalization of the state for ethnic gain, or the promotion 
of individuals to office based on ethnic identity is known as ‘tribalism’ and its influence in 
politics is frequently decried by Nigerian commentators (Ekeh 1990; Achebe 2000).  
However, the findings of this thesis contradict the claim that Nigerians want to connect with 
their state on an ethnic basis. The values of transparency in people, and accessibility, are 
ethnically neutral, and applied in ways that transcend ethnic or ascriptive identities. For one 
thing, the examples drew on normative claims articulated within the ethnically-neutral 
settings of a market association and a cosmopolitan secular NGO. Rather than ethnic 
identity, the key nodes of similarity and difference are geographical and knowledge based. 
Geographically, leaders became untransparent when they moved away, adopted exclusive 
wealthy lifestyles and erected barriers of distance and fences between themselves and their 
constituency. Signifiers of otherness are not identity-based in the sense of being a ‘son of the 
soil’ but constituted by links to unknowable distant worlds. Adediran’s emphasis in chapter 
257 
 
seven on being ‘not far from the community’ and ‘being seen’331 emphasises the importance 
of ties which are based on the possibilities and connections of sharing the same physical 
locale, not having the same ethnic identity. The way that different forms of knowledge could 
constitute political identity were salient for both populists and Ajimobi’s progressives. In 
suspicions of Ajimobi’s links to global networks, described in chapter seven, elite and 
international forms of knowledge represented obstacles to communication and transparency 
in people.  
The findings on popular conceptions of good governance help to shed light on the APC’s 
infamous loss in Ekiti state in 2014. Previous research suggests that that Fayose’s appeal 
came down to him being perceived as accessible and authentic. Drawing on in-depth 
research with grassroots political mobilisers, Husaini (2015, 45) suggests that when 
grassroots political mobilisers commend the populist Fayose for being authentic, they are 
invoking a claim to trust based on familiarity. My findings flesh out what is meant by 
accessibility, including spatial and knowledge based markers of proximity. Fayose was seen 
as close enough physically and intellectually to engage with his constituents in a meaningful 
way, whereas Fayemi was not.  
Furthermore, my development of the value of transparency in people helps provide a 
conceptual framework in which to situate Husaini’s respondents comments that Fayemi was 
“always going to Lagos” (2015, 45–46). This was a sign of a lack of transparency as it 
connected Fayemi to unknown regional and national networks. Broader political discourse 
suggests that the idea of Fayemi as having untransparent social connections was an ongoing 
concern; for instance the accusation that he secretly ran a university in Ghana where he was 
really from (Premium Times Nigeria 2014c). Fayemi’s technocratic government left certain 
popular conceptions of good governance unmet, and was unable to balance long-term 
progress with more short-term economic benefits, leaving the door open to populists like 
Fayose to capitalise on the popular sense of disconnection from government elites.  
Therefore, the logic of the popular conception of good governance is one of closeness, 
embeddedness and visibility of leaders to those they represent. Linking the values discussed 
above to debates over Ekeh’s two publics deepens the analysis, showing how popular 
conceptions of good governance aspire to a connection between the primordial public and 
civic public.  
                                                          
331  I-36 Senior Elected State Level Office Holder, Ibadan 21/07/2015. 
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Values in Political Competition 
At the beginning of this thesis, Nigeria was painted as a land free of ideology. Commentators 
argue that politics was conducted on the basis of calculations of financial and violent 
capacity, rather than principles and values. Assessments of the Oyo 2015 election were no 
different. News articles in major Nigerian newspapers, analysing the political competition 
ahead of the Gubernatorial election were deeply practical in their assessment of the race. 
They barely mention policy or political orientation, focusing instead on geographic factors, 
elite coalitions, godfather squabbles, links to Abuja, ‘financial capacity’ and ‘political 
structure’ (Oladele 2015; Amusat 2015). The defections before the election and into 
Ajimobi’s first term can be seen as a case of individual politicians “seeking where their 
bread would be buttered” (Oladele 2015). Based on this evidence it appears that ideology 
either has no role in state-level politics, or if it is present it is outweighed by political 
expediency. 
Within the mainstream view this would suggest that Ajimobi’s Lagos Model approach was 
principle-based politics being pulled in the direction of patronage and money politics: with 
upstanding leaders having to go against their principles and engage in patronage. However, 
my case studies suggest something different is going on. Whilst the ability to deliver targeted 
empowerment before the election was important, a finding that very much coincides with 
these analyses, it doesn’t explain why such care was taken to frame and manage the 
presentation of empowerment events, and why certain aspects were made visible whilst 
others were obscured. Indeed, the examples help to show how the division between practical 
politics and principle-based politics is a false one, because the same practices take on very 
different meanings in different conceptions of good governance.  
The case studies presented in chapter eight demonstrate that political activities that are 
sometimes disregarded as straightforward patronage or moments of grubby and 
unremarkable politicking, are in fact sites of contestation and negotiation. With this in mind, 
Ogunyankin’s critique of Florence Ajimobi’s empowerment schemes can be seen in a new 
light. Ogunyankin muses that there is little long-term sustainable impact from schemes like 
the Food Bank. She writes, “[i]t’s not clear ... how a small bag of food is supposed to 
empower women”; a good point seeing as her informants define empowerment as some 
combination of skills training, equipment and money. Yet, the political intent that 
Ogunyankin identifies in such projects goes beyond than Florence Ajimobi simply trying to 
“curry favour for her husband” (Ogunyankin 2014, 202). All politics involves distribution of 
costs and benefits among different constituencies to secure political support. Ogunyankin is 
sensitive to the tensions in Ajimobi’s empowerment programmes, without picking up on the 
myriad popular needs that that tension is a result of.   
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Ajimobi’s response highlights the necessity of being sensitive to plural conceptions of good 
governance. He engaged in targeted patronage, framed in such a way that it could be read 
differently by different audiences, in order to meet popular demands just enough to win the 
election. Rather than a tale of “corruption fights back” (Adebanwi and Obadare 2011), it 
demonstrates the partial ways in which popular conceptions of good governance can be 
reasserted against technocratic visions that people see as untransparent, inaccessible and 
distant. However, there is a big difference between populist and popular conceptions of good 
governance. Contrary to suggestions by Chabal and Daloz that neopatrimonialism “works” 
for Africans (Chabal and Daloz 1999), or that corruption reflects social norms in African 
societies (Martinussen 1998), popular acquiescence to the amala politics of Adedibu and his 
forebear Adelabu, and political descendant Akala, was not a result of a popular belief that 
this represented good governance. Rather, it reflected a grudging acceptance of a form of 
politics that offered some minimal concessions to material reality in which people live, 
where other leaders had failed to either respond to this need or were unable to skilfully 
mobilise sufficient political resistance. However, the widespread criticism of Akala’s tenure 
in chapter four shows that popular demands for immediate economic benefits do not blind 
ordinary people to rampant corruption and waste, nor do they justify it.     
The popular conception of good governance is leveraged by politicians of all stripes. Most 
prominently it is invoked by those associated with the populist line in Yoruba politics, as 
examples from post-independence history and contemporary debates show. Historically, 
politicians from both the populist and progressive lines have had to respond to demands for 
both short-term distribution of the economic benefits of government as well as more long-
term progress. Where politicians in power from either side have failed to meet these key 
needs, new social constituencies have emerged creating new opportunities for opponents to 
develop new political offerings.  This created an opportunity before the 2015 election for 
political opponents, who were less committed to the international good governance agenda, 
and linked themselves to populist leaders of the past, to step in and promise that if elected 
they would meet those unmet needs. 
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3. Future Research and Conclusions 
After winning re-election in Ajimobi was sworn in for a second term on May 29th 2015. 
Further research could fruitfully explore which of the strategies for navigating competing 
conceptions of good governance have been adopted in the second term. One option is that 
the need to roll-back some policies and make concessions in advance of 2015 will act as a 
lesson, and lead to a greater focus on incorporating potential resistance into state patronage. 
With the freedom of another four years, another option is for Ajimobi to redouble his focus 
on performance and the attempt to re-orient popular demands in the direction of the 
enlightened public. As oil prices continue to remain historically low, and the government 
falls further into salary arrears, both strategies will be threatened by a lack of resources 
(Ojoye 2016b; Premium Times Nigeria 2016b; Vanguard News 2016). 
The state’s education policy since May 2015 points towards a strategy of continuing with the 
privatising thrust of the Lagos Model, whilst dealing with potential resistance by minimising 
the visibility of unpopular elements of his plans. Ajimobi’s education policy in his first term 
focused on the building of a handful332 of model secondary schools; which would showcase 
how an “acceptable global standard” could be met in Oyo State (Ajimobi 2015a; Jegede 
2013c). In his 2015 inauguration speech to the State House of Assembly, he announced that 
his administration would be exploring the “public/private ownership and management of 
[government] schools.” He hinted to legislators that there would be an introduction of user 
fees to encourage parents to take on “financial responsibilities hitherto totally shouldered by 
government.” (Ajimobi 2015a) 
By contrast, the inaugural speech he gave to the general public contained no mention of 
these potentially unpopular moves, just a broad reference to reducing reliance on the federal 
allocation through PPPs (Ajimobi 2015a; 2015b). A year later there was an outcry from 
students, teachers and advocacy groups when news broke that the government had 
advertised in a newspaper an invitation for expressions of interest in the “public/private 
partnership and ownership of schools” (Premium Times Nigeria 2016csee also: Akamo 2016; 
Vanguard News 2016; The Nation 2016b; Ojoye 2016a). Developments in other areas 
suggest that the state government is continuing with urban renewal projects, demolishing 
sections of Ogunpa and Dugbe markets in order to rebuild them via PPP (Tribune 2016). 
This suggests that Ajimobi’s response to ongoing fiscal constraints is to go even further with 
                                                          
332  In his inauguration speech 2015 Ajimobi said six are being delivered whereas in his 2014 
budget speech three model secondary schools and four primary schools were promised for each geo-
political zone.   
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the Lagos Model’s tendency to invite the private sector to collaborate or even replace public 
provision of goods and services. How strong resistance will be, and how he deals with it 
closer to the 2019 election will determine whether he continues to be successful in 
navigating competing conceptions of good governance. 
The Ajimobi administration represents a tentative and contested transition from form of 
politics to another. He was at once trying to transform Oyo politics in line with the Lagos 
Model, whilst competing directly with politicians who represented the model of amala 
politics he was trying to leave behind. In between the two, are popular conceptions of good 
governance where the desire for progress in the long-term is balanced with an expectation 
that legitimate leaders should provide economic benefits to a population facing a daily 
struggle for survival.  
With the success of the APC in the March 2015 presidential elections (BBC News 2015), 
Bola Tinubu’s role as National Leader of the APC means that his hitherto regional influence 
is expanded to the national level (Ezeamalu 2016; Premium Times Nigeria 2016d). Will the 
Lagos Model be replicated across the rest of Nigeria?  The findings of this thesis pose 
questions for how the Lagos Model will be used to draw lines of continuity and rupture in 
the service of good governance at the national level. Chapter five’s account of the ethnically 
specific conception of good governance and development shows that it draws on key 
legacies of a peculiarly Yoruba political traditions. This includes not only Awolowo’s belief 
in Yoruba superiority through exposure, but older Yoruba ideas of olaju which, over time, 
have become associated with a specifically Christian understanding of progress. Whilst 
Tinubu was able to incorporate the disillusioned OPC, which drew on Muslim fears about 
being excluded from power, this trumping of religious difference through shared ethnicity 
will not work for the largely Muslim and Hausa North. Can the Lagos Model be again 
reinterpreted and reinvent itself as offering a universal vision of development? How will 
conceptions of good governance grounded in different regional political traditions be 
contested and intersect with the conception of good governance in the Lagos Model? 
In summary, this thesis shows that the popular demands of Oyo State’s poor majority, for 
progress, economic benefits and legitimate leadership, are not satisfactorily met by the 
Lagos Model. The overall logics of governance under the Lagos Model pull in the opposite 
direction to the logics of popular conceptions of good governance. Whereas popular 
conceptions emphasise closeness, embeddedness and visibility of leaders to followers, the 
Lagos Model relies on an orientation outwards, a desire for distant knowledge and a dis-
embedding from institutions that represent popular demands for progress, economic benefits 
and legitimate leadership. Indeed, it is these elements which make many international 
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observers see the Lagos Model as a rupture with existing ways of doing politics in Nigeria, 
and thus ‘good’ governance.  
This concluding chapter has highlighted three main contributions that the findings make to 
different literatures. The first conclusion is that there are forms of African agency being 
asserted through partnerships with international donors and the adoption of international 
norms by ‘self-selecting’ good governance states. The second is that popular conceptions of 
legitimate leadership express a desire for state officials to remain embedded in their 
constituencies, and not to allow state office to lead to a severing of ethical connections. The 
third conclusion is that values and material politics cannot be separated, and one valorised 
and the other rendered illegitimate. Indeed, any government promising good governance 
must make a genuine commitment to popular demands for progress, legitimate government 
and economic benefits.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 Interview List 
Appendix 1.a Interview List – Markets 
Neighbourhood Market    
Code Description Pseudonym Location Date 
NM1-
1 
Focus Group with Igbo 
Food Sellers Mrs Thomas Ibadan 13/05/2015 
NM1-
2 Herbal Medicines Seller Niyii Ibadan 13/05/2015 
NM1-
3 
Focus group with Plastics 
Sellers   Ibadan 13/05/2015 
NM1-
4 
Focus group with 
Beauticians   Ibadan 13/05/2015 
NM1-
5 Provisions Seller   Ibadan 13/05/2015 
NM1-
6 Provisions Sellers   Ibadan 13/05/2015 
NM1-
7 
Assistant Manager of 
Neighbourhood Market 
Prestige 
Associates Ibadan 13/05/2015 
NM2-
1 Manager 
Prestige 
Associates Ibadan 20/05/2015 
NM2-
2 
Focus Group with 
Garment Seller and others Momo Ibadan 20/05/2015 
NM3-
1 Ready-Made Seller  Mrs Adelola Ibadan 30/06/2015 
NM3-
2 Soap Seller Mrs Adekunle Ibadan 30/06/2015 
NM3-
3 
Director of Prestige 
Associates 
Prestige 
Associates 
Telephone 
Interview 30/06/2015 
NM3-
4 
Focus group with 
Beauticians   Ibadan 30/06/2015 
NM4-
1 
Focus group with Food 
Sellers   Ibadan 02/07/2015 
NM4-
2 Babywares Seller Lady Ayeesha Ibadan 02/07/2015 
NM4-
3 Babaloja (male leader)   Ibadan 02/07/2015 
NM5-
1 
Apples Seller and 
Oranges Seller 
Mrs Adegbite 
(Apples Seller) Ibadan 09/07/2015 
NM5-
2 Provisions Seller   Ibadan 09/07/2015 
NM5-
3 
Focus group with Food 
Sellers 
Including: 
Ewedu Ibadan 09/07/2015 
NM6-
1 
Focus group with Two 
Beauticians Nike and Bunmi Ibadan 27/07/2015 
Junction market    
Code Description Pseudonym Location Date 
JM1-1 Cloth Seller   Ibadan 18/05/2015 
JM1-2 Roadside Photo Printer   Ibadan 18/05/2015 
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JM1-3 Roadside Cloth Seller   Ibadan 18/05/2015 
JM1-4 Ready-Made Seller   Ibadan 18/05/2015 
JM1-5 Underwear Hawker   Ibadan 18/05/2015 
JM1-6 Roadside Bag Seller   Ibadan 18/05/2015 
JM1-7 Roadside Artisan   Ibadan 18/05/2015 
JM2-1  Local Trader   Ibadan 03/07/2015 
JM2-2 
Roadside Electricals 
Seller   Ibadan 03/07/2015 
JM2-3 Cooked Food Vendor   Ibadan 03/07/2015 
JM2-3 Babaloja (male leader)   Ibadan 03/07/2015 
JM2-4 Cooked Food Vendor 2   Ibadan 03/07/2015 
JM2-6 Former Roadside Trader Elisabeth Ibadan 03/07/2015 
JM2-7 
Very Small Scale 
Roadside Trader   Ibadan 03/07/2015 
JM2-1 Provisions Seller   Ibadan 03/07/2015 
JM2-2 Local Trader   Ibadan 03/07/2015 
Highway Market    
Code Description Pseudonym Location Date 
HM1-
1 
Small Scale Roadside 
Trader     19/05/2015 
HM1-
2 
Small Scale Roadside 
Trader     19/05/2015 
HM1-
3 Roadside Phone Seller     19/05/2015 
HM1-
4 Roadside Phone Seller     19/05/2015 
HM1-
5 Roadside Vegetable Seller     19/05/2015 
HM1-
6 
Iyaloja and Babaloja 
(female and male leaders)     19/05/2015 
HM2-
1 Roadside Grain Seller     20/05/2015 
HM2-
2 
Focus Group of Roadside 
Phone Sellers     20/05/2015 
HM2-
3 Iyaloja (female leader)     20/05/2015 
Central Market and Central Market Extension   
Code Description Pseudonym Location Date 
CM1-1 
Cloth Seller, Central 
Market   Ibadan 28/05/2015 
CM1-2 
Cloth Seller, Central 
Market   Ibadan 28/05/2015 
CM1-3 
Cloth Seller, Central 
Market   Ibadan 28/05/2015 
CM1-4 
Babywares Seller, Central 
Market   Ibadan 28/05/2015 
CM2-1 
Focus Group with 
Jewellery Sellers, Central 
Market Extension   Ibadan 07/07/2015 
CM2-2 Babaloja, Central Market   Ibadan 07/07/2015 
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Extension 
CM2-3 Babaloja, Central Market   Ibadan 07/07/2015 
CM3-1 Mamaloja, Central Market   Ibadan 08/07/2015 
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Appendix 1.b Interview List – Local and State Government Civil Servants 
Ibadan Metropolitan Local Government   
Code Description Pseudonym Location Date 
MLG1-
1 
Focus Group with 
Community Development 
Section   Ibadan 25/05/2015 
MLG2-
1 
Focus Group with Head 
of Local Authority, 
Director of Finance and 
Director of 
Administration   Ibadan 06/07/2015 
MLG2-
2 
Director of Education and 
Social Services   Ibadan 06/07/2015 
MLG2-
3 Information Officer   Ibadan 06/07/2015 
MLG3-
1 
Community Development 
Council and Local 
Government Community 
Development Unit Focus 
Group    Ibadan 21/07/2015 
Ibadan Downtown Local Government   
Code Description Pseudonym Location Date 
DLG1-
1 Senior Officer Abubakar Ibadan 13/07/2015 
DLG1-
2 
Director of Education and 
Social Services   Ibadan 13/07/2015 
DLG1-
3 Medical Officer of Health   Ibadan 13/07/2015 
DLG2-
1 
Deputy Director of 
Administration and 
General Services   Ibadan 15/07/2015 
DLG-
CDC 
Chairman of Community 
Development Council Baba Bashiru Ibadan 15/07/2015 
DLG3-
1 Information Officer   Ibadan 18/07/2015 
DLG4-
1 Information Officer   Ibadan 30/07/2015 
Ibadan Central Local Government   
Code Description Pseudonym Location Date 
CLG2-
1 Director of Finance   Ibadan 14/07/2015 
CLG-
CDC 
Chairman of Community 
Development Council   Ibadan 16/07/2015 
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CLG3-
1 
Community Development 
Unity   Ibadan 20/07/2015 
CLG4-
1 
Local Government 
Caretaker Chairman   Ibadan 05/08/2015 
CLG4-
2 
Chief of Staff to 
Chairman   Ibadan 05/08/2015 
State Government Civil Servants  
Code Description Pseudonym Location Date 
ST-
TR1 
Senior Official, Ministry 
of Trade, Investment and 
Cooperatives   Ibadan 28/07/2015 
ST-
WA1 
Director of Poverty 
Alleviation, Ministry of 
Women Affairs   Ibadan 28/07/2015 
ST-
WA2 
Women Programmes 
Focus Group, Ministry of 
Womens Affairs   Ibadan 28/07/2015 
ST-
WA3 
Community Development 
Unit Self-Help Officer   Ibadan 28/07/2015 
ST-
TR2 
Senior Official 2, 
Ministry of Trade, 
Investments and 
Cooperatives   Ibadan 03/08/2015 
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Appendix 1.c Interview List – Elite Interviews 
Elite Interviews    
Code Description Pseudonym Location Date 
I-1 
Non-Governmental 
Organisation Employee   Abuja Jul-13 
I-1 
Ex-Patriate working on Donor 
Project with Federal 
Government   Abuja Jul-13 
I-3 
Non-Governmental 
Organisation Employee   Lagos Jul-13 
I-4 Lawyer   Lagos Jul-13 
I-5 
Former progressive member of 
the Federal House of 
Representatives for an Oyo 
State constituency   Ibadan 20/10/2013 
I-6 State-level Bureaucrat   Ibadan 22/10/2013 
I-7 State-level Bureaucrat   Ibadan 23/10/2013 
I-8 State-level Bureaucrat   Ibadan 23/10/2013 
I-9 
Senior Member of Arisekola 
Household   Ibadan 28/10/2013 
I-10 
Senior Member of the 
Governor's Executive Council   Ibadan 30/10/2013 
I-11 
Non-Governmental 
Organisation Employee   Lagos 11/11/2013 
I-12 
Non-Governmental 
Organisation Employee   Lagos 11/11/2013 
I-13 
Junior Member of the 
Governor's Administration   Ibadan 02/12/2013 
I-14 
Leader of Oyo State Branch of 
a Major National Union   Ibadan 21/04/2015 
I-15 Former Aide to Adedibu   Ibadan 22/04/2015 
I-16 
Retired Permanent Secretary to 
Oyo State Government   Ibadan 21/04/2015 
I-17 
Special Adviser to the 
Governor   Ibadan 22/04/2015 
I-18 
Former Commissioner in Oyo 
State Government under Akala     Ibadan 29/04/2015 
I-19 
Academic and Gubernatorial 
Aspirant   Ibadan 29/04/2015 
I-20 
Human Rights Organisation 
Employee   Ibadan 04/05/2015 
I-21 
Human Rights Organisation 
Employee   Ibadan 04/05/2015 
I-22 
Director of Human Rights 
Organisation    Ibadan 04/05/2015 
I-23 
Former High Ranking Member 
of Ajimobi's Executive 
Council   Ibadan 06/05/2015 
I-24 
Matron at a Government 
Health Facility in Ibadan, 
formerly employed as a nurse 
at an ABC Clinic   Ibadan 11/05/2015 
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I-25 
Director of Active Ibadan-
based NGO   Ibadan 15/05/2015 
I-26 
Director of Ibadan-based Legal 
Practice   Ibadan 21/05/2015 
I-27 
Development Activist and 
Consultant   Ibadan 25/05/2015 
I-28 
Local Level APC Politician 
and Member of Ajimobi's 
Campaign Team   Ibadan 26/05/2015 
I-29 
Former Progressive Member 
of the Federal House of 
Representatives for an Oyo 
State Constituency (follow up)   Ogbomosho 27/05/2015 
I-30 Retired State Civil Servant   Ibadan 10/05/2015 
I-31 
Businessman and Political 
Operator   Ibadan 30/05/2015 
I-32 
Director of Ibadan-based Legal 
Practice (follow up)   Ibadan 30/05/2015 
I-33 
Senior Staff Member of 
DAWN Commission 1   Ibadan 05/06/2015 
I-34 Business Journalist   Ibadan 08/06/2015 
I-35 
Director of Construction 
Company    
Telephone 
Interview 29/06/2015 
I-36 
Senior Elected State Level 
Office Holder Adediran Ibadan 21/07/2015 
I-37 
Director of Active Ibadan-
Based NGO (follow up)   Ibadan 23/07/2015 
I-38 
Political Journalist at a Major 
National Newspaper   Ibadan 25/07/2015 
I-39 
Local Government APC 
Chieftain   Ibadan 28/07/2015 
I-40 
Local Government APC 
Chieftain (follow up)   Ibadan 30/07/2015 
I-41 
Focus Group with Widows 
Association   Ibadan 31/07/2015 
I-42 Director of Widows NGO   Ibadan 03/08/2015 
I-43 
Academic at the University of 
Ibadan   Ibadan 04/08/2015 
I-44 
Personal Assistant to Seye 
Makinde   Ibadan 04/08/2015 
I-45 
Senior Journalist at a Major 
National Newspaper   Ibadan 04/08/2015 
I-46 
Senior Member of Ajimobi's 
Cabinet   Ibadan 24/07/2015 
I-47 
Senior Staff Member of 
DAWN Commission 2   Ibadan 26/06/2015 
I-48 
Former Aide to Adedibu 
(follow up)   Ibadan 10/08/2015 
I-49 
Senior Member of Ajimobi's 
Re-Election Campaign Ade Ibadan 06/08/2015 
Interviews from Field-notes     
Code Name Pseudonym Location Date 
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F1 
Junior Academic at the 
University of Kebbi and 
Political Activist   Ibadan 01/05/2015 
F2 
Academic and Activist, 
University of Ibadan   Ibadan 14/05/2015 
F3 
Academic and Progressive 
Activist, University of Ibadan, 
Ibadan    Ibadan 07/05/2015 
F4 
Senior Employee, Ajumose 
Vocational Training Centre and 
Ajimobi Campaign 
Headquarters (follow up)   Ibadan 27/07/2015 
F5 
Former aide to Arisekola 
family   Ibadan 15/05/2015 
F6 
Former aide to Arisekola 
family   Ibadan 22/05/2015 
F7 
Former aide to Arisekola 
family   Ibadan 18/04/2015 
F8 
Former aide to Arisekola 
family   Ibadan 12/05/2015 
F9 
Graduate and Businessman 
from Ibadan   Ibadan 22/05/2015 
Ajumose Vocational Training Centre and Ajimobi Campaign Headquarters 
Code Description Pseudonym Location Date 
AJ1-1 
Senior Employee, Ajumose 
Vocational Training Centre and 
Ajimobi Campaign 
Headquarters   Ibadan 21/05/2015 
AJ1-2 
Teacher, Ajumose Vocational 
Training Centre   Ibadan 21/05/2015 
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Appendix 2 Top Three Ministry Department and Agency Expenditures on 
Consultancy Services in Oyo State Government 
Bureau of Investment Promotion and Public-Private Partnership 
  2014 2015 
Expenditure on Consuultancy Services 
(naira) 100,000,000 250,000,000 
Total Expenditure on Overheads (naira) 530,700,000 300,000,000 
% 19 83 
YES-O World Bank Assisted Programme State Operation Coordinating Unit  
  2014 2015 
Expenditure on Consuultancy Services 
(naira) 150,000,000 100,000,000 
Total Expenditure on Overheads (naira) 350,432,000 300,000,000 
% 43 33 
Oyo State Ministry of Finance 
  2014 2015 
Expenditure on Consuultancy Services 
(naira) 1,220,000,000 2,776,450,000 
Total Expenditure on Overheads (naira) 1,620,000,000 2,921,450,000 
% 75 95 
Source of data: OSG Website. 2015. “Summary of Overhead Costs by Ministry.” 
Tables 112, 115 and 124. Oyo State Government. http://www.oyostate.gov.ng/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/SUMMARY-OF-OVERHEAD-COST.pdf. 
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Appendix 3 
Appendix 3.a News Sources for Food Bank and Widow’s Empowerment 
Scheme Date Location Sources 
Widowhood 
Support 
Programme 
24/12/2014 
 
  
https://www.facebook.com/Florence
Ajimobi/posts/714437151997430  
 
Widows 
Support 
Initiative 
11/10/2014 
Government 
House 
Sun News. 2014. “New Dawn for 
Widows in Oyo,” October 16. 
http://sunnewsonline.com/new/?p=86
300. 
   
thenationonlineng.net/new/ajimobis-
wife-empowers-1000-widows/ 
   
https://www.facebook.com/Florence
Ajimobi/posts/675601525880993  
Widows 
Support 
Initiative 
04/10/2014   
Sun News. 2014. “New Dawn for 
Widows in Oyo,” October 16. 
http://sunnewsonline.com/new/?p=86
300. 
   
thenationonlineng.net/new/ajimobis-
wife-empowers-1000-widows/ 
   
https://www.facebook.com/Florence
Ajimobi/posts/675601525880993  
Food Bank 18/04/2014 Afijio (Heritage Echo News 2014) 
Food Bank 28/03/2014 Ibadan 
(“Unveiling of Soka Death Den, a 
Result of Answered Prayers -Mrs 
319 
 
South West  Ajimobi – Florence Ajimobi” 2015) 
Widowhood 
Support 
Programme 
07/02/2014 
Ibadan 
North East 
https://www.facebook.com/Florence
Ajimobi/posts/542679142506566  
   
http://whatsupibadan.com/2014/02/11
/well-eradicate-hunger-from-ibadan-
north-east-lg-communities-mrs-
ajimobi/ 
Ajumose 
Food Bank 
31/01/2014 
Ibadan 
North 
Now defunct: 
http://www.mrsfajimobi.com/author/a
dmin/ (accessed 3rd May 2015) 
   
https://www.facebook.com/Florence
Ajimobi/posts/542679142506566  
Ajumose 
Food Bank 
28/06/2013 
Ibadan 
South East 
(Johnson 2013, 500) 
   
http://whatsupibadan.com/2013/06/2
9/florence-ajimobi-fetes-500-women-
at-mapo-ibadan/ 
Food Bank 10/05/2013 Oluyole  
https://www.facebook.com/Florence
Ajimobi/photos/a.327306867377129.
80598.311844532256696/406903962
750752/?type=1  
 
   
https://www.facebook.com/Florence
Ajimobi/posts/406901589417656  
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Originally in Tribune: 
http://www.oyostate.net/news/jubilati
on-as-500-women-benefit-from-
ajimobi-food-bank-initiative-
nigerian-tribune 
Widows 
Empowerment 
Programme 
01/05/2013   
www.thenationonlineng.net/new/ajim
obis-wife-empowers-1000-widows/ 
Food Bank 14/12/2012 
Ibadan 
North East 
https://www.facebook.com/Florence
Ajimobi/posts/335753933199089 
Food Bank 22/11/2012 
Ibadan 
South West 
https://www.facebook.com/Florence
Ajimobi/photos/a.327320784042404.
80603.311844532256696/327322980
708851/?type=3&theater 
Food Bank 14/11/2012 
Ibadan 
South West 
https://www.facebook.com/Florence
Ajimobi/photos/a.327320784042404.
80603.311844532256696/327322980
708851/?type=3&theater 
Food Bank 17/10/2012 
Government 
House 
https://www.facebook.com/Florence
Ajimobi/photos/a.327320784042404.
80603.311844532256696/327322980
708851/?type=3&theater 
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Appendix 3.b Sources for Party-based Empowerment of Associations 
Group Date Details Link (all accessed 12/01/2016) 
One Love 
Theatre Arts and 
Motion Pictures 
Producers 
Association 
TAMPAN  
07/04/2015  Cloth 
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAji
mobi/posts/773048899469588 
Association of 
Pepper Sellers 
in Oyo State 
07/04/2015 
28/03/2015 
18-seater bus 
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAji
mobi/photos/pcb.773042772803534/773
041569470321/?type=3&theater 
Women 
Spiritual 
Leaders of the 
Celestial 
Church of 
Christ 
07/04/2015 
28/03/2015 
18-seater bus 
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAji
mobi/photos/pcb.773042772803534/773
041569470321/?type=3&theater (28th 
March) 
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAji
mobi/posts/767837776657367 (March 
28th) 
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAji
mobi/posts/767842286656916 (7th 
April) 
Association of 
Diesel and Oil 
Marketers, Oyo 
State Chapter 
31/03/2015 18-seater bus 
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAji
mobi/posts/769530949821383 
Oyo State Fish 
Sellers 
Association, 
Babanla Zone 
28/03/2015   
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAji
mobi/posts/767837776657367 
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Ibadan South 
East Forum 
28/03/2015   
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAji
mobi/posts/767843603323451 
Labaowo 
Market Men and 
Women 
28/03/2015   
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAji
mobi/posts/767843603323451 
Representatives 
of Sule Kokoko 
in Olodo area 
28/03/2015 
Transformer 
previously 
given to the 
area  
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAji
mobi/photos/a.327306867377129.80598
.311844532256696/767835036657641/?
type=3&theater 
Islamic 
Materials 
Sellers 
20/03/2015   
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAji
mobi/posts/763580807083064  
Yam Sellers  20/03/2015   
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAji
mobi/posts/763580807083064  
Herb Sellers 20/03/2015   
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAji
mobi/posts/763580807083064  
Pepper Sellers 20/03/2015   
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAji
mobi/posts/763580807083064  
Sack Sellers 20/03/2015   
 https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAji
mobi/posts/763580807083064  
National 
Association of 
Patent Medicine 
Sellers 
20/03/2015   
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAji
mobi/posts/763570213750790  
 
Youth Groups in 20/03/2015 Motor-cycles https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAji
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Oyo Town mobi/posts/763496627091482  
 
Association of 
Fowl Sellers, 
Molete Branch 
16/03/2015 
18- seater 
bus 
https://www.facebook.com/FlorenceAji
mobi/posts/761610390613439  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
